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
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
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Indian Institute, Oxford.











C. Wells, int.

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TRUKKEE, SOUTHERN ENTRANCE FROM EXTERIOR.

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H I S T O R Y  
OF  
GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S  
ADMINISTRATION OF  
S C I N D E,  
AND  
CAMPAIGN IN THE CUTCHEE HILLS.

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
By LIEUT.-GEN. SIR WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B.

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WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

LONDON:  
CHAPMAN AND HALL, 193, PICCADILLY.  
1851.





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*Note.*—The perspective views were drawn to illustrate Sir C. Napier's campaign in the Cutchee hills, by Lieutenant Edwards, an officer on his staff. A love of art led that gentleman to aim too much at agreeable pictures; and the austerity of the region has not been adequately rendered. The defiles threaded by Major Beatson, sketched by another officer, more truly depict the savage desolate nature of the crags amidst which the hillmen were warred down.

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*Note.*—The rivers and streamlets marked in the Cutchee Hills, are but beds of torrents without water, except in heavy rain. The Teyaja alone flows continually, but at Deyrah it was only a yard wide during the campaign, and the whole region is inexpressibly arid.

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## P R E F A C E.

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WHEN the History of Sir C. Napier's Conquest of Scinde was published, an account of his after-administration in that country was promised as a sequel; hence the present work, which includes also his campaign against the hillmen of Cutchee. It is dedicated, as the History of the Conquest was, to the British people, because from the people only can support be looked for against the unceasing efforts made to suppress the just claims of a victorious general, and successful administrator, to the applause of his countrymen. But to obtain that support ingenuously, the man's thoughts as well as his actions should be made known with all integrity—wherefore his opinions of government generally, of particular systems, and his views and feelings on every important occasion, have been, where the necessity of compression would admit, recorded in his own words.

A more artful structure of composition might have been adopted to the advantage of the writer; but the original turn of genius, the natural temper and unsophisticated character of Sir C. Napier could not

then have been presented with such naked honesty : nor could he be in any way so successfully defended from slanderers as by letting the reader hear him think aloud. Many of his opinions, thus recorded, will however be misunderstood, if taken otherwise than as applications to the peculiar customs and prejudices of the people he was dealing with. He might, for example, be supposed to advocate military in preference to civil government, if his reasoning on that head was not entirely dependent on the exigencies of a recent conquest over a violent, warlike race, which was to be at once controlled and civilized. In like manner his objection to the employment of civil servants, if not read with reference to the particular state of affairs at the time, and especial reference to his conviction, that the system of civil administration established in India was essentially vicious as well as inapplicable to the condition of Scinde, would seem to imply an indiscriminate contempt for all civil servants and all civil government. But this would be entirely opposed to his real sentiments, and to his practice ; for all his efforts were directed so to use his military power as in the shortest time to render the Scindian population fitted to receive and willing to uphold civil institutions, of which he laid the foundations. How he performed that difficult task this work will show ; and also the many obstacles opposed to his success ; for he was not a man working with and sustained by power—the flame of his genius burst upwards through the official ashes heaped to keep it down. Military

despotism had no part in his scheme of government beyond the first necessity: and it may be here stated as a fact honourable to both, that his successor, Mr. Pringle, a Company's civil servant, zealous and of a just disposition, after two years' experience voluntarily proffered an acknowledgment of the great capacity for civil government evinced in Sir C. Napier's Scindian institutions.

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## NOTICE.

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*The author having reserved to himself the right of giving permission to translate this work into German, has done so, and it will be immediately published in Germany under that authorization.*

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S  
ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

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CHAPTER I.

WHEN Shere Mohamed, called the Lion, was defeated near Hyderabad, his vanquisher publicly declared that another shot would not be fired. This was ridiculed as a vain boast, but it proved a sound prediction, and well founded on the following considerations.

A country peopled by distinct races, having different religions and opposing interests, could not furnish either the passions or the material means for a protracted contest under misfortune. The Scindian proper, the cultivator of the soil, was but an oppressed bondsman, an unarmed slave, and the destruction of the ameers was his deliverance. The Hindoos, numerous, timid, and of a faith condemned by Beloochee and Scindian alike, were an isolated plundered people and sure to accept peace with protection. The Beloochees only had an interest to prolong the war; for having been habitually oppressors they desired to maintain their profitable ascendant position. But they had lost two great battles, their treasury had been taken, six of their princes were captives, and their political and military organization was so shattered they could not take the field again for regular warfare, while the diversity of religion and interests was a sure bar to any general insur-

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gent resistance. Moreover, the Belooch polity was feudal, and its natural tendency to disunion was augmented in Scinde, because the sirdars and chiefs owed service to many heads,—each ameer being sovereign—and though their princes lived in families and even in the same fortresses, it was in hatred, agreeing in nothing save to oppress their subjects and turn the land they misgoverned into a wilderness for hunting.

Mohamed, the Lion of Meerpoore, was the hardiest of the Talpoorees, but he had been signally defeated at Hyderabad. At Meeanee he had not fought at all, and his failing to do so, though caused partly by the rapidity of the English leader, resulted chiefly from a miscalculation of chances and advantages; for, Sobdar excepted, the ameers had been to him always inimical, and he, thinking like all of his race the British could not stand before the fierce swordsmen gathered on that fatal field, moved slowly. Victory he knew would render the other Talpoor princes more insolently encroaching towards himself, and he reserved his contingent force of twelve thousand warriors entire, to influence the after-arrangements. While on the march he heard with astonishment that the battle was lost and the Talpoor dynasty overthrown; whereupon, falling back to Meerpoore, he offered peace, yet insincerely and only to gain time for collecting all his own feudatories and rallying the fugitives from Meeanee. But though a temporary union of the tribes had taken place before that battle, old feuds were not forgotten, and only the Lhugarees and Nizamarees, under the leading of Ahmed Khan, the chief who assailed the residency, joined him in mass; the others held aloof, or came with broken numbers, for they had little love towards him, and six thousand of their bravest were stretched in death on the gory banks of the Fullaillee.

Great was the Lion's intrepidity to lift his standard amidst all this carnage and terror, defying the conqueror in the very heat and flush of victory, when by merely remaining quiet he might have retained in safety his dominions and dignity; and had this gallant effort been made from national feeling, the English leader would have felt it a painful duty

to strike the valiant prince. But the deliverance of an oppressed people, and the safety of the whole Christian community in India, then seriously menaced by the recent Mahometan success at Cabool, were in one and the same scale with the interests of his country and the honour of his army, while in the other were only gallantry and tyranny—wherefore he smote the last ameer as he had smitten the first, renewing the terrors of Meeanee and rendering them indelible.

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Shere Mohamed, thus stricken, could not become the leader of a protracted warfare, and indeed many chiefs and sirdars had abandoned his cause between the two battles, proffering their salaam, or fealty, to the English leader, who treated them so as to excite hope for the future and stifle any lurking attachment to the fallen dynasty; no difficult matter; for though it came within the Talpoor sirdars' notions of honour to uphold the family sovereignty while any of the princes struggled in the field, there was no attachment of that kind between the ameers and their feudatory chiefs. As princes they had warred for the Talpooree dynasty, not for the interests of the Belooch race; and the latter had assembled in arms neither from personal attachment nor from national feeling, for being recent and isolated conquerors they had dominion without a country. They were moved to fight by religious hatred and a desire to maintain their power of plundering and oppressing, their pride and cupidity being excited by the Affghan successes. "We are braver and more numerous than the warriors under Ackbar at Cabool" was their cry, "the Feringhees at Sukkur and Kurrachee are not so many as those he killed: no, not by half! why then should we not destroy them also?"

Now the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad dissipated all this swelling fierceness, and Sir C. Napier, judging that having found him too strong in battle they would, if beneficence followed victory, prefer his rule to that of the ameers, resolved to treat them with a munificent liberality. Those who submitted, soon discovered that their

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bravery in fight was a recommendation ; and they felt his generosity was innate, not assumed, when they saw the captive ameers, from whom nothing was to be gained, treated with a respectful and forbearing humanity even while their conduct was dangerous and offensive. Moreover, the great sirdars and chieftains, those who were still in arms and those who had submitted, were for the most part at feud with the Lord of Meerpoore, and in a manner absolved from fealty towards the other ameers by reason of their captivity ; wherefore it was reasonable to suppose they would, if their own possessions and dignities were assured, make their salaams in good faith.

These considerations led the English leader to look on the Lion as an isolated chief whose bravest followers had fallen in battle, leaving him without material resources for regular warfare, and without influence beyond his own feudatories—as one also, who, notwithstanding the greatness of his mind, despaired of success from irregular warfare, because his flight had been to the desert when all his insurrectional resources were in the Delta. For there was his richest territory, there his most numerous feudatories ; and the country itself was so intersected with canals, so dotted with forts, so overspread with unhealthy marshes, that difficulties almost insuperable at that time would have opposed the progress of the British, more especially during the inundation which was close at hand. To fly from such a lair was to say hope was lost, and formed one of the many reasons which prompted the confident assertion that the conquest of Scinde was effected by the battle of Hyderabad so far as arms were concerned. It was the prediction of a sagacious mind, not an idle boast, and when the government of the country was conferred on him, Sir C. Napier evinced the sincerity of his conviction by proceeding at once to establish a polity which made no distinction between the vanquished Beloochees and the delivered races of Scindees and Hindoos.

Having fixed notions of government, he rejected the vulgar opinion that Indian statesmen were to be guided

by something occult and peculiar, not by great principles based on the common nature of man. Condemning the system of the East Indian Company, he applied to that body the poet's character of Lord Bacon, *at once the meanest greatest of mankind*, and thus analyzed its policy.

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“To the genius of some governors-general and some military commanders, and to the constant bravery of the troops, belongs all the greatness; to the Courts of Direction, designated by Lord Wellesley as the ‘*ignominious tyrants of the East*,’ all the meanness. Not that directors have been personally less honourable than other gentlemen, but that they are always in a false position, as merchants ruling a vast and distant empire solely for their private advantage. No man ever seeks to be a director from mere patriotism or thirst for military glory unaccompanied by pecuniary profit; and hence, when the Court does send out a governor-general of great mind, which is not often nor willingly done, it treats him as if he were unworthy to possess power at all. This is natural. Their objects are not alike. His will be the welfare, the aggrandizement, the unity of a hundred and twenty millions of people committed to his charge; theirs the obtaining all possible profit from the labour of those people. If the safety of their empire demands a war the directors object; not as it inflicts misery, but having personally a brief tenure of power they dread loss of profit. This feeling has always led them to quarrel with their best governors-general. The merchant, unable to distinguish between wars for self-preservation and conquest, objects to both as lessening immediate gain; and it must be admitted that the former has in India always involved the latter.”

“The mercantile spirit weakens if it does not altogether exclude noble sentiments, and the directors have always regarded their armies with a sinister look. The bravery and devotion of their troops, not their own commercial skill and enterprise, have expanded their original small settlement on the Hooghly to a mighty empire; and yet on every accession of territory the soldier has been treated as unfit to govern what his sword had won; on each new

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acquisition a civil establishment has been fastened, incongruent with the military barbarism of the people to be governed but fulfilling the conditions of patronage and profit which make the Direction an object of desire. For those civil servants have much higher salaries and allowances than the military servants have, and the proprietors' dividends are thus lowered as the directors' patronage becomes augmented, the true nature of the transaction being covered by loud protestations against all wars."

"In this manner a vicious circle of policy is completed, and a solution furnished of that seeming paradox, that while the instructions issued by the directors for the government of the East have always been moderate and opposed to aggrandizement by war, their empire has been continually augmented by arms and little or nothing has been effected for the welfare of the people. The truth being, that men momentarily possessed of power at home object to war lest it should diminish immediate profits; but when the soldier has won new dominions the successors of those ephemeral sovereigns hastily gather the private advantages. They denounce war notwithstanding, because it is easy and graceful to be philanthropic in words; and the topic furnishes convenient arguments for supplanting the military by civil establishments to the advancement of their own private family interests."

"All this is detrimental to the Company's general interests; for those civil servants are, with splendid exceptions, ignorant of great principles, devoid of business habits, and therefore wasteful of the new resources. The more experienced men naturally abide by their old high and lucrative offices, with the details of which they are familiar, and decline new duties in perhaps insalubrious localities and amongst a people with whose language and customs they are unacquainted. Wherefore nepotism works freely, and young, and often very incapable men, are sent to acquire experience and fortunes at the expense of the proprietors' dividends, by misgoverning newly conquered territories. Unknowing how to rule even a settled country, they have to create every branch of administra-

tion, and must necessarily manipulate roughly, and as it were with horny hands when the nicest touch is essential—meddling arbitrarily and ignorantly with social and financial affairs where error may give mortal offence, where parsimony may be folly and extravagance madness.”

This picture of the civil service in India has been confirmed by the Honourable Mr. Shore—one of the body and well acquainted with his subject—an honest benevolent man, whose exposition, published in 1837, has never been controverted; although he has effaced the directors' pretensions to moderation and justice, by showing that their public instructions, so lauded for their ethics, have invariably been neutralized by an appended provision, that nothing was to be of force which tended to lower dividends. Sir C. Napier, because he accepted Mr. Shore's exposition as coinciding with his own observation, has been called an enemy to all civil servants, and has from many of them suffered wrong; but he only condemned a system under which the best must misgovern, as founded on false principles. Personally he judges the civil service to be like all other bodies, furnishing good and bad, clever and foolish persons; and he has always been glad to act with those of sound heads and honourable views, though he refused to bend his experience of mankind to newspaper dictation, and the narrow conceit of men who assume that long residence in the East confers an otherwise unattainable capacity for Indian government.

Spurning such arrogance, he remarked—“that length of residence and sensual indulgence weakened body and mind, and give only aptness for official details without enlargement of ideas; and most of those persons, generalized as ‘*Old Indians*,’ because they have worn out originally vigorous appetites and feeble minds while enjoying large salaries and the adulation of black clerks, who do all their duties, imagine they only know the East. Despising and avoiding the society of the natives, they yet pretend to know the characters of those natives, and call themselves the Statesmen of India! There are however amongst those vegetations of a rank soil, men who do study



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the people, who know their customs and their history, applying minds of a high order and powerful energies to their work; and pre-eminent in that class are the uncovenanted servants whose enterprise has brought them in mature life to India—men who cannot live in luxurious ease, and therefore the most valuable of the Company's dependants."

That the people of India had feelings in common with the rest of the human race the new governor thought no fallacy, and he imagined two years might suffice to fill any head with all the knowledge of peculiar customs necessary for modifying general principles which nature designed it to contain. With those notions he classed and epitomized the character and interests of the people under his government in the following manner.

"The money-seeking Hindoo goes about all eyes, and with fingers supple as his conscience, robbing everybody by subtlety as the Beloochee robs them by force. To him the conquest must be as a feast and a blessing of grace."

"The Scindee, strong and handsome, is indolent from the combined effect of heat and slavery; but he has fine natural qualities, and his bondage being of recent date he may be reclaimed and fitted for independence—to him also the conquest is a blessing, and it shall be my business to make it a feast."

"The Beloochee, though fierce and habituated to acquire property by violence, is shrewd, and has a strong though savage sense of dignity and honour according to the customs of his race. A combination of coercion, of respectful treatment, of generosity and temptation, may therefore bend him to better habits, without breaking the chivalric spirit which is now his best quality. He fought desperately for the ameers, because to fight and plunder was his vocation; but neither he nor his particular chief, nor the ameers, fought from national feeling; education and habit have divested all three of patriotism in the European sense. The Beloochee warrior loves his race, his tribe, not the general community, which he regards but as a prey and spoil. The chief's allegiance to the sovereign

being feudal is slight, and the more easily snapped, because the ameers, personally odious, are captives; a consideration of weight in all countries, but especially so in the East, where the fealty is to the throne not the person."

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"Strongest of the influences which brought the warriors to battle was their natural fierceness, excited by unbounded confidence of success and the hope of plundering an army more affluent than that which had been despoiled the year before in Affghanistan. But there was also latent fear. For conscious of their own ferocious design to massacre every European in Scinde, they thought the English had discovered the project—as indeed they had—and meant to revenge it in kind. They had seen them in peace, under the mask of treaties, seize Sukkur, Bukkur and Kurrachee, and naturally concluded they would go further in war, and either slay all the Beloochees or reduce them to the grovelling condition they had themselves reduced the Scindees. With men of this temper a change of dynasty will be little regarded if their own dignities and possessions are respected; and as it is a desire to obtain property, and not any abstract love of glory which impels them to war, their contempt for industry may be abated by the attraction of honest gains—when debarred of profit by violence they will seek it in commerce and agriculture, if openings are furnished to them."

"To meet the requirements of these different races in the present circumstances my policy must be, while fastening on the country a strong military gripe, to apply all softening and healing measures to the vanquished race, all protective and encouraging measures to the liberated populations—to make strong even-handed justice be universally felt—to draw forth the abundant natural resources of the country, and repair the terrible evils of the ameers' misgovernment. The trading Hindoo will then attach himself to a system which protects his calling and opens a wider scope for its exercise. He will for his own sake give timely intelligence of designs to restore the oppressive yoke of the Beloochees, and the rich Banians have a wonderful knowledge of all that is passing."

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“The Scindian cultivator will not be less earnest to support a government which raises him to independence, and encourages his labour on a grateful soil ; and he is not deficient in strength of body or spirit to defend himself against attempts to renew his bondage. He may also be stirred if necessary against Belooch ascendancy through the Kallora prince, who is alive and not without influence over the former subjects of his family. Residing in the Punjaub, he has claimed of me the restoration of his dominions, offering half the revenues and magnificent presents ; but affairs not being in a state to require his interference, my reply was, ‘ When you can give back the lives of my soldiers who fell in battle to dethrone the ameers, can repay the expenses of the war and furnish a tribute, we will negotiate.’ ”

With these views, Sir Charles Napier, who had all his life studied the great principles of government, and in Cephalonia tested his theoretic convictions by successful practice, soon framed a political edifice of which justice and diligence were the beams and jointings. Nor did he lose time in nice consideration of the ultimate appearance of his work ; for he thought delay in satisfying the minds of the Scindian and Belooch races as to their condition under the conquest, might produce a partisan warfare more costly and dangerous than any momentary defect in his plan of government. Hence, while his cannon still resounded on the banks of the Indus, he had made known that all persons, whether of high or low degree, were confirmed for the time, and would be so permanently, according to their behaviour, in the employments they held under the ameers ; and that all rights and possessions would be safe from confiscation, save those of the people who contrary to the faith of nations had assailed the residency. Then as governor he made his proclamation of conquest, short and decisive. “The Talpoors have been overthrown by the British and are dethroned—Scinde belongs to them no longer. All revenues paid to the ameers are now to be paid to the English. Hitherto armed men have been treated as soldiers fighting by the orders of their masters.

From this time forward armed men assembled shall be treated as robbers and outlaws. Slavery is abolished throughout the land, and all people are invited to return and live peaceably at their homes." And this well-judged general system of conciliation was supported by a very subtle and sagacious stroke of policy; for finding the numerous tenants and debtors of the ameers were influential persons, he released them from their liabilities, observing, that "between a ruler with a sponge and one with an iron sceptre there would be no hesitation, and the cause of their creditors would be permanently abandoned."

Lord Ellenborough, judging that a government springing from conquest and to be administered by the conqueror should for a time at least be sustained by the sword, made that of Scinde military and despotic; and the new governor immediately announced "that the conquest of a country was sufficient convulsion for any people to endure, without adding thereto abrupt innovations on their social habits; wherefore no avoidable change was to be made in the laws and customs. The executive officers were only to correct those evils which the tyrannical Belooch conquerors had inflicted, thus teaching the people that the coming of the British was a redemption from slavery and not a mere change of masters."

This was a wise measure that could not have been effected by a civil government, which must have had its own disturbing organization with great expenses, and would thus have planted the seeds of discontent, to grow into insurrection, as happened afterwards in the Punjaub; but a despotic military government was no disturbing event, being only the substitution of an English for a Belooch master, with the accompaniment of justice and wisdom instead of cruelty and oppression. The dulness of Indian official forms was however disturbed, and severe censures were passed by men, who blinded with going round in a political mill, imagine there is no other road of governing and regard vigour on great occasions as the sign of indiscretion. The abolition of slavery, proclaimed in obedience to Lord Ellenborough's orders, was condemned with peculiar vehe-

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mence. "It would produce discontent—it was unwise—why vex the people with such spurious philanthropy?" Such were the cries of men startled from their monotonous self-sufficiency by the rustling wing of genius passing over their official dormitories. Their opinions were not shared by the slave-girls of the harems in Scinde, who all rushed forth to liberty and their homes; nor during the whole of the subsequent administration was any resistance made, or even a complaint uttered against the edict, though at first infractions happened and were punished.

The new governor was very desirous to be known to the people as a peaceable ruler, but withheld for some time after the battle of Hyderabad, the full action of his authority, because the flitting operations of the Lion gave the robber bands in the Delta an excuse for calling themselves his soldiers. Hence the English leader, knowing what force there is in a name, would not apply a corrective until he had put down the ameer himself; observing that while those bands had a nominal sovereign they would have moral strength, and using his name might raise their predatory hostility to the dignity of insurrectional warfare. Then the Lion, active and hardy, would shift his operations to the Delta where he was most to be feared; and where, besides the force he could bring with him, he had four thousand feudatories, and could rally twenty thousand fierce Beloochee swordsmen, roving since the battles about Scinde and ready for any mischief.

This also was the time when the factious enemies of Lord Ellenborough at Bombay were most active to make their foul prognostications, of evil, realities, urging the Beloochees to insurrection and the sepoy to mutiny; but the English general's resources and energy went beyond their ken, and as they made their malignant hopes their guides they were signally foiled. The crisis was however dangerous; for though the Delta could have been surrounded and the Juts and Khosas—two tribes driven by the ameers' tyranny to live as outlaws in the great desert—could have been brought against it, a horrible war of extermination would have ensued, and reinforcements must have been

drawn from India when all Lord Ellenborough's vigour could scarcely keep down insurrection there. In fine, fifty thousand men would have been required to crush an insurgent warfare in the Delta, and meanwhile the hill tribes on the north-western frontier of Scinde, robbers by vocation, would have poured down on the plains like streams of lava.

It was this danger, lurking in the swamps of the Delta, that had induced Sir C. Napier to brave the deadly sun of Scinde in June, when despite of a heat which the Beloochees vainly imagined no European could support he finally crushed the Lion, and forced him to fly across the Indus to the mountains of Khelat, which ended the insurrectional danger. But, as the Lion, accompanied by the Lhugaree chief, Ahmed Khan, both having treasure, then endeavoured to stir up the mountain Beloochee tribes and the Affghans of Candahar to war on Scinde, the Bombay faction clamorously and joyfully pointed to their efforts as certain to produce a partisan warfare which would finally deprive the British government of the recently conquered kingdom.

But when the Lion was driven from Scinde the disorders of the Delta were corrected with martial severity and promptitude. No longer able to call themselves the ameers' soldiers, they were hunted down as robbers by those very villagers who would have joined them in arms under the Lion's orders—so imposing is established government even under the most revolting forms. The prisoners were punished more or less severely at the places they had plundered; and those who had perpetrated murders were hanged with labels on their breasts, bearing legends in three languages, to the effect that they were put to death, not for opposing the British but for killing villagers. Amongst those executed was the murderer of Captain Ennis, and it was the general's intention to hang the Ameer Shadad, having full proof that he was the instigator of that barbarous action; but Lord Ellenborough forbade the punishment, and that high-born ruffian and loathsome sensualist became the cherished favourite of the Bombay

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faction for having cruelly murdered a sick and defenceless British officer.

While thus displaying his power and sternness against criminals, Sir C. Napier restored to the chieftains and sirdars who made salaam their rich swords, as he had before restored those of the ameers. They belonged to him of right, and their aggregate value was great, seeing that four hundred chiefs had submitted and many others were ready to do so; but between gain and greatness it was never in his nature to waver: the fiercest chief however trembled when his weapon was restored with this stern, though flattering admonition. "*Take back your sword. You have used it with honour against me, and I esteem a brave enemy. But if forgetful of this voluntary submission you draw it again in opposition to my government, I will tear it from you and kill you as a dog.*"

All the sirdars were permitted to wear arms as a mark of dignity, and to show the governor's confidence in them; but their retainers were disarmed and with them the camp followers of the army—fifteen thousand—who had taken advantage of the times to commit excesses. The chiefs of tribes on the western bank of the Indus were treated however very warily; for Beloochistan proper was mountainous, and the Scindian tribes had both feuds and friendships with those of Khelat and of the Cutchee hills. Many of the western Scindian chiefs had not made salaam; and the general, who was chary of pressing them as the political agents had during the Affghan war, and with very bad results, refrained from disarming their followers as he had done on the eastern bank of the Indus, lest apprehension of further innovations should produce a confederacy. Rigorously speaking therefore only the eastern bank of that river could be called a subdued country. But with his usual subtle policy he effected the object of protecting the villagers on the east from individual Belooch insolence, by causing every Beloochee who passed the Indus from the west to be disarmed, as if it were a process of war, giving the spoil to his soldiers, and thus the thing passed. However, to protect the Scindees on the western bank

from being plundered, he told the hill tribes, dependent and independent, that he would put all of their race to death who passed the Indus from the west with arms; and if they offered violence to the Scindees on that side he would enter their hills with fire and sword.

These were no mean proofs of resolution, for more than twenty thousand roving swordsmen were then on the western side; and he dared not arm the Scindees in defence, because strong-handed robbery had been so long the prevailing system that every young man, almost every boy, who could procure a sword or matchlock thought it glorious to become a robber. His indirect policy was however so effectual, that the country, which just before the conquest and during the war had been overrun with armed men spreading terror and misery, soon presented the aspect of a peaceful community; and that surprising result affected men's minds and disposed them to accept the new government with cheerfulness while they trembled at its power.

There were also particular instances of impartial justice which made a profound impression upon all classes. A Parsee merchant was murdered on the highway and his goods carried off; two armed Beloochees were tracked and seized; they had obeyed the orders of their chief, they said, and the goods were in his house. He was demanded from his tribe and was given up; the proofs were clear, and all three were hanged many miles from any soldiers. This could not have been done for a political matter, but the general, subtle in his policy, knew the tribes would not risk the anger of a conqueror for a mere criminal, and by the population at large the punishment was loudly applauded with this significant remark—“*The Padishaw kills nobody for himself.*” And thenceforth wherever he went the people crowded to see the “just Padishaw.”

This moral contentment was aided by a superstitious feeling, common to Beloochees and Scindees. For immediately after the “*murder of the Kalloras,*” so the epoch of the ameers' accession was designated by the Scindees, while the Bombay faction called the latter “*Patriarchal*



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*Princes*," no rain fell for six years, famine was in the land, and as the Kalloras were a sacred race this drought was judged an effect of divine wrath. But at the commencement of Sir C. Napier's warfare abundance of rain fell for many successive days, a refreshing dispensation which had not happened for several years before, and this, being compared with the tradition of the Kallora drought, was viewed by both races as a sign that the ameers' time was come and the English a favoured people. ¶ That notion, and the steady discipline of the troops, the unremitting activity of their chief, his manifest love of justice, his confirming all persons in their possessions and employments, and a great reduction of taxation, with entire suppression of the oppressive violence previously accompanying government exactions, created a wonderful affection for his rule. Only four months before, the people had seen him descend on their country with all the terrors of war, an irresistible conqueror, and already they felt him as a peaceful legislator, striving to improve the condition of all, whether well-wisher or enemy: wherefore they accepted his administration as the effect of a benignant fate. √ His power was military and despotic, but neither harsh nor capricious, for he put a bridle on himself by promulgating a formal code of regulations in judicial proceedings, which admitted all the ordinary legal forms of the land, with the superaddition of English revision, guided by an honourable sense of equity and referable in all serious cases to his own supervision—his confirmation being essential to legal execution. And he rigidly restrained his own paramount power within the published regulations, save where the absolute safety of the conquest demanded an unusual exercise of authority. Meanwhile, founding his policy on the idiosyncracies presented by the three races, he endeavoured to conciliate the great Beloochee chieftains and sirdars with a generous treatment, and a respectful acceptance of their notions of honour without reference to a European standard, which they could not comprehend and would have submitted to only as the imposition of a conqueror.

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Always however, he restricted this to matters not affecting those below them; for he sought not the hollow distinction of pleasing the great and powerful with an underworking of misery for the multitude. And knowing the human mind is never better disposed to gratitude and attachment than when softened by fear, his iron hand was felt within the velvet glove, that all might know he protected their lives and fortunes from a sense of benevolence, not from fear or weakness. "It will not do," he observed, "to let their barbaric vanity gradually wipe away the fear cast on them by the two battles." But to soothe the pride of the chieftains and sirdars while their entire submission was exacted, the queen's picture, covered with a curtain from the gaze of private men and retainers, was shown to those who made salaam; a ceremony so agreeable that every new batch eagerly demanded to see the "Great Padishaw's face."

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Nevertheless they did not understand how a woman could govern; nor clearly comprehend the nature of the governor-general's power. They knew the last was of superior rank to the general, and thought he might, after the eastern manner, at some time put him to death and seize his wealth; but judging that a difficult affair, seeing how strong he had been in battle how entire was the devotion of his troops, they with profound reverence accepted him as their immediate lord. One old chief being told of the queen's rank and power, exclaimed, "*But sahib she did not beat me at Meeanee; you are my king now.*" Another asked, "*How far off is she?*" So and so. "And you are next in rank?" "No! The governor-general is so in India." "How far off is he?" "He is at Calcutta." "*Oh! I have heard of Calcutta, and it is far off;—you are at Hyderabad. Answer me one thing. Cannot you cut off my head?*" "*Yes! if you do not obey.*" "*That is enough, I am your slave.*"

They looked on the head of the army as the head of everything, and that alone justified Lord Ellenborough in constituting the government a military one, and confiding it entirely to the conqueror, of whom all were in

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dread, and from whom therefore benefits flowed with more grace and effect. His appointment was however, a signal for the outbreak of malignity incredibly base, and so inveterate that it continues to this day. Emanating originally from the council and some of the permanent official persons of the Bombay government, it was supported by their dependent and expectant partisans, all stung to the quick at the loss of the sinister profits in perspective from the accession of new territory. But foul as their own bad deeds would it be, to make this accusation without reservation or exception — there were civilians in office who opposed and disdained this hostility, men whose honour demands respectful acknowledgment, and amongst those highest in position and character Mr. John Warden must be named.

Incessant efforts were made by this faction to render the military government of Scinde a failure. Newspaper organs openly, and expectant tools secretly were set to work in England and in India to vilify the victorious general; and they were countenanced and encouraged by the directors and by the Board of Control under Lord Ripon, whose injurious and offensive conduct towards Sir C. Napier shall be exposed, because it is not fitting to respect folly when it degrades authority by insulting merit.

In July Lord Ellenborough placed the Scindian government in direct communication with the Calcutta council, to relieve it from the interested meddling of Bombay. The official expectants at the last place, having then no hope either to force their way, or to sneak, into lucrative Scindian appointments, nothing was too gross for the polluted pens they hired to blacken Sir C. Napier and lower his exploits. "He had not gained victories, he had slaughtered some poor half-armed people who made no resistance" — "Scinde was a waste of sand" — "a Golgotha, foully and murderously obtained, a disgrace only to be put away by restoring its patriarchal princes."

Then he was "an imbecile ruffian, delighting in carnage, faithless, rapacious, a liar who disgraced the army, and stained the glorious age of Wellington." — "Why did

not the sepoy's rise and put an end to the fellow's doings? He had brutally torn away the ornaments of the ameers' women and dishonoured his uniform"—"Luxuriously changing his residence to feast on the delicious pulla fish, he was encircled by parasites who hourly promulgated shameless falsehoods to prop the reputation of his ridiculous system of government, which all '*Old Indians*' knew must fail."—"He had taken the traitor Ali Moorad to his bosom"—a traitor because he had not warred against the British troops!—"had loaded him with presents, had conferred on him the possessions of the plundered *patriarchal princes of Scinde!* and was at once his benefactor and dupe."

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Foremost to predict disaster was Outram, the discarded political agent, who announced, that forty of the younger ameers were at large, that while they were so, continual insurrections would disturb the English rule, and after ten years of guerilla warfare the country must be restored to the fallen princes—with much more of a like bald presumptuous talk, showing the vulgar character of his mind, which could see and exaggerate difficulties but had no resources for overcoming them. His predictions were echoed by most of the Indian and not a few of the London newspapers; and though the course of this work will show how the touch of genius bursted these bubbles, the new governor's labour and difficulties were much augmented by these infamous arts of men, who with official power to do evil had hearts and heads so gorged with malice and falsehood that there was no room left for honour or patriotism.

Few persons could have borne up against such a torrent and fury of abuse, and such malignant and foul official thwarting; fewer still could have worked a way to order and a fair frame of government through such a chaos; but the indomitable energy of Sir C. Napier may be thus judged. He had three distinct governments to correspond with—Calcutta, Bombay and the Board of Control—and often from the stoppage of dâks and other circumstances, as many as a hundred letters would arrive

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together in the midst of arduous military operations ; and through them he had to work while acting against the Lion, while subjugating the Delta, tranquillizing the population, organizing the administration, and establishing his general scheme of polity. The sun-stroke received in the field had so debilitated him, that the medical men urged him to quit Scinde as the only chance of life, and Lord Ellenborough, with a rare generosity, proposed to go in person to that country and conduct the government there until his health was restored. That he would not suffer, and though he could only write lying on his side—the heat being above 132° of Fahrenheit in an artificially cooled tent—though frequently at the point of death from exhaustion, he with stupendous energy continued to labour until he had reduced the evil influences of war insurrection and social confusion to placidity, and cast the foundations of a new civilization.

## CHAPTER II.

HAVING to create all branches of administration, and reform the social system, the general's first object was to find qualified subordinates. Everything was new, there was no guide, the land and its conditions were to be studied, and for the civil branches of administration the choice of men was restricted; nevertheless, with a happy fortune, he found what he sought in his army, and by *soldier civilians*, the administration of Scinde was established and conducted with far less expense, and more activity, than it could have been done by civil servants.

This is not conjecture. The expenses of Outram's political agency had been by Sir C. Napier abated sixteen thousand pounds annually; and his own monthly contingent charges varied from six and ten to one hundred and fifty rupees, whereas Outram's had been as much as sixteen thousand! Moreover certain civil servants had been sent from Calcutta for the administration of Upper Scinde, with a promise, as they said, of an establishment; which in India generally means a large retinue of clerks to do business while the heads of the department recreate themselves. Sir C. Napier would not allow of these clerks and called for work; this was at first peremptorily refused; but finally two of the gentlemen wrote an expostulatory letter to their superior, Captain Pope, the collector, declaring they obeyed him with disgust and detestation! Lord Ellenborough recalled them, and a Mr. Richardson, appointed by the general, did singly for five hundred rupees a month, and without any disgust, the work for which they had received above two

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thousand rupees. Scinde was then left in the hands of the military men, and though in addition to their own business the arrears of the political agency, neglected by Outram, were to be brought up, a solid framework of administration was soon laid, fit for immediate usage, yet capable of receiving improvements without alteration of the general form.

The governor, being the only visible source of power, surrounded himself with troops that all might remember the sword would uphold what it had won. But those troops were also disposed with reference to the chances of insurrectional and partisan warfare from the hill tribes, who might be stimulated to hostility by the Talpore princes still at large, or by their own appetite for plunder. Affghan or Seikh invasions, events then considered very likely to happen, were also contemplated, and the military arrangements were so contrived as to meet all these chances, and preserve internal tranquillity without affecting the discipline and readiness of the army for active service, and without bringing the soldiers into contact with the people except in powerful masses: the troops thus obtained, in addition to their real power, all the imaginary power of the unknown, to augment the fear and wonder which their prowess in battle had created.

This system was directly opposed to that of the political agents, who had during the Affghan war always spread their forces, and with a baneful result; but it was Sir C. Napier's fixed conviction that the civil and military forces should be kept entirely distinct in their support of government. "Soldiers," he said, "were instituted to fight declared enemies, not to be watchers and punishers of criminals; they should be, in thought and in reality, identified with their country's glory—the proudest of her sons—and never employed to enforce the behests of the civil administration until the civil power was found too weak. A contrary system lowered the army to a criminal police, hurt the soldiers' pride, and by dissemination and ignoble contact injured their discipline and high feeling. It also substituted for the civil, a military

force too easily had recourse to, thereby abating the vigilance activity and resolution which ought to be characteristics of civil power. And to these general considerations he added two especial ones, of weight in Scinde, namely, that the sepoy should be debarred from forming too close friendships with the people, while the latter would be saved from the domineering arrogance of soldiers flushed with conquest; an arrogance which renders all armies, in every foreign country where they have long acted, whether as friends or enemies, so odious that no policy can counteract it when once entertained.

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With these views he embodied a numerous police, composed chiefly of Scindians who had been so employed by the ameers; but the greater number had suffered in person or family from the cruelty of those princes, and bore towards them the hatred of emancipated slaves to cruel masters. They were at first timid, the natural result of oppression, and very impatient of discipline, deserting when checked; but by mixing with them bold adventurers, Patans and Rajpoots, and even some of the minor chiefs who had fought at Meeanee; and by giving them a handsome uniform, and a military organization under European officers, the necessary courage was created, and they soon acted alone or alongside the troops on the most dangerous services.

By degrees their numbers were increased to two thousand five hundred, divided into three classes, namely, the city, the rural and the mounted police. The first were for the great towns. The other two, clothed and armed in a different manner, were designed for the protection of the plains; and they were to act not only against ordinary evil-doers, but against the plundering hill tribes on the west of the Indus, aiding the troops if the incursions called for military operations. They protected small stations, guarded the dâks, escorted criminals and treasure, enforced executions, relieved the soldiers from many isolated minor duties, and formed a body of excellent guides in war. When circumstances called for the combined service of all the forces of government, the rural police, finding themselves then



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elevated to the dignity of soldiers, acquired greater confidence and courage to perform the duties imposed on them when alone—duties which as regarded the hill tribes were at once honourable and dangerous, being in fact partisan warfare.

Uncontaminated by the ignoble, though necessary employment of detecting and dealing with rascal offenders in the great towns, which belonged entirely to the city police, the rural police soon caught the spirit of their organization, and, finding themselves well supported by the government, at first fell into the extreme of being too rough. Their duty was however very trying, and especially with the Beloochees, their recent masters; if they had not been haughty they would have been cowed by those fierce passionate men, and would probably have finally coalesced secretly with them; indeed a fear of this termination made the general very cautious in checking them, until the course of their duties had produced some sharp fights, in which several were killed on both sides: but then, knowing the feuds thus engendered would bar any coalition, he proceeded to enforce a vigorous discipline.

While establishing this power in support of the government and arranging his military system, he organized the civil gradations of administration in the following manner.

Immediately beneath himself sat a commissioner for civil affairs, Captain Brown, the person in Scinde best acquainted with the country. All matters relative to the taxes and customs were referred in the first instance to him for examination and report. His title was afterwards changed to that of secretary to the government, but his functions remained the same.

The whole country was divided into three great collectorates or districts, namely, Sukkur, Kurrachee and Hyderabad, and there was a separate collectorate for customs. The first embraced all the dominions on the right of the Indus as far south as Sehwan. The second included all Scinde on the right bank, from Sehwan to the coast. The third extended from the boundary of

Ali Moorad's territory in the north, to the mouths of the Indus, and to Cutch eastward, being bounded there by the desert. At each station was a chief collector, having under him three sub-collectors disposed in the most convenient places for superintendence and communication, and each sub-collector had a staff of subordinates.

Every month the collectors sent statements of receipts and expenditure to the commissioner of civil affairs, who laid them, with his observations, before the governor, without whose direct authority no expense could be incurred.

At the end of each month a report was made to the governor-general; stating the disbursements in gross, the receipts, the balance in hand, the average price of labour, and cost of food for five persons, together with explanations of the causes producing a variation in the balance from one month to another. To this was appended a memorandum upon the extent of country newly irrigated, in square measure, the length of roads made, the public buildings begun or finished, and the height of the waters of the Indus.

Each station was supported by a body of police under a European commander, and protected by a powerful mass of regular troops, always within reach, yet only to be employed when the police and irregulars being unable to resist incursions the duty became a warfare.

At Hyderabad, which was at first the seat of government, the police were under the European captain of police, who had European lieutenants at the other stations, the responsibility for discipline, payments and organization being as rigorous as for troops of the line.

To sustain the rural police, the irregular cavalry, composed of men who disdained the company of persons lower in degree, were distributed between the collectorates and around them; and though disposed in smaller bodies than the regulars were still in masses.

Every branch of the physical force was thus kept distinct; yet combined for general purposes; and each was stimulated to excellence by unity of purpose and

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employment. For as the city police stood between the rural police and the more degraded of the population, so the rural police stood between the city police and the irregulars, troops whose pride prevented familiarity with the people; and all three hedged round the regulars, who were never interrupted in their discipline by being detached on police duties, and never degraded in their own estimation by intercourse with criminals. Remaining in masses, they were isolated mysterious objects of terror and respect for an uncivilized people, who knew them only by their terrible deeds in war. Meanwhile the police being in constant contact with the population were forced to exert all their energies, having however, where overpowered, the irregular horsemen to look to for support, and finally the regular troops, of whose strength in battle the most exaggerated notions had been formed.

To these gradations of authority was added another, which Sir C. Napier indeed found in existence, but gave to it an entirely new direction; adapting it with a subtle policy to his schemes for regenerating the social condition of the people. The land of Scinde was divided into districts of various extents and value, called *kardarats*, and over each was a *Kardar* or headman, answering to the *cadi* of the Arabians. They were nominally only allowed to decide in small causes, and to a certain extent punish summarily with fine and imprisonment, but in practice they exercised power of life and death and torture; and though in capital cases they referred to the *ameers* it was but a form, as those princes always decided on the recorded evidence of the *kardar*, who collected their land revenue and customs, and rendered in person an account every half-year at Hyderabad. In some districts they farmed the customs and land-taxes, and were then generally very harsh and oppressive, frequently fining and torturing the miserable *ryots* to increase their own gains: one *kardar* was said to have realized in a year fifteen hundred pounds by fines alone.

These men had necessarily great influence with the people; but they were from fear the slaves of the *Beloochee*

sirdar, or chief, to whose jaghéer or estate their villages belonged, and were consequently enabled to oppress but not to protect those under them; and like all slaves they were venal, knavish and deceitful. Nevertheless Sir C. Napier, true to his avowed principle of causing as little disturbance as possible in the social relations of the people, continued the kardars, because they were a link of order to which the population was accustomed; but he gave them large salaries, to prevent any indirect taxation for their own behoof; and he attached them to the collectorates, with a warning that being thus part of and directly responsible to the government, the continuation of their appointments would depend upon their good behaviour.

If the villagers preferred just complaints against any kardar, he was removed and otherwise punished according to his offence. Their interests being thus bound up with the well-being of their people and their conduct closely watched by the officers of the collectorate they became circumspect, and willingly served a government from which they derived high pay without the odium and vexation of being at once slaves and tyrants, suspected by their masters and hated by their constituents.

This circumspection however, was not of immediate growth; many of the kardars, concluding the governor's regulations were like eastern laws, to be broken by the powerful, behaved oppressively. Prompt punishment corrected this error, but the danger of such misconduct induced the establishment of sub-collectors with assistants; and they and the officers in command of distant outposts received magisterial authority, that the delinquencies of the kardars might be more readily checked. The population was thus generally encouraged, and a heavy blow was given to the feudal or clan system, which Sir C. Napier designed to break down without appearing to be an enemy; for the kardars, no longer dependent on the Beloochee sirdar for existence, did very soon, as was expected, become protectors of their villages against the injustice of the chiefs; and were, on appeal, in rightful

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cases supported by the government, which thus only appeared as an arbitrator not a meddler.

The villagers had been too long enslaved and were still too fearful of their tyrants to dare being in the wrong at first; and before that spirit could arise, the clan system would, it was judged, be broken down and the influence of regular government prevail. But if contrary to expectation the villagers were in the wrong, the redress awarded the chief would attach him to a system which protected his rights and saved him from the employment of armed men to enforce his just demands; for under the ameers all was effected by violence, and the retainers invariably exacted more than the right, impoverishing their employers both ways. He was thus also saved from feuds, which in Scinde were infinite, and virulent to an almost incredible degree.

It was noticed by the duke of Wellington that one of the greatest dangers to the Indian empire from every new acquisition of territory, was "*the throwing out of employment and of means of subsistence, all who had previously managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or plundered the country.*"

This danger, peculiarly formidable in Scinde, where not an official body but a whole race had plundered the country, was completely obviated by the employment of the kardars, and by the organization of a police which attached so many loose dangerous men to the government; and by the still more prudent course, of preserving the Beloochee noblemen in their possessions and followings, under a peaceable tenure.

The system of collectorates and kardarats soon affected the revenue favourably. The receipts, which in the first month were not above three thousand pounds, rose in July to above ten thousand, and many evasions and false modes of collection were discovered; and many false oppressive kardars were punished. This increase during a time of war and trouble, and when the ameers' taxation had been reduced, proved that a great revenue could be obtained. It was certain also to be augmented by an increasing

population. For already the people of Kandahar were flocking to Shikarpoor, to enjoy the protection of a man who so regarded and upheld justice, that men were under him in the midst of war and conquest safer than with others in profound peace. The Scindees, satisfied with a little food, easily obtained, were indeed disposed to indolence as the greatest pleasure and contrast to their former state of forced labour; but it was foreseen and so happened, that new wants and the example of strangers, joined to judicious taxation and encouragement of labour, would in time stimulate them to draw from the rich soil beneath their feet an increasing amount of its inexhaustible productions.

Many attempts were made at first, to impose on the new government and ascertain the character of its chief. One was conspicuous from the extent of its aim, and the amusing facility with which it was disposed of and future projects of a like nature precluded; for it was an effort to establish a precedent which would in its effects have caused universal confusion. The Hindoo merchants, ever watchful to gain, and now stimulated to revenge for the Beloochee sirdars' former oppressions, thought to get back not only the loans forced from them under the ameers, but compound interest on an original interest of thirty, forty and even fifty per cent.: and to establish a ruling precedent they first claimed from the ameers. The general at once perceived the extent of their drift, and foreseeing that the ameers, if referred to, would admit any claim, however false or usurious, were it only to make the English pay; and because they would calculate, that if restored, as they then expected to be and as the faction at Bombay gave them hopes of being, they could reclaim all these false debts and easily recover the money by torturing the claimants. Wherefore seeing that a door would be thus opened to endless false pretensions and incalculable mischief, he thus answered the rich Banians, who put their case in the following plausible manner. "You sahib, having conquered the ameers and seized their treasure are responsible for their debts; we invoke your sense of justice.

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To us they owe much." The sum was immense, the claim clearly a forged one; for the ameers often took but never borrowed, save in the way of forced loans, well understood to be confiscations—their way being to make the rich Banians bid as at an auction for their own noses and ears.

To have dismissed the matter at once in the exercise of absolute power would have been easy, and without evil consequences; but the general, desirous to give a public check to the concoction of such schemes in future, thus replied. "The ameers were your friends when you lent this money, but they were my enemies, and I never heard of men fighting battles and risking the dangers of war to serve their enemies. I shall therefore keep what I have won for my government. You know that all taxes and debts due to the ameers previous to the first battle have been remitted; how then can I be justly called upon to pay their creditors for money advanced before that epoch—and advanced to enable them to make war upon me? Your claim is of this class, and so far from paying, my intention is to have all loans to the ameers examined, with a view to the infliction of a fine upon their creditors for having assisted my enemies."

"We then are ruined, sahib—we must starve—we must die!"

"That," he replied, "will be very convenient; for I am about to construct a large cemetery and shall want bodies to put into it—be therefore at ease, when you die I will take you under my protection and bury you honourably!" They laughed and the matter terminated.

The whole revenue would not have sufficed to meet such hollow demands, but privately small claims were examined and paid, when found just, as a matter of generosity not of law, and this cutting of the Gordian knot was indispensable, and within the rights of a conqueror, creating neither surprise nor discontent, even with these usurers, who could produce no proofs in support of their demands.

To the collectorates was attached the judiciary system, that protection might march abreast with taxation. Each collector was a superior magistrate; the sub-collector and

the officers commanding certain outposts were inferior magistrates, and all were restricted in authority by the following regulations.

The military magistrate was to make a preliminary investigation, assisted by the *cazi*, a kind of judge-attorney, who was to expound the Mahometan law and the customs of the place—and as between man and man, the Mahometan laws are simple, clear and very just. This was however only to aid the magistrates, who decided according to their own equitable notions unfettered by legal niceties; a freedom of judgment which was given because prompt redress and punishments in every-day occurrences were essential to tranquillity, and to the first progress of the government machinery; and in the choice of collectors regard was had to moral qualities, as well as to abilities. Indeed all appointments, from the highest to the lowest, were given to men who had served well in the campaign—and all recommendations and requests from England, whether of friends or of powerful people, were denied.—“Those who won the land have the first right to govern it if competent to the task,” was the invariable answer, and not until their claims were honourably satisfied would the general look even towards his own family.

Magistrates had arbitrary power to decide in all cases which they were competent to hear, yet they were premonished to attend to the *cazi*, unless they doubted his integrity, and their power was to be exercised under the following regulations.

Where the property in litigation exceeded twenty-five rupees the evidence was to be recorded in Persian, and no civil suit could be entertained for any sum except on a written petition in the same language, on the back of which the magistrate's decree was to be recorded.

No suit involving the right of property in land was to be judged by any save chief collectors and their immediate assistants; and all the military magistrates were bound to transmit to the collectors of their districts, on the first of each month, a report of the cases decided by them during the previous month.



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In the criminal jurisdiction a number of specified minor offences were left to the discretion of the assistant magistrates, but the more serious were for the decision of the collector; and where the sentence was to be executed without appeal, the maximum of punishment was six months' ordinary imprisonment, or three months' with hard labour; twenty-four lashes, or a fine of one hundred rupees: but only one of these penalties could be inflicted for a single offence, and none of them save for offences specified in the regulations. Where the punishment exceeded this scale the sanction of the governor was necessary; and when the fine passed twenty-five rupees, or the incarceration more than one month, a record of the case and sentence was made in the Persian language, whereas minor causes were merely entered officially in a book.

This system was in conformity as to the general framework with the nominal laws of the country under the ameers; but with these appreciable improvements,—that they were real—that the European magistrates, higher in character and station, were less liable to be swayed by private motives than the kardars—that their authority was more restricted by forms, their proceedings more frequently and rigorously revised—that their punishments were clearly defined and all torturing and oppression prohibited. The ameers, seeking to obtain as much revenue as possible, were indulgent to oppressive kardars, whereas the English ruler, seeking only to insure justice was vigilant to restrain and inexorable to punish them. These differences were soon widely made known, for on several occasions, kardars convicted of oppression were degraded and punished in the presence of the people they had wronged.

In capital cases the proceedings were entirely different. The magistrate had to take down the evidence in writing, and transmit it to the judge-advocate-general of Scinde—Captain Young, a qualified person and of great justice and industry—who had been appointed by Lord Ellenborough at the request of Sir Charles Napier. That functionary, after due examination, placed the record before the

governor, with his own observations upon the legal and equitable points, and the latter imposed upon himself the enormous labour of analyzing, in conjunction with the government secretary, every document of this nature, before he even affixed his order for a military commission to try the accused.

Trials were conducted under rules, having for aim to elicit the truth without a slavish adherence to lawyers' dicta, and the minutes were laid before the governor by the judge-advocate-general, with an opinion as to the proceedings, finding and sentence; whereupon the former again went through the case before decreeing execution. He never augmented punishment, or inflicted it of his own authority, though that was unlimited; for he could put men to death without responsibility, save to his conscience and public opinion; but conscious of the weakness of human nature when invested with unrestricted power, he voluntarily created these checks, and entailed upon himself these oppressive examinations, without evading, or shrinking from them, during the whole of his government. Whether in peace or war in quarters, or in the field, no serious sentence was executed without his having previously made himself master of the case, and duly reflected upon what justice and policy required.

This union of legislation, judgment and execution, was undoubtedly the essence of despotism; but though leaning theoretically to the doctrine which opposes all capital punishment, Sir C. Napier thought the arguments in favour of that doctrine were only applicable to a high-wrought state of society, which furnished so many other modes of repression for crime. "They who adhered to it in Scinde," he said, "would soon be thrown into the Indus"—"Beccaria and Livingstone would find it hard to rule Beloochees without capital punishment."

Death however he inflicted only for murder; a restriction which did not prevent his rule being at first more stern and life-taking than comported with his natural benevolence; giving him constant care and anxiety, which combined with other vexations affected his health. For

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the habits of the Beloochee race had been so barbarous, their customs so ferocious, and the worst examples of cruelty and all odious vices had been so constantly given by the ameers, that a general depravity of feeling prevailed and could only be corrected by fear. Torture, and mutilations worse than death were common punishments, applied not only by the ameers but by their nobles, and even by the kardars of villages. Child-murder, especially of females, was so common as to be the rule not the exception, and was indeed with them no crime. Whenever a woman was guilty of infidelity, or even suspected—and that suspicion was excited by trifles, and often pretended from interested views—one man would hold her up by the hair while another hewed her piecemeal with a sword. To kill women on any pretext was a right assumed by every Beloochee, and they could not understand why they were to be debarred.

A man had been condemned for murdering his wife; his chief sued the general for pardon. "No! I will hang him." "What! you will hang a man for only killing his wife!" "Yes! She had done no wrong." "Wrong! No! but he was angry! why should he not kill her?" "Well, I am angry, why should not I kill him?" This conviction of their right to murder women was so strong and their belief in fatalism was so firm, that many executions took place ere the practice could be even checked; but, finding the general as resolute to hang as they were to murder, the tendency after a time abated, and to use his significant phrase "the gallows began to overbalance Mahomet and predestination." They were however a stubborn race, and their contempt of death may be judged of by the following anecdote, chosen rather for its forcible portraiture than its singularity as to the indifference displayed. A Beloochee condemned for murder walked to execution conversing with calmness on the road; when turned off the rope broke and he fell, but started up instantly and with inexpressible coolness said "*Accidents will happen in despite of care! try again!*"

Sir C. Napier classed under the head of slavery, the

dragging young girls from their homes for the harems of the great; and often he rejoiced at being the instrument of Providence to suppress the cruelty exercised towards women, though to do so, he was forced to wield the sword so terribly in battle and give the axe of justice such a sweep; but the feeling respecting the non-right of women and children to their existence and freedom demanded the sternest repression; for the examples of unmitigated cruelty and debauchery given by the numerous ameers, had a wide currency which sharp justice only could counteract. From that painful duty he did not shrink; but his repugnance to take life acted strongly in confirmation of his conscientious resolve to spare himself no labour in the examination of all judicial matters—five or six hours' sleep in the twenty-four was his only relaxation from care, and that not always permitted.

He also put down the practice of suttees, which however was rare in Scinde, by a process entirely characteristic. For judging the real cause of these immolations to be the profit derived by the priests, and hearing of an intended burning, he made it known that he would stop the sacrifice. The priests said it was a religious rite which must not be meddled with—that all nations had customs which should be respected and this was a very sacred one. The general affecting to be struck with the argument replied. "Be it so. This burning of widows is your custom; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation has also a custom. When men burn women alive we hang them, and confiscate all their property. My carpenters shall therefore erect gibbets on which to hang all concerned when the widow is consumed. Let us all act according to national customs!" No suttee took place then or afterwards.

Even-handed justice was naturally offensive in a certain measure to the Beloochee race, whose long-exercised supremacy was thus broken down; but they had expected a cruel overbearing master in their conqueror, and finding him the reverse, resigned themselves with eastern quietude to their "*kismet*," or fate; and brutal as they were in

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many ways, their faults were more those of education and false pride than any innate depravity: nature had not given them such fine persons without corresponding qualities of mind, and to their chivalric notions the general diligently appealed, adding a soothing flattery, and opening new views of self-interest.

All the land in Scinde belonged to the state, and grants of it, called jagheers, were made by the ameers on the feudal tenure of bringing so many swords and shields into the field when the prince called for them. These jagheers could always be resumed, and the smaller jagheerdars were liable to constant capricious removals from one estate to another, the ameers invariably seeking profit by the change. But the tenures of all were very uncertain, seeing that their masters, acknowledging no law but their own will, or fears, watched eagerly to resume jagheers whenever a favourite was to be endowed or a spirited man crushed. Even the greatest chiefs were at times dispossessed, and with the possessions of the chiefs went those of all his personal followers. Then he would take shield and matchlock, to live by plunder; and so long as he abstained from the ameers' private estates and money, he was free to rob all others if his hand was strong.

Inconceivable as this may be to civilized men, it was the custom in Scinde; and one of those customs which must have dissolved the ameers' power, or rather the whole frame of society in a short time, if the conquest had not interfered. It had already taken a singular social form. To rob an unprotected stranger was a matter of course, and the exacting of black-mail, after the manner of the Scotch Highlanders, was also established; but in Scinde, a running account was kept on the following curious basis. If two tribes were at feud and one found the balance of loss in cattle or goods against it, the overplus was charged to some weaker tribe, upon whom a foray was made to enforce this strange debt. Yet social intercourse was not broken thereby; the robbed men, with a civil salaam, and pretending to know nothing of the act, asked the

robbers to aid them in spoiling a third tribe to the same extent, and thus a species of poor-law was enforced by arms.

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Change of jagheers, and often entire deprivation, had been very frequent under the ameers, and upon that uncertainty of possession the English general founded his main resource for attaching the Beloochees to his rule, without lowering their dignity or reducing their immediate followers' means of existence. England he told them neither wanted nor would have the aid of warriors on the feudal system, her regular army was sufficient, as they had learned to their cost; hence no service of sword and shield could repurchase their jagheers, which were all forfeited by the conquest. Nevertheless he would restore them, with this condition—that when any public work was in progress through their jagheer, each jagheerdar was to provide labourers with mattock and spade in the same proportion as he had before been bound to provide warriors with matchlock and sword; and it was his design to commence such works as would enhance the value of their possessions. This was assented to, and thus another sap was laid to the feudal system without being discovered. For he did not deceive himself in supposing that the great men, thus made permanent landholders, would accept Scinde from his hands as a country, instead of from the ameers as a spoil.

These measures being taken with the powerful classes, it remained to improve the condition of the people at large, and to draw forth the resources of the subdued land—a land so rich by nature that it was said “it might be tilled with a man's nails.” The general aspect presented great leading features which served as guides for the future action of administration. First of these was the Indus, with its periodical inundations, which, like that of the Nile, was at war with the desert, and the cause of all fertility; but though capable of being made in time the great artery of commerce with the Punjaub and the nations of Central Asia, the aid of art was required, and expenses which should be the consequences rather than

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the excitors of commerce. It was of varying depths, capricious in changing its bed, and subject to whirlpools of such extraordinary violence as to turn even a steamer round with amazing velocity. It would not suffer buildings near its stream. "I have," said the general, "seen from the deck of a steamer as much as half an acre of the bank carried away at once." The navigation also required boats of a peculiar construction, and there were no permanently accessible ports at the different mouths—Kurrachee was forty miles from the nearest navigable branch of the river, and, though the best port of Scinde, was very inconvenient at all times, and in the monsoons nearly unapproachable.

From river commerce therefore Sir C. Napier expected little advantage, until Sukkur and Kurrachee should become populous; and for the moment he looked only to assuage the most prominent difficulties, leaving to time and the enterprise of merchants, the development of the great commerce which he foresaw would finally spring up, if not repressed by bad government and wars. Nevertheless, in anticipation, he thus early meditated a great scheme of river police to be continued by the khan of Bhawalpore, which would secure trade for hundreds of miles up the Indus, and render Kurrachee an emporium. Meanwhile the value of the Indus for interior traffic, and for its influence on agriculture attracted his immediate attention, and the engineers who were employed to take the levels found the bed of the river above the plane of the surrounding country; wherefore it was apparent that scientific operations, which were immediately set on foot, would, with no great expense, control and regulate the irrigation of the land and be productive of immense wealth and prosperity.

Next to the river came the mountains and the desert for consideration. The Hala range, bounding Scinde on the west, touched the Indus at Sehwan, but receded below and above that point, so as to leave wide extents of fertile country, of which the northern was the richest and most important. It was the most exposed also to the plunder-

ing excursions of the hill and mountain tribes, and hence protection by arms and administration was more needed than peaceful works on that side.

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On the east Scinde was bounded by the Thur or great desert, which only left a narrow strip of land between it and the river, and continually advanced where not repressed by the hand of man; but between absolute waste and absolute fertility, there was a line ten or twelve miles broad and nearly four hundred long, which partook of both characters, and could by artificial means be restored to the latter. Moreover, during his march to Emaumghur, Sir C. Napier had discovered, what no European had before known, that a range of fertile hills with rich woods was to be found on this neutral ground, lining the west bank of the Narra river, which fended off the naked waste of sand.

This Narra, whether a natural channel or entirely artificial, had at one time run near Omercote in the desert, and it was thought—if re-opened—that it would restore a great track to agriculture—the newly-discovered hills would then furnish a retreat and shelter from the raging heat to a population settled there. A corps of surveying engineers was obtained from Lord Ellenborough to examine and report on the practicability of this great scheme, and with a benevolent elation of mind at the prospect, Sir C. Napier exclaimed. “If I can restore this immense Mesopotamian plain to cultivation I shall do much for the people of this great country, to which I have done no injury, no wrong, and I shall laugh at the cant of ‘*Fallen Princes.*’ ”

South of Hyderabad was the Delta of the Indus, naturally the richest portion of Scinde, but the most intricate, the most insalubrious, and, because of these things and the wild character of the population, the most difficult to govern. All ameliorations there required great caution, lest discontent should render it a Scindian La Vendée.

Such was the general aspect of the country, and it brought conviction, that the first and greatest efforts for



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the general welfare must be directed to encourage agriculture and small trading, by laws, by public works, and an improved system of irrigation which should give full effect to the annual inundations. River commerce could only be a secondary consideration, though not to be neglected; but it was foreseen that internal and external trading—then principally carried on by caravans—would augment when the vexatious restrictions of the ameers were exchanged for facilities and encouragement, which would lead to the use of the river, and ultimately develop the great resources and advantages of Scinde. In fine, Sir C. Napier's view of the matter was thus laconically expressed. "*Control the robbers. Control the waters. Open the communications, and the natural richness of the land and the variety of produce will do all the rest.*"

There was however a strange obstacle to be overcome—scarcely could a handicraftsman be found! The ameers and sirdars in their short-sighted tyranny had laid that branch of industry waste! They forced carpenters, smiths, builders and other artisans to work for low, or rather nominal wages—seeing that half their scanty earnings were taken as a tax for license to work at all; and of the other half a moiety went to the collector as a present. If the starving workman was importunate, or that his work did not give satisfaction, he was assailed with blows, or suffered the loss of nose or ears; wherefore, knowing that, unlike the poor serf who tilled the soil, they could gain bread in other countries, the artisans gradually abandoned Scinde, and those who remained were hard to find, and so few that even a small house could not be built.

This was an obstacle severely affecting the welfare of the troops, for whom it was the general's anxious desire to provide good barracks—having in every quarter of the globe seen that bad barracks were a powerful cause of crime and death and general unhealthiness with British soldiers. Everywhere he had found them inconveniently planned, ill situated, and exhibiting the extravagance, the negligence and criminal indifference in the authorities

to the lives and morals of the troops. Hence one of his first objects was the construction of barracks, which should give the soldiers a fair chance of health. This want of artisans stopped him short in that and other public works; but to remedy the evil he proclaimed in Scinde and the neighbouring countries his need, inviting craftsmen of all kinds, with assurance of employment at high wages. His reputation for good faith soon brought many, and their demands were, at first, as he expected, exorbitant, exceeding in the proportion of ten to one the wages under the ameers. The English community then took alarm, and many persons proposed, according to Indian notions, that a maximum should be established. To this a deaf ear was turned as being unjust and financially impolitic; and because a few years' experience of such social protection would give the Scindians spirit, if the country were given back to the ameers, to resist the oppressions of those tyrants, and thus mankind would be benefited.

There were however strange notions of political economy afloat. An official person wished to compel the fishermen on the coast to drag for pearl oysters in despite of their objection that few pearls were to be got at that season, and as they were only paid for the number they obtained their families would starve, whereas by fishing for sharks they could support themselves.

"Are we here," the general asked, "to protect the poor or to rob the people of the land?"

"To protect the poor."

"Do you call forcing them to labour for the government and starving some twenty families protection?"

"But they won't starve, they acknowledge they can get pearls."

"Would they fish for sharks if they could get more money by dragging up pearls?"

"No, I suppose not, but the revenue will suffer."

"Have we any right to prevent them winning their bread as they think best themselves?"

"No." So the matter ended.

This liberal policy was successful; the remuneration for

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labour gradually found its level; a high one, but that was an effect of previous oppression; and it was within the general's views to encourage industry at the expense of luxury.

In September the administration was arranged in all its branches, and Sir Charles Napier, whose bodily powers were then nearly expended, transferred his quarters to Kurrachee; partly to recover his strength, principally because it was more suitable for the seat of government, being the key of the country politically, militarily, and commercially. But previous to describing his government when in full activity, a general recapitulation of what he had achieved since his entrance into the country will not be misplaced.

In October 1842, the political and military affairs of Scinde had been placed in his hands at a crisis of great danger, when the disasters in Affghanistan had shaken the British Indian empire to its centre; he was a stranger to the people and the country, and ill seconded by some of the political agents, yet in three months he had laid open the hostile designs and intrigues of the ameeers, had broken their combinations and forced those of Upper Scinde, when on the point of assailing his troops at an inconvenient moment, to fly to Lower Scinde without a sword-stroke. At the same time he detached Ali Moorad the most powerful of them from the family alliance, and made him a firm ally.

In January 1843, he marched into the desert and destroyed the fortress of Emaumghur, thought by the Beloochees to be impregnable.

On the 17th of February, with less than two thousand fighting men he defeated thirty-five thousand Beloochee warriors, killing nearly six thousand in a battle of four hours' duration—which gave him the strong fortress of Hyderabad and six sovereign ameeers as prisoners.

During the remainder of February and the first three weeks of March, he constructed an intrenched camp, and a fort to protect his steamers, while he maintained a very dangerous position with unsurpassed resolution in the face of thirty thousand fresh enemies.

On the 21st of March, he with five thousand men defeated twenty-six thousand strongly intrenched under the Lion at Dubba, in a battle of three hours' duration, in which five thousand Beloochees were killed—and then with matchless activity reducing the fortified towns of Meerpoor on the edge and of Omercote in the heart of the desert, he regained Hyderabad on the 8th of April, before the inundation of the Indus could break up his communications.

During the remainder of April and in May he repaired the fortress of Aliar-ka-Tanda; strengthened Meerpoor; digested and proclaimed the principles and plan of his government, and partly by menace, partly by clemency, brought four hundred of the great sirdars and chiefs of tribes to submit. Meanwhile, keeping the plundering bands of the Delta in check, he organized a steamboat expedition to re-open his communications up the Indus, which had been intercepted by the tribes from the west; and at the same time arranged an immense combination of troops, from posts hundreds of miles apart, to crush the Lion, who had not only raised another army but prepared the conquered Beloochees about Hyderabad for a general insurrection.

Early in June, though the mercury stood at 132° of Fahrenheit in an artificially-cooled tent, he marched from Hyderabad, and having by a dexterous stroke of policy prevented the breaking out of the general insurrection, on the 8th entirely crushed the Lion. While thus employed a sun-stroke reduced him to the last degree of bodily weakness, yet in this state he entirely suppressed the disturbances of the Delta, completed the organization of his government, and brought the country to a state of general tranquillity.

In September, the labour endured, coupled with the effects of the sun-stroke, had so affected his health, that the medical men told him he must go to Kurrachee and quit work or prepare to quit life and work together. Work he would not abandon, but consented to try Kurrachee, and arrived there just ten months after he had first set foot on shore the year before, having in that time

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achieved the conquest of a great kingdom, and organized the government of a numerous people, already taught to regard him as a just ruler.

But now the Bombay faction, those persons who had been constantly denouncing him, and continued to denounce him to the world as a man of unmitigated ferocity, pretended alarm for the consequences of his conciliating system of government.—“He was encouraging and trusting men who were unworthy of trust”—“The Belooch chiefs were deceiving and would betray him”—“Shere Mohamed was arousing all Beloochistan for war”—“conciliatory measures were weakness, and would produce mischief.” Sir George Arthur, the governor of Bombay, was fortunately so far influenced by these assertions as to allude to them in his letters, which elicited the following reply, shaking the flimsy texture of woven folly to pieces, and showing the power with which the land was held.

“Shere Mohamed has gone to Kandahar, leaving his family behind; from which it would seem that he means to return. Meanwhile he is his own ambassador; and a king who is his own ambassador is also a beggar, and not much to be feared. We are friends with the great chiefs of Scinde, and will, I hope, continue so. Those who croak should say what they fear. Suppose the chiefs should prove traitors! Have I not got my troops in hand, and in masses? They are not scattered in feeble detachments, they cannot be cut off. Are not my magazines full? Do I not maintain discipline? Have I not repaired all fortified places that ought to be defended, and thrown up new works everywhere that they are likely to be required? In what point then am I careless; and, unless that be shown, where is the mischief of conciliation? If the whole country were in arms I could do no more than I do now. I am ready to encounter fifty thousand enemies by merely sounding a bugle. I am indeed but half-prepared against climate, but that I cannot help. I cannot make workmen labour as I wish, and were I to punish these wild fellows they would disappear.”

## CHAPTER III.

AT Kurrachee Sir C. Napier opened his administration with a careful examination of the collectors' and engineers' reports, relative to the state of the people under the ameers and the prospects of Scinde under an ameliorated system. It then appeared how terrible a scourge is bad government, how wide it spreads, how deep it penetrates ; how infinitely more devastating and dreadful it is than war, which is generally but a transient blast, exciting the highest energies of man as it passes, and consequently leaving behind it the vigour necessary to repair its evil effects. Nor are those effects so far as agriculture is concerned very lasting, or the plains watered by the Po, and those through which the Scheld passes, which have for centuries been the battle-fields of Europe, would not exhibit, as they do and always have done, the highest cultivation.

In war also, when not too prolonged, the dignity of women gains most, because they are of necessity imbued with high and serious thoughts, and the passions excited tend in both sexes to exalt the imagination and forbid the access of baseness. National not civil warfare however it must be, for the last belongs to bad government, and must be reckoned among its dreadful consequences. In Scinde the unmitigated evils of such government were exhibited in shocking characters ; and it was for the conqueror, the man of war, to remedy them. They were indeed such and so deep-seated, that only a conqueror could arrest their rapid progress towards entire desolation.

The land, as before noticed, belonged entirely to the state, and the ameers raised the chief part of their

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revenue from it; exacting their dues with shocking cruelty—mutilations and tortures. Nominally the sovereign's exaction was but half, yet various minor oppressions made the land-tax upon the ryots amount to two-thirds, or more, of the gross produce. It was levied also capriciously, and at some places in money, but generally in kind, the realizing money upon which gave rise to new exactions and oppressions.

Under the Kalloras the ryots had hereditary tenures, which gave them an interest in the soil; and always Scinde, from its natural fertility, when tolerably governed, had been a rich and productive country. The ameers, seeking only personal profit, broke all the ancient tenures, rendered the husbandman a mere slave, and turned nearly a fourth of the finest land into hunting wildernesses. They gave still greater tracts of equal fertility, as jagheers, to indolent, careless Beloochee chiefs, who cultivated scarcely a tithe, caring for nothing beyond their immediate ease and feudal dignity.

But those jagheerdars were themselves subject to heavy oppressions, and the greatest could not get from their jagheers an amount equal to that obtained by the ameers on government lands; while the minor ones, from inability, or neglect to provide water-courses, indispensable to fertility in Scinde, often found it impossible to collect half that amount: hence their turbulent urging of wars between the ameers to obtain plunder and pay. Their daughters were excluded from inheritance; their sons were only accepted when supposed intelligent enough, and willing, to forward the paramount interests of the ameers: and they had on such occasions to make great presents.

The grain taken for the land-tax was sold by the ameers to their subjects, and often they forced their umbardars or corn-factors, generally Hindoos, to take it at a price fixed by their own authority—thus in 1842-3 Musseer Khan compelled his umbardars to purchase rice in the husk at twenty-six rupees, though they could only obtain from eighteen to twenty rupees for it when cleaned.

Irrigation being the sole source of fertility in Scinde, the ameers were driven by necessity to foster it, and they increased the number of canals cut by former governments for extending the waters of the Indus to inland parts during the periodical inundations. They were partially cleaned once a year at the government expense; which was however small on the whole matter, because the greatest part of the country was a dead level below the water-line of the flood. Where it was more elevated the Persian water-wheel was used. For this indispensable, self-interested, aid to agriculture one-half, in some cases two-fifths of the produce was levied on the jagheerdars, according to the method of irrigation employed—the highest tax being where new canals had been cut. But those proportions and all others were nominal, the mode of ascertaining the government share varied under every ameer, and even varied under the same ameer.

One was the "*buttaee*" system, or taking the government share in kind on the gross produce when harvested. Another, called the "*kasgee*," was by estimating the value of the growing crops, the kardars fixing the government share, which the cultivator was bound to deliver to the ameer's corn-factor thrashed and winnowed. A third mode, called the "*danbundee*," varied only from the *kasgee* in this; the value of the growing crops was in the latter made after measurement of the land—in the former by a mere inspection. Both were preferred by the ryot to the *buttaee*, because under that many impositions were superadded; such as the maintenance of the government "*chokedar*," who guarded the crops while ripening—and the feeding and feeing of many retainers of the kardar, while the latter was making the *buttaee*. The mode also was often varied at the caprices of ameers and kardars; and the ryots were frequently charged with head-money, and the expense of carrying the government grain to the stores. When, as often happened, the ryot had not seed left for his next year's crops he was forced to buy back his own grain at enhanced prices from the ameers.

These oppressions had caused the abandonment of great



CHAP. III. districts of good land, and two tribes, the Juts and Khosas, had gone off bodily to the desert to live by the strong hand. Throughout the country cultivation was withering away, and the ryot passed a life of hopeless wretchedness, while the handicraftsmen nearly disappeared altogether.

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Nor were the manufacturers and tradespeople better treated, though the extreme subtilty of the Hindoo trader gave him some protection. In times not remote, Scinde had been celebrated for its cotton fabrics and shawls. Tattah a town near the lower Indus, was the chief seat of this industry and was then rich and populous: it was now desolate, and the whole country for forty miles was a waste! At Tattah also was found a man who had been shut up twenty-six years in a small cage and become idiotic. It was said, that having committed some crime, the ameers made his family responsible for him, and in terror this method of security was adopted. But the ameers' condemnation as rulers is not to be taken from isolated cases, it was written on the broad surface of the waste around Tattah in unmistakable language. There was the fair sheet of fertile land, spread out by the Almighty, and upon it those men had scrawled in horrid characters, desolation! For miles beyond the precincts of the shrunken ruined city, the plain was covered with tombs of fine cut stone, showing the numbers and riches of the olden people, who had been succeeded by the scanty squalid population now burthening the shrivelled agricultural resources. Brutal government only could be assigned for this change. The ameers had crushed agriculture on land, and on the water had nearly annihilated traffic by vexatious and oppressive imports and transit duties; a few years more and the whole country would have become a howling wilderness, and the tyranny which had thus overwhelmed a community of a million of human beings with misery, in a land fertile enough to subsist ten millions in comfort, would have dissolved of itself. No modern war ever did, or could produce such devastation, such ruin as this; and the Scindian conquest, so foully decried by interested calumniators, was a providential interference to

restore civilization and bring hope to the hearts of a despairing people.

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Although far from having the pestilent climate attributed to it by those who were not allowed to plunder its revenues, Scinde has very unwholesome localities and sickly seasons, caused by the vehement heat, the marshes left by the inundation, the malaria produced by the extensive hunting-jungles, and vast tracts of fertile land left uncultivated by the wretched Scindees who were unable to sustain the oppression of their Beloochee masters. But there are many places exceedingly salubrious; Kurrachee is especially so; and good government with extended cultivation would certainly again render Scinde as healthy as in the days when it supported great cities and teemed with riches. To confer that good government, to restore that salubrity and those riches, was Sir C. Napier's ambition, and he made his public works travel abreast with the other branches of his administration, as far as a country nearly denuded of artisans and the usual resources of civilization would permit.

His views were large, his activity incessant, and as the remains of ancient cities and stations were numerous he naturally looked to them as guides; but the speculations of learned men and travellers about Macedonian stations on the Indus he held in no reverence when he saw the destructive rage of the river, and knew it must have changed its bed a hundred times in as many years. Yet there were places, such as Roree, Sehwan, and Jurruk, a point below Hyderabad, where solid rock controls the rushing waters, and judging those to have been the olden stations of importance he directed his attention to them while considering how to consolidate his conquest. The soldiers' health was however the most pressing consideration, and previous to quitting Hyderabad he had commenced capacious barracks, well raised above the exhalations from the earth and twenty-five feet in height, with double roofs and upper ventilation; and always attentive to the general welfare, he built these barracks of fine burned bricks, with a view to revive the pottery manufacture at Hyderabad, which under

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the ameer's tyranny had decayed. He would have adopted the same model at Kurrachee, but barracks had been commenced there before the war according to the usual habits of those who construct the sties generally appropriated for the British soldier, and he could only amend them by giving verandahs; yet he commenced and in time finished new barracks for a troop of horse-artillery on his own plan, and they remain, a pattern of excellence.

His other public works were as follows. At Hyderabad he repaired and strengthened the ameer's great fortress, completed his own intrenched camp, organized the steamer station at Kotree, and advanced the fort commenced there between the battles. He showed also how the Indus might be restrained from swallowing the land in its capricious gluttony as it descended to the ocean. This Kotree fort was originally raised two hundred and fifty yards from the river on the right bank, and yet three days of inundation brought the main stream within a hundred yards; whereupon, as an experiment, thick stakes, twelve feet in length, were planted along the bank and firmly backed with brushwood, and that simple expedient gave hope of controlling the ravages of a stream which at times would carry away whole shikargahs, to the equal detriment of the land and its own navigation.

Eastward of Hyderabad the large fortress of Aliar-katenda was restored, the walls of Meerpoore were repaired, and bridges were cast over the greater nullahs, between it and Hyderabad, to secure communication during the inundations.

Within the desert Omercote was strengthened, and its communications with Meerpoore, and with Boog in Cutch, was assured by the occupation of many small forts.

Cutch had been taken from the Bombay presidency and placed under Sir C. Napier, but the Bombay political agent had remained there, an honourable amiable man, and a zealous public servant, yet without military knowledge, which had caused embarrassment and some danger during the partisan warfare in the Delta. The general had therefore asked to have Colonel Roberts, the able officer

See Conquest  
of Scinde.

who captured the Lion's brother, placed at Boog in an independent military position. Lord Ellenborough with his usual judicious promptness made him also political agent, a situation for which he was eminently qualified, being intimately acquainted with the Raō and the people, and having extraordinary influence with the Juts, the Khosas, and other wild tribes in that quarter. He was in fine the fittest man possible for the post; but the removal of a civilian, added to the loss of the general control, was clamorously denounced at Bombay as a treacherous oppression; for to replace a man unqualified from peculiar circumstances, with one essentially able, at a crisis of danger, was for the faction an inexpiable offence.

Below Hyderabad, Jurruk was surveyed, with a view to form another great steamer station; and above Hyderabad, a military post was designed for Sehwan, notwithstanding the heat, which is so great there that the natives guard against it during the raging months by keeping their turbans and even their bedclothes constantly wetted: yet with the aid of good barracks, and employing only sepoy under certain conditions, it was hoped to maintain a military post.

North of Sehwan, the places of Sukkur Bukkur and Roree—by the natives run into one name—and all the other military points were strengthened, and a large *serais* or mercantile depôt, was projected. It was designed by Lord Ellenborough, who thus early sought to prepare for a great commerce with Central Asia by the Indus and its confluent. A trading port at Sukkur and docks for building the smaller boats required for the upper branches of the rivers were to be added, and Sir C. Napier established at a later period a great central mart there, especially for horses, by which he hoped to supply the Indian army with the fine strong animals of Affghan and Turkistan at a much less cost than the slight Arabian horses were obtained for. This vast scheme would have quickly established a trade between Central Asia and Bombay, but when several hundreds of fine horses had been sent to Bengal, at less than half the cost of the inferior

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App. XVII.

CHAP. III. Arabs bought for the military service, official jealousy, 1843. folly or self-interest, interfered. An order arrived to stop the trade, which was thus, with many other noble schemes and beneficial plans, thwarted after Lord Ellenborough's departure by the perversity of boards and councils, who would not tolerate such disturbance of their official monotony.

To the eastward of this triple station, the surveying engineers were, as before said, employed to ascertain the facilities of re-opening the Narra river, and restoring to fertility the wooded hills and the long tract of country lining that great watercourse.

On the westward of the Indus, works involving the future prosperity of Shikarpoor and the health of a wide district were projected. That town was rapidly regaining its former opulence and importance through the immigration of merchants and men of capital, who flocked from the surrounding states, and even from distant parts of India, to live under the protection of the just governor of Scinde. Sickness was however always prevalent both at Shikarpoor and at Sukkur, and Sir C. Napier remarked that when the one town was salubrious the other suffered from pestilence, an alternation which followed certain changes of the wind. Wherefore, concluding the malaria came from swampy ground lying between the towns and periodically inundated by the overflowing of the Indus, he projected two great sanitary and commercial works, namely, a raised causeway to connect the places for trading and military intercourse, and a *bund*, or dike, to bar out the inundation: the last a great affair, for the construction, of very considerable height and solidity, was above thirty miles long.

Kurrachee was not neglected in the scheme of public constructions. Plans were prepared for fortifying the cantonments and rendering that station the great military hold of the British in Scinde; and as the population was increasing in a very sensible manner, civil works were projected to support a prosperous commercial city, and make it the great port of the Indus. Many and great

obstacles were however to be overcome. The neighbourhood was hilly, but the actual shore so flat and the harbour so shallow that vessels had always difficulty in making the port, and in the monsoons did not attempt it. To remedy this a lighthouse was built, and to render the port commodious, the construction of a pier or *bunder*, was at once commenced on so great a scale, that, besides the land approaches, it was to be carried nearly two miles into the water.

The works designed to protect the port and the rising city were likewise very considerable, and measures were taken to finish a great watercourse, called the Ghara Canal, commenced at a former date to join the port with the Indus. Swimming-baths were constructed for the use of the troops, and the chief commissary, Major Blenkins, undertook the superintendence of a large tract of ground appropriated for a government garden, which under his able management soon produced every species of vegetable indigenous to Scinde, and all kinds of European esculents besides—and so exuberantly, that while three thousand soldiers were amply supplied without cost to them, and the officers purchased at a cheap rate, enough remained for general sale to repay the expense fourfold. Scurvy which had previously prevailed to an alarming extent then disappeared entirely, and fine plantations of trees were laid out, promising shelter and recreation for the population at no distant time, for vegetation is very rapid and luxuriant in Scinde.

To nourish this garden and provide for the health of the rising town, levels were taken and a plan laid down for turning a small river called the Mullyar or Mulleree, running at the distance of twelve or fourteen miles, not only into the government garden for irrigation and fountains, but into the houses of the town and cantonments for health and convenience. Finally it was to be conducted by pipes to Keymarree point, where the great mole was to end in deep water, and thus supply the shipping, at once; an object of great importance, because the vessels only got water with difficulty from a distance inland, and at a great expense.

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Appendix III.

The facility of executing this great and useful project was ascertained, and the estimated cost not more than a thousand pounds a mile; but the scheme was not ripe before Lord Ellenborough's recall, and the government which succeeded him could never be induced to sanction the expense, or even to notice the letters proposing it, though the health of the soldiers and of the population was grievously affected by the bad water of Kurrachee.

It may here be observed, that in all things Sir C. Napier was strongly supported by Lord Ellenborough; and with respect to the public works enumerated above, some were of that nobleman's conception, in others he had been forestalled. One had been simultaneously planned by both, namely, the restoration of water from the Indus to Cutch, which the Kalloras first, and then the ameers, had with a fiendish policy—only second in enormity to the monstrous conception of Albuquerque to destroy Egypt by turning the course of the Nile—cut off at Shah Bunder in the Delta; thus giving the people of Cutch up as a prey to the encroaching waste. Lord Ellenborough however, merely proposed to make the Indus reflow in the withered district; Sir C. Napier projected the restoration of the Narra, not only to benefit Cutch, but to recover the great and fertile strip of land before mentioned as bounding that river on the west. Unhappily this last project was too great to be executed from the resources of Scinde alone, and the officials of the supreme government always repressed instead of encouraging the noble and beneficent plans of the Scindian governor.

These many and great works were not dealt with in that easy method by which some men have obtained unearned fame—namely, by issuing orders for their construction, leaving to others the finding of means, and to their own successors debt. Sir C. Napier was practically acquainted with every branch of execution, whether for the excavation of canals, the construction of piers or the erection of edifices, and he decided with a full knowledge of the subject in detail. His plans involved indeed great expenses from their number, their magnitude, the

scarcity of artisans, and the high wages these last demanded—wages which he was continually importuned to regulate by tariff—but for him who was casting the foundations of a great community, the permanent rights of labour were far more important than any temporary inconvenience, however great. Hence, holding fast to great principles in all branches of administration, he rigorously squared his undertakings with his means, and for public profit, not display.

His receipts however more than kept pace with his expenses. The revenue under the ameers had sunk to forty lacs, which was far below that raised by the Kal-loras, or even that of the Char-yar. But all their receipts were the offscourings of oppression, not the surplus which the country under honest government could furnish without pressure, and the English ruler peremptorily rejected remorseless taxation. He strove instead to ascertain and restore all the natural resources, to re-open, enlarge and invigorate the closed or shrunken arteries of public prosperity, and trusted to the renewed vitality of the community for future profit. His early revenue was therefore small, the first financial year, reckoned from the battle of Hyderabad, giving only ninety thousand of the four hundred thousand pounds, said to have been paid to the ameers. But war had raged during full six months of that period, much grain had been carried off by the Beloochee troops, and when peace came the English collectors could not for several months extend their operations far from the camps, lest the roving Beloochees should fall on them; for no military escorts were allowed, nor had the general any desire to be involved in premature police difficulties with such fierce and dangerous fellows for the sake of a small increase of revenue. Moreover Ali Moorad's revenue and that of the districts of Subzulcote and Bhoongbarra, made over to Bhawalpoore, had been included in the ameers' receipts.

From this restricted, imperfect collection, a surplus of seventeen thousand pounds in money was obtained after defraying all the civil expenses; and the estimated value of



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the public grain in store was much greater—an example of economy combined with efficient work, contrasting too strongly with the extravagance and inefficiency of most other administrative establishments in India not to give offence. The comparison was dangerous, and to blind the public a clamour was raised about the burthen and expense of Scinde—the statistics published being not only false in themselves but improperly loaded with the cost of the troops quartered there. To this was added also the equally false assertions, that the country was not subdued ; that the *people*—that term being used without discrimination for all the inhabitants—sighed for the return of their *Patriarchal Princes*, and would rise at once for their restoration, but for the enormous force maintained to keep them down.

The expense of the army in Scinde certainly exceeded the revenue derived from that conquest, because a very powerful body of troops were by the general government quartered there ; not for the purpose of overawing the people, who were rejoicing or contented according to their races at the change of government ; but to be ready for the exigencies of an extraneous war, which, actually beginning at Gwalior, was very likely to break out also in the Punjaub, and might from thence extend to Affghanistan. The expectation of it had also rendered Beloochistan and the hill tribes bordering Scinde uneasy and dangerous. It was not *Scinde* therefore, it was *India* that required these troops, and their cost was a general charge which in no manner depended on the state of affairs in the former country. But the most artful turn given to this unfounded clamour was the assumption that any extraordinary number of troops were maintained in Scinde at all ; for, with exception of some increase to the Scinde irregular horse, not an extra man had been raised for the conquest or the holding of that country. The troops employed were of the ordinary standing army of the East, and would have been embodied though Scinde had never been entered. They were merely pushed forward into advanced cantonments on a new frontier,

and it might with equal propriety have been alleged that Hampshire was a peculiar burthen on England because a large garrison and expensive dockyard is there maintained. Scinde, when conquered, was an integral part of the Indian empire and subject to the influences and effects of the general policy of that empire, which was at this time menaced by two great wars.

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It was said also, and with as little truth, that the former frontier of India towards Scinde, being more restricted, would have enabled the Company to reduce their troops; but the new frontier was in fact the shorter and stronger, and the conqueror was soon prepared, and proposed, to maintain his conquest when not menaced by a Seikh war, with as few troops as had been employed in Scinde before the conquest; and not only to pay the whole cost of these troops from the resources of the country but to provide a large surplus for the general treasury.

This clamour would have been here unnoticed, as being part of the filth with which every man who travels fast on a great road must expect to be spattered, if it had only been the cry of those from whom it appeared to come; but it was supported and encouraged by the directors, by the Council of Bombay, and by several members of parliament; and it has ever since been directed unceasingly to the ruin of all the great public works and admirable arrangements of the first Scinde administration. Yet those arrangements and constructions were worthy of all support, having in view to make Kurrachee an emporium for trade with Central Asia, and to organize institutions capable of sustaining a great and prosperous community. Thus, scarcely was the war ended when the surveying engineer establishment was spread over the country, laying down the principal geographical points for an accurate survey, and taking the levels of the land and of the Indus, with the object of organizing a complete scientific system of irrigation. The shikargahs also, covering one-fourth of the fertile country, were taken in hand as having become state property; and they were full of very fine timber, infinitely

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valuable, as supplying fuel for the steam navigation of the Indus; but being too extensive and choked with fallen trees and jungle, the first measure was to give the people the loose timber for the pains of fetching it away. This was followed by the appointment of a commission to class and regulate them as forests, and set out such fertile tracts as might be deemed most fitting for cultivation, to be held under government tenures calculated to encourage agriculture—in fine those receptacles for wild beasts were made to yield revenue to the government, wood and grass to the villages, and timber to the towns, and for export.

While thus providing for internal tranquillity and civilization, Sir C. Napier had also to arrange his foreign policy, for the comprehension of which it is necessary to give a descriptive sketch of the states bordering on Scinde, commencing with Cutch.

The Raō of Cutch was an ally at whose court a British political agent had long resided; and his country was important from its situation and from the unsettled tribes on its borders. Through Cutch, by Deesa, was the direct land communication with Bombay, always of great importance when the monsoons cut off the sea intercourse. It was to secure this communication that Omercote and Meerpoore had been repaired, and so many forts restored, and bridges cast between those places and Hyderabad. Cutch was also of direct interest in regard to the Delta. Colonel Roberts could raise on emergency as many as two thousand Khosas and Juts, who, abhorring their ancient oppressors the Beloochees, were ready to pour with fire and sword upon those of the Delta if an insurrection called for such a measure. Meanwhile his great influence over those tribes secured that line of communication from disturbance.

Eastward of Cutch was Guzerat, under the Guickwar; and northward of Guzerat were the states of Joudpore and Jessulmeer, of old the independent countries of the bravest of the heroic Rajpoots, now subjected allies of the British, having political residents and being entirely under the power of the Indian government; for they were

hemmed in on the east by India, and on the west was the great desert, across which only a few lines dependent on the wells led to Scinde.

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The communication with Jessulmeer was direct from Roree, and on that side, within the desert, was the fort of Shah-ghur long held by Roostum's nephew Mohamed, but evacuated when the Lion was finally defeated. It was then taken possession of by the British, though belonging to Ali Moorad as a turban appendage, compensation being promised, but neither the Bombay nor the supreme government up to this time have redeemed that promise!

Plan 1.

From this geographical trace it may be seen, that the eastern frontier of Scinde, which was however very undefined, because the ameers with a sinister policy had removed the boundary-marks and destroyed all records, was defended by Meerpoore, Omercote and Shah-ghur; that it was fringed by allies who had no interest to betray, or make war, and being watched and controlled by a garrison at Deesa and political agents at Joudpoor and Jessulmeer, were unable to effect mischief if so inclined. The principal passages across the desert were thus secured, and the communication between Scinde and Bombay was assured by land when the monsoons debarred intercourse by sea.

Tracing the line of frontier further northward, a state of great importance presented itself, namely Daodpootra or Bhawalpoor. It had long been protected from Runjeet Sing's ambition by the British government, and Lord Ellenborough had recently restored to the rajah the districts of Subzulcote and Bhoongbara, formerly torn from him by the ameers. He appeared faithful, but Sir C. Napier was disquieted that great interests should depend on an eastern prince, who might be coerced by the Seikhs, then very menacing towards the British. The rajah's subjects also leaned strongly towards those who desired the downfall of the Feringhees; and his territory, lying between the great desert and the lower Sutlej and lining the banks of the latter, gave him power to intercept the direct communication between the north-west provinces of India and Scinde, by land and by water. This might prove infinitely

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dangerous if war happened with the Seikhs, and hence, as the faith of the supreme government was so pledged that the rajah's dominions could not be absorbed while he was true to the alliance—which he could yet betray at a critical moment without previous indications of enmity—the general used every means to conciliate and attach him more closely.

On the north-east, Scinde was closed by the Mooltan country, which spread between the lower Sutlej and the Indus, descending below the junction of those rivers to Kusmore. The dewan of this territory, a tributary of Lahore, called Sawan Mull, father of the since noted Moolraj, was reputed able and prudent, and professed great friendship for the conqueror of Scinde; but the latter easily detected the Seikh feeling behind the screen of protestation, and towards Sawan his bearing was that of offering no offence, yet plainly intimating that any hostile indication would be instantly resented.

Plan 1 & 2.

North-west of Scinde was Cutch-Gundava, belonging to the khan of Khelat, and connected with the lower Indus by a range of peculiarly savage rocks called the Cutchee hills, which run nearly perpendicularly westward, from the river, towards the Bolan mountains. In those hills dwelt dangerous tribes, namely, the Mazarees next the Indus, then the Bhoogtees, Jackranees, Doomkees and Kujjucks, all of which were subdivided into smaller tribes.

North of the Doomkees and Bhoogtees were the Murrees and Keytrians. One branch of the Mazarees, lying on the Indus, owed allegiance to the Mooltan man; but the other tribes were claimed as subjects by the khan of Khelat. The Murrees denied his supremacy, and were themselves of better customs and civilization than their neighbours. They had been unjustly meddled with during the Affghan war by the political agents, and their principal fort of Kahun had been occupied; but they defeated one British detachment under Major Clibborne, destroyed another under Lieutenant Clark, a young officer of promising ability and heroic courage, and finally forced the

political agent to recall Lieutenant Brown from Kahun, after a long and most intrepid defence.

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The Jackranees, Bhoogtees, Doomkees, and one branch of the Mazarees, were avowedly predatory, fierce, daring absolute robbers, but calling themselves *Lootoos* or plunderers. They had indeed some chivalric feelings and customs, yet were still robbers, ferocious and devastating, despising civilization, thinking all property belonged of right to the sharpest sword, and the plains made by nature and cultivated by man for their spoil. Very powerful they were, and northward and westward they had a vast sweep of mountains inhabited by kindred tribes to retire upon if pressed by superior forces, while on the south they were defended by the desert of Kusmore, eighty miles wide, which separated them from Scinde. This waste, they, knowing the wells and preparing beforehand in the recesses of their wild hills for expeditions, could easily pass, but it was hard for troops to cross and attack their rocks in return, which made them incredibly insolent.

Westward of these people was the Khelat country, inhabited by Beloochees. During the Affghan war their capital had been stormed, and their khan, a popular prince, killed; wherefore the nobles were enemies of the British. But the son of the slain khan, a youth of eighteen, had been restored, had received money and personal kindness from Sir C. Napier, and being of a grateful disposition was, so far as he was his own master, friendly; wherefore the general corresponded with him amicably, giving advice and support against his turbulent sirdars, and against the Affghans of Candahar, who continually menaced him.

On the west, the Scindian frontier rested on the Hala mountains, and between them and the Indus, next the desert of Kusmore, was the country of the Chandikas and other tribes, previously of the same plundering habits with the Cutchee tribes, but now subjects of the British government. Below them to the southward were the Rins and Lhugarees, touching on the Indus at Sehwan; and between that point and the sea-coast were the

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Jokeas. Beyond the Jokeas was the jam of Beilas country, a dependant on Khelat. These different tribes partly occupied the plains, partly the mountains, for the frontier of Scinde included the eastern slopes of the Hala range; but the western slopes were inhabited by the Khelat tribes, who shall be in future called the *Mountain tribes*, in contradistinction to the Cutchee *Hill tribes*, whose fastnesses, though of wonderful ruggedness and strength, were not of altitude entitling them to be ranked as mountains.

All these tribes, Scindian and Khelatian, the general sought by a mixture of generosity, justice and severity, to conciliate with the new order of things, and he was not unsuccessful; his rough dealing with the jam of the Jokeas has been related in the Conquest of Scinde, and coupled with the following treatment of Wullee Chandia, the head of the Chandikas, illustrates his policy. This last chieftain had followed the British army with ten thousand warriors so closely, just before the battle of Meeanee, that he was within one march of it when the action was fought; and if Outram's imbecile counsel had then weighed so much as to cause the delay of only a few hours, the Chandikas would have fallen on the rear during the fight. Wullee's march was stopped by the victory, and he retreated across the Indus to his own country, where in concert with others he resisted all Ali Moorad's attempts to take possession of the lands ceded in right of the turban. These confederates being too strong for the ameer, he proposed a conference, to which they came, twenty-nine in number, with a hundred and fifty followers; but Ali having prepared an ambuscade killed several and captured the rest, amongst them Wullee Chandia.

Proud of this perfidy, he brought his prisoners to the general, expecting applause, while the captives looked only for that death they would themselves have inflicted in like circumstances. Both were disappointed, Ali was publicly and severely reproached for his want of faith and compelled to give all the chiefs presents in amends;

and they were restored not only to liberty but to their possessions, with encomiums on their bravery, and expression of sorrow for the base treatment they had experienced. The scene with Wullee was thus described at the time. "He is a fine vigorous old man, resembling in look a large owl; for his white hair and beard, thick and clustering like feathers, discloses of his bronzed countenance little more than a very hooked nose and two immense round black lustrous eyes, which he kept fixed on the general without a wink, and in perfect silence, until the speech which announced his restoration to freedom was interpreted. Then he eagerly asked, 'Is this true? Am I free? May I go?' 'Yes!' The old man rushed without another word from the house, and made for his own country with headlong haste; and it was falsely supposed, with a heart more touched by the wrong than the redress; but when safe amongst his tribe he exclaimed 'The Feringhee general has given me my life, my land and my sword, I am his slave.'" The course of this work will show how he kept his word.

Having thus described the frame of nations and tribes, of mountains and deserts, in which Scinde was set, it remains to treat of Ali Moorad, whose dominions, situated within the boundaries, seemed as a flaw in the jewel; for this prince still governed after the manner of the ameers, and though his ruling was of necessity ameliorated, the contrast between it and the new government offered a striking contrast. That he was allowed to have any dominions at all was a constant theme for abuse with the degraded faction at Bombay, which, loud in reprobation of the dethronement of the ameers who were enemies of the British, was indignant that he amongst them who was faithful should be treated with justice. "He was a vile traitor because he had not fought alongside of the other ameers—he was infamous, a coward, a liar, a monster, because he had not aided to destroy the English army! Sir C. Napier had trusted entirely to him—had heaped presents upon him—had added to his territories and was his dupe."

These efforts to pervert the public mind were so far



CHAP. III. successful as to produce a vague general notion that Ali  
 1843. Moorad had been trusted, had conferred and received presents, and had augmented his dominions. Outram even asserted, in an official document, that a promise of additional territory had been made; having no other foundation for the tale than the working of a brain, at that time more confused than ordinary by anger and mortified vanity. It is therefore fitting here, to give a succinct sketch of the real intercourse, though involving some repetition of what has been already told in the Conquest of Scinde.

When the resolution of Lord Ellenborough to form new treaties with the ameers was first made known, Ali was as inimical as the rest to the English alliance, until he found that Roostum's eldest son, Hussain, a violent man, had by threats induced the old ameer to contemplate a violation of the laws of succession established by the "*Char-yar*," which conferred hereditary rights on the brother in preference to the son. Before that period Ali had been forced to take arms against Roostum and his sons, and had defeated them; yet was so mild in victory that the others deceived him by feigned reconciliation, and thus regained all they lost by arms.

Appendix XX. When Sir C. Napier took Scindian affairs in hand Ali demanded a conference, at which he asked for aid against his family opponents; but was distinctly told to expect neither aid nor opposition, save what the treaties warranted. Soon afterwards Roostum renounced the turban in favour of Ali Moorad, and this being according to the "*Char-yar*" law of succession, and consonant to the Mahometan law and the treaties, the English general was bound to maintain it; but he first ascertained that it was a voluntary act. Roostum subsequently asserted that he was coerced, and, revoking the instrument, conferred the turban on his son; but this investiture was contrary to the law of the family, and to the Mahometan laws, and so far from being coerced he had refused the English general's offered protection at the time.

With the turban went certain possessions in the nature

of crown property ; the fortress of Emaum-ghur was in that predicament ; and it was under Ali Moorad's authority as wearer of the turban that Sir C. Napier took that place—it was with his concurrence also, for the ameer fired the first gun with his own hand, that it was destroyed. The desert expedition therefore, was not, as falsely represented by an Indian official personage, an act of aggressive war, but the fulfilment of a formal treaty which bound the British to support each ameer in defence of his rights ; for Ali Moorad was, against all law and justice, there opposed by his nephews in rebellion : but Sir C. Napier placed so little trust in him, that he was compelled to march with the troops lest he should deny having assented to the operation. Afterwards, under Lord Ellenborough's instructions, Ali was, as having been faithful to his treaty, confirmed in all his possessions, although the English map of Scinde was thereby blotched and the unity of territory acquired by the conquest broken : but this example of good faith had a beneficial influence on all the wild chieftains, who judged from thence that the restoration of their possessions would not be disturbed.

Lord Ellenborough had also empowered the general to define and settle the boundaries of Scinde on all sides, and he had, consequently, negotiations with the khans of Khelat, Bhawalpoore, Jessulmere, Joudpoore, and with Ali Moorad. He had therefore to confer land, to grant and withhold advantages, a power which would in the days of Clive have been worth many lacs of rupees ; and it was natural for the Bombay faction, sighing for such large opportunities, to suppose this had not been thrown away. Nevertheless the only present received by Sir C. Napier was a cock and some addled eggs from Ali Moorad, when in the desert ; and he was so little grateful, that when the ameer asked for an elephant as a mark of honour it was given with this characteristic speech and condition. "I take no presents, and cannot afford to make any ; and if the governor-general objects to this, you must return the animal or pay its value into the treasury."

To maintain this ameer's right of territory was imperative ; yet there was no point of Indian policy more

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condemned by Sir C. Napier, than the having native sovereigns within the empire. "The princes and nobles of the East" he said, "hated the British as intruders, but the people liked them as being better rulers. To the people then the British should look for the permanency of their empire; whereas, by leaving them to the ruling of their own princes and nobles, they were retained in slavish ideas of obedience to men who were enemies, and who thus obtained a supporting power which might and ought to be used against them—and it also retarded civilization." In this view he aimed to raise an independent spirit in the Scindees which would lead them to resist the restoration of the ameers' or any other tyranny.

Ali Moorad's perfidy to Wullee Chandia, induced the general to watch him closely. He placed a political agent at his court, and interfered, though amicably, in the choice of his ministers; for the ameer, young and sensual, neglected business, and it was important not to let an enemy of the British lead his councils. He was also stringently taught, as shall be hereafter shown, that on good behaviour his sovereignty depended; a teaching essential to the security of Scinde; for his territory was so situated on both sides of the Indus that it commanded the navigation, cut off Roree, Sukkur and Shikarpoor from Hyderabad, and was on the north all but in contact with the robber tribes. On the south-east it approached Sehwan, where the Hala mountains strike on the Indus; and it was everywhere fertile and dotted with forts—that of Dejee-ka-kote being surprisingly strong from situation. To his court all the Talpoor princes still at large naturally looked; so did the Affghan chiefs of Candahar, and the sirdars of Khelat; Dejee could cover a large assemblage of armed men, and Ali had a right to keep Beloochees and Patans in his pay.

High faculties were required to maintain the conquest, and they were signally displayed, since it was maintained without commotions, while a new system of government was established with so much judgment that the delivered Hindoos and Scindees were not more attached to it than

the vanquished Beloochees; but the acquisition had been made by the sword, and always the general nourished a salutary fear of his arms, by keeping his force so efficient, and so disposed, that neither internal nor external enemies could draw reasonable hope from its weakness. This vigilance deprived the Bombay faction—certainly not the least virulent enemy of tranquillity—of hope from insurrection, and therefore a new clamour was raised, that the occupation of Scinde had weakened the frontier of India. When noise and falsehood are the main resources of faction, a dogma, founded on some general truth crookedly applied, is always given as a rallying cry to save the multitude the trouble of reasoning; here it was said, “that while Scinde was under the ameers India had a desert frontier to the west, and deserts are the strongest of all frontiers.” That deserts are generally the strongest frontier was the small nucleus of truth crookedly applied; for the desert frontier of India was not given up, but strengthened.

Who were the external enemies on the west? Affghans and Beloochees of Khelat, who might move of their own hatred or be pushed on and supported by Persia at the instigation of Russia.

Who were those on the north and north-west? The same Affghans stimulated by the same powers; and the Seikhs.

But for Persia, the Gedrosian desert of Alexander is more formidable than the Thur which separates Scinde from India; and the Persians must invade by Herat and northern Affghanistan—to descend afterwards by the Bolan Pass, or slide down behind the Hala range and enter Scinde by the coast-line. In the first case they would come upon Bukkur and Hyderabad, in the second upon Kurra-  
chee, three fortified places which they must take, and after passing the Indus would still have the Thur desert between them and India.

Were a great combination of nations, Persians, Toorkomans, Affghans, Beloochees and Seikhs to be precipitated upon India, the line of Ferozepoore, where the Sutlej

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offers but a feeble barrier, would probably be chosen, but there the vaunted desert frontier ceases. Then, and in all cases, Scinde under the ameers, and also Bhawalpoor, would have been forced to place their resources at the invader's disposal, whether for passing the Thur against the Bombay Presidency; or for pouring by Ferozepoore upon Delhi; but while a British force held Scinde, and was based on Kurrachee, having a sea communication with Bombay, how could the invaders pass the Thur? They would not be able to pass the Indus, guarded as it would be by steamers and strengthened by fortresses. Wherefore the conquest of Scinde, which attached a delivered people to the British government, strengthened instead of weakening the Indian frontier on the south-west; and furnished a secure base for an army to operate against the flank and rear of invaders moving by the north-western opening against Delhi. It also rendered it unnecessary longer to keep troops, as had always been done before, at Deesa, Joudpoore, Jessulmere and other points, to watch the ameers, who were significantly called by the duke of Wellington, the "*pirates of the southern Indus.*" In fine it was a conquest beneficial to India, to humanity, to commerce, and all the mental garbage of newspapers will be unable to sully its reputation; but it may be assumed as a maxim, that whenever a clamour is raised by many newspapers together something unsound is at bottom; for neither oppressed men, nor straightforward men, have much influence with such publications, and the concurrence of many in one cry indicates active intrigue.

Sir C. Napier had to guard five hundred miles of communication, and the four great stations of Kurrachee, Hyderabad, Sukkur and Shikarpoor.

Shikarpoor, being close to the Cutchee hills, required a strong garrison, which however depended for support on the greater military station of Sukkur.

Hyderabad, governing all the central parts of Scinde and the head of the Delta, was secured by the ameer's great fortress, the intrenched camp, and the steamer station at Kotree.

Kurrachee had walls, a native fort and an intrenched cantonment.

Around these stations, each of which had its peculiar commandant, the regular forces were destined to move if invaded, and they were kept well supplied with military stores and provisions, while the armed steamers preserved the water communication between them. But to enable the troops to move freely to a distance, a general system of fortification was pushed forward as speedily as the great dearth of workmen and materials would permit, for Scinde had been a country of destruction not of production. The plan was the same for all, namely, one large fort or citadel as a safe magazine; and in connection with it, according to the localities, martello towers to be defended by a few men. On this plan Shikarpoor, a walled place and with three native forts, only required martello towers; Sukkur having its stores in Bukkur, which was impregnable to any force not having a mortar train, was in the same predicament. Hyderabad had the ameer's fortress, which was to be connected with the intrenched camp like Athens with the Piræus, but by towers instead of long walls; and the haven for steamers on the opposite bank of the river was protected by the fort of Kotree.

Kurrachee, the point of connection with Bombay and the place where the last stand must be made against invasion or general insurrection, was to be protected by a regular fortress having eight or ten bastions, and furnished with a tank of never-failing pure water. The magazine-forts at each station were calculated for a garrison of three hundred men, though capable of holding more; and the martello towers were to have twelve men with an 18-pounder. A wing of a regiment therefore sufficed for the security of each station, and two regiments and a half would secure all the great points. Each place of arms was safe, because they were all impregnable to storm, and no insurgents could have a battering train; the great bulk of the army was therefore free to move in mass to any quarter, which in a country so extended and so inter-

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CHAP. III. 1843. sected by canals and shikargahs was no mean military consideration.

It has been before shown how the police and irregular cavalry were grouped around the masses of regular troops, to preserve internal tranquillity and watch the robber tribes; but with so long a frontier exposed to so many barbarous plundering hordes some additional protection was required; and in that view leave, or rather instructions were obtained from Lord Ellenborough, for the same design occurred simultaneously, to form a fighting camel corps, on the model of the dromedary corps employed by Napoleon in Egypt; and the general also added to the Scinde horsemen a second regiment which was commanded by Captain Malcolm, a young officer of courage and ability. The camel corps was under Lieutenant Fitzgerald, whose invincible strength, courage and activity, was admirably suited for the sudden rapid and arduous duties expected from his corps, which was thus organized.

Each camel carried two men, one armed with carabine and sword, the other with a musquatoon and bayonet, the musquatoon being formed by cutting down and repairing condemned arms found in the Kurrachee stores. One man guided the animal and fought from its back; the other was to act as an infantry soldier, because the robbers were habituated to fire from the fissures and holes in the plains, where neither lance nor sword could reach them. If assailed by superior numbers the camels were to kneel in a ring with heads inward and pinned down, thus furnishing a bulwark for the men; and it was proposed to give the soldiers spears also, but this was relinquished at Fitzgerald's desire: the question however remains open, because the corps never had to break through a body of swordsmen, which would have been the test of utility for the spear. On the camels were carried the men's packs, cooking utensils and beds, the latter forming part of the saddle; and thus a body of soldiers capable of acting as infantry when required, having no tents, commissariat, or baggage to embarrass them, could make marches of sixty miles in twenty-four hours even with the bad camels at

this time furnished by Scinde; but of eighty or even ninety miles with finer animals, and consequently no other troops could keep up with or escape from them. When formed, the camel corps was sent to aid the cavalry employed to watch the Cutchee hillmen.

With this general view of the condition of Scinde and its political and social relations to surrounding tribes and nations, the narrative of events which follow can be read with a better understanding.

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## CHAPTER IV.

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DURING the voyage to Kurrachee Sir C. Napier recovered some strength, but his medical advisers still urged a change of climate, to which he would not consent, because the great machine he was constructing could not advance without his superintendence, and he held his life no counterpoise to that interest in the public scale. "There are," he said, "many men more competent to govern this country, but they are not on the same vantage ground; they have not the influence of victory; the horses here are wild, but know my hand; with another they would start off while he was gathering up the reins."

At first his government proceeded happily, but soon, as if to try the temper of his spirit, a strange pestilence came raging through the land, bearing down men and institutions. In the course of October and November, not one person, from the commander-in-chief to the drummer, in an army seventeen thousand strong, escaped its visitation: there was nobody strong enough even to make out a report, and in some regiments no medical man was able to attend the hospitals. It did not however assail all quarters at once, it ran as it were through the forces, and at first was supposed to be the result of cessation from fatigue and excitement; but that notion vanished when the people of the country fell even more rapidly than the soldiers.

It stopped agriculture, for the people were too ill to work; it drove away all the foreign artisans in fear; it spread north, east, south and west, and was by all men

regarded as a strange unrecognized visitation. Fortunately it was not very fatal, but with officer and soldier it laid mind and body prostrate; very few had energy to rally for a long time, and at one period the Cutchee hillmen might certainly have sacked Shikarpoor and Sukkur, and devastated Upper Scinde, for there was not a soldier on his legs to oppose them, and the moral influence of the general alone kept those plunderers in check. He was suffering severely himself, but his spirit did not sink. Presenting an undaunted front, his language to the tribes and surrounding nations was even more imperious than when his army was effective and flushed with recent victory. But while his official correspondence proves that he gave himself no relaxation from labour, his private letters show how hard the bodily struggle was, and how he yearned for that ease which his sense of duty would not let him accept.

During this pestilence the Bombay faction laboured to excite the Beloochees to fall on the sickly soldiers, and the Bombay Times pointed out in detail the best mode for killing them; but these flagitious efforts had no effect; tranquillity prevailed, and in the Delta so great a change had occurred, that when all the collector's escort fell ill the Beloochee peasants of the place voluntarily guarded him. Everywhere officers travelled or followed the chase, singly or in company, traversing the country in various directions, and in safety; to travel in the immediate neighbourhood of Bombay was far more dangerous than to penetrate the wildest tracts of Scinde, and yet it was shamelessly asserted at the former place, that the Scindians were panting for an opportunity to massacre their oppressors! But the people knew the conquerors were not oppressors; they saw that they assumed no haughty superiority, offered no insult, made no exactions; their own customs were respected where not opposed to morality; taxation was reduced, vexatious restrictions were abolished, agriculture encouraged, trade fostered—and as the chief was, so were the subordinates in office. The money spent by the troops was also felt as a sensible

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advantage, because it was not first taken from the labouring man by taxation ; and therefore they had not to work twice for it, as the celebrated William Cobbett said in reply to Justice Bailey, when, with the political folly of an English judge seeking to prop a harsh sentence, the latter announced from the bench that "Taxation was a benefit to the labouring man because the money went back to him as wages." In fine there was no oppression and therefore no oppressors to rise against.

Early in December the sickness abated, but it was followed in the spring by a flight of locusts which devoured nearly all the rising harvest, scanty in itself from the little labour previously bestowed during the pestilence. Those destroyers were succeeded by an anomalous rising of the Indus which increased the distress, and meanwhile menacing political and military events demanded the utmost vigilance and extensive preparations.

It has been shown that, strictly speaking, only the eastern side of the Indus and the country immediately about Kurra-  
chee were subdued ; for though the jam of the Jokeas, whose territory extended from near the latter place to Sehwan, was entirely controlled, the country above Sehwan belonged to chiefs who had made no submission, and were intimately connected by blood and habits with the Khelat mountaineers and the robbers of the Cutchee hills. And these last, though disregarding the Bombay exhortations to a general insurrection, were not unlikely to be stirred to plundering incursions by the money which the Lion and Ahmed Khan Lugharee might offer them. External circumstances also tended to excite those tribes to mischief ; for in December it was secretly known that a great confederacy was in progress to overthrow the British power in India, and the state of Scindhia, better known as Gwalior, was breaking out into open war. The Mahometan population of the empire was not to be trusted ; Nepaul was more menacing than friendly ; the Seikhs, in a state of military anarchy, seemed disposed to cross the Sutlej ; and their kindred in the protected states on the left bank of that river were ready to join them. The spies said the

Affghans were likewise preparing to move down the Bolan pass upon Shikarpoor.

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With these stimulants to their natural cupidity, the Khelat mountaineers and Cutchee robbers could not be expected to remain quiet; already one incursion had been made by the Doomkees near Larkaana, and that tribe was peculiarly connected with the Khelat sirdars and Affghans of Candahar, who desired to overthrow the young khan because of his alliance with the British. There was fear therefore that a general burst of these wild mountaineer tribes would devastate the western side of Scinde; for to use the English general's words "Gwalior and the Punjaub were in arms, the independent hill tribes were like banditti listening for the sound of carriage-wheels, the Scindian Beloochees on that side were between a growl and a bite, and Ali Moorad apparently turning traitor in the midst of the sickening troops."

Amongst those who gave secret information was the Persian prince, Agha Khan, whose real title was the Emir of the Mountains, he being the lineal heir of the ancient "*assassin*." Though no longer the terrible being who made kings tremble in the midst of armies, this wandering occult potentate still possessed secret but great power; and his people, spread over Asia from the Indus to the Mediterranean, supplied him with a revenue, and with information sure and varied. He had come to Scinde with a train of horsemen before the conquest, knew of the amceers' design to assail the residency, had remonstrated against it, and afterwards gave such information on that subject as to render Outram's imbecile vanity on that occasion most painfully prominent. He and his horsemen had acted on the side of the British during the war, and he received a pension from the supreme government; but his position and proceedings were suspicious, and he was watched and even prevented quitting Scinde, when he designed to make some intriguing religious excursion to Bhagdad. Nevertheless he was on friendly terms with the general, and now told him the Affghans of Candahar, and the Beloochees of Khelat were in close amity with the Lion—that all the

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Scindian chiefs west of the Indus had secretly assured that ameer they were ready to raise a religious cry against the British and restore him to his throne—that Ali Moorad had written to the same effect, saying eight thousand of the troops were then prostrate with fever, the remainder tottering from debility, and if the Affghans would only send two thousand men down the Bolan Pass they could destroy all the Feringhees. To this the government moonshee, Ali Akbar, whose intelligence and fidelity were alike unquestionable, added, that there certainly was a great combination of the Indian powers in progress, and a secret intercourse going on; but he thought the nations in the immediate neighbourhood of Scinde dreaded the “Bahadoor Jung,” the great warrior, so they called the general, too much to break out unless some remarkable opportunity tempted them.

Of Ali Moorad the moonshee did not speak, but there were grounds for suspecting that ameer's fidelity, besides the report of Agha Khan. He had dismissed his minister Sheik Ali Houssein, the fast friend of the British, and had written to the general so insolently as to indicate hostility. This it was supposed he dared not have done, unless some great support was at hand, which could only be looked for towards Gwalior, the Punjaub and Affghanistan—for Ali knew well the Beloochees alone could not contend against the British.

Very gloomy was the prospect of affairs, and it must be admitted that great moral intrepidity and a sure perception of chances were required to control the crisis, when it is considered that Sir C. Napier, just emerging from war, and while establishing a new government to which so many interests and different races of men were to be reconciled, had his whole military force suddenly paralyzed in his hands by an unheard-of sickness, which at the same time nearly stopped the social existence of the nation—that he was menaced by foreign invasion, by the supposed treachery of Ali Moorad, and the partial insurrection of the western chiefs, at a moment when he was personally reduced to extreme bodily debility by an

illness so depressing to the mind, that at Kurrachee alone several officers had become insane for a time, others childish, and four committed suicide. Finally, that while struggling under these accumulated difficulties, those from whom he had a right to expect every aid and support, were assailing him with secret enmity and the most incredible virulence of abuse! Nevertheless with a wonderful moral force he carried himself and the people he ruled, triumphantly and without commotion through all difficulties.

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His first efforts were directed to obtain sure intelligence that he might regulate his operations justly, and he had before established several good channels, independent of accidental sources such as the Persian prince afforded. The Sheik Ali Houssein, a man of great shrewdness and wide influence, was one of these channels; and a sure one, for he knew his own fortune was bound up with the British supremacy in Scinde. Ali Moorad disliked him, and by the dethroned ameers he was counted a traitor; he was also odious to the Patans in his master's pay, because of his nepotism, the rock on which men in his position generally split; but these things made him the more adhesive to British interests. Through the rich Hindoo merchants holding jagheers from the Scindian government, whose interested vigilance never slept, and whose means of gaining intelligence were extraordinary, sure intelligence was had, and the military spies were good and active. Wherefore, feeling he could not be politically surprised, the general sought to dissipate the storm as regarded Scinde with a combination of moral and military influence, founded on his judgment of the barbaric character generally and of Ali Moorad's in particular; but first he put his outposts on their guard by the following instructions addressed to the officer commanding at Shikarpoor, the point most exposed to an attack from the Affghans and Cutchee robber tribes.

“Be vigilant, and with your hundreds, aided by a fort, you may defy as many thousands of the enemy; yet with British soldiers against Beloochees and Affghans a fort

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should only be a refuge for sick men and stores. If an enemy approaches you, attack him and put it clean out of his head that he is going to besiege you. If he comes within ten miles of Shikarpoor, get near him in the night and fall on him at dawn if he is not too numerous; if he is too strong let him come closer to the town before you attack him; but in any case attack.—The only difference is that if he is very strong he must be allowed to come closer to the fortress than if he is weak. If his numbers be overwhelming you must wait for aid from Sukkur, and the commandant there has orders to move to your succour, yet in a mass, nothing must be done by driblets. Bukkur must be secured, but every man not employed for that object must march on Shikarpoor, whence you must be prepared to sally with your whole force the moment the guns outside are heard. I do not apprehend any attack but forewarned is forearmed."

This warning was a precaution against the Lion, who was among the Affghans of Candahar, and in communication with the robber tribes, and hence, down the Bolan Pass and from the Cutchee hills the coming of his war, if it came at all, was to be expected; and it would be no slight one, seeing the robbers alone could bring down twenty thousand of the fiercest swordsmen of Beloochistan, and if reinforced by Affghans, and aided by any treachery on the part of Ali Moorad, they could not but prove formidable.

Ali Moorad's temper and projects were next to be tested. He had a reputation for courage and hardihood, but Sir C. Napier, knowing him to be addicted to drinking and the zenana, thought his intrepidity would not prevent him from securing his own safety in Dejee previous to the breaking out of mischief; for that fortress, perched on the summit of a lofty isolated rock, was by the Beloochees considered impregnable. It was so to anything but bombardment, and the general, in anticipation, sent a train of mortars,—some of which he immediately obtained from Bombay,—up the Indus to Sukkur, which was only three days' march from Dejee. This measure,

ostentatiously taken to give notice that he was jealous of the ameers' conduct, being arranged, he asked to have the regiments most afflicted with the sickness relieved by fresh troops; and he would have gone himself to Sukkur, but that he feared a fresh access of fever, which might from its peculiarly depressing effects prostrate his energies when he most needed them. Indeed he was then so weakened that his medical advisers and all his friends earnestly pressed him to quit Scinde as the only hope of saving life; but to their solicitations he replied thus.

“If it were to save, not mine but a thousand lives I would not go. Were I to do so there would be wild work here; and a man wanting my accidental advantages could not bring affairs to a happy conclusion. I cannot therefore in honour leave Lord Ellenborough in the lurch of this political sea. I know my team, but a far more able man could not get on the box before the horses would start off. Chieftains and tribes who obey me willingly because of my victories would rise against a new comer; from me they would take a kick with more patience than a sour look from another whose force they had not proved in battle. ‘General! give the word and I follow you with ten thousand shields against the Seikhs. All Scinde will rise at your command against them. You are my king, I will hold your stirrup and never quit it.’ This speech was recently made to me by the Belooch commander-in-chief who opposed me at Meeanee, and I believe him. An English general may not try experiments, but were I a sovereign I could lead all the Beloochees against the Seikhs, and do many greater things that are not to be attempted by a servant. With the *prestige* of victory anything may be effected with these people; but a new man without it, having at this moment the Lion and the Affghans on the west, the Seikhs on the north, and an army crippled with sickness, would be lost if a rising were to take place. Every blockhead would then be pressing advice on him, he would be unable to distinguish the right road and all would be confusion. How then can I consistently with my duty to Scinde, to England,



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to Lord Ellenborough, throw up the reins at such a time? Impossible! I must stay and bide what will. There are thousands here in more danger from disasters than I am in from sickness, and I will sink or swim with those poor fellows."

In this mood he awaited the crisis, resolved, if Ali Moorad gave offence, to assail Dejee, and so doing he judged he should by one and the same blow reduce that ameer and suppress any general conspiracy of the Belooch chieftains—such as the Persian prince had supposed to be in progress—arguing thus. "If Ali resists me there must be a general confederacy, for I know he is not, though so reputed, of that hardihood to fight alone; and if I take him in his celebrated fortress, it will so terrify the tribes, that their confederacy will melt away or they will prematurely break out during the siege, for they think Dejee invulnerable; but sixteen heavy shells falling into it every five minutes will break down that conceit."

To test Ali Moorad's firmness, when the mortars had reached Sukkur and attracted his attention, a gentle recommendation to restore Sheik Ali Houssein was forwarded. It had no effect, and then so rough an admonition followed, that Sir George Arthur and the commander-in-chief Sir Jasper Nichols, who happened to be at Bombay, objected to its being sent thinking it would force the ameers into hostility. Sir C. Napier had judged his man more sagaciously. While the Bombay faction was representing him as the dupe and rewarder of Ali Moorad's treachery, he forced that prince to an entire submission. The sheik was restored to the ministry with an assurance that the ameer had never thought of setting aside that worthy councillor—that his own back had been bent at the idea of the governor's displeasure, but now finding his conduct approved, his heart danced like the sunbeams on the waters of delight—with other like flowers of Eastern composition,—upon which the general drily remarked that the "weight of sixteen mortars would have rendered the complaint in the spine incurable." At this time he described Ali Moorad as an inebriate, hunting, zenana-

going fellow, who would, if not stayed by fear, help to cut the English off as readily as any of the dethroned ameers; afterwards he judged better of his disposition, though not of his head, believing drink rather than treachery had excited him to insolence.

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Internal treason being thus restrained, external dangers were regarded with less anxiety, and by the end of January the resolution with which the crisis had been outfaced was rewarded by a change in the aspect of affairs. The troops were then rapidly recovering strength, the field artillery had been well horsed, the police all armed, clothed, and sufficiently disciplined to contend with the wild forces of any enemy. Colonel Roberts had organized a strong body of irregulars in Cutch, a thing vainly attempted before by the Bombay political agents, and the desert chiefs, bordering on the Run of Cutch, even proposed to relinquish their predatory habits and settle in Scinde, so entirely had the new governor's reputation subdued their lawless and fierce tempers. These were events of considerable importance, inasmuch as they completely guaranteed tranquillity along the eastern frontier of Scinde. Shikarpoore was therefore immediately reinforced from Sukkur with three field-pieces, a regiment of irregular cavalry and one of infantry, making up a force sufficient to defy the Affghans and hillmen united; and the void thus left at Sukkur was filled up by regular cavalry and a field battery, which were sent from Kurrachee up the eastern bank of the Indus. At the same time, Fitzgerald's camel corps, now organized and able to march sixty miles a day, went up the western and more dangerous side of Scinde, to Larkaana; and between those bodies the armed steamers, ascending the river, formed a link of connection. Thus, while the important points of Shikarpoore and Sukkur were being reinforced, the troops destined for that service acted as roving columns, traversing the country in various directions, appearing stronger than they really were, and, as always happens on such occasions, were still more magnified by rumour.

These complicated movements, the exaggerated numbers,

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and the whispered ultimate intentions, were all calculated to distract and keep in a state of suspense, unfavourable to conspiracy, the western Beloochee chiefs who might be inclined for commotions. Meanwhile the 13th sepoy regiment came from Bombay to Kurrachee, and Sir Robert Sale, the renowned defender of Jellalabad, assumed the temporary command at Sukkur, bringing with him his own 13th veteran European regiment, then on its return to England. Scinde was thus well garrisoned, and the danger of having to fight external and internal enemies with an army paralyzed by sickness was removed; but the views on which Sir C. Napier acted will be best shown by extracts from an official memoir, in which he opposed a proposition to withdraw a European regiment in December 1843, when the sickness was most prevalent.

“Scinde is now quiet, I know not that Beloochistan and the Punjaub are so; and if they become disturbed Scinde will not be tranquil, because the Mahometan population, so recently subdued, cannot be expected to remain free from the external influence of nations having the same faith. The people of Scinde are like all other people, there is no mystery in governing them—they will be quiet when they believe it for their interest, and when that interest demands an insurrection they will rise. The Beloochees are robbers by habit, and will probably be disposed to rise if an attack from without offers an opportunity to plunder the Hindoos and Scindees. Our troops must cross to the western bank of the Indus to collect in the north if the Punjaub becomes disturbed and an attack is menaced from Beloochistan. It will then be necessary to place the country, south of a line drawn from Kurrachee through Hyderabad to the desert, under the guard of troops from Cutch; and that is one of the reasons why I wished to have Cutch under the control of an able military man like Colonel Roberts, instead of a political agent.

“The question of reducing or strengthening the force in Scinde depends upon the state of the Punjaub. Scinde internally is tranquil, but, until the agitation in the Punjaub subsides and our government is firmly established here,

two European regiments are necessary. The question is one of general politics. If the Punjaub becomes hostile the mountaineers of Beloochistan will probably become so likewise, and if so, Scinde must be strongly guarded."

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This was his opinion in December, but in the latter end of January, when a battle near Gwalior had been fought by Sir Hugh Gough—when his own adroit policy had stifled any disposition for commotion amongst the western chiefs—when he had collected his army in three masses, at Kurrachee, Hyderabad, and Sukkur, with a strong advanced guard at Shikarpoore, the whole pointing as it were in march against the Seikhs of the Punjaub, he again developed his views of affairs.

"If the Seikhs cross the Hyphasis, I shall move every man I can spare, without danger for Kurrachee and Hyderabad, upon Sukkur, and if possible lead a *handy* force to the vicinity of Ooch, to hold Bhawalpoore and Mooltan in check. If the former is faithful, I shall perhaps act against Mooltan; but I cannot cross the Sutlej unless I have security for the Bhawalpoore man's faith—that is to say *his person in my camp*—he might otherwise cut off my supplies from the south, and my line of retreat. In fine any demonstration I can make in favour of Lord Ellenborough's operations on the Upper Sutlej I will make, without waiting for orders; for if the battles near Gwalior have not been decisive, and the Seikhs cross the Hyphasis, my communication with Ferozepore and Agra will be cut off.

"The Seikhs, it is said, can turn out seventy thousand men, of which forty thousand are well disciplined and armed, and they have a powerful artillery. Wherefore, if I can keep Scinde quiet and hold the Bhawalpoore man firm to our alliance, I shall do as much as seventeen thousand sickly soldiers can well manage in this hot climate. I fear my despatch to Lord Ellenborough has not reached him, but I shall act without orders if necessary, and as my movements do not depend on his the failure of the despatch is of little consequence. If I steady Bhawalpoore I shall do much; if I also draw off the Mooltan

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force I shall do great things—more perhaps than I expect. My opinion is however, that the Seikhs will not now attack, because, if the Gwalior army has been quite beaten, there will be twenty thousand troops disposable for the Hyphasis, besides the force already on that river. Gwalior is indeed a long way from the Hyphasis, and that may expose the left bank to be ravaged, but the force left there ought to be and I suppose is strong enough to defend that river.”

That an extensive confederacy against the British power existed in the latter end of 1843, is certain, but the vigorous policy and military energy of Sir C. Napier stopped it as regarded Scinde; and it was extinguished generally by the battle of Maharajapoor gained near Gwalior. British India was thus replaced in a commanding position, was freed from serious internal mischief, and had only the external hostility of the Seikhs to look for. The operations which led to this state of affairs were certainly the results of Lord Ellenborough's military policy, which was so exactly timed as to break at once the wide-spread conspiracy; and as he was personally engaged in the battle, a victory gloriously terminated the series of able measures by which he had dragged the British power up from the depths of degradation and disaster into which it had been sunk. The success at Gwalior was not however necessary to the maintenance of English supremacy in Scinde. Neither the Affghan nor the Khelat tribes, nor the Lion's influence, nor the treason of Ali Moorad—if he had fallen away from his alliance—nor all those things together, joined to a defeat at Gwalior, could have produced more than a momentary commotion—except while the soldiers were down with the fever: for so entirely were the three races now aware of their advantages under the British rule, that they would have taken arms to resist a change sooner than to forward one. Some Talpooree sirdars might indeed have felt bound in honour to join a prince of their family who appeared in arms, but the general feeling in favour of the English was evinced in an unmistakeable manner. The police were aided by

Beloochee villagers to arrest armed deserters who resisted capture; and where murders were committed, not of Europeans for they were never molested, but of women, or in quarrels, the criminals were delivered up, though the crime itself was held to be venial. In fine genius had done its work.

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But if Lord Ellenborough, following the Indian system, had restricted his lieutenant's discretion and power by official rules, misplaced and inapplicable to the circumstances and the people, the conquest would have ended as in Affghanistan, with a terrible disaster, and the treasonable hopes and efforts of the Bombay faction would have been realized. For so complicated were Scindian affairs, civil and military, so nicely depending upon delicate and timely management of men and interests, that none but he to whom victory had given a key to the cipher could have rightly interpreted the characters. In other hands the massacre of a second British army would have happened, would have been followed by a Seikh and Affghan invasion, an insurrection of the Mahomedan population of India, and the open or secret defection of the preserved sovereignties within the old frontier. Scinde was therefore a great acquisition, and its condition and value at this time were well set forth by Sir C. Napier in the following condensed extract from a memoir, drawn up in reply to an official question as to the policy of repairing or destroying the many native forts with which the country was spotted like an angry leopard.

“ The forts should be let alone. In this climate dilapidation does not make rapid progress. To repair one fort, if required, would not be difficult; to repair them generally would be very costly, the advantage small; for the people here and immediately around us, having no artillery, can neither attack nor defend a fort with success against the British.

“ This is a frontier country which may be defended with comparatively few troops; the large force now here is required only for the moment, because of the disorderly state of the Punjaub and the conquest being so

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recent—the present establishment need not be permanent.

“Scinde furnishes a valuable frontier for North-Western India, in a commercial as well as a military view.

“In a commercial, because of its river, which will facilitate the introduction of goods from the north; and as it has but one sea-port, that of Kurrachee, the custom-house duties may be cheaply collected. The desert will also avail to prevent contraband trade, because the passages across are few and easily guarded. As a military frontier, it protects the left flank of an army defending any of the five rivers of the Punjaub, which as lines of defence may be said to radiate northward from Mittenkote, on the upper frontier of Scinde. Any of those rivers would furnish a well-defined frontier for North-Western India; but while Scinde was in the hands of the hostile ameers the left flank of all those lines could be taken in reverse.

“Reasoning therefore on abstract military principles, the defence of the Hyphasis or Sutlej—the actual frontier—would have been weak without the close alliance of Bhawalpoore, which however could hardly have maintained its alliance if pressed by Sawan Mull of Mooltan on the north, and by the ameers of Scinde on the south. The desert would have been no barrier for India against the ameers—they could have passed it in many places—it offered a strong barrier *for them*; because they could destroy or poison the wells, or defend them by the very forts which are the subjects under consideration, but which would have been efficient *against* an invasion from India. Now they are of little military advantage, because we command both sides of the desert. The conquest of Scinde has therefore strengthened the line of the Sutlej.

“It remains to treat of the military advantages possessed by Scinde itself for its own defence, on a line of five hundred miles, traced from Mittenkote to the mouths of the Indus.

“An enemy invading it north of Hyderabad, would find the desert before him and a British force on both flanks; he must therefore change front to the right or

left. If to the right, the troops in Southern Scinde would be concentrated at Hyderabad, with a line of fortified posts behind them on one side, as far as Omercote, all in a good state, having been repaired or newly constructed by me immediately after the battle of Hyderabad with design to provide a secure communication with the Delta. Thus concentrated at Hyderabad, the southern force would have six lines of communication and of retreat, by which supplies and reinforcements could reach it from India, according to the season of the year. 1°. To Kurrachee. 2°. The mouths of the Indus by Vikkur. 3°. To Bhoog the capital of Cutch. 4°. To Guzzerat. 5°. To Deesa. 6°. To Balmeer.

“ Three of these have ports which ought to be protected by works; the other three are land communications, and that by Omercote on Deesa I have secured with fortified stations. But while the enemy thus turned against the force of Lower Scinde, which from the variety of communications could move in almost any direction, he would have his flank vexed by the armed steamers on the Indus, and they would insure the British communication with the northern force based on Sukkur; for an army cannot march very close along the banks of the Indus, because of the numerous large watercourses and cuts for irrigation.

“ The northern force would be in direct communication with the army on the Sutlej, and the other flank of the invader would be pent in by the desert; he would therefore perish, unless he gained a victory by forcing some of the strong positions furnished, at every half-mile of ground about Hyderabad, by the nullahs, which could be easily and rapidly intrenched. The British force could even then, though defeated, dispute the ground inch by inch down to the sea; or go across the desert to the eastward; or even cross the Indus, and taking Kurrachee as a base of operations, and being in communication with Bombay by sea when the monsoons did not prevail, could act on the enemy's rear. Thus, all circumstances of climate and ground considered, to pass the Indus between



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Mittenkote and the sea would be a dangerous operation for an invader.

“If he turned to the north, after crossing that large and dangerous river, he would meet with difficulties of a like nature; for the Sukkur force would have two lines of communication and retreat open, and reinforcements would pour down the Sutlej by water and through Bhawalpoore by land. If he did not move northward, the British troops at Sukkur, taking a position on the edge of the desert with Shah-ghur and Jessulmeer in their rear, could menace his right flank, which would compel him to follow them into the desert; while the force at Hyderabad and that coming down from Ferozepoore, could close on both his flanks and on his rear, and cut off his supplies without abandoning their own lines of communication.

“These observations show that Scinde has by the conquest become a compact defensible well-defined frontier for India; but when it was in the ameers' hands, it compelled the Indian government to keep large bodies of troops at the eastern side, on a longer and weaker frontier-line, less defined and more costly. By that conquest also a native power, having a regular organized government vehemently hostile to the British, was put away—a power which could at any time have passed the desert to attack the Indian frontier in its whole length; but which could not be so easily attacked in return, because whoever commands the watercourses is master of the desert. Upon these grounds it may be assumed that few regular troops will be wanted hereafter for the defence of Scinde; and those less for the security of the country than to give a strength to the frontier-line of the Upper Sutlej which it does not naturally possess.

“Kurrachee, independent of its great importance in the general system of defence, will become so rich that it may tempt the hill tribes to rush down and plunder it: wherefore large fortifications are there requisite.

“Ahmed Khan, in the Hala mountains, should likewise be made a fortified sanatorium, if found to be as salubrious as report makes it. But as yet its quality of

climate has only been tested in cool weather: it must likewise be tested in the heat of June. Its position is good, and it covers the only known north road from Kurrachee to Sehwan, which runs through the wild tracts of country formed by the roots of the Hala hills. Those hills are full of passes and scantily inhabited, yet the road is one of great traffic, and fever is said to be unknown at Ahmed Khan.

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“All this seems irrelevant to the question of retaining or dismantling the native forts; yet it shows that if the main points be strongly occupied, and yet fortified so as to be defended by a few men, their usual garrisons can on sudden emergencies send roving columns to suppress any insurrection. But if all the native forts are repaired and garrisoned, the troops in Scinde must be largely augmented, and parcelled in detachments, which a well-planned insurrection, boldly executed, and so timed as to turn the raging sun to account, might cut off or starve into submission if not kept constantly stored with many months’ provisions, which would be a constant expense. If so stored, the garrisons might indeed resist but could not march out to quell disturbances: moreover, most of the forts, having been constructed with reference to the facility of obtaining water, are situated in low marshy places and very unhealthy.

“The plan adopted is to keep the troops as much as possible in masses, and always in readiness to move in any direction to awe internal enemies. Against an invader the force of Southern Scinde will assemble at Hyderabad, and at Sukkur on the Indus; but if an enemy approach by the coast road from Soono-Meeanee, on the edge of the Gedrosian desert, Kurrachee will become the point of concentration instead of Hyderabad and Sukkur, and there are to the westward strong positions, on the Arabis or Hub river, which have been partially examined. If he forces them he will still have to besiege Kurrachee before he can approach the Indus, which he will find in those lower parts without fords, and without boats, save those armed and organized to prevent the passage—in

CHAP. IV. itself a difficult operation even without opposition—but  
1844. what army could bring a siege-train through Beloochistan  
to reduce Kurrachee?

“Our present state of affairs may be thus described. We are only just getting firm hold of Scinde—we have had a terrible sickness, and have not yet sufficient cover for the troops because of the difficulty of obtaining artisans—we were, previous to the conquest, and are still, very ignorant of the country—we have had to contend with prejudice raised against us by the majority of the Indian newspapers, which have, though in vain, laboured to make the officers appear dishonourable, to create mutiny amongst the sepoys, and to excite the Beloochees to rise upon us during the sickness. Yet with all these impediments to overcome, we have obtained a grasp upon the country which the forces of all Central Asia cannot loosen.

“From the first, the plan developed above, has been pertinaciously followed with a prospective not a momentary expediency; where a fortification could not be constructed from want of time or means, houses were loopholed, to be afterwards expanded to permanent works; therefore all that has been effected forms, however minute in itself, a portion of a general plan, and belongs to the system. The conquest of Scinde does now, and will still more hereafter add to the security and strength of the north-western frontier of India, and it covers the south-western frontier. So far from adding to the expense of the Indian government, it will diminish it and augment the revenue of the Company; not only by the excess of receipts beyond expenditure, but by obviating the necessity of keeping on the Sutlej, and from Ferozepoor down to Cutch, so large a force as must have been maintained had Scinde remained under the ameers.

“The dangerous position of a British army on the upper Sutlej may be well conceived, if Scinde, Gwalior, Nepaul and the Punjaub were hostile and united, an event which was very probable after the disaster at Cabool; for the princes of those states did certainly send confidential agents to arrange treaties by word of mouth, and the

extent of their secret coalition can never be ascertained. This danger would have been very great if they had been allowed time to complete their arrangements: and there will always be peril, while native princes are left on their thrones within the frontier. The people indeed are generally with us; but the people will follow their native oppressors, because they are not civilized enough to think for themselves.

“An extension of territory is however by no means desirable. The upper Sutlej is a better frontier-line than the upper Indus. The conquest of the Punjaub will soon be forced upon us, but it is not at all desirable. It would indeed be desirable to possess Bhawalpoore, and Scinde was certainly necessary to the security of the north-eastern frontier. The cry raised against the conquest, is as incomprehensible as the reasoning on it, which would set aside the safety and well-being of a hundred millions of people to preserve the power of a few treacherous chiefs, whose rights were founded on violence and treason of a recent date.

“As we cannot take possession of Bhawalpoore, the next best thing is to make the Nawab both friendly and powerful, he will then have more to lose if he behaves ill. His dethronement would give us an unbroken frontier-line from the mouths of the Indus to the sources of the Sutlej, and the great advantage of having a river for a frontier is obvious. It furnishes a definite boundary and does not separate the people on its banks, they mix as civilization advances. A mountain frontier prevents friendly intercourse between the tribes on each side; they pillage each other to the great inconvenience of the most civilized, and a state of aggression and hatred becomes permanent and virulent.

“The western frontier of Scinde under the ameers, was the Arabis river, which can be traced northwards for about one hundred and thirty miles; from thence the boundary-line was a chain of hills, forming part of the Hala range of mountains and also about one hundred and thirty miles in length, ending near Chandia of the Chandika tribe. From Chandia it strikes off, for one hundred and forty

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miles in a north-eastern direction, running parallel to the Indus at an average distance of forty miles, until it touches the foot of the Cutchee hills and there turns down to the river, which it falls upon at Kusmore. That portion which joins Chandia to the Cutchee hills is chiefly desert, and the whole line of boundary is positively defined by rivers, mountains and sandy wastes: it is generally well known, and a good frontier to adhere to on that side. The resources for defence are also very good on the lower and on the upper parts; but the Hala range is not known beyond the general character of mountains, namely that they have their ordinary passes, and can be crossed everywhere when circumstances require the effort."

Such were the external relations of Scinde, its interior condition and its intrinsic value shall be shown in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER V.

NOTWITHSTANDING the disturbance of the civil administration, caused by the visitations mentioned in the foregoing chapter, the progress of the public works and the vigorous repression of crime, taught the people, that while force was exhibited good only was intended. Inquiries as to the natural and artificial productions were set on foot, and it was found that in pottery the Scindians were peculiarly skilful, that the Tattah manufactures might be in time revived, and the natural productions were rich and varied. Grain of all kinds, which might be grown in unlimited quantities, opium, tobacco, soda, indigo, alum and sugar. Iron was to be found in the Hala mountains, and near them sulphur of the first quality, easily obtained; saltpetre was abundant, and in the Delta were discovered beds of the purest salt fourteen feet thick. Vast tracts of fine timber lined the banks of the Indus, and everywhere the land gave the lie to the shameless assertions that Scinde was a "barren waste, incapable of sustaining a large population." Cotton, indigo, and sugar, only wanted the advantage of good methods of cultivation to exceed the same products in any part of India, and Sir C. Napier endeavoured to improve the sugar cultivation by procuring West-Indian canes from Egypt, where they had been introduced with success; but this effort was malignantly frustrated by Bombay officials, who retained the plants there until they died.

The new police were now creeping over the face of the country, establishing their power by degrees and enabling the collectors to organize the judicial system, to obtain

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information, enforce the collection of taxes with greater impartiality, and protect the gathering of the autumnal harvest on which the revenue chiefly depended.

No site for a sanatorium had yet been discovered, and the want of healthful barracks could not be remedied, because a scarcity of artisans was renewed by the recent pestilence. A first effort to establish a sanatorium at Ahmed Khan, the favourite residence of the great sultan of that name, had not been fortunate, and the failure, conjoined with want of cover, compelled the hurried building of barracks—when the artisans returned—at great cost, and before the best sites could be ascertained. Meanwhile the soldiers were huddled in various parts, and moved, when circumstances would permit, according to the season, so as to avoid the evil influence of the river. But that likewise was attended with difficulties; for during the inundation the waters pursued them everywhere over the plains, while the mountains were generally without water, and without roads for the conveyance of provisions and materials for hutting. These embarrassments, which were cruelly augmented by the effects of the fever on the population, had rendered the cool season nearly a blank for work, and the administration had now to drag itself along as it could in the raging heat.

Amongst the many vexations to be encountered, none were more wearisome than the thwartings of official men—not only those impelled by factious motives but others, described as good men and honest, but little men, who sincerely believed the governor of Scinde ought to be gibbeted as an example to innovators; and who, with their official meshes tied him down as Gulliver was by the Lilliputians: and whenever he broke loose which was not seldom, a flight of small poisoned missives were sure to follow. When all his time and energies were required to insure tranquillity and the safety of his army, hundreds of letters, especially from the Bombay government offices, civil and military, were transmitted to and fro three or four times on the commonest matters, while the most important ones were indefinitely delayed; and

this immense unnecessary labour was, there is much reason to believe, imposed on him in a climate proverbially distressing and exhausting to European constitutions, purposely, in the villanous hope of destroying life!

Amidst these difficulties the protection of Upper Scinde, west of the Indus, against the mountain and hill tribes was become a subject of great anxiety. Many chiefs of the former had not made salaam, and two were in arms, plundering. The latter were at open war on the simple principle of spoil, without pretending a political motive; and though the irregular cavalry had been well disposed, and precise arrangements made for its protective action along the tormented frontier, the hillmen's forays were made with circumstances of frightful ferocity, and there was danger of the example exciting not only the Khelat mountain-tribes, but the Scindian chiefs of the Hala range to the same courses. To prevent this, Fitzgerald's camel corps was quartered at Larkaana, and he was ordered to construct a strong fort there as a base for his operations. Soon after his arrival he made a march of one hundred miles in twenty-four hours, and carried off a criminal chief from the midst of his tribe, which so awed the other recusant Scindian chiefs, they offered to make their salaams. Even the hillmen became alarmed, a momentary fear as after events proved, yet it gave the poor villagers a short respite.

At this time all danger of an Affghan descent to raise the Beloochees in favour of the Lion ceased. For that unhappy prince having besought the aid of the Candahar chiefs, was by those perfidious barbarians treated, as he, a barbarian himself, should have anticipated, and as the general had foreseen when he described him as a king who was his own ambassador. Having got all they could from him by cajolery, they set persons at night to converse with his servants, telling them to provide for their own safety as the ameer had been sold for two lacs and a half to the "Bahadoor Jung." The poor exile thus deceived, mounted his horse and fled to the Cutchee hills, where he was well received, and commenced anew his efforts to raise com-



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motions in Scinde; but as the Bhoogtees, with whom he resided, were then at feud with the Murrees his schemes failed. The hopes of the Bombay faction were thus again baffled; and their political prophecies as to insurrections, were at the same time signally belied by the sudden submission of all the western Scindian chiefs. These men, who had hitherto held out, were now induced by Fitzgerald's vigorous action and the growing influence of the new government to submit. One hundred and fifteen came down towards Kurrachee with their armed followers—in number an army—on the 21st of March, but halted within ten miles and sent this laconic message—We are come.

The reply was—*Good!* but come not with arms or woe awaits you! Down went all the weapons and they entered the camp like suppliants.

Greeted somewhat sternly, they were asked why they had not come sooner? “We were too much frightened to appear in your presence.”

Of what were you afraid?—“We do not know, but we come now to lay ourselves down at your feet, you are our king, we pray for pardon!”

Well, chiefs! Answer this! Have I done evil to any person except in fair fight?—“No! you have been merciful to all, every one says so.” Then why were you afraid?—“We do not know, you are our king, pardon us and we will guard the country from your enemies.”

I do not want you to guard anything, you saw my camel soldiers, I can send as many regiments as there are camels. I can defend Scinde, I do not want you to defend it, I want you to be good servants to the queen my mistress.—“We will be!”—Come then and make salaam to her picture. They did so, and were thus addressed. There is peace between us. All Scinde now belongs to my queen, and we are henceforth fellow-subjects; but I am here to do justice, and if after this voluntary submission any of you rob or plunder, I will march into your country and destroy the offender and his tribe. Chiefs! you all know I won the battles when I had

only five thousand men, I have now fifteen thousand, and a hundred thousand more will come at my call ; you will believe therefore that this is not an empty threat ; but let peace be between us, and I give back to all their jagheers, and what they possessed under the ameers." Then they all cried out, "You are our king ! what you say is true, let it be so ! we are your slaves !"

These terms being settled, they were told the troops should be shown to them in order of battle. They did not like that ; few had ever seen a European, they knew nothing of civilized customs, feared it was a design to kill them without danger, and their terror, which had been very evident throughout the conference, visibly augmented. The general observing this conversed familiarly with them, and discovering some who had been in the battles and knew him again by sight, he bantered them, demanding why they had run away when his cavalry charged at Dubba ? "Because we were frightened answered one with a quiet simplicity ; and that also was the reason I did not come here sooner ; for it is said that you like the men who stood and fought better than those who fled—and I fled." Another shrewd old chief being told he had been close on the rear of the army with ten thousand men while Meeanee was being fought, quickly answered "No ! I had only eight thousand." Then he named the tribes who were in march to join the ameers, showing that more than eighty thousand warriors would have been assembled if that battle had been delayed ; and these statements tallied so accurately with the reports of the spies at the time as to leave no doubt of their correctness.

This conversation excited merriment with the majority, but the general, whose jests and behaviour were all calculated, observed several stern-looking men who could not be moved to laughter, and who were evidently ready for mischief when opportunity offered, bending only to circumstances : wherefore, persisting in his design to give them a lesson as to what they might expect in war by showing them his troops, he drew out two European

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and two sepoy regiments, six guns well horsed, and his own guards of one hundred Scindian cavalry.

The reluctance of the chiefs to appear at the review was not disguised, yet they came to his door on horseback at the hour appointed, purposely a late one, and rode to the field, where the troops, after marching past, formed line and threw out skirmishers. Of this they all seemed to think little; but when the line advanced their thoughts changed. "That is the way you came on at Dubba," exclaimed a brave Lhugaree leader, and the others cried out, "By Allah! it is a wall.—A moving wall. Nothing can withstand that. Oh Padishaw, you are master of the world!" A long and well-sustained file fire with a cannonade was then opened, and continued until the air was so agitated they could not hear each other speak, whereupon the fire suddenly ceased and the line charged shouting. These two things astonished them most; they had heard of the great rapidity of the British musketry fire, but had not believed in it. Soon the artillery sought refuge, as from cavalry, and the troops formed squares. It was then dusk and the sheets of bright flame covering those small masses, with the rapid march of the guns over the rocky heights in the vicinity, amazed and delighted them. When their exclamations discovered this temper of mind they were dismissed with assurance that they had received the honours paid to kings in Europe, which pleased them; and the general was satisfied that fear, and content as to their future condition, would keep them true, unless events very unfavourable to the British supremacy should arise to awaken other thoughts.

Now he felt master of Scinde, as a conqueror and as a legislator; for all these chiefs had submitted voluntarily, and his policemen, who had fought several times successfully with the smaller robber bands, had been generally aided by the Beloochee villagers. They were also become so amenable to discipline, that one of their native officers, having robbed by virtue of his office in the eastern manner, and flogged a villager, was sent under guard of his own men to the place of his offence, was forced to refund

the sum taken, had his uniform stripped off, and received in right the number of lashes he had bestowed in wrong. A kardar also of great power and influence, possessing a jagheer of five thousand acres, being detected in public frauds and oppression of the poor, lost his jagheer, was mulcted in five hundred pounds, and sent to work on the roads in chains. These examples spread far and wide. "This is justice" exclaimed the people. "When before this was it ever known that the officers of the government were punished for ill-treating a poor villager? The padishaw is great, he is just."

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In April, the sick being reduced from twelve thousand to less than nine hundred, the roads and levels for the canals, the general surveys, the barracks, and the mole making good progress, and the universal goodwill towards the government being apparent, the organization of two battalions of native Beloochee troops was commenced, with a view to lessen the number of regular soldiers employed in Scinde. The general knew those battalions, although there were amongst them men who had fought at Meeanee, would be true against the Seikhs; and if an insurrection happened their defection would be of little consequence beyond the loss of their arms. Of insurrection however, he had so little dread, that he would have restored two regiments to the Bombay government, being certain, if the Punjaub was settled, he could hold Scinde in tranquillity; but the nations and tribes beyond the frontier were all disturbed by the Seikh commotions, and some new menacing movements by the Cutchee hillmen, and the unreasonable alarm which they created in the mind of the officer commanding at Sukkur gave him at this time uneasiness.

General Sale had come to Kurrachee on his way to England, and his temporary successor, conjuring up imaginary enemies, thought and said he should be *Cabooled*, though not more than six thousand warriors could come against him from the hills before reinforcements arrived. The Cabool massacre had indeed terrified all British India, and still haunted weak minds; showing how justly Napo-

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leon assigned the greatest proportion of force in war to moral influences. Sir C. Napier as keenly sensible of the truth of this maxim as his subordinate was of the Cabool influence, sent Brigadier Simpson to take the command in Upper Scinde; and meanwhile, as the spring harvest was gathered and the submission of the hundred and fifteen western chieftains complete, he resolved to put in execution a measure commanded by Lord Ellenborough at the close of the preceding year, but which the sickness and other events had delayed—namely to issue a summons for *all* the Scindian Beloochee chiefs to meet in Durbar at Hyderabad, and there do homage on her majesty's birthday.

Such a great ceremony was desirable, as a sign and a warning to surrounding tribes and nations that Scinde was irrevocably and willingly a British province; but when Lord Ellenborough called for it, neither he nor Sir C. Napier expected more than two or three thousand Beloochees, chiefs and followers, to assemble. Now it was discovered that twenty or thirty thousand would appear, and not a Durbar but a formidable army, which might in a moment take offence and renew the war, was to be dealt with. The affair was serious, and recourse was had to policy for rendering it harmless; yet the general was proudly confident it would end in a signal rebuke to the detestable factions, which in Bombay and in England were then daily announcing that force alone prevented a general insurrection.

He might however have reasonably feared violence at such a meeting, for scarcely could a tribe be named which had not to deplore the deaths of their bravest warriors slain in the battles: one old man had lost his whole tribe, none were left but himself! Yet often he came to see his conqueror, received presents from him, and would find consolation in speaking of his own calamity, never showing anger though nearly crazed with grief. Nevertheless the presence of many a desperate vengeful Beloochee, brainsick at the fall of his race, was to be expected; and as they were all fatalists, careless of life and holding assassination to be no crime—some of them also religious fanatics—a sudden death-stroke, covered by a tumult and

followed by a combat, was far from unlikely, even though no previous design of violence had been entertained. For such risks however his mind was always as well prepared and braced as it was for open battle; and the unshrinking nerve with which he could sustain the approach of seeming mischief had been previously shown in the following remarkable manner.

An Indian sword-player declared at a great public festival, that he could cleave a small lime laid on a man's palm without injury to the member, and the general extended his right hand for the trial. The sword-player, awed by his rank, was reluctant and cut the fruit horizontally. Being urged to fulfil his boast he examined the palm, said it was not one to be experimented upon with safety, and refused to proceed. The general then extended his left hand, which was admitted to be suitable in form; yet the Indian still declined the trial, and when pressed, twice waved his thin keen-edged blade as if to strike, and twice withheld the blow, declaring he was uncertain of success. Finally he was forced to make trial, and the lime fell open cleanly divided—the edge of the sword had just marked its passage over the skin without drawing a drop of blood!

But this meeting involved great political interests, and other than personal dangers were to be apprehended; wherefore, as before observed, recourse was had to adroit management. First, under pretence of sparing the chiefs a long journey, those of Upper Scinde were required to wait on General Simpson at Shikarpoor, by which a part of the multitude was thrown off. And at Hyderabad, the place of conference was appointed between the Phullaillee and the Indus, the western tribes being to assemble on the right bank of the latter river, opposite the intrenched camp; the eastern tribes on the right bank of the Phullaillee, and consequently on the left bank of the Indus. The steamers were to float between the two bodies which therefore could not unite, and the concentrated British troops were covered from both by the rivers.

With these precautions the assembling of an unusually

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large British force could be avoided, which was desirable, because of the heat, and because insolence might be excited by an appearance of fear ; and any show of distrust might produce panic, seeing that the Beloochees, arguing from their own customs, were not devoid of suspicion that a general massacre was designed. There were however to be four thousand men and sixteen guns, having the support of a fortress and an intrenched camp covered by two rivers, on one of which were the armed steamers ; and it was arranged to call the Beloochees over the river by tribes—none to pass either stream until called. It was also proclaimed, that chieftains only should appear at the assembly armed. Thus preserving the haughty tone and domination of a conqueror, the general calculated that he should awe those wild warriors, most of whom only knew of him by his battles, while he tested their temper, seeing that any violation of this command would have argued a readiness for violence.

The Durbar was appointed for May, and meanwhile, taking an escort of sixty irregular horsemen, Sir Charles rode to Hyderabad through the Jokea territory without attending to frequented routes. He had been strongly advised not to do so, heard of strange difficulties, which he disregarded, and found as he expected a generally fertile district with easy passes over the lower ranges of those very hills which had been described to him as of terrible asperity. In one of them his attention was attracted to the colour and great weight of the stones, indicating the presence of iron, and he was afterwards informed by a Beloochee chief that iron was there obtained and used in the fabrication of arms.

While at Hyderabad he visited the field of Meeanee, where a large tomb was being raised by the Beloochees over the body of Jehan Mohamed, the chief killed in single combat by Captain McMurdo. Another was completed over the brave swordsman who had assailed himself, and was slain by Lieutenant Marston. This tomb was on the spot where the man fell. That of Jehan was advanced far beyond the line where the British troops fought, as if

he had broken through—an indication of military pride not lost upon the legislator: he viewed it as marking a generous love of honour in the Beloochee race which could be made available for attaching them to the new government.

Having terminated the business which brought him to Hyderabad, he returned to Kurrachee by a different road, taking notes of all that might conduce to the future welfare of the country; but while thus engaged he was disquieted with news of another incursion made by the Bhoogtees, Jackrances and Doomkees, at the instigation of the Lion, and executed with unusual ferocity. For it was not common with the Beloochees to ill-treat women and children in their feudal wars; yet here they had destroyed the village of Mean-Ka-Kote, killed forty people, and cut off the hands of children to get at their bracelets! This ferocity, and the dreadful misery of the frontier inhabitants exposed to such inroads, made him resolve, if gentler means failed, to compel those tribes to become quiet neighbours, either by stimulating other tribes to hostility against them, or by subduing them with regular warfare, and sweeping them from their hills. By the first he hoped to make them settle further from the frontier, and to that he was most inclined, foreseeing all the difficulties of the second; one or other was however imperative; for the mischief was become intolerable in itself and pregnant with future evils. Already Cutch Gundava had been rendered desolate, and the Scindian frontier was nearly as miserable; few villages were left standing; and scarcely any cultivators were to be found between Shikarpore, and Poolagee the stronghold of Beja the Dhoomkee who had made this inroad: with exception of a few idle men in league with the robbers, the whole population was preparing to emigrate.

Beja Khan, celebrated for his strength, courage and enterprise, was embued with an inveterate hatred of the English, having been, as he asserted, perfidiously entrapped during the Affghan war by Captain Postans, a sub-political agent. His wrongs however could not be considered at



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this time, because he had, after his liberation, made a treaty with the British; and though a subject of Khelat, which was in alliance, had now ravaged a part of Scinde. The khan of Khelat himself had received a considerable sum of money from Sir C. Napier and was inclined to hold faith; but he was a boy, unable to control his Durbar, and being menaced and interfered with by the chiefs of Candahar was thus openly disobeyed by Beja Khan, who was also secretly encouraged by the Khelat sirdars.

This state of affairs was very disquieting. The Scinde frontier was being depopulated, the governor's reputation must sink in the opinion of the surrounding people if he did not avenge the injury, and military negligence had certainly caused the disaster. The irregular cavalry disposed along the frontier were sufficient to have prevented the foray, or at least met and punished the robbers, and some signal chastisement was therefore called for; but as the hot season was rapidly advancing, to take the field then would cost the lives of many soldiers. The raging sun had been indeed braved the year before to break up the Lion's power and effect the sudden conquest of Scinde—those objects being sufficiently great to justify the measure—but the punishment of these robber tribes was not commensurate with the risk, and therefore action was reluctantly suspended until the cool weather.

The hope of civilizing those wild people by gentle means, grafted upon a vigorous repression of their lawless proceedings, was however still entertained; and in that view it was designed to inform them that past transgressions would be pardoned if they ceased from further offence; if not, their country would be devastated; but previous to sending this message, an untoward event intervened to give a new aspect and greater importance to their warfare. It happened thus. Sir C. Napier had been importuned to allow of an attempt to surprise Beja in his town of Poolagee, because Fitzgerald of the camel corps, who had formerly resided there, thought his knowledge of the place would enable him to take the chief in his bed. Such a stroke would have been very conducive to the

general's views and he consented. He had not been told Poolagee was a walled place or he would have refused altogether; but he knew a watchful barbarian like Beja was not to be taken by a careless operation, and that failure would be hurtful in a political view and dangerous to the troops employed; wherefore he enjoined absolute secrecy as to the enterprise, and ordered the following dispositions to be observed.

The camel corps was to make a forced march of sixty miles to reach Poolagee; the irregular cavalry was to follow in support, and be in turn supported by infantry with guns; moreover, not liking to trust the operation entirely to the sanguine young man who had proposed it, nor the superintendence of it to the officers in temporary command at Sukkur and Shikarpoor, he desired that nothing should be attempted until General Simpson, then on his way to assume the chief command in Upper Scinde and well instructed as to this particular enterprise, should arrive. With these precautions he thought no serious mischief could happen. But war is never without its crosses from time, circumstances, and persons; Simpson was not waited for, secrecy was not observed, and the system of supports was entirely neglected.

Five hundred horsemen under Captain Tait, and two hundred of the camel corps under Fitzgerald, marched across the desert, lost their way, and arrived at eight o'clock in the morning, exhausted with fatigue, before a fortress, defended by a good garrison of several hundred matchlock-men under Beja, who had obtained accurate knowledge of the design. Fitzgerald with impetuous resolution led his men against the gate, designing to blow it open with a sack of powder; carried by the same sergeant who had effected that exploit at Ghuznee in Lord Keane's Affghan campaign; but the Bhooghtees killed the gallant sergeant with nine other soldiers, and wounded twenty-one. How Fitzgerald escaped death none could say, for striding in his gigantic strength at the head of the stormers he was distinguished alike by his size and daring, and well known of person to numbers of the

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matchlock-men on the walls, yet he returned without a wound! Irritated by his repulse, and naturally vehement he would have renewed the attack, but Captain Tait ordered a retreat. This was made with difficulty and could not have been effected at all, if water had not been found at an abandoned post in the desert called Chuttar, fortunately overlooked by the enemy when filling up the other wells to impede the march. From Chuttar the retreat was continued to Kanghur, the nearest Scindian post, by an uninterrupted march of seventy-five miles under a burning sun, which was sustained with noble energy. Only one exhausted soldier fell during the movement, and a few moments after a Jackranee came up and cut him to pieces; but vengeance soon followed; the same Jackranee having tried to spy in a village, was seized and delivered up by the villagers, and being a noted ruffian was immediately hanged.

Great had been the firmness of the sepoy in this affair, and the two young officers who had acted so rashly fell sick with chagrin; but the intrepidity displayed at the attack and the hardihood of the retreat, were so conspicuous, the general smothered his vexation—which was yet so great as to bring on fever—rather than augment their mortification. He was at first inclined to go to Sukkur, but was withheld by a motive that had actuated him from the time he won his first battle, offering an illustration of the subtle combinations of moral and material power by which he effected such great actions. Once placed in the commanding position of a conqueror he had resolved never to appear where he could not strike heavily, lest the fear of his prowess should abate. After the battle of Dubba, thinking Omercote would resist and he should not have time to besiege it, he would not go there in person; and now he would not approach the scene of this disaster until the season should permit him to take the field in a formidable manner.

While revolving in his mind a remedy for the political mischief this failure might produce, another proof of the entire ascendancy he had obtained over the Beloochee

race was furnished by the two powerful chieftains of the Chandikas and Mugzees—the first a Scindian, the last a Khelat tribe. Hearing of the defeat at Poolagee, they proffered their swords to war against Beja and against their old master the Lion. Wullee the leader of the Chandians, whose vow of fidelity has been recorded, was foremost on this occasion to offer his services, and they were gladly accepted, as certain to occupy the attention of the robber tribes during the hot weather; at the termination of which more formidable combinations could be made. Nor was the brave old Chandian slack to fulfil his promises. Before the 15th of May he killed above forty of the Jackranees and sent in more than five hundred head of their cattle.

Beja's foray—instigated by the Lion and for his behoof—furnished another proof that the ameers had no hold over the minds of their former feudatories. No man assumed arms in their favour; not a sound of sedition was heard; and two of the most powerful tribes had, as just shown, voluntarily taken arms to punish the predatory invaders. The fame of the exploit, magnified by Beja himself, spread however, far into Asia; he was looked to as a chieftain capable of defeating the Feringhees, and thus obtained a swollen reputation and immense influence; but for the ameers no man would fight, none desired their return. Yet this time was chosen by the Bombay faction to proclaim that *the submission of the people was that which the lamb paid to the wolf, and that they only watched an opportunity for insurrection!*

The condition of Scinde was at this period very happy in all things save the killing of women in families, and these predatory excursions; but Sir C. Napier's determination to free the country from both those evils was thus expressed.—“I have declared that women shall not be foully murdered, and that merchants shall travel in safety. I have hanged twelve men to repress the first crime and I will hang twelve hundred if necessary. For the robbers, if they will not be quiet and give hostages for their good behaviour, I will with an army, lay their country waste.

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They come with fire and sword into our territory ; they shall be visited with fire and sword in return ; and I will undertake that without compunction, because I can save their women and children although they have not respected ours." There was however another subject of disquietude thus described.

" Seikhs and Mooltanees have certainly glided through the hills with a view to depredations—a strong indication of what the Punjaub army, which is now gathered on the right of the Sutlej will do. The lawless state of that army *must* bring on a war. It is impossible that the Indian government can permit seventy thousand armed ruffians to hang on her frontier, ready at any moment—without war proclaimed—to rush across the river and ravage our north-western provinces ; nor can the government afford the expense and vexation of keeping up there and in Scinde strong armies of observation. The frontiers of Mooltan and Scinde touch, and for my part I will not suffer the kick of a fly from Sawan Mull. He professes friendship and he shall keep faith or take the consequences. Yet I pray that he may not provoke me, that no war may break out, I want to see no more ; it is fearful work in its best form, and revolting to me. I hate it, though humanity will certainly gain by a Punjaub conquest as it has done by the Scindian one. What I rejoice to look at is the zeal with which our young officers, my soldier-civilians, work, in defiance of the sun and of fever and the debilitating influence of climate, to do good and dispense justice to the people ; and I believe the latter are sensible of their merits and grateful, for everywhere we meet with civility and all the appearance of goodwill."

The time for holding the great Durbar having now arrived, Sir C. Napier repaired to Hyderabad, travelling under a sun which was beginning to shoot its fiercest rays. The fortress was restricted in size for holding the conference, and danger was to be dreaded if it was filled with fighting men while an army of Beloochees was without ; but the necessity of having shade for all overruled

this objection, and the chiefs were admitted inside with their followers, under the regulation before mentioned. Amongst them were a thousand jagheerdars, who, from fear and distrust, had never before submitted, but now made their salaams and received pardon. It was a spectacle of great magnificence and still greater interest. Nearly twenty thousand Beloochees, horsemen and footmen, in their bright tinted habiliments, crowded the banks of the two rivers, on one of which floated the armed steamers. Under that brilliant sky the many-coloured multitudes, bearing the flags and streamers of their tribes, were seen lining the banks of the rivers, while tribe after tribe passed amidst discordant shouting and the thundering of guns in salute. All were obedient to the order about arms, and all hastened to proffer their entire submission to the man who had, within a few miles of that place, only fourteen months before covered the ground with their slaughtered kinsmen.

He received them day after day, he walked amongst them, he was closely surrounded by hundreds; yet no man thought of revenge, none proffered a word of anger—the battles had been fairly fought, the blows manfully exchanged, and all remembrance of the hurt was merged in a feeling of gratitude to the conqueror who had so promptly stayed the terror of the sword and substituted for it a beneficent legislation. The speeches of the chiefs, filled with eastern compliments, were only accepted as sincere when corroborated by their actions; yet there were feelings exhibited which could not be mistaken. One very old man endeavouring to force a way to the general was pushed back; but he struggled and cried with a loud voice I will not be put back I have come two hundred miles to see him and I will do so—let me pass.

During the three days of the ceremony a hot wind from the desert struck fourteen European soldiers of the 86th dead, and the regiment afterwards became very sickly for a time. It was a grievous calamity, and the Bombay faction did not fail to raise a cry of murder;

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saying the deaths arose from exposing the troops to protect Sir C. Napier; but it so happened, the greatest number of men stricken were not in any manner connected with the guard of honour, which was by these malignant persons called a guard of safety—though it was never near his person—because their hope that his career would have been ended by an assassin's knife was disappointed. Accident and the governor-general's orders had forced him to hold this great meeting in the heat, as the necessity of putting down the Lion had compelled him the year before to take the field at the same season—and these things he did, “because without them results which appeared to the unthinking as easily arrived at could not have been attained; but they are *vital experiments*.” The cry of blood raised by the Bombay faction was however only an ebullition of rage at seeing its vile prognostications so signally falsified.

At this memorable Durbar was arranged that most delicate and difficult portion of the basis of all government,—the tenure of landed property. Under the ameers it had been variable and insecure. The jagheers, some of which were sixty square miles, had been always granted on military service tenure; but the jagheerdars were only tenants at will, and that will very capricious, the whole system going to foster a community of legalized robbers. Sir C. Napier had before substituted mattock and spade for the service of shield and sword, the jagheerdar being bound to produce labourers for public works instead of warriors for public mischief. Now he restored to the sons of all jagheerdars who had fallen in battle against him their fathers' lands; and to them and all others he gave the choice of paying rent instead of holding their land on the service tenure.

This rent was not based on the value of the jagheer—that would have been resisted sword in hand, because the lands had been received as gifts of fortune and favour, not as estates nicely balanced as to labour and value. It was calculated on the expense of the military service which had been attached to it; and if a jagheerdar said he was unable

to pay the rent, he was offered the land for a life purchase, and even longer, on condition that so much of the jagheer as would, if let to ryots, pay the rent demanded, should be withheld by the government. This gave a secure tenure of the remainder for life; but when those shrewd men were told the monthly expense of the retainers they were bound to produce would be the basis of calculation for rent, they answered, that when called out in war they had the chance of booty and the general could not go to war every month! No! nor every year, was the reply; and therefore, if the expense be eighty rupees, for example, the government calls upon you, not for that sum monthly, but for half of it yearly.

Satisfactory to many was this arrangement, and the portion of land resigned was let to ryots upon terms, to be hereafter mentioned, which soon furnished the whole rent originally demanded, and widely extended cultivation. Thus, with great policy and imperceptibly to them, the greater jagheerdars were made proprietors, and the smaller ones yeomen, interested in the welfare of the land, instead of being savage warriors, prowling robbers and seditious subjects, always ready to excite commotions for the sake of spoil. Sir Charles Napier knew time only could consolidate such a project; but government lost nothing save military service which it did not want; and meanwhile the jagheerdars, having a secure tenure and no hope from commotion, acquired an interest in the welfare of their ryots. He expected also that the successful industry of the cultivators settled on the government lands, would stimulate the hitherto predatory Beloochee to seek profit from agriculture—and the readiness with which many jagheerdars accepted the terms, the evident disposition of the poorer Beloochees to traffic, and the eagerness of the ryots to obtain government grants, led him to think a generation might suffice to change the character of the population, and render Scinde one of the richest and most industrious of the East. To forward this he contemplated a cautious system of resuming jagheers where there was default, designing to parcel them out in such proportions



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as would raise the cultivators to the condition of substantial farmers, and thus gradually reduce the territorial power of the great chiefs and sirdars. And from all jagheers he took away their royalties; that is to say, the right which they conferred of life and death and unrestrained taxation.

Having thus commenced his system of rent with the consent of many jagheerdars, for he forced it on none, he was indifferent as to regular payments for a few years, his object being, not revenue but civilization; and he foresaw that a comparison of the holdings on the different tenures would be entirely favourable to those who accepted his terms. For on one side would be a tenant for life secured by law in his rights; on the other a tenant at the will of government, and in many instances at higher cost, because bound to provide labourers for public works, which the other was exempted from by paying rent. This comparison he expected to do the work of legislation, and produce a landed aristocracy interested to maintain order; whereas, if the ameers' system had been preserved, the great feudal chiefs would have paid nothing to the state, would have remained powerful in arms, and compelled the government to maintain a large force to control them, instead of ruling through them with the aid of a few hundred policemen.

These and other great administrative measures, embodied in official reports, being laid before Sir Robert Peel, caused him to express astonishment at the comprehensive views of government therein disclosed. "*No one,*" he said, "*ever doubted Sir C. Napier's military powers, but in his other character he does surprise me—he is possessed of extraordinary talent for civil administration.*" Now it cannot be supposed that Sir Robert Peel's astonishment sprung from the vulgar contracted English notion of military men's intellects; he must have known that a consummate captain cannot have a narrow genius, and that service in every part of the globe must have furnished such a person with opportunities for observing different forms of government—hence his opinion thus emphatically

expressed, must be taken as an assurance that he thought Sir C. Napier's system superior to the general plan of ruling in India, for to that, as Sir Robert Peel well knew, it was entirely opposed. "With civil servants as assistants," said the general, "Scinde would have been thrown into complete confusion, and the expense of producing that confusion would have been immense."

Most of the Scinde administrative measures were adopted without reference to Calcutta, because of the distance, and the Scindian sun, which left little time for action; but always they were supported by Lord Ellenborough; and if half the year was denied to activity by the raging heat, oppressive correspondence and all fear of responsibility was spared to the anxious administrator by this confidence from a man who only knew him by his exploits. It was not so with the minor authorities, on whom, having the troops of two presidencies under his command, he was in a great measure dependent; the secret enmity of those meddling subordinates was always disquieting, and at one time drove him to declare that he would not be responsible for the discipline of his troops. These vexations were increased by a vicious habit with courts-martial, of misplaced leniency towards officers—a habit which, as commander-in-chief, Sir C. Napier afterwards endeavoured to reform; but at this period it was in such mischievous activity that two surgeons guilty of constant inebriety while engaged in the hospital duties, were suffered to remain in the service, a source of misery, terror and death to the sick soldiers!

And now happened an event surprising to all persons but the man affected by it, an event which rendered Sir C. Napier's after career one of incessant thankless labour without adequate freedom of action. Lord Ellenborough was suddenly recalled. Not unexpectedly to himself, because he knew his government had aroused all the fears and hatred of the jobbing Indian multitude, and all the fierce nepotism of the directors; but to reflecting men, it did appear foul and strange, that he who repaired the terrible disaster of Cabool should be contemptuously

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recalled by those whose empire he had preserved; that England and India should be deprived of an able governor, at a terrible crisis which nearly proved fatal, to gratify the spleen of men incapable of patriotism and senseless in their anger. Sir C. Napier felt for the welfare of his country too much to be silent on that occasion, and the following expression of his indignation, addressed to Lord Ripon, prophetic as it was just, may partly account for the unmitigated hatred of those whose conduct he thus denounced.

“Lord Ellenborough has opposed peculation, but folly and dishonesty have defeated ability and honesty, which being in the usual course of human events does not surprise me. It seems that the ‘*suaviter in modo*’ with a Cabool massacre, is preferred to the ‘*fortiter in re*’ with victory. To expend millions in producing bloodshed is preferable in the eyes of the Court of Directors, to saving India and the prevention of bloodshed. Lord Ellenborough’s measures were taken with large views of general policy, and were all connected in one great plan for the stability of our power in India. They were not mere expedients to meet isolated cases. The victory of Maharajapoor consolidated the conquest of Scinde, and the conquest of Scinde was essential to the defence of the north-western provinces of India and the line of the Hyphasis. The whole has been one grand movement to crush an incipient but widely extended secret coalition—the child of the Affghan defeats—which would have put, probably will still put our Indian empire in peril.

“This great defensive operation, hitherto successful in the hands of Lord Ellenborough, has not yet been terminated; nor can it be while the Seikh army remains without control; for I fear that powerful force by no means participates in the horror of war which appears to be entertained, very properly, by the Court of Directors and Lord Howick. Yet there is a time for all things said the wisest of men, and I cannot think the time for changing a governor-general is when in presence of seventy thousand armed Punjaubees. I indeed believe that possession of

the Punjaub is not desirable for the Company; the Hyphasis forms a better frontier-line for our Indian territory than the line of the Upper Indus, and is more compact now that we have Scinde: we have enough of territory—more than enough! Nevertheless this country of the Punjaub must be ours: all India proclaims that truth by acclamation. If not taken, the ravaging of our finest provinces can only be prevented by a large standing army in observation on the Hyphasis, with the example before its eyes of the Seikh army profiting by successful mutiny! That Seikh army is also recruited with our own discharged men, who are in correspondence with our soldiers; for since we have abolished flogging every crime is punished with dismissal from the Company's service—none other is now permitted—and thus we are daily recruiting the Seikh army with our well-drilled soldiers; for the men we discharge for trifling offences go in great numbers to join the Punjaubees. This I do not think sagacious on our part. The question therefore is no longer, whether or not we shall increase our territory, but whether we shall hold our present position in India, or run the risk of being beaten to the sea. '*Aut Cæsar aut nullus*' applies emphatically to our present power in India.

“To destroy the Seikh army will not I believe be so easy as people seem to imagine; and if we are beaten back across the Hyphasis, as we were by the Affghans across the Indus, the danger to India will be very great; and it will, as far as I am able to judge, show that policy to be erroneous which leaves native princes on their thrones within our territory, or rather within our frontier. This policy was I suppose formerly found useful and safe; but it is now replete with danger when our great extent of dominion compels us to scatter our forces. To return to Scinde. Some of the Punjaubees from Mooltan may insult our northern frontier, a portion of which borders on the land of Sawan Mull. If so I am determined to resent it, and I hope for the support of the supreme government, because every insult we put up with is certain to shake the alle-

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giance of the Beloochees in Scinde. I know that I am accused of wishing for war—that is false! I have seen too much of it. I detest it upon principle as a Christian, and from feeling as a man. I am too old also for the fatigues of war, especially where the heat is so exhausting. My wish is to rest. Yet I will not suffer her majesty's arms and the Company's arms to be insulted, and patiently wait while the enemy gathers his hordes to attack me. I take, and I will take all possible military precautions, not because I love war, but that I do not love to have our throats cut. A procrastinating diplomacy is the game of the barbarians, and whoever is blinded by it will be defeated.

“In the Murree and Bhoogtee hills the predatory tribes are now fostering the ex-ameer, Shere Mohamed, with a view to hostilities in Scinde, and if they be not crushed when the season opens mischief will ensue. We cannot in the heat do anything; but I must attack them in winter if I can, though I well know it is a thing difficult to accomplish. It has indeed occurred to me to take them into our pay as the more humane course, but I fear the supreme government will not consent to the expense: one or other course must however be pursued, or a very large force must be constantly maintained at Shikarpoore. An attack on those people may possibly hasten a war in the Punjaub; but I am daily more disquieted about our Scindian frontier; I do not clearly see how far this border warfare will go, and I well know it is the most difficult and dangerous to conduct that can possibly be. All within Scinde is tranquil.”

When Lord Ellenborough was thus recalled, by an act of arrogant power so indefensible as to force from the duke of Wellington the only passionate censure he was ever known to use with respect to public affairs, the oligarchs who perpetrated the wrong, proceeded consistently, but shamefully and ungratefully, in India and in England, to assail the general whose victories and administrative talents consolidated that policy by which the recalled nobleman had re-established their tottering empire. Foully they

assailed him through every channel that corruption and baseness could penetrate; that is to say as a corporation; for amongst the directors of the time were men too honourable to engage in such passages; but as a body they did encourage expectant parasites to assail Sir C. Napier with such vituperation as only parasites are capable of: nor did they confine this enmity, as shall be shown, to revilings and falsehoods. There is however a time for baseness and a time for virtue to triumph—there is also a time for retribution—and it came. Bending in confessed fear and degradation, these trafficking oligarchs were afterwards forced by the imperious voice of the nation, to beseech the commander they had so evilly treated, to accept of higher power and succour them in their distress! God is just!

## CHAPTER VI.

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UNTOWARD as the Poolagee disaster had been, the extraordinary marches made by the troops, unheard of before in that season of heat, gave the hill tribes an uneasy sense that where such men were to be encountered, or evaded, there would be little safety for future incursions. Nor was Wullee Chandia's enmity a matter of small moment for them. His power was considerable, he was crafty in their own method of warfare, he had a blood-feud with the Doomkees which rendered him inveterate, and from his stronghold, thirty miles west of Larkaana, he could launch several thousand warriors against their hills, where the Murrees were his allies. He had before the Poolagee expedition done so much, that at the great Durbar the general publicly gave him a sword of honour, girding it on himself in presence of the assembled chiefs and sirdars. Wullee in return promised to press heavily on Beja, which he could with less fear attempt, because he had the British posts as well as his own fortress to fall back on.

The spies now asserted that the tribes, elated by the defeat of the English, were assembling in great numbers around Poolagee, with design to bring the Lion into Scinde; but the general was not deceived; for though he knew they had schemes of that nature, he judged this congregation to be defensive, because they were poisoning the wells in the desert, and the Murrees were at feud with and actually fighting the Bhoogtees and Doomkees. The villagers also, encouraged by the avowed resolution to repress the robbers were beginning to defend themselves against small bands, and had even made several prisoners.

Meanwhile a native officer in Ali Moorad's service arrested five Boordee chiefs who though subjects of that ameer had plundered some Scindians near the Indus—these Boordees being indeed as lawless as any of the hillmen. Thus far all was satisfactory. But notwithstanding these many favourable circumstances unceasing vigilance was necessary; for the Lion was hovering in the hills, on the side of Shikarpoore, with a strong body of horsemen, and Ali Moorad though he dismissed his Patans as a proof of his fidelity to the alliance, received and entertained with honour four of the exiled Talpoorees, his nephews and cousins, while the great Durbar was being held; and they, thinking Sir C. Napier, then in the midst of twenty thousand Beloochees, would be embarrassed to refuse their demands, had the temerity to claim the restoration of their possessions and the right of residing in Scinde. They were undeceived by a peremptory order sent to Ali for their arrest; but afterwards, all the Talpoor princes still at large, the Lion excepted, were received and suffered by the supreme government to remain at Ali Moorad's court, causing constant embarrassment.

Affairs remained in this state until June, when two painful and important events occurred, namely, a successful incursion of the Jackranees and Doomkees, and a mutiny of sepoy's at Shikarpoore, both resulting from mismanagement and attended with deplorable circumstances. The mutiny was thus caused. Several Bengal regiments being ordered from the north-western provinces of India to occupy Upper Scinde, refused to go there without higher allowances, but after some trouble and the disbanding of one corps, marched, the 64th regiment setting the example, for which it was imprudently praised and in some degree rewarded. Finding Sukkur and Shikarpoore better quarters than they had expected, these regiments were quiet for a time, but the 64th, having been as they said, and truly said, promised the higher allowances before they marched by their Colonel Mosely, refused the lower rate at Shikarpoore, and again broke into mutiny.



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Had this happened when the nations around were combining, and the old troops down from pestilence; or even later when Sale's departure left the temporary command to a man who feared to be "*Cabooled*," the result might have been fatal. The actual danger was very great; for the other Bengal regiments were said to be only withheld from joining the 64th by anger because it had broken the bond of the first mutiny—a slender thread of fidelity which must soon have snapped when it became known that the 64th had been deceived. An undecided officer in command would have been lost; but fortunately Brigadier-General Hunter, a Company's officer sent by Lord Ellenborough to succeed Sale, was then at Sukkur—a man of an intrepid temper. He ordered the regiment down to Sukkur, thinking to quell the mutiny by personal remonstrances; but he was assailed by missiles, and finding the men in that mood brought out the whole garrison of Sukkur, seized thirty or forty of the mutineers, disarmed the rest without spilling blood, and compelled the regiment to cross to the left of the Indus, there to await orders.

Colonel Moseley was afterwards tried and dismissed the service, but meanwhile, twenty ringleaders being condemned to death, six were executed; yet the regiment was still insubordinate, and Sir C. Napier taking away its colours, ordered all men of a second degree of guilt to be discharged, with an intimation that one step further in mutiny would cause the discharge of the whole. He had no other means of making an example, but he discharged the men reluctantly, thinking the system impolitic and pushed to an unjust extent in the India army.—“The sepoy,” he said, “formerly looked to his regiment as a home; but if he is to be discharged after long service, for trifling offences, perhaps on the complaint of some passionate young subaltern as the custom is, he cannot retain that feeling of attachment to his corps which gives the government such moral power over the army.”

General Hunter was unjustly treated on this occasion.

His services were indeed finally acknowledged, but he was at first reprimanded when he should have been commended without stint, having done much and done it well, and in good time, as the following summary will prove. The Lion and Ahmed Khan Lugharee were, during the mutiny, not far from Shikarpoore with a body of horsemen from the Cutchee hills, and fifteen Talpooree princes were then in Ali Moorad's court, distant but a day's march; some of these had been very forward in commencing the war which ended in the conquest, and all were ready to fight again if opportunity offered—there were large magazines at Sukkur and Shikarpoore, and a considerable treasure at the former place, where all the European officers were, with their wives and children, at the mercy of the mutineers: for all the men of the 13th, the only European regiment there, were then down with the sickness and could not have resisted five or six native regiments in rebellion. The artillery and stores would have been seized at Shikarpoore, and that place sacked and the Europeans murdered; the hill robbers would then have come to share in the plunder, and with the insurgent troops would have afterwards assaulted Sukkur. Treasure, guns, stores, lives, all would have been lost, the ameers' standard would have been again hoisted, and Ali Moorad compelled to join it! This terrible train of mischief was cut off by the vigour of General Hunter, and in return he was reprimanded!

Sir C. Napier attributed this ill usage partly to secret enmity against Lord Ellenborough, who had appointed General Hunter; partly to a jealousy about Bengal troops which affected some military functionaries, who seemed anxious to make the commander-in-chief a grand Lama only to be known through his permanent staff. Sir Hugh Gough was always upright, honourable, frank and generous-minded, without guile or intrigue; but a bad system enabled the Adjutant-general Lumley and the Judge-advocate-general Birch to press General Hunter, and they did so until the governor-general, Sir Henry Hardinge, to whom Sir C. Napier appealed, corrected the error. Mean-

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while the opportunity for slander was not overlooked by the Bombay libellers. Lauding Hunter's conduct, as indeed it deserved, they represented Sir C. Napier, who was then straining every nerve to defend that officer, as striving to ruin him and being stopped in that dishonourable course by superior authority!

Nearly coincident with the mutiny happened the other disastrous event.

Captain McKenzie of the 6th irregular cavalry having allowed a detachment of grass-cutters, and an escort under a native officer to forage eleven miles from Khangur, their careless attitude induced a roving band of robbers led by Beja Khan to surprise them. The grass-cutters and many of the escort were slain, more than two hundred in all, and fifty of the horsemen who escaped were wounded. McKenzie hearing of the event pursued the hill-men in vain, and after an exhausting march returned without having seen an enemy. The general expressed his discontent in a public order, and the more strongly because McKenzie was connected with him by marriage. "The detachment," he said, "should not have been sent to such a distance, when an enemy was near, without strong support and under good arrangements. No officer should quit his saddle day or night while a detachment was out of the cantonment; the commander of such an outpost should be always on horseback, sword in hand—he should eat drink and sleep in the saddle—no outpost officer had a right to comfort or rest until all was safe; and that could never be in the presence of such an active enemy as mountain robbers were in every country where they existed. It was useless for officers to gallop their troops over a country after mischief had been done—that only harassed men and horses, and was a mark of inexperience—it was to play with the enemy."

This action was magnified by the tribes into a victory over the British, the fame of it spread to Candahar and even to Cabool, and every encouragement proper to increase the pride and hopes of the robbers was given by

the Bombay faction through their newspaper organs. Then the insolence of Beja and his confederates became unbounded, their inroads more frequent, and the troops were fearfully harassed, yet unable to give that protection which the distressed and harried people cried for with piteous accents. McKenzie asked for inquiry, but it was refused, and like a gallant gentleman, he sought and found another and a better mode of sustaining his reputation. Keeping incessantly on the watch, after one failure from the heat in an attempt to surprise a hill-fort in July, he got notice in August that five hundred hillmen, horse and foot, were only sixteen miles from Shikarpoore. With a forced march of nearly forty miles he got between them and their own country, and cut to pieces all their infantry, but their cavalry escaped during the fight. Two hundred robbers fell, and then was brought out in full relief, the slanderous enmity and falseness of the Bombay faction; for when the reproachful order upon the first disastrous affair appeared, the hired libellers, thinking to find in McKenzie a coadjutor, pestered the public with denunciations of the tyrannical and brutal treatment he had experienced from his general; but when he had thus honourably amended his error, they accused him of having attacked and murdered, in revenge of his former failure, a set of innocent villagers, calling them robbers!

But Sir C. Napier had an exact inquiry made, and it appeared, that if any villagers were amongst the slain they were Boordikas, Ali Moorad's subjects, who had joined the robbers and fallen in their ranks with like weapons and dresses. They could not have been distinguished, and there was no need to distinguish them from their companions, being like them robbers, with the additional offence of acting against the orders of their prince. The truth was, the disaster of the grass-cutters, following on the defeat at Poolagee, had so elated the tribes they thought the hour for destroying the English was come, and this inroad was made with a view to plunder Ali Moorad's territory previous to a general outbreak. Their hopes were known, and some Boordikas having joined with

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arms to partake of the spoil, fell, fighting valiantly, for in that country all of the Beloochee races are brave. Their destruction had a great effect. The tribes suspended their inroads, and the ill-affected villagers, previously surly and disobliging, came to fair observances, aiding the grass-cutters to find forage for the cavalry. Meanwhile the Bhoogtees and Murrees, always at feud, had another battle, and the latter being worsted called upon their friends the Chandikas for help, but when the chief Wullee answered this call he also was defeated. The general then offered to divide the land of the Bhoogtees, Jackranees and Doomkees, between the Chandikas and Murrees, if they would drive those bad tribes away from the frontier altogether, thinking thus to war down the robbers by their own kindred. The effect of this offer shall be shown hereafter, and as no other military actions occurred at that time, the progress of the civil administration claims attention.

In the judicial branch, the diligence of the functionaries, and their efforts to dispense even-handed justice had produced general content, and emboldened the people in the assertion of their rights. The women also loudly proclaimed their approval of the new social system. "Formerly," they exclaimed, "there was no peace. Feuds and family quarrels rendered our lives miserable,—now there is a '*bundobust*,' a fixed rule, and we are no longer so wretched." And as death was rigidly inflicted for murder, an impression began to prevail that it was unlawful to kill women from caprice. These and other proofs that he was largely benefiting his fellow-beings, sustained Sir C. Napier under the burden of serving a thankless government. Other crimes of a heinous nature were not common, and the robbing of merchants and traffickers, though not entirely suppressed because of the nearness of the hills, was abated by the police, now become a solid force. The Beloochee battalions were also advancing in discipline, and many of the warriors who fought at Meeanee continued to accept service in them as sepoy.

Industry of all kinds was reviving; and so widely spread was the reputation of Scinde for security, that rich merchants and numerous cultivators from distant countries, were constantly coming there to settle. The population of Shikarpoore, and still more that of Kurrachee, augmented monthly, and even English and Parsee mercantile men were beginning to turn their attention to this line for trade with the interior of Asia. The factious newspapers, disregarding all these proofs of tranquillity, were still indeed proclaiming, that inveterate hatred filled the minds of the people; but the falsehood became notorious, when the Bombay government, tormented by insurrections, the result of oppression, was compelled to recall troops from Scinde to maintain its own authority by the unsparing use of fire and sword.

From recent occupation, and the many adverse natural visitations, the financial resources could only be vaguely judged at this period, but there was promise of unlimited future prosperity. And notwithstanding the difficulty of ascertaining all the sources of revenue, notwithstanding the time required to examine the ameers' system, to adapt new rules to the habits of the people, and to organize the collection over so vast an extent of country—notwithstanding the numerous frauds attendant on the sudden rupture of social and administrative habits of laws, customs and authorities—notwithstanding the plague of locusts which swept away the revenue by devouring the harvests—notwithstanding the pestilence which affected the physical exertions of the new functionaries and sensibly lowered the receipts by checking cultivation, imposts being chiefly paid in kind, the *soldier civilians*, amongst whom the collectors Rathborne, Pope and Goldney, were conspicuous for zeal and ability, had obtained sufficient revenue to provide for the whole administrative expenses, including every salary, from that of the governor to the lowest servant—including also the camel corps, and more than two thousand policemen of whom eight hundred were cavalry. Sixty-seven thousand pounds sterling remained, and were credited in August to the general

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treasury in aid of the military expenses and the public works—a sum more than double the expense of the barracks, which had been of necessity pushed forward with least regard to economy. This first development indicated great prospective advantages when the collectors should be more able to discover and cherish the resources of the country. And so economical was the administration, that all those expenses had been provided from a sum not much exceeding two hundred thousand pounds sterling, while the collectors judged four hundred thousand pounds would be the immediate, and one million the final standard, without pressure on the people, for to raise revenue with public suffering was contrary to Sir C. Napier's notions of government.

“Taxation here,” he observed at this time, “is still too high, but it requires delicate management to lower it; for the taxes have been so ill arranged, that if a bad one be removed before a good one is prepared to replace it, the revenue may be ruined in a moment. The whole system must be revised, and that cannot be done until we are more firmly established. Hence I am compelled to let matters remain as they are for the moment, except relieving the poor labouring ryot, from whom one-half the produce of his land is taken; but that shall be brought down to one-third, and then increasing comforts will increase industry and bring up the revenue again in a better manner. When we first hired labourers here at very high prices they were lazy, and if checked went off; but now, having experienced the increased comforts commanded by money, they even submit to punishment rather than lose employment. The more men get the more they want, and to this feeling alone I would trust for resistance to the ameers should the government be so mad as to restore those tyrants.”

This restoration had become a great object with the Bombay faction when it had no longer hope to plunder Scinde under the forms of governing. The aim was to throw it back to the ameers, in the not ill-grounded expectation that they would provoke a renewed con-

quest, under better auspices for official peculation and nepotism. In this view petitions and memorials filled with charges against Sir C. Napier, pretended to be from Roostum and the other ameers, but really framed at Bombay, were transmitted to England, where they were secretly countenanced by the Court of Directors, and openly by some members of parliament. Happily with no ultimate effect; for if those princes had been reinstated, the Mooltan insurrection under Moolraj, instead of being suppressed by a British army from Scinde, would have been sustained by a hundred thousand Beloochees from that country, and probably by the forces of Bhawalpoor also.

It has been shown that the regular Indian military establishment had not been augmented for the conquest of Scinde, or for the retention of it; the troops assembled there having reference to the menacing state of the Punjaub and the general interests of the empire. The real strength of the British in Scinde was that the people could *live* under the new government; they were well fed and with their bodily sufferings their abject spirit was departing. The ameers without a foreign army to aid them would have been driven forth again by their own subjects; yet to restore them was seriously proposed in England and India, and merely from factious motives—"It would be such a triumph over Lord Ellenborough!" True enough that saying was, but it would also have been a triumph over England and over humanity.

The public works came under two heads, civil and military. The first, founded on rigid calculation as to their prospective advantages, were profitable investments for the Company. The second were profitable investments for England; because to save her soldiers' lives by building good barracks, and to secure the frontiers by well-disposed military works, are profitable even when commercially viewed. Moreover Sir C. Napier's measures were profoundly calculated for laying a solid foundation to sustain the superstructure of a great community, which he was striving by moral influences to establish on the



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banks of the Indus. Under the fostering care of Lord Ellenborough this project would assuredly have been accomplished in all its gigantic proportions; but as many of the most essential parts were afterwards stopped, both by the interference and the negligence of superior power, it will be here only necessary to give a general indication of their nature and design.

“When I can master the sun, the river and the robbers, the people will turn their rich country to account, for themselves and for the revenue.” This observation showed the extent of Sir C. Napier's views and his difficulties; but to that he added “It is difficult to get engineers, for there is in India an abundance of civil servants with enormous salaries, while to provide *officers* is less regarded and there is a dearth of engineers.” This obstacle was the more serious, because Scinde had been the country of feudal chiefs, and consequently the military establishments of civilized nations were not to be found in it at the period of the conquest. “We are more like a colony in a desert than a civilized community,” was his forcible expression. Everything had to be created, and it was truly marvellous that in so short a time, not merely the semblance of but a really energetic and to the people satisfactory system of administration had been established. It was however only by incessant labour and pains that result was obtained; for the springs and wheels of the great machine did not fall at once into their right places, like soldiers at the bray of a trumpet—the trumpet's sound was indeed heard throughout the land, commanding, but the strong skilful hand was also there, organizing and compelling.

Most sorely felt among the difficulties springing from the paucity of resources, was the want of large buildings in which to lodge the troops; and the construction of barracks had been the most serious charge on the surplus revenue and the least satisfactory, because there was no time to choose sites when every day lost was a soldier's life lost. Moreover the Company's system which forces officers to become accountants rather than engineers, was, and is,

in India defective, and incredibly expensive. At Kurrachee the barracks, projected on a bad model when that town was occupied during the Affghan invasion, had been with the usual official inattention to the soldiers' well-being, built with wood, sent from Bombay, but previously used in other edifices and unfitted for its purpose. And there were other impediments to a remedy which were thus described in November 1843. "Public works go on slowly in this country. The people are idle, the climate enervating; the materials are brought from a distance with great difficulty; the working hours are few, and everything is against the engineer even if he has health. The sickness has hitherto prevented progress. Everybody has been ill and very ill. Nor have we workmen now—where four hundred were previous to this sickness procured at Hyderabad by the engineer he cannot now procure fifty! The country people are more sickly than the soldiers, and until this great and unparalleled sickness passes away nothing can be done!"

Kurrachee, the seat of government, was to be fortified so as that no Asiatic assault could succeed; yet in such a manner as not to prevent its expansion into the emporium of trade for the nations bordering the Indus and its great confluents. In this view the plan embraced a large extent of ground, including the town the cantonments and the port; and the flanks of some near hills, called the *Pub* and *Ghisree* mountains, were probed for springs, with a view to conduct their waters by a natural fall to the cantonment, in addition to the stream of the Muller river. It was contemplated also to procure Chinese immigrants, whose skilful industry might forward the establishing of gardens around Kurrachee, and stimulate the natives to improvement: a wise plan but derided by those who pass their lives in condemning works which they have neither the energy to undertake nor the capacity to understand when undertaken by others. It was said "The Scindians won't learn, they are wedded to their own ways." A trite observation and true enough in most things, was the reply, but, not as regards luxuries and

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The badness of the port has been noticed. The ships lay near an exposed point, while the troops or merchandize were passed across a creek in open boats, which had often to remain out all night; and always the soldiers had to wade far, after landing, through deep mud, to the detriment of their health. To obviate this, a military road to the shore was constructed, and from thence the mole was to be cast across the mud and waters of the creek to the distant point, to enable vessels to load and unload at all times without difficulty. The sickness had disabled the few workmen available at the beginning of the year, but four hundred were afterwards obtained from Bombay, and progress was made in this great work, which was to run two miles through mud and water, and was become important for the future destiny of the town. For it was now proposed by the supreme government to send the Bombay reinforcements and stores for the army on the upper Sutlej through Scinde, thus furnishing a decisive argument in favour of that country having become the frontier of India.

To connect the port of Kurrachee with the nearest branch of the Indus, was essential to rendering the latter the great artery of trade—which was not then the case, the richest traffic coming by caravans from Sehwan, by Ahmed Khan, along the road under the Hala mountains. Wherefore to give the great river its due importance, the unfinished choked channel, called the Gharra Canal, before mentioned as running towards the Indus from the Ghisree creek near Kurrachee, had been surveyed, with a view to restore its navigation and form a station near its junction with the river at Jurruck. Meanwhile the military communication with Hyderabad was by land, through Gharra to Tattah, where the troops embarked to pass up the Indus, but subject to many difficulties; for the embarkation and navigation of the Indus were difficult, and the river so capricious at Tattah, that vessels would in the evening have deep water close to the shore and next

morning find a high sand-bank. Three days were usually required afterwards for the voyage to Hyderabad when the current was strong, and often the men had to wait a day and a night or more at the unhealthy Tattah station.

To remove these embarrassments a carriage-road from Kurrachee was projected, to run northward of Gharra to Khotree, opposite Hyderabad, by which the land-march was augmented thirty miles, but the troops at once reached their final destination, and could cover the additional distance in two days or even in one on emergency; it was designed also to conduct a branch from this road to Jurruck where the rocky banks always insured the embarkation. On this road, of about a hundred miles, were to be erected sheds, to contain the wing of a regiment and to mark the halting-places, by which the labour and time of pitching striking and loading tents would be saved and the marches made in the coolest time; an advantage to be appreciated by those who know how helpless and physically weak inexperienced troops are when first disembarked in a strange country.

Such were the works proposed for the district of which Kurrachee was the centre; all of immediate and obvious utility, yet having reference to the future wants of a rising community; but they and many other great projects were for the most part set aside or stopped by the general government which, though continually importuned, would not give the sanctions necessary, or even answer the letters addressed to it on the subject.

Taking Hyderabad as the next centre, the plans were on the same great scale and with the same reference to the future.

The brick barracks have been noticed, the improvements being lofty rooms, double roofs, good ventilation, and the securing of the lower story from the pestilent night exhalations of the earth.

The restoration, strengthening and cleaning—no slight labour—of the ameeers' great fortress has also been mentioned; it was now complete, and so strong as to be nearly impregnable. To besiege it in summer or autumn would

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be destructive to an army from malaria; and as it was built on a precipitous rock, fifteen feet high, it could only be breached above that line, which would be difficult from the softness of the bricks, and the opening would still be inaccessible. It contained seven wells of fine water, which had been choked during the ameers' occupation but were now discovered and cleared out by the British. A new gate was also opened, and the place furnished outside with a clear circuit wall, for which many buildings had to be removed. The road of communication between the camp and the fortress was likewise made, but a sanction to build *martello* towers for connecting the fortress with the camp was never given.

These works had only a military object, those designed for the advancement of civilization were of far greater magnitude. They were. *Firstly*. The filling up many pools of water round the town, and constructing in place of them large stone tanks; for the pools, though furnishing the principal supply of water for Hyderabad and annually replenished by the inundation, were pestiferous in the heat. *Secondly*. The formation of a road through Meerpoore to Omercote, a distance of ninety miles, and involving the casting of many bridges in a country intersected with watercourses like network. The principal structure was to have been over the Fullaillee, and the whole line, though useful as a military communication, was chiefly designed to open the capital of Central Scinde as a market for agricultural produce. *Thirdly*. A road running a hundred miles southwards to Cutch, having also administrative as well as military objects; for it was to open the Delta, the most fertile, the most barbarous, and most dangerous part of Scinde; and to give facility for watching over and protecting the Hindoos, who were there more numerous and more oppressed by the Beloochees than in other quarters. *Fourthly*. A northern road, passing the Fullaillee also by another great bridge at Meeanee, which would have completed the military communications between Kurrachee and Sukkur.

To strengthen this long line, loopholed houses or towers,

having a wall-piece and a garrison of two or three men, were projected for each wood-station on the Indus; not only to provide secure residences for the agents and enable them to protect the wood and guard the navigation of the river from robbers, but to give them an importance in the eyes of the people on the right bank, who were poor and barbarous. Now also, taking into consideration the mutability of the river, Sir C. Napier, with that foresight which marked his military operations even more than his daring, and was perhaps the cause of that daring, had a large model of Cæsar's bridge made, that its nature might be perfectly known to his engineers and workmen; for he anticipated the necessity of having control over the Indus in the event of an invasion, and chose this model from its intrinsic excellence, and because the capricious river might change its bed and leave the bridge, which could then be easily taken to pieces without damage and follow the water.

At Sehwan, the point on the river nearest to the Hala range and therefore the most imposing to the mountain tribes for offence, and in defence well placed to take in flank any force descending from the hills upon Larkaana or Hyderabad, he was still desirous to establish a military station, but accidental circumstances forbade it at this time.

At Shikarpoore, Bukkur, and Sukkur, the great *bund* or dike, for shutting out the inundation between those places; the barracks; the *serais*; the river port and dock and the magazine, had been either commenced or marked out, but progress was slow, because the pestilence of 1843 there, as elsewhere, had struck down engineers and workmen. In the Affghan campaign, a military bridge had been thrown over the Indus above Bukkur; but it had been removed, and the only passage was by a ferry extremely difficult from the violence of the stream; wherefore Sir C. Napier, contemplating the time when Roree and Sukkur should rise to be cities, designed to cast two suspension-bridges of great span, from Bukkur on each side, and felt assured of succeeding, yet at this time contented himself with improving the ferry. Mean-

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while, the general survey had been making rapid progress, the regulation of the shikargahs or state forests was completed, and many thousands of ryots were settled on government lands: numerous nullahs, great and small, were cleared and new ones opened to aid agriculture: a scientific scheme for general irrigation was perfected, and the construction of some prisons finished the long list of public works designed for 1844.

An immense correspondence and constant application were necessarily attendant on these schemes, for, as before said, neither men nor things fell into their places of their own accord; and the energy which compelled them to do so would have been remarkable even for a young man, acting in peaceable times under a temperate sky; but here they were superadditions to battles of the most terrible nature, policy of the most intricate elaboration, and conducted amidst all manner of vexations and crossings, all foul revilings and calumnies from men, who with a spark of patriotism or honour should have been the foremost to support them. And those men, not satisfied even with the mendacity of the Indian press, aided by many equally foul English journals, had recourse to the French press to spread their libels. Thus, amongst other articles, evidently supplied from India, there appeared in the *National* a fabricated report from a committee of the House of Commons—a committee which never sat—pronouncing a formal condemnation of Lord Ellenborough and Sir C. Napier, and an approval of Colonel Outram's conduct! The *Siècle* French newspaper also, denounced Sir Charles as having committed atrocities surpassing those French burnings at the caves of Dara!

At Bombay, when the fear of Lord Ellenborough was removed, it became difficult to say whether malignant ferocity or spiteful meanness were most predominant in the hostility displayed. Vessels which previous to that nobleman's recall had been regularly despatched with the mail for Scinde, were on his departure stopped, and the public correspondence, continually delayed, accumulated so as to make it nearly impossible to conduct it with

propriety; while with respect to private correspondence, Sir C. Napier had to endure frequent loss of letters, and to find in the *Bombay Times*, the avowed organ of the faction, sneering allusions to the contents of some which never reached him! The enmity of the official people even descended to harass him by demanding forty pounds sterling daily for his simple food, without wine, on board a government steamer when going up the Indus to hold the great Durbar; a charge designed, not so much to obtain money as to impose an additional heavy correspondence on him; and when he successfully resisted this attempt at extortion, worthy of a Swiss innkeeper, the newspapers were directed to impute avarice! Avarice to a man who was at the moment proposing to the supreme government a reduction of his salary; and who in a long life has only regarded money as enabling him to confer on others the ease and comfort he denied to himself! It is thus they make war on me, he wrote on this occasion "It is thus they endeavour to prevent the success of Lord Ellenborough's policy; but that policy is good, and if necessary I will die sword in hand to support it—when I shrink let them sing their song of triumph over me and over their country."

Continued tranquillity in Scinde was his consolation for all these vexations; but it would be erroneous to suppose that was obtained without a personal superintendence and labour beyond the ordinary habits of government; for the people, finding law and justice synonymous, took an eager pleasure in the first, and the number of cases, continually augmenting, became at last nearly overwhelming. This was endured however in preference to having the aid of lawyers, with their enormous expenses and their fixed rules, neither giving nor taking, which the fierce Beloochee race would not bear; for even in the commonest matters they could scarcely be convinced that justice was done if the *Padishaw's* autograph was not attached to the decision. In serious matters the nicest political discrimination was required. Two men might be, and in the eye of the law would appear similar in guilt—hang one, and



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all would bow in submission; hang the other and the whole country would rise in arms. Thus Wullee Chandia and another chief might commit the same crimes; but the first was a holy man as well as a robber; to touch him would have aroused all the fanaticism of the neighbouring tribes, would have brought forty thousand men to his aid and produced a great war. It was by such considerations Sir C. Napier was governed in his internal policy, and no amount of personal labour would make him deviate from it. He was compelled also to apply the same mixture of force and subtilty to the surrounding independent tribes, for which one illustration will suffice.

The jam of Beila, ruling beyond the Hala range on the south-west, allowed some of his people to make a slight foray in Scinde; he was powerful, but not in a condition to raise a war; wherefore the general, accepting the plundered ryots' word for the amount of their losses, sent his moonshee with an escort of horse and a letter, demanding repayment, and intimating that delay would cause the governor to come in person, which would be more costly. The money was instantly paid, though the jam was forced to pawn his sword to raise the sum; he said indeed that the ryots' claim was far too large, but added, "the general is a king, and what the king does is good." To the moonshee however he complained that one of the Scindian commissaries had defrauded him of his just taxes; and that being found true, the offender was arrested and forced to refund the amount. It was greater than the ryots' claim and the jam gained by the whole transaction. The overplus was however paid with a subtle turn, to show that justice not weakness had prevailed. An officer of gigantic stature and daring temper, escorted by a selected body of the Scindian horsemen carried the money as an ambassador, with this message, "the jam's friendship is the more prized as it saves the governor the grief of being compelled to plunder Beila, and gives him the happiness of being able to attack the jam's enemies if they come into Scinde," thus indirectly giving him hopes of British protection.

These negotiations furnished an opportunity to examine the Beila country and ascertain the prince's true position. He was the most powerful chief of Southern Beloochistan, and though nominally subject to the khan of Khelat, was in fact independent, despotic, and odious to his subjects. His country extended to the coast and contained the port of Soono-meeanee—a better one at that time than Kurrachee—where much smuggling was carried on, to the equal detriment of the jam, and of Scinde and Bombay. It was therefore proposed to the supreme government to purchase this port, which it was thought the jam would readily sell, as his revenue also suffered from the smuggling. But to put down the contraband trade was only a part of the general's design; he hoped finally to draw the trade of Central Asia down by Khelat and the plain of Wudd, behind the Hala mountains, to Soono-meeanee, without going through the difficult and dangerous Bolan Pass, where it fostered the plundering habits of the tribes bordering Scinde. "These are castles in the air, he observed, but if I can fix a few good foundations the floating castles will settle down on them, and the nations will look back on my battles as wholesome alteratives, which have produced freedom and comparative affluence in place of miserable slavery and a fitful existence by rapine."

Notwithstanding the general adherence of the Beloochees to the new order of government, they were too fierce to yield implicit obedience in all matters, and their conqueror was too wise to exact by violence a submission which ought to be the result of policy and time. He well knew the whole race still carried arms, and he was content to let that pass, if they regarded his edict so far as to hide them in the presence of the British authorities. He knew also, although the slaves generally had defied their masters, that many rich people and chiefs still held persons, principally women, in slavery but treated them gently, fearing to lose them, liberty being a morsel greedily snatched at. Hence, only when complaints of ill-usage reached him did he directly interfere, acting indirectly however, with great

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perseverance and subtilty to insure their final emancipation, as shall be shown further on.

But while engaged in these matters of civil administration, he was continually meditating on the great and difficult scheme of operations necessary to reduce the Cutchee hill-tribes when the season would permit action, for the obstacles were formidable. Troops could not move from Sukkur and Shikarpoore until the inundation, which always flooded the country between those places, had subsided; and that subsidence was generally followed by sickness, which was already discovering itself at the latter town in a severe form. It was therefore necessary to ascertain whether a general pestilence would again prevail, before any measures could be even taken to open the campaign, and then the following difficulties were to be overcome.

A great desert was to be passed, a surprise effected and many warlike men to be encountered, who, brave even to madness, had an immense space of mountains behind them for prolonging a dangerous warfare; they had also to back them a multitude of other tribes, brave as themselves and as lawless, ready to aid, either in fight or in retreat, until the conflict should bring the British into collision with the Seikhs and Affghans. In that desert a heat destructive to Europeans prevailed; and in those mountains a cold equally destructive to sepoys; for the breezes which the former would rush eagerly to meet the latter would shrink from as bringing death. Failure would cause the loss of all the troops engaged, and be dangerous for Scinde, which would be immediately overrun by the victorious barbarians, and by all their kindred tribes of the Khelat and Hala mountains. The pestilence was to be dreaded therefore in Upper Scinde while preparations were being made; and those preparations had to be made with secrecy, or the surprise of the hillmen, which was judged essential to success, could not be effected. It was essential also to deceive the organs of the Bombay faction—ever on the watch for doing mischief—as they would be sure to give the enemy timely notice of prepara-

tions and projects, and give advice also as to counteraction. How all these obstacles were overcome shall be shown hereafter, for many serious crosses and forced changes of plans happened before the warfare was in activity: but the first general notions may be thus sketched.

The Murrees though warlike were not ferocious, nor very predatory, and it was hoped to separate them from the others. The Kujjucks, lying beyond the Murrees on the west, were too distant to make incursions on Scinde, and being avowed subjects of the khan of Khelat might through that prince's influence be kept neutral. The hostile tribes would thus be confined to the range of hills running from Poolagee to the Indus, if by surprise, a body of men sufficient to fight them when altogether could be thrown into the hills near that place, cutting off the Kujjucks on the west and uniting with the Murrees on the north. In this view it was designed first to assemble troops, as if in defence and fear, at Khanghur and Rojan on the Scindian edge of the Khusmore desert; then to invite the khan of Khelat to a conference at Dadur near the mouth of the Bolan Pass, under pretext of arranging Khelatian affairs; if he accepted the proposal to proceed there with two thousand selected men and twenty field-pieces, but instead of returning by the same road, to strike suddenly off into the Cutchee hills and sweep the defiles in all their length towards the Indus, while the forces at Rojan and Khanghur made a simultaneous march upon Poolagee. In this manner it would be possible to surprise and surround Beja Khan, who was now the avowed chief of the hill confederacy for the war; and if, as was very probable, that wily warrior should detect the snare of meeting the khan and save himself in the western mountains, his places of Poolagee, Oolagee and Lheree could be destroyed, and their forts occupied, which would give a command of the wells and consequently of the desert.

Though the plan and time of execution were confined to the general's breast, his resolution to punish the robbers, sooner or later, was made no secret of; because neither the Bombay faction nor Beja could divine the final scheme,

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and in their eagerness were likely to conceive many false notions, which would in the end perplex themselves and conduce to the public interest ; but the matter being thus noised abroad, displayed in a very remarkable manner the influence which as a conqueror he had acquired over the barbarian nations of Central Asia. For it was supposed the expedition would be the commencement of a career of general conquest, and there came from the traveller Wolfe, then at Bokara, a letter, saying the general's anger was dreaded there ; and at the same time presents and assurances of goodwill arrived from many other quarters ; amongst them from the Affghan chiefs of Candahar and Herat ; and it was at this time the khan of Khiva, whose dominions border the Aral and Caspian seas, sent a prince of his family to negotiate an alliance with the victorious governor of Scinde. To all these messages and ambassadors fitting answers and presents were given, and Sir C. Napier, ever watchful to augment his moral influence, caused his horse-artillery to gallop up some difficult rocky heights and open a fire in presence of the Herat and Khiva men ; well knowing the exploit, really remarkable and to them astonishing, would be magnified by eastern hyperbole into something marvellous, and as such spread all over Asia.

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From the chiefs of independent tribes came offers to join the expedition with their mounted warriors, and this general indication of respect for his power in arms, was seen by the general with pleasure, as giving moral force ; but in the difficult enterprise projected he would not accept the service of men sure to turn upon him if a reverse happened. He preferred trusting to his own genius with fewer but surer men, and only drew from those offers the inference, that he might act with even more audacity than before in his intercourse with the surrounding nations.

While revolving these matters, one of the bad effects of Lord Ellenborough's recall was felt in the separation of Cutch from his command. The secret committee in England, on Bombay instigation, had it restored to that presidency, alleging grounds in language pompous and

pretending, and disclosing a vulgar desire to give all possible personal offence, combined with all possible ignorance of the subject. The command over Cutch had been voluntarily given by Lord Ellenborough, and to lose it again, when he was almost overwhelmed with labour, was for Sir C. Napier personally a great relief; but for the public very injurious. Firstly. It deprived Scinde of the support of Colonel Roberts, whose influence over the Raō of Cutch was unbounded; and with Roberts went the action of the native force which that able officer had organized to aid in controlling the Delta. Secondly. Cutch belonged politically and militarily to Scinde, and had no natural connection with Bombay. The people of Cutch—more especially the outlaw tribes on its border—were at once attached to and afraid of the Scindian government, whereas they despised and laughed at the Bombay government, probably the most oppressive and incapable of any under British domination; hence the error of taking Cutch from Scinde would have had to be repaired at great cost of life and treasure if any after-commotion had happened in the unhealthy and intricate Delta. Nothing of that kind occurred indeed, because Sir C. Napier proved himself a conqueror in every way; subduing the Belooch fierceness in battle, bending their pride by just laws, and winning their affections by unmistakeable anxiety for their welfare; but with less policy on his part the folly of the act would have been made manifest. His reasoning on this occasion clearly developed his own views, and exposed all the ignorance and insolence of the minute in which the change was advocated.

“Of Cutch, its local history and past government he might,” he said, “know little, as asserted in the minute; but the treaties of 1816-19-32 were enough for the purpose. The civil government of Cutch had been conferred on him when he was ill and only prevented by a sense of duty from resigning that of Scinde. It was however by its geographical position and features separated from, *not connected with Bombay*, as the minute averred; and it was, on the contrary, *closely connected* geographically with

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Scinde. The great *rhin* or *run* of Cutch was a continuation of the Gulf of Cutch, which being connected with the desert boundary of Scinde, *cut off* Bombay and Guzzerat, and *united* Cutch to Scinde.

“As to their ‘*moral positions.*’ If two countries under different princes, divided also by strong natural features, were united by fortuitous circumstances it would be an anomaly, and did not exist here. Under his government no correspondence as to ‘SOCIAL CONNECTION’ between Cutch and Guzzerat had taken place, but a great deal as to DISPUTES between them; which, coupled with the three treaties, sufficiently indicated their mutual feelings of hostility: Cutch seemed to be as inimical to the Guicwar of Guzzerat as it was to the Bombay government, which it hated.

“Why was it supposed that the Raō of Cutch had ‘*more confidence in the government of Bombay than in that of Scinde?*’ It would be indeed surprising if the Raō desired to resume his connection with Guzzerat and Bombay—the contrary was the fact. The Raō had full confidence in his tried and acknowledged friend Colonel Roberts; and that excellent officer had given him entire confidence in the governor of Scinde, who had done nothing to forfeit it.

“That some connection should have existed, previous to the conquest of Scinde, between Bombay and Cutch was natural; because Scinde had been hostile in the extreme, Bombay friendly; but it was the ameers only who had been hostile—not the Scindees, who were connected with the Cutchees in social life, by mercantile and religious ties, and by marriage. This was proved in the trials of offenders where all those ties were made known, though not always of a moral character.

“If a military government had its disadvantages, and it unquestionably had so, it had also its advantages; one being, that the chief knew most of what passed, and acquired a general knowledge of what in civil governments is absorbed or lost in departments. Hence he was enabled to say, that if the rooted hostility of the ameers

to Cutch, had not been able to separate the two people, the friendly intercourse now established and rapidly increasing, would soon incorporate them as completely in their 'moral' as in their 'geographical relations.'

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"There was however an administrative view also to be taken. Many of the robbers of the desert bordering the Rhin of Cutch were Scindees, defying equally the ameers, the Raō and the Guicwar; but who yet found, when pursued by any one of those governments, an asylum with their social friends in each country. Lord Ellenborough, who thoroughly understood the whole subject, had enjoined a conciliatory policy with these outlaws, and that was one reason for employing Colonel Roberts; because he knew them well, and he had persuaded numbers, driven by the tyranny of the ameers to become robbers, to return and settle as ryots in Scinde. Barbarism had however long ruled, and those wild tribes cared not for the Bombay government, nor confided in its protection, nor feared its anger; but the military governor of Scinde they did fear, knowing he could and would be amongst them in arms if they offended him. They were essentially warriors and held civil government in contempt; a corporal in Hyderabad would have more moral influence with them than the governor-general in Bombay. They were all submissive from the day the battle of Hyderabad was won, because from that field they had been informed by the victor that he would extirpate them if they were not so. Yet before that action they had despised the English government at Bombay.

"Colonel Roberts' influence with the governor of Scinde they knew, and that the latter decided all appeals by strict rules of justice and not by favour:—hence they, and the Raō himself, had great confidence in the Scindian ruler. The Raō personally had more than once found the Scindian *paramount power* meant only *paramount justice*, protecting alike himself and his people; and being a just and good man this gave him pleasure and a confidence in the Scinde governor which he did not feel in that of Bombay: and with respect to administrative acts the



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former was also closer for reference and communication.

“‘*Religious connection.*’ This had been touched upon in the minute without much knowledge of the matter. The Hindoos in Scinde, and especially in the Delta, were very numerous—the majority were Hindoos, and *there existed no ‘religious bar’* to an intimate connection between Scinde and Cutch: nearly all the artificers attracted to Scinde since the fall of the ameers came from Cutch.

“With respect to the military view, no wise man could in his political arrangements assume as a basis that a new conquest would be peaceful; no man rejoiced more at the tranquillity of Scinde than he did, because he was responsible for it; no man had more confidence in its permanence; but he was not blinded to the fact, that accident might at any moment disturb that tranquillity—he had shaken hands with the Beloochees, but they were bloody hands! Scarcely a family in the land but had to deplore losses, and these things were not forgotten; yet they were, he believed, forgiven, because a Beloochee glories at the death of his relations in battle. Besides he had given the chiefs back all they possessed under the ameers, none had suffered in property and many had gained—the poorer people had done so enormously.

“One old man had, after making submission, grasped his hand and said ‘I am here to make my salaam to you as my chief; but I fought at Meeanee and eighty of my own family died in that battle! Now I am ready to die fighting by your side and under your flag.’ Such were the military feelings of these men, but would not that old warrior in a moment draw the sword again, if he thought there was a chance of victory—a faithful subject only while it was convenient. For some years nothing else could be expected, and to legislate, to administer on the bond of such a man’s loyalty would be gross folly. He bowed to the conqueror, to the man who returned his possessions. Let that conqueror be replaced by a civil government, and let civil servants affront him and he would take to arms instantly; but he would not do so

where a victorious general was to be dealt with. Hence, 'the tranquillity prevailing could not be a reason for reuniting Cutch to Bombay.'

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"He had recently given Bombay help, yet reluctantly; not from wanting the troops, but lest their departure should give Dr. Buist of the *Bombay Times* an opportunity of calling down the hill tribes, by saying the force was weak and the time favourable for destroying the English. In the Delta also, insalubrious and blotted with jungles desert tracks and sand-hills, were tribes that, having such fastnesses and a retreat open into the great desert and to Cutch, had been always wild and resolute, and a revolt there would be very difficult to quell. But if the force in Cutch were in good hands, like Colonel Roberts,' it could co-operate with troops from Kurrachee, Hyderabad and Omercote; and the revolters thus attacked on all sides would lose the game. They knew that, and were quiet; but if Cutch were again placed under the Bombay government, and a political agent replaced a military man, the hold of the Delta would at once become morally weakened: for the people there could not understand the troops being under one man the civil government under another.

"Such countries could not be governed by the mere official arrangements of a civil governor; their ruler for some years must be a military man, who must have frequent intercourse with the chiefs to gain an insight to their characters; and they also would form a tolerably correct one of his. In fine, unsophisticated human nature and military nature must both be studied in dealing with barbarians; they would not bear from a civilian arrangements suited to civilization but crossing their prejudices; yet to the stern behests of a soldier chief they would bow in submission.

"A comparison of the last year's administration of Cutch under Colonel Roberts with any other political agency under the Bombay government, would show the superiority of the former; and the wisdom of Lord Ellenborough's arrangement would be made manifest. Colonel Roberts knew

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much more of Cutch its '*history, treaties, and peculiar circumstances*'—so emphatically and ignorantly adverted to in the minute—than any government could know; his knowledge being derived from many years' residence amongst them. And as to '*records*,' Scinde and Bombay being equally under the one supreme government, no public advantage could accrue from their custody being with one or the other, seeing they were only deposits for rare references on unimportant matters of detail.

“ It was asserted in the minute that the '*governor of Scinde was necessarily and completely ignorant of what had been previously done, and of the peculiar circumstances of the country.*' An opinion thus given as to his peculiar ignorance was not worth disputing; but that he was '*necessarily ignorant*' could not be sustained; because only a little energy and reading was sufficient to ascertain what had been done, and what ought to be done under the '*peculiar existing circumstances.*' However, whether well or ill acquainted with that matter, if '*he must, even though perfectly informed, be incapable for a long time to come, of acquiring the confidence of the prince and people, in a degree comparable to that in which it was possessed by the Bombay government,*' he agreed that Cutch should not be left to his ruling. He would only remark, that recent events and the insurrection then going on in the presidency of Bombay, did not seem to prove that '*long and intimate connection with the Bombay government was synonymous with confidence in it.*'

“ If Cutch was not annexed to Scinde the troops in the former should not have their commander in the latter province. In peace it was not necessary, and it would cause a useless inconvenient separation of the Bombay troops from their own government. But in contradiction to the positive and ill-founded assertions in the secret committee's minute, Cutch ought to be annexed to Scinde; because those countries were united geographically and in every relation of life, civil, religious, commercial and military; because Cutch was naturally severed from Bombay as regarded its internal arrangements; and because

the Raō had not any particular desire to belong to that presidency."

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This view of affairs, unanswerable, and unanswered save by the exercise of dogged power, was, at the very moment of its being proffered, confirmed in an unquestionable manner by an application from several hundred families in Cutch for land in Scinde, accompanied with certificates from a British sub-collector to say, they were not barbarous, but an industrious people and skilful cultivators! Nevertheless Cutch was reannexed to Bombay, because Lord Ripon, to whom this foolish and insulting minute was addressed, feared and flattered the Court of Directors instead of controlling it; and that short-sighted and malignant body was swayed by personal feelings. It is thus the world is misgoverned !

## CHAPTER VII.

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IN October the 13th European regiment came down the Indus to Kurrachee, in progress for England, and according to custom left volunteers for other corps, some of them to finish their many glorious actions with deaths as heroic as ever graced the best soldiers of Rome. To replace the 13th at Sukkur, the 78th were sent up the country, a fine body of Highlanders from whom gallant service was expected in the Cutchee hills, but an overruling power had decreed that a terrible calamity should frustrate that hope. Meanwhile a practical crushing reply to the calumnies of the Bombay faction, as to the unquiet feelings of the Scindians, was furnished by Sir C. Napier. Though on the point of engaging in a difficult campaign beyond the frontier of Scinde, he spared, at the earnest entreaty of the Bombay government, one European and one native regiment to aid in quelling an insurrection in that presidency; and that no kind of reproof might be wanting, he supplied the loss of those regiments with the Belooch battalions, composed of the men said to be his deadly enemies!

In November, the annual sickness after the inundation being much less than was expected, and most places entirely healthy, the general resolved to repair to Sukkur in furtherance of the contemplated operations against the hillmen; and as the north-western part of Scinde, which, as before observed, was rather conciliated than conquered, had never been visited by him, he resolved to take that line, and, making his journey one of inquiry, exploration and reform, to impress the full action of his administra-

tion on the people. He took with him the volunteers of the 13th regiment, formed as a guard, and with them a detachment of the Scinde irregular horsemen, called by the country people, as they do all irregular cavalry, Mogullāees—Moguls—and by that name they shall in future be distinguished. Steady in faith and conduct they were, though a congregation of adventurers from every country; fierce and daring in battle also, and true in every way were those men; and that was shown to all the world afterwards at Goojerat, where the Scinde Mogullāees surprised friend and foe alike by their surpassing discipline and courage.

While preparing for this journey, a strong detachment was ordered from Hyderabad to Ahmed Khan, once more to test the salubrity of that place; and one advantage was immediately discovered, namely, good water, plentiful and pure, a thing of great moment; for in Scinde the soil was so impregnated with different salts that scarcely ever could good water be found. This time was chosen for testing Ahmed Khan, in the hope that such various movements of troops—those from Hyderabad going westward, while the 78th went northward up the river, and the general with his escort roved through the north-western parts—would give rise, as the same policy had done the year before, to exaggerations, and powerfully affect the fears and the imaginations of the hill tribes. The sanatorium project was however finally abandoned, because the Clifton hills and the Munnoora point, near Kurrachee, were found to possess a more excellent climate close to the seat of government, whereas Ahmed Khan could only be reached through the strange region now being explored by the general.

It was a series of dead levels, five, fifteen, and twenty miles broad and from fifteen to a hundred long; each flat was bounded by limestone rocks, in ranges running nearly north and south, and rising perpendicularly from a thousand to three thousand feet. The strata were of every inclination, horizontal, perpendicular, oblique and even circular; but the faces of the ranges were like walls

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crowned with huge castellated battlements ; and though watercourses from eighty to one hundred yards wide were sometimes found, the plains were otherwise as flat and united as a billiard-table.

Sick men could not be safely moved across these flats because of the sand-storms, common enough in Scinde, but here of peculiar vehemence. One which assailed the head-quarters on this journey had no parallel in any person's previous experience. The air was calm, but suddenly everything, animate and inanimate, became overcharged with electricity, and the sand, rising violently, adhered to the horses' eyes, nearly blinding them ; the human hair stood out like quills, streaming with fire, and all persons felt a strange depression of mind until the evil influence passed away. Invalids could not have lived under the oppression. The people said there was no water in the rocks, and though this was discredited, it was certain that water would be difficult to find, and the making of roads expensive : moreover the reflective power of those natural walls was very great, and untempered by the cool monsoon breezes, which are found to render Clifton one of the most healthy stations in the East.

In the country above Sehwan Sir C. Napier found a tribe of *Rins*, not the Belooch tribe of that name but Scindees, in a miserable condition. They had been driven from their dwellings in the Delta by the ameers because of their fidelity to the Kalloras, and had taken to a robber life in the western mountains, where, in the midst of Beloochees incited to attack them, they lived entirely by force. These poor people were transferred with their own consent to Jurruk on the Indus, and they became honest cultivators and faithful subjects. This was the first of the reforms which this wild quarter of Scinde required ; and there were many violations of law to be corrected and false applications of political economy by subordinate administrators to be suppressed. The task was difficult, yet, having previously caused all the collectors, sub-collectors, and military magistrates to keep minute diaries of their proceedings, which with

enormous mental labour he had constantly perused, Sir C. Napier was prepared to discover what was ill judged, and to apply checks.

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Everywhere the goodwill of the people and the immense natural resources of the country were apparent; but the administration had been much embarrassed and retarded by the absence of the chief collectors and many sub-collectors, who, debilitated by the fever of 1843, had gone to other countries for the recovery of strength. In their absence, errors, frauds, oppressions and irregularity of various kinds, had sprung up, as was to be expected in a country where such disorders had been so recently the general rule of government. Amongst other mischief many fishermen of the great lake in that quarter had been nearly ruined by having their taxation raised on the false principle of improving the revenue; and the land-tax still practically amounted to half the produce. These follies were suppressed in spite of all remonstrances, as being morally wrong and fundamental errors in government, though not so judged generally.

Mistakes of this kind the general was not surprised at; but he was amazed and incensed to find himself surrounded by numbers of slaves praying for liberty, the edict against that wrong having been wholly disregarded. He instantly seized twelve or thirteen of the most guilty slaveholders, and carried them with his camp in irons. His subtle dealing with this matter shall be explained further on. Meanwhile he was surrounded by the population, praying protection against the robbers, and especially against two chiefs, or rather tribes, who vexed the country in a terrible manner. These men he had long been watching and they were at this time captured. The first, named Sowat Guddee, was taken by Fitzgerald, who hearing that the robber swordsmen were abroad for spoil, only forty remaining with the chief as a guard, made a march of seventy-five miles with the camel corps and surprised his mountain camp. Guddee fled, Fitzgerald launched men in pursuit, and the robber with his son, his two nephews and some others turned at bay.



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of Scinde.

Lieutenant James of the police, speaking their language, said to four who stood separately, Surrender and you are safe. One leaped forward and seized his bridle, James saved him, and cried out again, You see I do not hurt him! Surrender. No! exclaimed the other three, No! we are Guddee's son and nephews and we will not surrender. They stood, and clashed their arms. But there was amongst the police present a lad, son of Ayliff Khan, the strong Patan swordsman who captured the Lion's brother; this youth, scarcely inferior in strength courage and comeliness to his father, rushed with a comrade to the duel, and though the Beloochees had sword and shield, while young Ayliff and his companion had only swords, the latter slew all three. Meanwhile Ayliff, the father, rode up to Guddee saying Yield thee, Guddee, or I will slay. Are you Ayliff Khan? Yes. Guddee flung down his weapon; for these eastern swordsmen are all well known to each other, and no man was more formidable than Ayliff Khan. Grieved the general was for the death of Guddee's son and nephews; but their resistance was rather the result of desperation than high feeling; they gave no quarter and expected none; even the man who surrendered to James attempted to kill him immediately afterwards.

Nowbut Khan, the second robber chief, was a terrible savage of great personal strength, who had recently plundered a Persian cafila within the borders of Scinde, and murdered six poor unarmed camel-men. He had five hundred swordsmen, and was the terror of the upper plains. A thousand rupees had been offered for his apprehension, and Wullee Chandia, always true to his word, captured and brought him to the general, who paid the reward in the presence of all the chiefs, at a Durbar held in Larkaana. He also gave Wullee, Nowbut's sword, that robber's name being inlaid in gold letters on the blade; and with subtle policy he did so; for the acceptance of such a sword was the public acknowledgment of a blood-feud which must end in the death of one or other chief.

At this Durbar, sharply and even vehemently did he address the assembled chiefs, inveighing against slavery and giving the greater men indirect intimations that the persons he had arrested were not the only violators of the law. He told them likewise that he knew of their secret thoughts as to plundering; and he adduced the fates of Nowbut and of Guddee, who were to be put to death, as proof of his power and resolution to enforce his authority. Tighter than this he did not think fit to draw the cord, until the great robber tribes of the Cutchee hills were put down. However he so awed the chiefs present, that voluntarily they assured him they would in future keep their followers from robbing, and they fulfilled that promise. On these occasions he regretted his ignorance of the Belooch tongue, a knowledge of which would he said, have been equal to an additional force of a thousand soldiers; but he endeavoured to supply this want by significant actions; and in that view had, as before said, carried with him in chains the rich men arrested for having slaves.

Many sirdars, conscious of like offences, seeing this, came to beg the guilty men off, and some were pardoned; but others more guilty were still retained in irons as an example. There was here unequal justice, but he thus explained his policy. "It is true Wullee and Hadgee, the great chiefs, are just as guilty, but they treat their slaves gently; and were I to make them prisoners, at least one battle with forty thousand mountaineers would have to be fought, and probably slavery would be perpetuated: now I shall by indirect means destroy it. This is the way to deal with these barbarians. Meanwhile I fortify places, build barracks, form police, relieve the poor and encourage them to defy their own chiefs. No person knows my whole policy, it comes out in my public discourses, as if unpremeditated, and is only gradually unfolded. If it was known beforehand it would lose its effect. It is indeed so little understood, that I have had trouble to keep some of my superior officers from driving Wullee Chandia to revolt, by expressing anger at his being a robber, as if all

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natives were alike in all things—but they are not alike in disposition, or power, or habits. Robbery has been the vocation of Wullee and others, and in their notions an honourable one. Hence I never justify punishment of any person by saying he robs—he murders—he is immoral. I say I punish you because you have disobeyed *my orders* which were that you should not rob, should not murder, should not hold slaves. This they understand, it is the Padishaw's will. They do not understand our notions of honour and morality. The chiefs think I am a man who is taking time by the forelock, making my fortune, and as I hit them hard in the battles they offer no opposition; but the people find I am their friend; they live well, and in a few years will be so independent as to defy a return to slavery and misery. Even now, if the ameers were restored I could drive them out again by the aid of the people only, without a soldier.

The gift of Nowbut's sword rendered the Chandian chief a sure check on that robber's remaining band and friends, which, conjoined with the promises made by the other chiefs, gave good hope that the right bank of the Indus would be tranquil during the operations against the hill tribes. Wullee did not shrink from the dangerous honour of the sword, but knowing that Nowbut, if let loose again would seek to slay him, he, when departing, turned and in a low earnest tone said You will kill Nowbut. Yes I will kill him. Good! and the old man left the tent. But this killing of Nowbut, Guddee, and inferior robbers, was not done without a sore mental struggle, which was thus described.

“ I shall hang all my prisoners, there is no help for it; if I did not do so Scinde would be a sheet of blood! The villagers are coming in crowds around me, complaining of devastations and murders by these robbers and their confederate in the Cutchee hills. Women have been killed; children's hands cut off; the innocent unarmed camel-men cruelly put to death; great tracts of country have been laid waste, and twenty-five villages destroyed. They shall have a fair trial, but if murders

are proved they shall die. Were deliberate murderers to escape from weakness on my part, the consequent disorders would lie on my head and I could never quiet this country. All the people are rejoicing that these men have been captured. In fine, a man placed as I am must have nerve for his work; but it is very painful and makes me wish I had never put a sword by my side, or used anything but a spade. However I pray God to make me just in my decisions, and my mind being once fixed I strike! And if social laws are to exist at all, if we are not to hold our throats to the assassin's knife, if self-defence is permitted, I am justified in what I do as much as I should be in struggling for life with an assassin and killing him.

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“Some think this contrary to the Christian religion; perhaps it is so; but then government must cease, and the greatest ruffian be the greatest man. Human nature cannot go this length, and I am resolved as to my course, feeling my heart free from all motive but doing what the interest of society demands, namely, *that the robber shall be put down in Scinde*. I said this from the first, and I have done it, or will do it ere three months more be passed. If it be God's will that the robbers shall not be put down, I shall fail; but he has, by overthrowing the ameers, apparently given his sanction to the course I pursue. I could neglect my work and get more praise, but if I did this I should not see Scinde prosper, and my conscience would be ill at ease: now I sleep well for I do my best. Yet I please not the Court of Directors. For that I care not, they are but cunning fools, and I am a man whose daily occupation is to deal with the lives of his fellow-men; and if I do not deeply consider before I act I go down as a murderer! I allow no margin for men who rule—they may give up. I pray night and day and every hour in the day to do right, and I believe I do so in the sight of God. If not I am criminal, for error in judgment in rulers is crime. Nations should not suffer because individuals are vain and self-sufficient.”

During this journey Sir C. Napier had occasion to

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observe with what an infelicitous derision Scinde had been called Young Egypt, as if the comparison were a folly, when in fact the two countries have a striking similarity. In their flatness, fertility, deserts, mountains, single river and annual inundation—in their deltas, their scarcity of seaports, their frequent change of rulers, their three races—Copts, Arabs and dominant Mamelook swordsmen in Egypt; Hindoos, Scindees and dominant Belooch swordsmen in Scinde—in their former greatness, their decay under a bad government and their present chance of resuscitation. In all these things the resemblance is complete: and it is not a little curious, that at this time was found, westward of the Indus, a river of petrified trees like that which exists westward of the Nile!

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paragraph A.

Vast tracts of fertile but uninhabited land, and many anciently-peopled sites, were also discovered, showing that the riches and magnificence attributed to Scinde in former days were not exaggerated, and that the right road was being followed to restore them again. One of these ancient posts was very remarkable. Noted on the map as Mohun Kote, it is called by Sir Alexander Burnes a fortified hill; but the country people know it only by the name of Rennee Kote; and it was found to be a rampart of cut stone and mortar, encircling not one but many hills, being fifteen miles in circumference and having within it a strong perennial stream of the purest water gushing from a rock. Greek the site was supposed to be, yet no Greek workmanship or ruins were there, and the ameers having repaired the walls had the credit of building them.

Of the position of Alexander the Great's towns as given by geographers, Sir C. Napier was sceptical, unless where he found rocky basements which the river could not have washed away; such as Sehwan, where there were considerable mounds, the work of distant ages though not Greek. Neither could he understand the Macedonian hero's march as described by the historians, unless the country was then much more advanced in civilization

than those historians record. For as Scinde now is, and this must have been from greater cultivation still more the case in Alexander's days, not even a small army, much less the hundred and twenty thousand men led by the son of Philip, could have marched down either bank of the Indus within from ten to sixteen miles of the stream: the numerous nullahs or watercourses would have barred his progress, unless they had been bridged permanently, which would indicate even greater civilization than that noticed by ancient writers. These things had however only a passing consideration; he was more occupied with investigating the effect of his administration upon the welfare of the people.

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There was much to amend, especially with respect to the imposition of injurious taxes, which one collector, Captain Preedy, had adopted in the false hope of raising the revenue. These mistaken views chafed him, and when he discovered how the poor lake fishermen's taxes had been thus raised from thirteen to forty per cent. by the same collector, who had before sought to force the pearl-fishery, his patience forsook him. Jesus of Nazareth! he exclaimed, How far well-meaning men will go in mischief! The absence of the chief collector of this district, Captain Pope, driven from his duties by sickness, had indeed opened a door for many follies, many peculations and oppressions, the more extensive at first, because the European collectors and their subordinates had been plunged suddenly and by the force of arms at once into a chaos of revenue affairs, of jagheers and different modes of taxation, in a country where all the minor and most of them corrupt native functionaries had from policy been retained in their offices. Light was however now breaking on all these matters, and each day showed that future prosperity depended entirely on the wisdom and vigilance of the government.

At the commencement of the journey the spies, who were spread in all directions, said the robber tribes were assembling with the object of supporting the khan of Khelat in the proposed conference. The general thought they would fall on him, either coming or going if occa-

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sion offered, and therefore he resolved to appear at Dadur with a force capable of beating them ; but though they had so determined, they soon fought amongst themselves, and the Murrees were twice defeated by the Bhoogtees, first singly, and then in conjunction with the Chandikas, who made an unsuccessful attempt on Poolagee. The stimulus before mentioned, of offering the land of the Doomkees, Bhoogtees and Jackranees to the Chandikas and Murrees if they would drive them back from the frontier, had therefore failed ; and it was evident that only by a great combination and the employment of British troops could the hill robbers be put down. The difficulty of doing this was indeed felt each day more strongly, but the general had decided on his policy, and as new obstacles arose nerved himself more rigidly for the enterprise.

The fame of his march, and the wiles he used to influence the fears of the barbarians had a great effect. Beja Khan became so alarmed as to send his two sons to General Hunter with an offer of salaam, but his recent incursions, the mutilation of the children, and the killing of the unarmed grass-cutters, were acts of unprovoked warfare and cruelty not to be passed over ; hence, Hunter was directed to give the sons reasonable time to go back, but to hang them if they did not depart ; and Beja was told he also would be executed when taken. Then assuming black habiliments he declared himself *gazee*, or religiously devoted to the destruction of unbelievers ; and these gazee fanatics were very dangerous—once declared there was only to kill or be killed.

Beja was not the only enemy to be menaced. The Lion was amongst the tribes, urging them with gold and promises, and sometimes appearing on the frontier of Scinde with a strong body of horsemen. To him therefore this message was sent. "Hitherto, ameer, I have looked on you with respect as an open and brave enemy. I now find you mixed up with robbers and murderers, and if you continue to be their companion, as a robber and murderer I will treat you." Soon afterwards the Lion took refuge in the Punjaub.

Thus continually advancing towards the execution of his enterprise Sir C. Napier arrived at Sukkur the 19th December, exactly two years after he had quitted it to commence the campaign which gave Scinde to England. But no joyful state of affairs greeted his arrival, the pestilence was abroad, the European artillery was entirely disabled, two hundred of the 78th dead, and others daily falling into graves that seemed destined to swallow all. With anguish of mind their general was compelled to send the survivors to Hyderabad, instead of leading the whole as he had hoped to a glorious service—nor did even this save them, nearly as many more perished ere the sickness ceased.

This terrible calamity was seized upon by the Bombay faction to declare, that it arose from Sir C. Napier's ignorant wilfulness, and a desire to make a military display as if he really was going to assail the hill tribes—that he ought to have known fatal sickness would attend a movement at the time of year chosen for the march of the 78th—that he would not consult the medical men, and the consequent deaths were on his conscience; it was a case of aggravated murder—he was the murderer of the soldiers! And not content with proclaiming these things in India, where men knew the libellers too well to regard their malevolence, they with detestable wickedness sent like statements to Scotland, to work upon the feelings of the deceased soldiers' friends and clansmen, and raise there, if possible, a hatred of the general. He however, at once showed the foulness of the accusation, and the careful consideration he had given to that and every question affecting the soldier's welfare.

“He was, he said, attacked in the papers; that gave him no pain, but the death of the soldiers grieved him to the heart's core. Blame could not however attach to him. The usual course of the fever at Sukkur had been to attack in September and half of October, after which few new cases appeared; but the first cases were very apt to *relapse*, and those relapses were very dangerous. *Superior orders had directed him to bring down the 13th European regiment*

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CHAP. VII. *from Sukkur to Kurrachee, and to send the 78th regiment*  
1844. *up.* It was done with cautious care, so as that the 13th, which had already been assailed by the epidemic, might get away from Sukkur *before* the time for relapses arrived, and the 78th reach that place *after* the same dangerous period had passed. Thus he hoped to save those regiments both from attacks and relapses; for continual movement at that season was by the medical men judged good. In that view the 86th had been marched from Hyderabad, and he had himself moved up the country, at a later and worse period, with an escort equal in strength to the 78th. He had likewise sent troops to Ahmed Khan, and all had escaped fever and gained strength, thus confirming the medical judgment.

“The 13th did escape *relapses*, reached Kurrachee, and went to England in a healthy state; and the volunteers it left behind, two hundred in number, formed part of his escort up the country, thus making this so-called dangerous march both ways, and yet remaining in perfect health. The 78th reached Sukkur in a good state on the 25th of October, and remained healthy until the beginning of November, about which time the fever burst forth with unheard-of violence, and continued to the end of the year.

“It was true that the marches of the 13th and of the 78th might have been delayed until the whole of the sickly season had passed away; and could the calamity have been foreseen they would have been delayed; but it was not from what afterwards happened that a judgment could be formed. There was at the time no prospect, but the contrary, of a sickly season; Kurrachee, Hyderabad, the intrenched camp on the edge of the river, Kotree on the opposite bank, the steamer stations, and lastly Sukkur itself were all healthy; Shikarpoor alone had sickness, and that appeared to be local, accidental, and subsiding. But these considerations did not embrace the whole subject. A mutiny of the Bengal troops, in which the men had called aloud for their officers' blood, had just been quelled by General Hunter. The *Lion* was then stirring up the

hill tribes on the frontier, and fifteen Talpoor princes were in Ali Moorad's court close at hand. Was it proper then to leave Hunter in that critical state without a European regiment? Suppose the Bengalees had again mutinied? The 64th had *twice* seized their colours within the preceding four months. Suppose they had a third time mutinied, had murdered their European officers, as happened at Vellore, had seized the magazine at Bukkur, and the treasury, and gone over to the Lion and the hill tribes; or to the Seikhs of Mooltan, among whom they had numerous friends and relations?

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"These things might not have happened, but they were within the bounds of probability. Many of the mutineers of the 34th Bengal regiment, which had been just before disbanded, did go to the Seikh army; and if such a train of evils had happened, would it not have been said, '*Sir C. Napier left the murdered Hunter and his unhappy comrades without the protection of a European, although he must have foreseen the catastrophe from what had passed.*' How could that have been answered? There could be no justification, and he must, conscious of error, of crime, have hid his head in sorrow and shame the rest of his life. Hence, though inexpressibly grieved for the 78th he felt no sense of error."

The proofs that the march of the 78th had not been the cause of the sickness were numerous and conclusive. The 78th fell sick, but so did all the troops which had remained quietly in Upper Scinde; the European artillery were attacked more fatally even than the 78th; and of the towns, Sukkur and Shikarpoore alone suffered, the other places in their neighbourhood escaped, and the crews of the steamers which brought the 78th up from Hyderabad also remained at Sukkur and had no sick! In fine the imputations cast by the Bombay faction were but the outpourings of weak brains disordered by the working of peculiarly malignant dispositions.

This pestilence, by some attributed to a neglect of the canals, was generally supposed to be caused by an unusually high and anomalous inundation, and an equally

CHAP. VII. anomalous fall, which brought on an extraordinarily fertile  
 1844. but premature vegetation. The early and entire subsidence of the waters left this vegetation to be withered up by the sun, which produced, as it always does in Scinde, malaria ; and it was particularly active at Shikarpoore and Sukkur, because the basin between those towns was still open to the overflow, the great dike being only nascent. This was clearly shown—for while the wind blew towards Shikarpoore the pestilence was there most virulent ; but when it blew towards Sukkur, sickness commenced at that place and ceased at Shikarpoore.

Dr. Kirk of the Bengal service, who bestowed great attention upon the subject, attributed the sickness to exhalations from the limestone rocks on which the barracks were built, and it is probable that both causes were combined. It may also be, that this and other epidemics which prevail at irregular periods in Scinde, arise from exhalations produced by volcanic action ; for the country, though alluvial, is so subject to sudden and extensive changes from earthquakes, that in 1819 nearly the whole surface of Cutch was changed. Minor imperceptible shocks, opening fissures in the surface of Scinde, may therefore give vent to the escape of deleterious gases, producing sporadic pestilence, or epidemics according to the extent of the subterranean disturbance. But to whatever cause, inscrutable or otherwise, the sickness itself may be attributed, there was little difficulty in accounting for its extensively fatal ravages amongst European regiments. The habit of officers and soldiers in India is to drink copiously of beer, wine and brandy, of the first especially. The soldiers' ration is a vile potation, falsely supposed to be distilled from rice, but really obtained from other substances, chiefly from a liquor procured by incising the date-tree. Four soldiers' rations make a bottle of this deleterious drink, few are the soldiers who content themselves with their rations, and though this general use of strong drinks does not produce the pestilence, it predisposes the constitution to receive infection and always renders it more

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fatal. Doctor Robertson of the 13th reputed as one of the best informed practitioners for Indian maladies, said, that during the siege of Jellalabad he had no sickness, and attributed it entirely to the impossibility of obtaining liquor.

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As Sir C. Napier had now returned to Sukkur after making as it were the round of Scinde in conquest, a recapitulation of his labours will not be misplaced. Short it shall be, yet thick with great actions. Two years only had elapsed since he had quitted Sukkur to war on the ameers, and in that time he had made the march to Emaumghur in the great desert, gained two great battles, reduced four large and many smaller fortresses, captured six sovereign princes, and subdued a great kingdom. He had created and put in activity a permanent civil administration in all its branches, had conciliated the affections of the different races inhabiting Scinde, had seized all the points of an intricate foreign policy, commenced a number of military and other well-considered public works, and planned still greater ones, not only suited to the exigencies of the moment but having also a prospective utility of aim. In the execution of these things he had travelled on camels or on horseback, at the head of troops, more than two thousand miles, had written, received, studied and decided on between four and five thousand official despatches and reports—many very elaborate—besides his private correspondence, which was extensive, because he never failed to answer all persons who addressed him however humble or however unreasonable. He had besides, read, not hastily, but attentively, all the diaries of the collectors and sub-collectors, and had most anxiously considered the evidence in all capital trials. And these immense labours were superadded to the usual duties imposed by the command of a large army belonging to different governments, namely, of England, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. They were sustained without abatement under severe attacks of illness, at the age of sixty-three, by a man covered with wounds, and in a climate where

CHAP. VII. the mercury rises to  $132^{\circ}$  in artificially-cooled tents. They  
1844. were sustained also amidst every mortification, every viru-  
lence of abuse, every form of intrigue which disappointed  
cupidity could suggest to low-minded men, sure of support  
from power, to him ungrateful but to their baseness  
indulgent and rewarding.

## CHAPTER VIII.

To chastise the robbers of the hills was now become imperative ; for their successful incursions had so raised Beja Khan's reputation that the ultimate consequences were to be dreaded. The confederates could, without reckoning the western mountain tribes, bring down twenty thousand of the most daring men of Asia ; and behind them were races of the same blood and temper in greater numbers. Scinde contained many tribes, who could not be expected to remain submissive if continued incursions gave the hill robbers a promising position ; and a short impunity would have rendered the latter's warfare as formidable as that of the celebrated Pindaree freebooters, who were only stronger by twelve thousand men when the marquis of Hastings thought it necessary to assemble eighty thousand troops to quell them. Yet they were but isolated rovers, having no mountain fastnesses to retreat to, no great Seikh army to look to for support ; nor were they held together by any sentiment but the love of plunder, being men of different nations and tongues. The hillmen had a common language, a race, a gallant pride of ancestry, and a country which for ruggedness in defence is not surpassed in all Asia.

It was their boast that for six hundred years no king had ever got beyond the first defiles in their land, though some had tried with a hundred thousand men ; and in those fearful passes the British arms had also been fatally unsuccessful. There Clibborne had been defeated, there the heroic Clark and others had fallen, and there the unshaken firmness of Brown but just sufficed to preserve

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CHAP. VIII. 1844. the lives of his men, in a chivalric defence of a fort, against the Murrees alone. To allow such a people to gain a head, and by degrees raise the hopes and warlike spirit of the Khelat and Scindian mountain tribes, until a hundred thousand uncontrollable warriors should rage over the plains, when the Seikh army was menacing a formidable warfare, would have been madness. And yet the putting of them down was fraught with risks which might startle the boldest general, while a failure would be sure to accelerate the danger sought to be averted. For though called robbers, these hillmen were not such in the European acceptation of the term. It was with them no ignoble title, and like the Greek "*klepte*" they thought themselves, and were by others thought, to be a race of courageous haughty men who would not let the world pass without paying them toll. Their peculiar customs and warfare shall now be described.

Plans 1 & 2.

The desert of Khusmore extends from near the Chandian's capital at the foot of the Hala mountains, in a north-eastern direction towards the Indus, and with its northern edge binds in the Cutchee rocks. This desert, about eighty miles broad, has a hard surface, sprinkled here and there with tamarisk-bushes but for the most part destitute of water. Where water did appear it was at this time surrounded by a few mat huts, and in some places commanded by clay forts with round towers. These forts, seemingly despicable, were formidable from circumstances. In summer, the unendurable heat of the desert rendered it difficult to attack them, as the troops would have to carry water with them, to fight for more. In winter they could not be stormed without loss, because barbarians and half-disciplined warriors are always excellent in defence, brave as any soldiers, and more expert with fire-arms, being always practising. The matchlock also, though very inferior to the musket, furnishes means for steady aim, requiring no disturbing force for the discharge like a musket. Perilous therefore it is to assail those desert forts of clay, and the more difficult that the clay when hardened by the sun is elastic, and, without

being shaken, lets a cannon-ball pass through—there is a round hole of less dimension than the shot and no more.

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As soldiers, the robbers were, like their forts, strong and terrible to deal with from circumstances. Robust and adroit with their weapons, and having the desperate courage of fatalists, they perfectly comprehended all the advantages of their position, and trained their animals as well as themselves with unceasing pains to their mode of warfare. On horseback or on foot, the Belooch robbers of the hills were men able and willing to encounter any foe; but like the Scots in Bruce's time, they generally moved as cavalry, being mounted on small but high-blooded fiery mares, swift and enduring to a marvel. These little animals were so trained for the desert service as to surpass the British cavalry, regular or irregular, in retreat or pursuit: the latter could not get near them save by stratagem. The mares were taught to drink only at long intervals, and were at times fed with raw meat, which is said to increase their vigour for the time, and create less thirst.

When an expedition across the desert was to be undertaken, the mare's food was tied under her belly; the man's, consisting of a coarse cake and sometimes a little arrack, was slung across his shoulders, and was generally sufficient for ten or twelve days' scanty fare; but it was used only in necessity, for to the spoil the robber looked for subsistence. Every warrior carried one sword, many carried two, and so sharp they would mend a pen, for professional sword-whetters attended all their forays. These swords, broad, short, not much curved and heavy, were either of fine Damascus steel, or of the Cutch manufacture which is much esteemed. Each man carried a matchlock, of a small bore but long in the barrel and heavy, a weapon so inferior to the musket that it is Sir C. Napier's opinion it must soon be discarded in the East as in the West, and that very serious consequences will result from the change. The matchlock in common use cannot be judged of by the fine specimens sent to England; there is as much difference as between a common musket and the sporting rifle of London.



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Powder the robbers carried in flasks slung over the shoulders, some of them bore a long spear, and all carried large embossed ornamented shields, a knife, a dagger, flint and steel. Thus equipped, and strong in the principle of fatalism, to which they impute all events all crimes, they sallied forth resolved neither to spare nor to yield. "*Wug*" is their name for plundered cattle, but they call themselves Lootoos, which might be more properly translated spoilers than robbers; and with all their ferocity they had noble qualities and customs. It was seldom they hurt women or children, and the recent instances had been generally reprobated. Nationality in the European sense they did not possess, but their attachment to their religion—the Mahometan—to their families, and to their tribe, was strong; blood-feuds were common, yet if two tribes were at war and an irresistible foreign power assailed either, the one so pressed would send their wives and children to their kindred foes as a mark of despair: then the feudal war ceased, and the families thus sent were honoured as guests. When beaten by strangers, their customs were terrible. Going to battle with design to die sword in hand, they, acting as barbarians have always acted from the earliest records, left trusty agents to kill the women and children if the fight was likely to be lost—a fearful custom which had a powerful influence upon Sir C. Napier's operations.

When a foray was designed, the hillmen assembled at some watering-place, filled their leather bottles called "*chaguls*," crossed the desert, plundered a village and returned with such celerity, that before the frontier cavalry-posts could hear of the inroad the robbers were in full retreat. If pursued, so extreme is the reflected heat of the desert, from April to October, that no Europeans could sustain it: even the sepoy and camel-men sunk under its deadly influence; no effective protection could therefore be given during those months, although accidental surprises, such as Captain McKenzie had effected, might happen.

After the campaign it was ascertained that the tribes

could bring altogether to the field eighteen thousand eight hundred warriors, besides their armed servants; and if those behind, and those on the western frontier, including the two great jams of the Beila and Jokea countries, had joined in one confederacy, which impunity would surely have caused, more than a hundred thousand men would have been in arms, whose mode of fighting was thus described by their conqueror.—“Every man has his weapon ready, and every man is expert in the use of it. They cannot go through the manual and platoon like her majesty’s guards, but they shoot with unerring aim; they occupy a position well, strengthen it artificially with ingenuity, and their rush on a foe with sword and shield is very determined. They crouch as they run, cover themselves admirably with their protruded shields, thrust them in their adversary’s faces, and with a sword like a razor give a cut that goes through everything.”

In the Cutchee hills, every discontented Asiatic could at this time find employment, if he had money or could wield a sword, and the last were not a few; for in all those countries, besides the regular tribes, which may be considered as municipal bodies, there was a very numerous class of gentlemen, having a following of from four to a hundred armed men, roving *condottieri*, who offered their services in every feud and every war, for food and leave to plunder all persons save those in whose momentary service they engaged. Beja Khan’s renown was great, it rose each day of impunity that he enjoyed, and in another year he would have been able to collect many thousands of these wandering swordsmen; and then he would, because he could, if an epidemic happened to rage at Shikarpoor, massacre the garrison there. Lastly in those hills were four pieces of captured British artillery a trophy stimulating to the pride and arrogance of the barbarians.

To the young khan of Khelat most of the robbers acknowledged a nominal allegiance, which they would readily have made real if he would have aided their warfare; and though he was personally inclined to the British alliance, it was against the wishes of his nobles. He was

CHAP. VIII. therefore only such a friend as a boy prince could be to  
1844. those who had killed his father, stormed his capital, and  
plundered his treasure—for so had the British done to  
him in the Affghan war. When restored he was governed  
by men attached to his family, who thought that during  
his minority the English were the safer support; but  
those men, secretly detesting the ally thus chosen for their  
prince, longed to revenge the death of Merab his father.  
Like the ameers, these Khelat sirdars had, before Sir C.  
Napier's arrival in Scinde, deceived the discarded political  
agent Outram, playing with his vanity, but they only  
awaited a reverse to the British arms to display their real  
feelings.

Reflecting long and deeply on all these matters, the  
English general had proceeded very cautiously from the  
first with respect to the enterprise in hand; and with his  
wonted prudence had combined all the subtle policy, and  
all the military force he could command to effect his  
object, counting on discipline and his own skill for the  
rest. In this view he had kept a heavy hand on Ali  
Moorad; had treated the recently submitted western  
chiefs with generosity; had awed the jams of Jokea and  
Beila; had both aided and menaced the khan of Khelat's  
court, and had admonished the chiefs of Candahar. For  
this he had endeavoured to spread through Central Asia  
an exaggerated notion of his military power, had made so  
many complicated movements in Scinde, and used the  
camel corps to convince the western tribes that he was  
able and ready to avenge any hostility on their part. For  
this also he had publicly given Nowbutt's sword to Wullee  
Chandia, and taken some of the latter's followers into  
pay; giving the money to the chief as a retaining fee,  
and offering to him and the Murrees, the Doomkee and  
Bhoogtee lands.

It was this subtle policy, coupled with the growing  
attachment of the whole Scindian population, which had  
brought the hundred and fifteen western chiefs to make  
salaam at Kurrachee, and the display of force there had  
acted powerfully on their after conduct; but their previous

recusancy had been principally caused by the falsehoods of the Bombay faction published in the *Bombay Times*. Continually announcing the restoration of the ameers, that faction had disquieted all the chiefs and sirdars, and had actually prevented Nowbutt and Guddee from accepting the frequent invitations made to them for becoming good subjects. Those chiefs therefore died, the first in prison the second on the gallows, criminals indeed, but also miserable victims to the infamous arts of Dr. Buist and his employers. Nowbutt and Guddee could have been captured at an earlier period ; but that event was purposely delayed ; partly in the hope they might submit, partly that their sudden seizure, when the general was in their country, might produce a greater effect on the surrounding tribes, which would conduce to tranquillity while the army was beyond the frontier.

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During the march up the country the spies had brought varying intelligence of what was passing with the robber tribes, and with the khan of Khelat. That prince was vacillating. Afraid to hold the conference at Dadur and equally afraid to refuse, he took a middle course, avoiding the meeting, while, to deprecate anger, he assembled troops and pretended to drive Beja Khan from Poolagee. This was easily seen through, and therefore the general's march was delayed under various pretences until the khan should be compelled to abandon Poolagee again from want of water ; it being judged that Beja would then, if the whole were not a concerted fraud, harass him in his retreat. These proceedings were very embarrassing, because the plan for a surprise required that Beja should be at Poolagee, and nothing could be undertaken until he returned ; but from Fitzgerald at Larkaana, such information was finally obtained as produced a modification of the original scheme, and gave rise to new combinations, which cannot be understood until some strange and some unexpected obstacles have been noticed.

Both Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry Hardinge approved of the projected campaign, and both had given discretionary power for the execution ; but when Lord Ripon

CHAP. VIII. was informed of the matter, a scene of odious arrogance  
1844. was opened. Sir C. Napier had told him of the great loss of human life and property caused by the incursions of hillmen—had told him of the disgraces and losses which befel the troops, of whom and of their followers more than three hundred had been slain—had told him of villages in ashes, of whole districts abandoned by the wretched inhabitants—of hundreds of murdered women and mutilated children! He had pointed out the evils to be apprehended from a continuance of this state of affairs, not only to Scinde but to all India, and shown him, that ultimately those robbers, then above eighteen thousand strong, besides their armed servants, would infallibly increase to a powerful army, and force the supreme government, either to abandon Scinde, and with it the navigation of the Indus and all its prospective commercial and military advantages, or to keep up a great force in Scinde at an enormous expense, and yet still be subject to continual losses from the same cause. To all these representations Lord Ripon's answer was, "*You make too much of these trifling outpost affairs, which are insignificant!!*"

Such arrogant imbecility impels history beyond the bounds of passionless narrative. What to Lord Ripon, satiate with luxurious ease, were the unceasing labours of officers and soldiers under a sun which shrivelled up brain and marrow as a roll of paper is scorched up by fire? What to him was their devotion, what their loss of life? What to him were devastated districts, ruined villages, the cries and sufferings of thousands driven from their homes by those remorseless robbers? What to him were outraged women, and the screams of mutilated children, holding up their bleeding stumps for help to their maddened mothers? *They were trifling, were insignificant!* For a moment indignation was excited in the lofty mind thus insulted, but it soon subsided to contempt. Lord Ripon was disregarded as a man devoid of sense and right feeling, and the expedition went on without his concurrence.

At Bombay the reduction of the hill tribes was treated with ridicule. "Sir Charles was talking big—was angry—

would destroy Poolagee when he could get there—would catch Beja as children are taught to catch birds.” But when it became certain the attempt would be made, not only the *Bombay Times* but nearly all the other newspapers of India, especially the *Delhi Gazette*, announced it as a folly, a chimera, and to the utmost of their power endeavoured to make it so. The *Agra Uckbar* indeed, and the *Bombay Gentleman’s Gazette* were mindful of truth and decency on this occasion, and it is due to the last to say it always was so, justifying its title; but the other papers made India echo with their folly and falsehoods. Sir C. Napier was ignorant, he did not know how utterly unfit his army was to contend with the tribes in their mountains—and this trash was forced on the public in England also by the parasites of the Court of Directors. Even Indian officers of experience thought the enterprise one not to be effected. “Sir C. Napier was too confident from his previous successes—he did not know how terrible those mountaineers were in their fastnesses.”

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So universal was this notion as to pervade even the army with which trial was to be made; for though full of courage and willing to make every effort, there was scarcely an officer, high or low, who did not anticipate failure, and the general forbore even to mention the subject, save to those of his staff to whom certain preparations were necessarily confided. This state of feeling disquieted him; for though entirely possessed with an overbearing will to make all things bend or break before his energy, he secretly trembled at the danger to the public interests which must ensue if he died during the campaign, seeing that he had no successor who viewed the enterprise as he did, or thought it feasible. The troops also were sure to have many severe trials, and the previous notion that the enterprise was hopeless might produce despondency at small failures; but on the other hand, as the robbers had vast herds of cattle, which could not stand hard pursuit, the soldiers were as sure to make frequent prizes, and he trusted that stimulus, conjoined with their innate desire to fight, would carry them on.

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Another serious embarrassment was felt in the still smouldering insubordination among the Bengal troops in Upper Scinde. The mutiny had been caused by injustice and bad management in the first instance, and neither Colonel Moseley's dismissal from the service, nor the execution of so many men, had entirely suppressed it; hence the experiment of marching with disaffected soldiers against an enemy required deep reflection. The Bengalees could be sent indeed to Lower Scinde, and Bombay regiments brought up; but that involved a great delay; and a disgrace which the English leader, who had been so well served in his battles by other Bengal troops, shrunk from inflicting upon men whom he knew to have been misled and ill treated: he preferred danger to himself, and decided to employ them: but this was one of the reasons for bringing up the 78th, that a strong European regiment might be ready to sustain accidents. His generous resolution proved the advantage of a good name with soldiers. The 64th Bengalee regiment, so recently in mutiny, whose leaders had been executed, and whose colours had been taken away, were now so ready to serve under Sir C. Napier that even their sick men petitioned from the hospital to be allowed to join the ranks, saying they would find strength to fight when he led them!

The unceasing efforts of the Bombay faction to excite insurrections in Scinde—efforts sure to be redoubled if a large force went beyond the frontiers—was another cause of embarrassment, because partial commotions might be created if any minor failures in the hills gave weight to the treasonable exhortations. For counteraction, the general trusted to his previous policy and the goodwill of the population; and however great these difficulties and obstacles were, they sunk in comparison with those caused by the fever, which left him not only without power to move against his enemies, but exposed him to imminent danger of being attacked and overwhelmed by them. His strength of mind in bearing up under so many and such dire impediments, always resolute to fulfil his mission, was not the least indication he gave of an

overbearing energy ; for not the 78th only had been overwhelmed, the sepoy and the artillery were in a similar condition, and he was forced to keep his volunteers of the 13th at Larkaana, lest they also should be assailed by the sickness. To that place likewise he sent the European artillery, without horses or guns, the men being too weak to take them. In fine he had only two hundred of his army able to stand up under arms at Sukkur, and those were but convalescents ! Nevertheless, firm to his purpose, and having obtained from the upper Sutlej the Company's 2nd European regiment and the Bundlecund legion of all arms as a reinforcement, he made his final arrangements, as follows.

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Appendix V.

The troops sent from the Sutlej were halted above Bukkur on the left of the Indus, to form his right wing.

The camel corps, the volunteers of the 13th and the Scinde horsemen, stayed at Larkaana, to form his left wing.

The irregular cavalry, artillery, engineers, sappers and commissariat, the reserved men of the 4th, 64th, and a detachment of the 69th native regiments, stationed at Sukkur, Shikarpoor and Khangur, composed his centre.

Wullee Chandia, and Ahmed Khan Mugzee who though a subject of Khelat offered to serve in conjunction with the Chandikas, were engaged to fight against all the hillmen save the Murrees, for with that tribe they had amicable relations, and the general meant to deal with it in a friendly manner. Wullee Chandia was thus secured as an auxiliary on the extreme left ; but he had no intimation of the plan of operations, and was led even to suppose none would take place that year.

On the extreme right, Ali Moorad was to assemble his contingent force ; being called upon, not so much as an auxiliary as to keep him from mischief during the expedition ; and in that view, Captain Malet, stationed as political agent at his court, was to accompany him in the field, to which he promised to move with five thousand men but did not bring more than two thousand.

The cavalry of the British army was composed of the Scinde Moguls, the 6th and 9th irregulars, and the horse-



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men of the Bundlecund legion, about two thousand in all.

The infantry was furnished by the Company's second European regiment, two weak native battalions, the foot of the Bundlecund legion ; and the camel corps, altogether two thousand five hundred. Eleven hundred convalescent infantry and the ordinary cavalry posts remained for the defence of Shikarpoore and the frontier towards the desert, in the event of the robbers passing between the columns of invasion to make a counter war.

The siege artillery was composed of twenty-one pieces, of which thirteen were mortars or howitzers ; the field artillery consisted of sixteen pieces, nine being howitzers, three mountain guns, and the rest six-pounders.

During the Affghan war the tribes had been unsuccessfully attacked, although they were then surrounded by the British armies and the allies of the British. Now they were sure to find towards Khelat, Affghanistan and the Punjaub, supporters, not enemies, and there was little hope to attain complete success, unless by surprise, for the danger of stirring up a great war would prevent pursuit into those countries. These obstacles were great, but exaggerated by the objectors and libellers, and the following extracts from the English leader's journal of operations show how profoundly he had considered the subject while those who pretended to a thorough knowledge of the tribes and their resources, assumed that he was ignorant, and predicted that his troops must be starved if they were not cut to pieces.

"These barbarians must be attacked on a principle the reverse of that which prescribes the keeping your own force in masses and dividing your enemies. To drive the hillmen together must here be our object—their warfare will be to evade attacks and to surprise. They must, in opposition, be driven to concentration and defence ; for all history points out that neither barbarians nor civilized warriors of different tribes, or nations, agree when compressed together ; and these Cutchee hillmen are peculiarly incapable of doing so, because the tribes adopt

the personal quarrels of each member. Another reason for thus operating is that they possess great herds of cattle, which will thus be driven together in a country where water is very scarce, and food for the animals still scarcer. These herds must then perish or fall into our hands at the watering-places, and the hillmen will starve instead of starving us, while we shall be encouraged by constantly recurring spoil, which will give us food; and at the same time we shall get water, which, though not to be found in abundance, will probably be sufficient to sustain life during the operations. These tribes are however a people as well as an army, and their families and furniture must move with them. They cannot, as when making incursions into Scinde, fly about like demons on their little blood mares, but, pushed into masses, will feel all the wants and difficulties of regular troops, without having the same supplies and redeeming arrangements or force."

Thus reasoning, he felt sure that with vigilance caution and perseverance, he could turn the difficulties of the hills, which the tribes trusted to, against them, and render their hardy habits and quickness of no avail. There was however still a difficulty, before alluded to, and which will be found continually embarrassing his operations; these desperate men, capable of any terrible action, might when pressed, cut the throats of their wives and children, and falling sword in hand upon the divided troops defeat them. To this could only be opposed great caution. The columns were to be strongly constituted with all arms, and forbid when advancing to send out detachments, but to employ in preference, patrols occasionally, and spies always, to ascertain where the masses of the enemy were. A few robbers might then indeed steal at night, or even by day, between the lines of march and be troublesome, but no great body could do so in such a rugged country; wherefore, after due consideration of all the difficulties to be apprehended, General Napier thus summed up his plan of action.

"To drive men, women and children, baggage and herds together in masses; to use their tracks as guides;

CHAP. VIII. to cut off their food and water. That will make them  
1844. quarrel amongst themselves, and compel them either to fight a general action or surrender. On open ground they cannot stand before the British troops, for not more than eighteen or twenty thousand can appear in arms, and not above five or six thousand need be expected at any point. The result of a battle cannot therefore be doubtful, but I will never press a fight when the women and children are gathered near the armies lest they should perish."

It was not with reference to the chances of a battle, but to the extensive range of hills which were to be assailed at all their passes simultaneously, that the number of troops for the campaign was fixed. Those passes were however of stupendous strength, and it was to be expected the barbarians would defend them now as they always had done before. Hence it was, that the artillery had been organized with so many mortars and howitzers, for the design was to dislodge matchlock-men by firing on a range beyond their reach, and by this distant fighting, at once save the troops and avoid driving these ferocious people to kill their wives and children. In fine the enterprise was one sure to have terrible concomitants if any mistake was made, and therefore every resource was employed that a subtle genius and an overbearing will could bring into activity.

In the middle of December the scheme of operation was ripened; but the khan of Khelat still remained at Poolagee with his army, and thus two native princes were, the one on the right the other on the left flank of the British force, and each sure in case of reverse to aid in destroying it: it might be that they would not wait for, but cause that reverse. To counteract mischief on the right the general trusted much to Captain Malet, who was political agent with Ali Moorad; but still more to Mr. Curling, a very bold man and a distant connection of his own by marriage, who being in that prince's pay, was commander of his troops, and had great influence with them. Security in that quarter was however of so much importance, that Sir C. Napier proposed a hunting of wild

boars to the ameer, expecting that in the familiarity of the chase he should be able to gain more insight into his true character than he had yet obtained. The result was a conviction that his good-nature and frankness were greater, his abilities and energy less than previously supposed, and no treason lurked beneath. Ali had indeed, when Sir H. Hardinge first arrived in India, sent a secret vakeel with complaints, thinking a new power would, according to eastern habits, overthrow all that Lord Ellenborough had approved; but he was terrified to find his accusations were transmitted to the general, and his vakeel sent back. Sir Charles, remarking that this was only barbarian nature, made it a subject for raillery when he met Ali at the chase, and the effect convinced him that the ameer was only weak, not treacherous or malignant.

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To obviate mischief on the left of the army, more subtle measures were resorted to. The khan's movement to Poolagee being, as before noticed, judged a concerted affair with Beja, the general was desirous to draw him so far to the south, that he should not be able easily to communicate with the robber chief, or embarrass the contemplated operations. In this view, pretending to think the prince meant still to hold the appointed conference, a letter was written to entreat that the place might be changed from Dadur to Gundava, because the general was old and feeble, and wished to be spared the fatigue of a long journey; his troops also were very sickly, and dying so fast he could not with them undertake the enterprise against the hill tribes that year, but would send the Chandikas and Ali Moorad in his stead.

This letter, delivered by the moonshee Ali Acbar, was calculated either to draw the khan to the south, or force him to disclose his real intentions; and as it was certain to be made known to Beja by the Khelat sirdars, that robber chief would conclude that the English leader was really too feeble of body for such a warfare, and so be misled. But to insure this last object, a duplicate was transmitted by a channel which Beja was certain to inter-

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cept, and thus have the same story from the intercepted letter and from his friends in the khan's court ; and to give greater weight to this wile no visible preparations for war were made at Sukkur.

Ali Acbar, was, if the conference was still refused, publicly to demand reasons, but secretly to ascertain, if possible the designs of the sirdars by whom the prince was held in pupillage. Of their enmity there could be no doubt, for they had recently induced the khan to excite Wullee Chandia to rebellion, and the stout old chieftain answered " I have sworn fealty and will not draw sword against the English sirdar." Very soon the clever and bold moonshee contrived to gain a private interview with the khan, and thus discovered that there were two factions, each headed by a great sirdar. The most powerful was openly inimical to the British ; the other had the prince's confidence and was not disposed to break the alliance at that time, but was too weak to display its real policy. It had therefore consented to the simulated attack on Beja, which the stronger party had, as suspected by the general, concerted with that formidable robber, of whom all were afraid. Indeed his implacable ferocity was so well known, that dread of him overbore for the moment even the fear of the "*Sheitan-ka-Bhaee*," the title now given to the general—in English "*The Devil's Brother*." But at this period, British and natives alike, thought Beja could not be subdued, and the spies and Scindian people were therefore very reluctant to give intelligence as to the nature of his country or his movements.

The reasons assigned in private by the khan for avoiding the conference were conclusive. Partly founded on the state of his Durbar, partly on the hostile disposition of the Candahar chiefs, they taught the English leader that if he failed at any point of his operations all the men of Cutchee, the Kujjucks and Khelat tribes, those of Seebee and the Bolan Pass, and the Affghans of Candahar, would be down on him like a whirlwind. The latter indeed only waited for an excuse, which a friendly conference with a Feringhee would give them, to plunder the khan's territory

of Shawl on the west, and Beja had already virtually deprived him of Cutch Gundava by laying it waste.

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Want of water soon caused the khan to retire to Bagh, and Beja returned to Poolagee; whereupon, as the troops were then nearly ready to act, it was judged advisable to send another negotiator to persuade the khan to go still further back to the heart of his dominions, and place himself beyond the reach of those wild tribes who it was to be feared might force him to some act involving hostility to the British government. This advice was enforced to his highness by pointing out that he would thus be ready to make head against the Affghans who were menacing him, and be more sure of support from the British army. The principal object however was to remove him so far from Ali Moorad's line of operations, that no combination for uniting and falling on the British rear could be easily effected. Such an event was indeed unlikely, but always Sir C. Napier extended his precautions in war beyond the immediate and probable. He designed also by this and Ali Acbar's mission, to give a mysterious character to his proceedings which might embarrass Beja and his friends in the Khelat court; and with these views, and that all forms might be observed, he sent on the 27th of December the government secretary Brown, who was an intimate friend of the khan, with a public mission to demand his assent in writing to the British army entering his dominions for the punishment of Beja and his confederates. This assent was given, but Brown on his return narrowly escaped a band of robbers sent by Beja to intercept him: they had come eighty miles without a halt, and he owed his safety principally to the intelligence of Aliff Khan, the strong swordsman, who was with the escort.

In January 1845, all things being ready for the campaign, Sir C. Napier issued a manifesto embodying a declaration of war against the Jackranees, Doomkees, and Bhoogtees. It stated their offences and their disregard of their own prince's alliance; then announcing the measures taken to obtain an interview with the khan, it declared the reasons given by that prince for declining it were

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satisfactory. It announced that the young khan, avowedly unable to coerce his subjects, had consented that the English should repay their inroads on Scinde, and an army was going to chastise them in their hills. The causes of war, the means taken to avoid it, their failure and the justice of a recourse to arms, were then set forth with a force and clearness which left Beja and his confederates nothing but their fierce courage and their strong fastnesses to rest on. It was also announced that the Beloochees, opponents at Meeanee, were now fighting on the British side : and lest the Seikhs and the distant tribes should take alarm, as thinking he was commencing a new scheme of conquest, the manifesto finished by declaring that when the robbers were suppressed the British army would return to Scinde.

Previous to issuing this document, the Bundelcund legion and the other Bengal troops sent from Ferozepore, had been directed to form a camp at Subzulcote, where General Simpson, and Colonel Geddes, commandant of artillery, went privately to ascertain their condition ; because Sir C. Napier, carefully avoiding all military show, sought by all means to mislead the enemy's spies and induce them to believe he was, as his double letter had said, disposed to defer the campaign. Meanwhile he despatched a letter to Major Broadfoot, political resident with the Seikhs, desiring him to demand a strict neutrality, and that the hillmen should be debarred entrance to the Punjaub, unless the dewan of Mooltan would allow the British troops to pass through that country to Deyra. This condition was made because the Bengal troops were in very fine condition, and he designed that Simpson should take the command and pass the Indus at Subzulcote, with a view to cross the Mooltan country and enter the Cutchee hills from the east, in combination with the main attack from the south. But just then became known Heera Sing's death at Lahore, and that the Punjaub was all in commotion ; wherefore, vexing as it was to change a well-considered plan at the moment of starting, Sir C. Napier felt that in such a state of affairs to pass

through the Sikh territory, even with leave, might produce a collision embarrassing to the governor-general, and possibly produce a war. He foresaw indeed that a war must soon happen, but resolved not to be a cause of it, and calling Simpson down, fixed the point of concentration for the whole army on the edge of the desert.

A short time before this, the Murrees and Bhoogtees had fought again, and the Murrees, declaring themselves victors, agreed to aid the British expedition, an event which now determined the new mode of attack.

The hills to be invaded, approached the Indus on the east, but on the north-west joined the great Soleyman and Khelat mountains. Northward they touched the Mooltan country, and between them and the river was thrust the narrow Mazaree district belonging to Mooltan. On the south was the desert of Kusmore, and from that side they could only be entered by terrible defiles. But these hills, or rather rocky ranges were narrow though of great length, and if an army could pass the desert by surprise, seize the defiles, and throw its left across the ranges so as to command all the gorges of the long ravines between the ridges, the hillmen would be cut off from the western mountains and must either fight, retreat into Mooltan, or be driven on to the Indus. For the Murrees would hem them in on the north, and it was only necessary for the left of the army to connect itself with that tribe to render a subsequent advance between the long ridges towards the Indus effectual.

In this view, Wullee Chandia and Ahmed Khan Mugzee were suddenly ordered to cross the desert on a given day, so as to reach Poolagee at dusk; and it was calculated, that so arriving, Beja, who was known to have intercepted the letter to the khan of Khelat, seeing in accordance with its contents only Chandikas and Mugzees, would be little disturbed and await the dawn to go out and attack them. But three hours' march behind Wullee, who had orders to sweep all spies and scouts before him, Fitzgerald, moving from Larkaana, was to approach with the camels, carrying his own men and two hundred volunteers of the

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Appendix X.

See Plans 1 &amp; 2.



CHAP. VIII. 13th regiment. From the same place also, at a fixed time, 1845. Jacob's Moguls, five hundred strong, were to follow Fitzgerald; and it was thought these British troops might perhaps, in the night, file unobserved, so as to place Beja between two fires when he came out in the morning to fall on the Chandikas. Head-quarters, with an advanced guard, were to precede the main body, which from Sukkur was to move the same day that Jacob quitted Larkaana; and both were to reach the frontier simultaneously, at the moment when all communication between Beja and his spies would be cut off by the advance of Wullee and Fitzgerald. All the supplies of food and spare ammunition, and camels to carry water in case the enemy poisoned the wells in the desert, had been previously prepared to attend the troops as closely as possible; and a corps of artificers, pioneers and well-sinkers, had been organized to mend broken gun-carriages, open roads and seek for water. They carried with them an abundant supply of iron punchers, steel rods to repair them, and quick lime, which in blasting rocks saves powder; and the army was also attended by the Kaherees, a small tribe driven from Poolagee, their own country, some ten years before by Beja: they were now serving as guides, and it was intended to restore them to their lands. The preparations for opening the campaign were however necessarily contracted, having been made very secretly to confirm Beja in the belief that no general movement would be undertaken; but to counteract this defect the general trusted to moral influences and was not deceived. And here also, as on his first assuming command, he accepted omens of success; for like many great captains his tendency was to augur good or ill from natural events.

On the 16th of January 1809, he had been desperately wounded and taken prisoner in Spain. On the 16th of January 1843, he had crossed the Scindian frontier to war with the ameers; Wullee Chandia was then menacing his rear, and a brilliant comet was streaming in the sky. Now, on the 16th of January 1845, being again crossing the Scindian frontier in a contrary direction for another

contest, Wullee Chandia was leading his advanced guard instead of menacing his rear, and the effulgence of another comet was widely spread on high! "How these things affect the minds of men" he observed "at least they do mine. They have not indeed much influence with me, but they have some and it is useful. Well! God's will be done, whether evinced by signs or not. All I have to think of is my duty." And with that feeling, conscious of having a just cause, he commenced the war.

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## CHAPTER IX.

## CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HILLMEN.

CHAP. IX.      TOWARDS the desert, the Cutchee hills presented in  
 1845.            their length several points of entrance, five of which  
                   were immediately within the scope of the operations,  
                   namely, Poolagee, Tonge, Zurekooshta or Zuranee, Gon-  
                   dooee, and Sebree, reckoning from left to right of the  
 Plans 1 & 2.    British front. Beyond Tullar was the defile of Tonge;  
                   beyond Zurekooshta the double defiles of Lullee and  
                   Jummuck.

Fronting these entrances and nearly in a parallel line, were the watering-places of the desert. Chuttur on the west leading to Poolagee; Ooch more eastward leading to Zurekooshta; Shahpoor, between them, a walled village from whence either Poolagee or Tullar might be assailed.

Rojan and Khangur on the Scindian side of the desert were the permanent English cavalry posts; they faced Poolagee, Shahpoor and Ooch, but had the waste between them and those places.

Behind Rojan were Larkaana and Jull, from whence Fitzgerald, Jacob, the Chandikas and the Mugzees, were to start for the surprising of Poolagee.

Behind Khangur, were Shikarpoore and Sukkur, from whence the head-quarter column and Ali Moorad's contingent were to move against the hills.

The frontier was not crossed before the 16th of January, but the campaign was opened the 13th by an advanced guard of cavalry and guns, which marched under the general from Sukkur to Shikarpoore, a distance of twenty-

six miles. Colonel Geddes had previously organized the artillery park and a corps of artificers at the former place, whence a detachment of sappers, miners, and well-diggers pushed forward the same day to Khangur, under the indefatigable Lieutenant Maxwell of the Bengal Engineers, an officer of extraordinary hardihood, mental and bodily. The infantry the artillery and the commissariat remained under the Brigadiers Hunter and Simpson, but with instructions to march at a stated time, and to be followed at a later period by Ali Moorad. Meanwhile Jacob and Fitzgerald, the Chandikas and the Mugzees, had orders to commence their march also on the 13th to surprise Poolagee: thus the troops were put in sudden and rapid movement to the front, simultaneously from the right and left of the long line of frontier.

On the 14th a march of thirteen miles brought the general with his advanced guard of cavalry and a battery of horse-artillery to Jaghur, and on the 15th he reached Khangur after a march of sixteen miles. Jacob had that day reached Rojan, fourteen miles west of Khangur, but by a terrible march through the desert, men and horses sinking from fatigue and thirst, because the camel corps, which preceded them, had exhausted all the wells in the desert, and many horses had died.

At Khangur the spies came in with news that Beja Khan, deceived by the intercepted letter, knew nothing of the British movement, and had forces at Shahpoor thirty-five miles in advance. This unexpected information, and Jacob's distress, rendered the first plan of surprising Poolagee inapplicable, and Sir C. Napier like a great captain instantly changed his whole scheme of operations—arguing thus. "If Wullee Chandia be true, he will this night attack Poolagee, and though Jacob's horsemen are too distressed to reach that place for the morning combination, they can reach Shahpoor; and an attack there, coupled with that of the Chandikas at Poolagee, will still drive the hillmen eastward and cut them off from the western mountains, which is the first great

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object of the campaign. Ooch is the next watering-place east of Shahpoor, and only sixteen miles from it: to Ooch then, the enemy will naturally retire unless he defeats Jacob at Shahpoor, and Beja may still be intercepted."

The head-quarter troops had then marched sixteen miles, and the distance to Ooch was forty, through heavy sand, where a single shower of rain would wash out all traces and bewilder the most skilful guides. This distance and difficulty seemed to forbid the effort; but the permanent irregular cavalry post of Khangur under Captain Salter, and two mountain-guns under Lieutenant Pulman, being fresh, were forthwith despatched against Ooch, and Jacob received orders to move against Shahpoor. Scarcely had Salter been lost to the sight, when fresh intelligence arrived; many chiefs with a strong force were already in possession of Ooch, and Shahpoor was still occupied as before. This news alarmed the general for Salter, whose ability he had not proved in action; he feared he might \* be beaten, and notwithstanding his own previous march, the great distance to Ooch, and the chance of losing his way, having as guides only two Kaheree chiefs whose skill was doubtful, he followed with two hundred of the 6th irregular cavalry and two pieces of horse-artillery under Captain Mowat. And these high-spirited soldiers, excited to enthusiasm by the energy of their leader, actually added those forty miles over heavy sand to their previous march, within the twenty-four hours!

At daybreak on the 18th the vicinity of Ooch was attained, but the general, who had then been above twenty-six hours on horseback and oppressed with constant thought, had fallen asleep in his saddle. A sudden halt of the advanced guard, with which he was moving, awakened him; lights had been perceived not far off and the enemy must be close at hand. Although uneasy not to have found traces of Salter, he resolved to wait only for his own main body, form a column of attack, and gallop at daylight headlong into the midst of the enemy supposed to be in front. But during his very short slumber, the column and guns had gone astray, and

he was left with only fifty tired horsemen close, as he imagined, to a numerous and formidable enemy.

At daybreak Captain McMurdo, who had ascended a sand-hill in front, returned hastily with intelligence that he had seen Beloochees firing in the plain beyond; this was embarrassing, for the general somewhat doubted the firmness of the native horsemen with him in such a perilous crisis; yet he would not retire, but merely moving out of matchlock-range from the sand-hill ascended by McMurdo, awaited the coming event, and at that critical moment his lost troops and guns suddenly emerged from behind another sand-hill! This happy accident having rendered him again master of his movements, he sent scouts towards the firing, which was dropping not continuous, and found that not the enemy but Salter was in front. He had engaged and defeated seven hundred hillmen in the night, and the shots were from his videttes to keep off prowling parties, seeking to steal back some of the spoil. He had found the robbers, under Deyrah Khan Jackranee, in a position covered on three sides by the rocks but open on the fourth, and had vigorously charged them. At first, from the darkness, he missed their line, sweeping along the front instead of plunging into it, but soon recovering he rode straight upon them and they dispersed, leaving many dead. Some prisoners were taken, with above three thousand head of cattle, and twice that number of cattle would have been captured but for the extreme fatigue of men and horses, for the hills in front were covered with scattered herds.

When the second camp was pitched, a knowledge of the prowling warfare and ferocity of the robber warriors induced Sir C. Napier to order that no man should go beyond certain precincts. But always a certain thoughtless negligence where personal danger is involved, characterizes young British officers and soldiers. Captain John Napier, the general's nephew, McMurdo his son-in-law, and Lieutenant Byng his aide-de-camp, seeing small bands of the hillmen assembling on a rocky height in front, as if to save the distant herds, went towards them.

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As they approached, fearing an ambuscade, Byng was sent back for some cavalry, but the two others soon had occasion to acknowledge the prudence of their general; for round a rocky knoll came galloping a gallant robber mounted on a small mare of great activity, himself of a fine presence, clothed in a wadded armour, and bearing a matchlock and two swords: he had a fine courage also, or he would not have hovered so close to the camp with such a pageantry of weapons immediately after a defeat.

McMurdo fell upon him sword in hand, and some time they fought, wheeling in circles and closing without advantage on either side, save that the mare was wounded. Napier looked on, too chivalric to interfere in so fair a fight, but at last McMurdo, who had already ridden the same horse sixty miles, said, John, I am tired, you may try him. The other, of a slight make, but with as bright and clear a courage as ever animated a true English youth, advanced, and all three were soon at full speed—the Beloochee making a running fight. Suddenly the latter turned in his saddle and aimed with his matchlock, being then only a horse's length in front; it missed fire, and as Napier rapidly discharged his pistol, McMurdo, a man of ungovernable fierceness in combat, thinking the report was from the matchlock unfairly used, dashed pistol in hand past his comrade—who in vain called out not to kill—and shot the daring fellow as he was drawing his second sword. Then ensued a scene singularly characteristic. The young men alighted, McMurdo reproaching himself for using a pistol when they were two to one, and both with great emotion tried to stop the blood flowing from their dying antagonist, while he, indomitable, clutched at his weapon to give a last blow: he was unable to do so and soon after expired.

From the camp now came succour, for the two officers were in danger from the vicinity of the dead man's prowling comrades, but to view the body of the fallen Beloochee was all that remained to be done. The general's first impulse had been to gallop out himself, but the recollection of his high

calling checked him, and he left the result to fortune—expressing afterwards his displeasure at the whole proceeding as contrary to discipline, contrary to prudence, and in his mind contrary to a just principle, which forbade even in war the shedding of any blood not absolutely necessary for the general success. He had however another scene of more painful interest to endure. Having found a native officer of the 6th irregular cavalry, named Azeem Beg, lying on the ground mortally hurt, he alighted and endeavoured to alleviate his suffering and give him hope of recovery. “General, replied the dying hero, *“I am easy, I have done my duty. I am a soldier, and if fate demands my life I cannot die better—your visit to me is a great honour.”* So he died! “These are the things,” Sir C. Napier wrote in his journal just after this touching event, “these are the things which try the heart of a commander; and accursed, he adds—alluding to the slanderous assertions of Lord Howick and his coadjutors—“accursed be those who in the House of Commons accused me of seeking war in wantonness.” They were not worth this passing invective, their miserable calumny was scornfully rejected and crushed at its birth by the English feeling of their auditors.

About midday, when the camp had been pitched, came a horseman from Jacob to say he also had surprised and defeated the hillmen under Wuzzeer Khan, Beja’s son; whereupon the general, notwithstanding his previous fatigue rode to Shahpoor and found that the enemy had been, as at Ooch, completely deceived by the letters written to the khan of Khelat. At both places, supposing the troops attacking them in the night were Chandikas and Mugzees, they had resisted until the vigour and skill of the fighting convinced them of their error; then they fled; and Jacob had so disciplined his wild Moguls that not a hillman who surrendered was hurt, although the Moguls had been forced to storm one house defended by sixty robbers, who after killing or wounding six assailants threw down their arms when the door was broken. It was a fine example of generous discipline.

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See Conquest  
of Scinde.



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Two chiefs and eighty men had been captured, a new phase in Scindian warfare, for hitherto remorseless slaughter on both sides had marked every fight. Six chiefs and above a hundred men had been killed or wounded in the two attacks, which cost the British only eighteen men; and it was reported that while battling at Ooch the robbers, until then firm, on hearing Salter's artillery cried out "The *Sheitan-ka-Bhaee* himself is there," and instantly fled—so great a dread had his actions created. Thus the desert was overcome by a finely-conceived and masterly change in the operations, suddenly adopted, enforced with astonishing energy, and wonderfully sustained by the troops, whose enduring strength may be compared with that of any soldiers ancient or modern. For the men with the general had marched without halting, fifty-six miles; those with Jacob fifty miles; those with Salter forty miles, through deep sand. For forty miles also Jacob's cavalry had been followed in the waste by a body of police infantry under Lieutenant Smallpage! And while all these hardy soldiers thus broke through the desert, their general was in the saddle for thirty hours, riding over seventy-two miles of ground—the last sixteen during a violent sand-storm, very oppressive to exhausted men and horses. It was only in Shahpoor, after writing his despatches and issuing orders for concentrating the infantry and artillery, which were now to close up, that he first took rest!

This triple success—for the true and valiant Chandian had at the same time taken Poolagee—again induced a change in the plan of operations. The enemy had voluntarily thrown himself into the eastern hills, and the original design of moving direct upon Poolagee and connecting the left of the army with the Murrees, was entirely relinquished. The principle of cutting off the hillmen from the west, and driving them up their long ravines remained indeed the same, but they had themselves shortened the operation by abandoning the western ranges. Salter therefore remained at Ooch and Jacob's cavalry was detached to Poolagee and Lheree, to hold those places,

and in concert with the Chandikas to awe the Khelat tribes. The infantry, the artillery, and all the supplies were directed upon Shahpoor, where a magazine for fourteen days' consumption was formed, which would have been twice as large, if the necessity of keeping Beja and his confederates deceived as to the movements had not restricted the previous preparations.

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Jacob's cavalry and the Chandikas being thus thrown across the hills towards the Murrees, the army occupied two sides of a square, one of which menaced the passes from the desert on the south; the other was in possession of the western mouths of the long parallel valleys, or rather ravines, which split the hills in their length towards the Indus.

Looking from Poolagee, to the east, those ravines were as follows:— Plans 1 & 2.

On the right hand, the ravine of Tonge was prolonged eastward, until it was lost in the crags of the Mazaree district near the Indus. It could only be entered from the south by the cross defiles of Zuranee, Gondooee and Sebrée, leading through an almost perpendicular wall of rocks.

Next to and parallel with Tonge, was the ravine of the Illiassee river; into which the only cross entrance was the defile of Jummuck leading over a rocky range, impassable save at that point.

From the Illiassee ravine several defiles gave entrance to the parallel ravine of the Teyaga stream, which, in the centre, was called the Valley of the Tomb, and more eastward the Valley of Deyrah. Into this ravine a shorter one opened, down which the Sungseela torrent came from the north-eastward, to fall into the Teyaga, flowing westward. These rivers are however mere beds of torrents, dry except in heavy rain: the Teyaga, the only continually-flowing stream, was but a yard wide at Deyrah, and the whole region is horribly arid.

Northward of all these ravines was a rocky range, separating the Murrees from the other tribes but pierced by the defiles of Sartook and Nufoosk.

With the desert behind, and this arid region, these

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craggy passes before him, the desolate nature of which can only be comprehended by reference to the plans and views, the English general, while impatiently awaiting the arrival of his infantry, his guns and stores, thus described his position on the 18th of January.

“To-morrow all the gorges will be plugged up by the cavalry, and Beja Khan is, I am sure, on this south side of the rocks, between a low ridge which hides him from us and a higher range on the north. I have examined Yarroo Khosa, the guide, this morning, and he says there is plenty of water at Tullar and very little at Tonge, but at Zuranee it is excellent and plentiful. I think it scarcely possible that water should abound at Tullar and Zuranee, and yet be scarce and bad at Tonge, wherefore I believe Yarroo is in Beja's hands, and that chief is at Tonge: however Yarroo and I have *agreed* that we cannot go there.”

This double-dealer being thus blinded, Jacob was directed to block the gorges of the ravines opening on Lheree and Poolagee, with six hundred horsemen and two guns, while Ahmed Khan Mugzee moved up the Teyaga into the Tomb ravine. Wullee Chandia was to scour that of Tonge, the Chandikas being, as the general observed, good feelers. He designed to move himself by Ooch upon the Zuranee pass, he directed Ali Moorad on the Gondooee, there to wait until the enemy was pushed upwards. By these dispositions he secured the western entrances of the hills, and could block the cross defiles from the south, while the Chandikas and Mugzees explored two of the ravines in their length and ascertained the real positions of the hillmen; and always he expected to capture cattle at the watering-places and so deprive the enemy by degrees of subsistence. Nor did he judge it dangerous to push forward the Chandikas and Mugzees in this isolated manner, because the recent surprises would inevitably lead the enemy to think they only masked the approach of the British forces as before.

From some negligence or error, the infantry, the artillery park, and the commissariat stores, did not come up in due time, and nothing could be done in the hills without

the first. Nevertheless, on the 20th, having first permitted the families of the prisoners to join them, making arrangements for their support with a liberal regard to humanity, he began his movement on Ooch, his intention being to force all the rocky passes on the south front immediately. But never did a campaign more entirely depend upon the prompt genius of a commander than this. There were no maps, the country was inexpressibly intricate and austere, the movements were governed by the finding of water, the spies all dreaded Beja and the guides were from fear, rendered his agents. Each day brought a new difficulty, or new information to cause a change in the plan of operations—and to all this was added an embarrassment, before alluded to, which seldom troubles generals in war, namely, the dread of forcing the robbers to a decisive battle near their families, lest they should butcher them when the day was going hard. This indeed he dreaded so much, that between the 20th and the 22nd, stoically humane, he twice rejected opportunities of destroying Beja while moving across the British front, because his family, and the families of his sons and chiefs, were with him.

At Ooch, the spies said that Tonge, into which the Doomkee chief had first thrown himself, was a place of singular formation ; being an immense basin, formed by rocks whose summits were inaccessible on the outside but easy of ascent from the inside. The only inlet was a small tunnel, made by a streamlet of pure water, which fell from the higher part of the rocks on the opposite part of the basin inside ; in former wars it had been turned temporarily by the hillmen so as to fall fourteen miles from the tunnel by the outward circuit, and the assailants, having the desert at their backs, were thus forced to retire from thirst : the more provident English leader was furnished with water-skins and well-diggers for such an occasion, and designed to block the tunnel and starve the defenders. Meanwhile Wullee Chandia, having swept the outer valley leading up towards Tonge, killed several Bhoogtees and captured a large flock of goats, so alarmed Beja by these movements, that he abandoned his fastness and fled across

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the front of the troops at Ooch towards Zuranee ; escaping capture, as noticed above, because his enemy was more compassionate for the women and children than he would himself have been. During this flight however, his followers left him in great numbers, and went to Belooch Khan of Lheree, who pretended to be friendly with the British ; but the general, thinking this reception of the Doomkees no proof of friendship, suspected a concerted scheme to organize a force on his flank, and therefore directed Jacob to treat Belooch Khan roughly, and even, if necessary, arrest and send him to head-quarters.

The Chandikas, reinforced with a squadron of cavalry, were now placed at Tullar in observation of the Tonge defile, because the latter was a good watering-place notwithstanding Yarroo's tale ; and though more correct information had stripped it of the marvellous strength at first reported, it was a fastness great and difficult to assail. Colonel Geddes was then sent with a column of all arms to Zuree-Kooshta, opposite the Zuranee defile, and the troops were becoming eager for battle ; yet the march of head-quarters was deferred, because hourly varying circumstances presented new combinations—"There is no need for haste," observed the general on the 21st in his journal of operations—"A check at any point might force me to retrograde ; that would be dishonouring, and weaken the effect of the first surprise. My army hems the enemy in on the south and west—the Murrees hem him in on the north—Ali Moorad ought to be now marching on the Gondooee defiles, and the hillmen's provisions are decreasing, while mine are increasing by the arrival of supplies and the captures of cattle. All the young men are eager for fighting, but I will not indulge them unless Beja goes to the Zuranee defile,—for I must force the passes there—meanwhile every man's life ought to be as dear to me as my own, and I will not lose any by provoking fights with small detachments, to hasten results when my measures are, it appears to me, sufficient to insure final success."

In this mood he remained at Ooch until the 25th of January, intent to spare life as much as possible, and

always dreading that a premature advance should bring the robbers to action while their families were with them, an event the contemplation of which filled him with horror. His movements were thus clogged, and many advantages designedly let slip; for nothing could shake his resolution not to have the blood of women and children swelling the red stream which the terrible actions of the robbers had forced him to set flowing. Nor did he spare moral means to avoid so horrible a catastrophe. After Salter's action, eleven men and sixteen women, amongst them the mother of Deyrah Khan Jackranee and the wife of Toork Ali, were found in a cave, and transferred with marked respect to the care of a Syud or holy man, who held a jagheer on the tenure of applying its revenue to the succour of the poor—and such obligations of charity are seldom violated amongst the Mahometans. By this Syud the humanity of the English leader was made known, and, coupled with the previous good treatment of the prisoners' families at Shahpoor, not only abated the horror felt by the hillmen at having their women fall into the power of Caffir enemies, but finally influenced Toork Ali and Deyrah Khan to surrender.

On the 18th Ali Moorad should have been in front of the Gondooee defile, but he had halted for the feast of the Moharem and did not arrive until the 31st—a very serious failure, as will be seen further on.

On the 23rd rain fell, which was useful for filling the wells, but otherwise inconvenient; on that day however, Hunter reached Ooch with a sepoy battalion and the 2nd Bengal Europeans, the latter, strong well-set men, "*not big, but with a big spirit*" was the remark of their chief whom they now saw for the first time. Simpson about the same period got to Shahpoor with the other sepoy battalion, and the Bundlecund legion: thus the whole army was assembled on the north side of the desert, and the magazines were now filled for two months.

On the 25th the general, unable to ascertain either the real numbers or the positions of the enemy, but supposing them to be assembled for the defence of the Zuranee and

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Gondooee defiles, marched on the first point, but with design closely to examine the positions before he assailed them. Meanwhile he directed Simpson to march with a column of all arms combined, from Shahpoor upon Poolagee, and from thence push up the Tomb valley upon Deyrah, a distance of seven marches. Scouring that valley in its length, he was to turn the cross defiles of Lullee and Jummuck while the main body assailed them in front. The army was thus disseminated in many columns, on the principle of warfare originally designed; but each column was so strongly constituted, and the hillmen were still so dispirited by the first surprises at Ooch and Shahpoor that no counter attack was to be dreaded: it was expected also that rumour would exaggerate Simpson's numbers, and the movements were not made without a military connection calculated to secure the army against any great disaster. Simpson, while moving up the Teyaga, had Jacob's cavalry and guns behind him in support, and the places of Lheree and Poolagee to fall back upon. The Chandikas and the squadron of cavalry, when at Tullar, were supported by Shahpoor, where a garrison of all arms under Captain Jamieson remained to guard the magazines: Shahpoor indeed, from its central position, gave equal support to Simpson and to the Chandikas, and was the place of arms for the whole movement.

No longer counting on Ali Moorad, the general now resolved to assemble at Zuree Kooshta a powerful force for offensive operations, and he effected this on the 26th; but only by forced and distressing marches, which nearly destroyed the sumpter camels; the nights also were so cold that the shivering sepoy could scarcely endure the change—three died—but the Europeans became more vigorous.

At Zuree Kooshta, it was ascertained that Beja had gone through the Lullee defile, that he had been joined by the Bhoogtees and Jackranees, that he was prepared to fight, and his ground was surprisingly strong. Wherefore, thinking sufficient time had been given for the women and children to gain distant fastnesses, the English leader

resolved to attack. He designed however, following his original notion, to dislodge his foes by powerful mortar and howitzer batteries if possible, and thus spare an infantry fight which could not fail to prove murderous for his own army.

On the 28th the troops advanced, but found no enemy to deal with. Simpson's movement had been, as foreseen, magnified into the approach of a great army, and the defiles of Lullee and Jummuck had been abandoned when he had only made three marches, one of which, from the extreme ruggedness of the ground was but of four miles. The English camp was now pitched between the Lullee and Jummuck passes, the space between them being about five miles. Good water was found, though not enough for a large force; but afterwards, near the summit of the Jummuck range, or ghaut, an abundance was discovered; and as these passes were points of great importance, a redoubt and other works were immediately traced for securing them. The defiles being thus gained, a trusty cossid was despatched to Simpson with orders to continue his march to Deyrah, by which his column was again linked to the main body, and thus the general movement was as successful in all its parts as the first had been; for the rocky region had been penetrated without loss, and an irregular transverse front was thrown across the parallel ravines, so as to block up all the western gorges and connect the left of the army with the Murrees. But though the tribes had abandoned these almost impregnable passes, showing their ignorance of scientific warfare, their prowling murderous bands infested the camp, and soldiers and followers who strayed beyond the sentries were killed without mercy. It was in vain to order that no man should go beyond the lines, the orders were disobeyed and daily losses ensued.

To ascertain the enemy's course was now the object to attain. His strongest hold was said to be amongst the desolate crags of Trukkee, but though celebrated all over Asia their real situation was at this time a mystery which neither guide nor spy cared to disclose; so fearful




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were they of Beja's after-vengeance, and so sure that he would be finally victorious: Trukkee was however at no great distance from the Jummuck pass, being ensconced in the ridge which separates the Deyrah valley from the Sungseela ravine. In this state the following questions were to be considered. Would the robbers throw themselves into Trukkee and fight their last desperate battle amongst its terrible rocks? Or would they make a push to break or evade Jacob's and Simpson's forces, and so getting through the western gorges gain the Khelat mountains, whither they could not be followed? This last was not much to be feared; the hillmen were too numerous, too much encumbered with their families, baggage and herds, to slip between the columns; moreover, issuing from Tonge they would be met by the Chandikas and Mugzees; and issuing from the Illiassee they would be met by Jacob; in the Teyaga ravine Simpson would oppose them, and at Sartooft they would have the Murrees to fight. They were indeed more numerous than any of these separated divisions, but the country was so strong for defence there could be no fear.

Trukkee remained, but it was soon ascertained that Simpson's column, which had frightened them from Jummuck, had also deterred them from going across the ravine of the Tomb, which, as it approached Deyrah, spread out into a spacious valley. Trukkee therefore was not their object then. There was a third course open, namely, to make eastward for the Mazaree hills, which abounded with fastnesses even more inaccessible and austere than the rocks they had just abandoned; and there the general desired to drive them, for the following reasons.—Barbarian communities, having less to spare of the necessities of life and less confidence in each others' faith, are more sensitive to intrusions than civilized communities; and here the Jackranees and Doomkees would be driven reflux upon the Bhoogtees, who were already suffering from a dearth, and were more likely to quarrel with than receive them amicably. They could then be all pressed closely until they surrendered, or were compelled





G. Wells, lith.

THE MOUNTAINS OF THE HIMALAYAS

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to break, half-starved and desperate, into the Mooltan or Keytrian countries, the last an eastern continuation of the Murree hills.

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To discover the true direction of their retreat, the narrow ravine in which the army was then encamped, was on the 29th explored eastward by a strong column of troops; and soon a recent camp was discovered, where the fires were still burning, and where women's camel-litters called *cujavás*, being left on the ground, showed that both chiefs and their families had been there. This sufficed, and the column returned.

Very remarkable and desolate was the rocky solitude into which the operations had now brought the troops. The ravine, up which the exploring column had gone, was formed by two ridges running east and westward, the ground between being fertile though uncultivated; the northern ridge, pierced by the defile of Jummuck, was highest, broadest, and extremely rugged; yet of less asperity than the southern ridge, through which the defile of Lullee had given entrance; for this last, extending from Tonge to the Mazaree hills, got mingled and lost amongst the prodigious rocks of the last-named region, and in its whole length presented, as it were, a battlemented wall some hundred feet high. It offered several narrow defiles or rather fissures, none more than thirty yards wide and with perpendicular sides eighty or ninety yards high; and it was impossible to employ flanking parties above, from the difficulty of gaining access to the summit and because their progress would have been stopped by transverse fissures of great depth, so narrow as to be in darkness and choked with bushes: but so terribly wild, so rugged, so desolate is the face of nature there, that a soldier, sublime in his homely force of language, exclaimed on seeing it "*When God made the world he threw the rubbish here.*"

Between Lullee and Jummuck the camp was of necessity pitched, although a dangerous place; but the enemy had no guns, the field-works traced out would command both the defiles, securing a communication with the

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plains behind, where the cavalry was stationed to oppose and give notice of any outbreak from the other passes. Moreover the reports of spies, and a calculation of probabilities, soon showed that the confederate chiefs, when deterred by Simpson's march from passing the Jummuck range, had moved eastward until the austerity of the ravine barred progress ; and then issuing by the Gondooee defile into the plain of Muth, had skirted the desert, until they could enter the hills again at Dooshkooshta the most eastern defile. This they could not have done if Ali Moorad had been true to his time and place, and his failure was a serious mishap ; it rendered nugatory all the previous able and finely-calculated combinations to finish the war at this point, the campaign was indefinitely prolonged, and suspicion was excited as to his fidelity.

While Beja was thus making for the Mazaree hills by the plain of Muth, Captain McMurdo was detached with a squadron and two guns to find Simpson, and ascertain if the Bhoogtee town and fort of Deyrah were defended ; they were empty, and Simpson, an officer peculiarly exact in following his instructions, was at hand to take possession ; hence McMurdo returned to camp, Salter's cavalry were charged with the advanced communication between the main body and Simpson, and the rear communication, between Shahpoor and the Lullee pass, was delivered to Smallpage and his policemen : still the lurking robbers grievously infested both the camp and the rear of the army, murdering all stragglers and carrying off many camels.

Reflecting on this state of affairs, the general thought some bands and herds must have been overpassed in the previous operations ; and as the vital principle of the campaign was to seize all the cattle and drive the people in heaps upon the most sterile fastnesses, he sent Captain John Napier with the camel corps and volunteers of the 13th regiment, to scour the ravine of Tonge, while a squadron of cavalry from Zuree Kooshta skirted the rocks outside in concert. Doing this, he said, that herds would certainly be found near the watering-places, and

he was right—John Napier, who united zeal and intelligence to great resolution and enterprise, returned on the 31st, without having seen an enemy indeed, but with two thousand cattle. The voice of the camp had foretold entire failure, for notwithstanding the previous successes light opinions were still expressed as to the ultimate result of the war, and the English leader was continually chafed by predictions of failure, anticipations of difficulties, and calculations too ill founded to have any influence on his convictions. “Hitherto, he jocosely said, he had proved himself at least a better robber than Beja, having taken six thousand of his cattle and a great deal of grain, killed many of his men, and forced the remainder to seek safety in sterile fastnesses where they must suffer want.” Meanwhile Ali Moorad arrived at Zuree Kooshta with two thousand men and ten guns, being then twenty-seven miles in rear of the camp, whereas he should have been ten days before at Gondooee, barring that defile against the confederates, who would thus have been entirely enclosed and compelled to surrender.

All the forces designed for the campaign were now in hand, yet the camp remained stationary, for the counter war of the hillmen had commenced and precluded movement. Their emissaries in rear of the army had diligently confirmed the notion inculcated by the *Delhi Gazette* and the *Bombay Times*, as to the folly and danger of the expedition, and panic was widely spread. “Beja could not be subdued—he laughed at the English leader, who with his army would be starved—would be cut to pieces—the hillmen were invincible.” To this the emissaries added, that “Sir C. Napier’s successor would shrink from defending Shikarpore”—a lesson they had learned from Buist, who was continually objecting to its retention—“that the confederates would come down and plunder that town and wreak Beja’s vengeance on all men who had aided in the invasion of their hills.”

Terrified at this prospect, the camel-men, first refused to pass Shahpoor with the supplies, and the next night deserted with their animals, five hundred in number.

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The contractors and owners of camels in Scinde also refused to complete their contracts, hid their beasts from the government agents, and in every way evinced their belief in the coming destruction of the army, and their profound sense of the Beja's ferocity. The troops were thus suddenly stripped of *carriage*, as sumpter camels are called in India; for the commissariat animals had been overworked by the previous rapid marches and the camel does not quickly recover. The idle talk of the army also became louder—Beja could not be hunted down, the thing was impossible—and at the same time the warfare on the communications became more active. The dawk was twice intercepted, the bearers were killed, and sixteen commissariat camels were taken. The camp was still more vexatiously tormented. Sixty baggage-camels were carried off at once, and many followers were murdered.

This loss of carriage entirely precluded movement, and the apparent check thus given to the operations might, it was to be feared, induce neighbouring tribes and nations to think the expedition had failed—a conclusion more likely to be adopted, because five times before within four years British troops had been cut to pieces in those hills, and the robbers, hitherto unconquered, were judged unconquerable. The Murrees and the Brahoee Belooch tribes of Khelat were most likely to be thus influenced to mischief, and though such a defection had been contemplated, and means to meet it prepared, much spilling of blood would have necessarily occurred, which the general strained every nerve to avert, by still greater exertions and giving vent to a more determined expression of his will.

The government camels, he observed, had plenty of a shrub on which they loved to feed; the cavalry horses throve on a kind of grass found in tufts at the edge of the desert; and common grass had been discovered in abundance at the foot of the Jummuck ghaut. Water could be had along the waste for digging. Two months' provisions had been stored in Shahpoor before the hired camel-men deserted, and twelve days' supply was in the camp; wherefore, when complaints came that there was no water, he

sent well-diggers to search for it ; and when told the yield was sulphureous, he desired the murmurers to boil it. If he was assailed with anticipations of famine he answered, that to sustain want was a soldier's duty. In nothing would he yield. " Sooner than flinch before this robber Beja, he exclaimed, I will eat my horse, I will starve, and I will not be put from my enterprise by the talk of men who have not considered the subject so deeply as myself. Nor am I without resources. The government camels are still capable of some work ; the cavalry can be dismounted to supply sumpter animals, and so can the fighting camel corps : patiently therefore, but unrelentingly, I will go on, and these murmurs only make my feet go deeper into the ground. Why should I give way ? Deyrah with its fort is in my hands, furnishing a fixed pivot, round which the army can move, contracting by degrees the space occupied by the enemy. The Murrees confine the robbers on the north, while the cavalry and Ali Moorad watch them from the plain south of the rocks. The Seikhs are influenced by my menacing language towards the Mooltan man, and by Major Broadfoot's diplomacy on one hand ; on the other by a natural dislike to have three starving ferocious tribes boring in upon their territories, bringing after them a victorious British army in pursuit. They will therefore probably hold by their neutrality. On the Keytrian side also there will be a bar ; for the spies say, Hadgee the khan of that tribe has told his son-in-law, Islam Bhoogtee, he will receive him if pressed, but not his followers : he will not therefore receive Doomkees and Jackranees."

But this want of carriage, a perplexing embarrassment in itself, involved the chance of very serious consequences. It rendered the army powerless when success was almost certain, for a hot pursuit at this time would have inflicted great loss on Beja if it did not entirely destroy him ; only twelve days' supply of food was in the camp ; and if at the end of that time the army was compelled to retrograde to Shahpoor, a shout of victory would peal from tribe to tribe through the hills, even to the Bolan pass ; that would be



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echoed along the crests of the Hala mountains as far as Sehwan, and then shield and sword and matchlock would pour down on the Scindian plains with a wild and merciless storm! The Keytrian man's resolution, which was only known through spies, might alter; and thus the line of operations would be dangerously extended, even though fresh carriage should be obtained; for beyond the month of March the troops could not keep the field under the extreme heat of the desert. At that moment all the troops were eager to fight, though convinced that ultimate success could not be obtained; but they were not all British; and would those young soldiers sustain half-rations in a halting-place? would not sickness be induced, and despondency also, from inaction, when assassins and thieves vexed their camp, murdered their servants and stole their baggage animals? Before them were inaccessible rocks, around them a solitude, and all their own discourses turned upon the impossibility of warring down Beja!

Such were the reflections made at the time, and the prospect was not bright. One evil however had already been avoided by prudence. Had a rash pursuit of the hill chiefs over the Jummuck pass been adopted when the army first entered the ravine in which it was now encamped, the convoys could not, when the camel-men deserted, have followed over that ghaut; the troops must then have come back for food, and would have found Beja and his confederates again in possession of the twin defiles. For it was afterwards ascertained that they had gone up the ravine towards Gondooee, persuaded that the British leader would cross the Jummuck Ghaut and leave them to seize the passes behind him; an able and shrewd combination but baffled by superior prudence. The campaign was indeed one of the utmost danger and difficulty, for, amidst arid deserts and stupendous rocks, Sir C. Napier had to war down a powerful people, gliding around him in craft like serpents and fighting like lions when beset. Fortune however, that great arbiter in war, was not adverse. At this critical time a vakeel from the khan of Khelat's Durbar reached the camp, charged with submissive and

friendly messages. The surprises at Ooch and Shahpoor, at the opening of the campaign, had alarmed that court; and the chief minister had a personal cause to plead; his brother's treacherous correspondence with Deyrah Khan, had been taken at Ooch; it proved his own complicity, and he had been told that if such hostility was continued the English leader would destroy both of them, even if they fled to Bokhara for safety. This vakeel, whose secret instructions were to plead the minister's cause, was merely made to remark the fortifications in the pass, with charge to assure the khan the English would remain in the hills for six months, and were raising these works for permanent possession. But the moonshee, Ali Acbar, was sent to Khelat, ostensibly and really to demand aid in procuring fresh camels; privately to assure the minister, that his brother and himself would be pardoned and obtain the friendship of the English government for ever, if they behaved well; and that a jagheer in Scinde would immediately be given to him if he provided camels, and held true to the alliance. This policy, good to obtain animals, was also designed to restrain the Khelat tribes from commotion during the actual crisis.

Ali Moorad was now directed to move to the Gondooee pass, for at Zuree Kooshta he was on the line of communication with Shahpoor, and his men were likely enough to act hostilely and lay their deeds on the outlying roving bands of hillmen. The ameer obeyed, to the great content of the general, who would have sent the English cavalry to occupy all the watering-places after him, as a further security, if the desertion of the camel-drivers had not precluded even this movement. Meanwhile to fix the Murree chief, whose faith he thought wavering, and whose enmity would be dangerous, he offered five thousand rupees for the capture of Beja; and at the same time, to free his force from all doubtful friends, he desired Jacob to send back to their own countries the Chandikas and Mugzees, as having fulfilled their mission; for he wished to have in this crisis as few tribes about his army as possible. Resorting likewise again to the stratagem which had before

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deceived Beja, he directed Jacob to write a letter to a friend, and cause it to fall into the hands of the Bhoogtees, the contents being, "that fresh forces were coming up, that the fortifications at Jummuck were to be very powerful, that the intention was to stay in the hills until Beja was killed, but the general's benevolence made him desire rather to have him a prisoner, and he would richly reward any chief or tribe who delivered him up."

Having thus employed all moral means at his command, the English leader, desirous to clear the vicinity of the camp and keep the troops in full activity, sent a column under General Hunter to scour all the adjacent ravines and rocks; for so daring were the lurking robbers that five of them, passing the pickets in the night, cut down two men not far from the head-quarter tent. Hunter's soldiers killed these men, but they fought desperately, and one of them, when pierced by a bayonet, continued to cut at his antagonist until the latter discharged his musket, the bayonet being still in the robber's body! About the same time the police under Smallpage captured cattle south of the rocks, and a despatch from Ali Moorad announced, that at Gondooce he also had taken six camels and three hundred head of cattle after a skirmish.

In this state of affairs a Kyharee spy arrived with intelligence, that the confederate chieftains, having ensconced themselves in a fastness only twenty miles distant, were starving: and next day Captain Malet came from Ali Moorad, to say that Beja wished to surrender. Here was an opening to emerge from a critical and dangerous position with apparent honour; but the unbending will of the English leader was then manifested. Instead of snatching at this occasion to terminate a war becoming hourly more difficult and dangerous, he answered thus. "Let the khan lay his arms at my feet, and be prepared to emigrate with his followers to a district which I will point out on the left bank of the Indus, and he shall be pardoned. If he refuses these terms he shall be pursued to the death, and the hundred Doomkees who are my prisoners shall be hanged."

There was a right, but no intention to hurt those prisoners, the threat was merely to strike terror; but the emigration condition was real, being founded on a policy resembling that of Pompey when he removed the Sicilian pirates from the sea-coasts; for like that great man, Sir C. Napier thought the robbers, if removed from the scene of their depredations and settled as cultivators, would relinquish their lawless habits. He saw they were ferocious, yet chivalric and capable of just reflection, being spoilers as much from necessity and ignorance as from liking, and he earnestly desired to reclaim not to slaughter them.

On the 5th of February a patrol again discovered and killed several armed hillmen between the passes, and three hundred horsemen were brought up from the rear to enable Simpson to scour the plain about Deyrah. But famine was now menacing the army, for though the captured cattle, always sold by auction in the camp, furnished a considerable resource, this was an Indian army, with at least three followers to every fighting man, and consequently that supply soon disappeared. No sumpter camels had yet been procured, and the general, thus pushed to the wall, detached Fitzgerald's fighting camel corps to fetch food from Shahpoor, with orders to scour the ravine of Tonge once more during his march, and even to attack that place if it contained enemies. The military excellence and power of this anomalous corps, was then strikingly shown. With hired sumpter camels the marches alone would have occupied six days and nights; and a strong escort must have been employed to protect the convoy. Fitzgerald's men, self-supported as a military body, not only scoured the ravine and reached Shahpoor in one night, after a march of fifty miles, but loaded their camels with forty-five thousand pounds of flour, and regained the camp on the morning of the 8th, having employed but three days and two nights in the whole expedition!

On the very day this supply came, another message was received from Ali Moorad, to say, not Beja only, but all the chiefs were ready to surrender. To this slight cre-

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
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dence was given by the English leader when he considered the state of affairs; but prompt to seize every opportunity, he marched a few hours after Fitzgerald's return towards the defile of Sebree, eastward of Ali Moorad's camp; leaving General Hunter with a small force at Jummuck to hold that and the Lullee defile. By this movement he designed to contract the pressure on the confederates and increase their disposition for yielding; but when passing Ali Moorad's camp the ameer entreated that no advance beyond Sebree should be made, saying it would alarm the chiefs and prevent their surrender. At his desire, the general, anxious to avoid bloodshed, agreed to halt at Sebree until the 4th, yet with a misgiving that the matter was a concerted design to gain time for mischief—I cannot, he said, trust these serpents of the desert. And the next day his dawk, though guarded by twelve troopers, was surprised and many of the men slain by a band of Jackranees two hundred strong. Pretending to belong to another irregular cavalry regiment, some of these robbers had entered into friendly conversation with the escort, but suddenly each man cut down the soldier he was talking to, and among the victims was a son of the soubadar who had died so nobly at Ooch.

Alarmed by this event for the safety of Captain McMurdo, who had been sent a few hours before with twelve troopers to examine the country beyond the defile of Sebree, the general rode hastily to his succour, but met him returning with a herd of cattle. A matchlock-fire had been opened on him in the pass, but instead of abandoning the cattle and galloping through, he had skilfully drawn back and enticed the enemy into low ground, where he was going to charge when a new band came upon his rear. His troopers, though Mogueellaees, had been for a moment panic-stricken when the fire was first opened on them, but now, stimulated by the bold demeanour of their leader, they charged and sent the robbers to their rocks, where several fell under the fire of their carabines: McMurdo with able contrivance then passed the defile in safety. It was a gallant and well-





G. Wells, lith.

Illustration by G. Wells, 1880

67, 32, 103, 16, 17, 103, 15, 100, 100

managed affair, and the troopers were rewarded with the price obtained for the cattle in camp.

This happened on the 9th; on the 10th Salter's cavalry was detached to communicate with Simpson; on the 11th the adjutant-general Major Green moved with a column to scour the hills towards Deyrah, in concert with a detachment which marched from Hunter's camp, and they killed some robbers and brought back eight hundred cattle. On that day also, certain expert men, called "*Puggees*," were employed to *pug* or track the robbers who had seized the dawk, it being suspected that the Boordees of Ali Moorad's force, who were at feud with the 6th irregular cavalry, because of McKenzie's action in which some of their tribe had been killed, were the perpetrators of the murder and robbery. The trail however went into the hills, fortunately for the ameer, as the general, chafed by his previous misconduct, declared his intention, if treachery had been detected, to take Captain Malet and Mr. Curling out of the prince's camp, and send in exchange a shower of grape from ten pieces of artillery.

On the 12th, hearing nothing more of the chiefs' coming in, Sir C. Napier began more strongly to doubt the faith of Ali Moorad, and thought the offer of surrender was only to gain time for a Seikh force to join the hillmen. Yet, when he considered that he had thirteen hundred good infantry, ten guns, and six hundred cavalry in hand, and that his reserves towards Shahpoor would give him two thousand more troops, he judged that Ali dared not be treacherous: and for any force Beja and his new allies, if the Seikhs were really coming, could bring to the fight, he cared little. However, always prudent, he brought Hunter's column up from Jummuck, leaving the defiles there to the care of Fitzgerald's camel corps. Then writing to the Mazarees on the Indus a menacing letter, to deter them from giving the tribes any aid, he chose a position of battle where he could defy twenty thousand enemies and awaited events.

The 13th Hunter joined the camp, and that day also



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the confederate robber chiefs sent their near relations to Ali Moorad, saying, As they were treated so would be the conduct of the khans, the English leader might put their relations to death, but then the war would continue: and it was intimated that Mohamed the Lion might come to aid the tribes with five thousand men.

Inflexible as steel the general replied, that he would have all prisoners, or none—they might choose. On the 14th, they demanded another day for reference—Not an hour, was the answer; “and if the whole do not come in, the British army will march to-morrow embattled into your hills, but *mercy* will go back with the heavy baggage to Shahpoor. With respect to Shere Mohamed, his highness will be welcome, I have as many men here as fought at Dubba and shall be sorry if the Lion comes with fewer numbers than he had there.”

This sternness induced the relations of the chiefs to quit Ali Moorad and come to the English camp on the 15th. They came however as ambassadors, pleading distance and customs and the recent death of Beja Khan's wife for delaying the surrender until the 19th, which they affirmed was the earliest day possible. Sir C. Napier would not alter his terms as to Beja, but to the others he offered new conditions. Islam Khan Bhoogtee might, if he was content to do so, take an oath never to invade the British territory, but he must make his salaam to the khan of Khelat, his lawful sovereign. Deyrah Khan Jackranee was desired to settle in Scinde, but he might take Islam's oath instead, if he would be surety for all his tribe. If he could not do that, Deyrah himself should be received in Scinde, endowed and protected, but his tribe should be warred down: these also were the terms for the minor chiefs.

Had he known at that time where the confederates were, he would have marched against them notwithstanding these negotiations; observing, that the loss of his camels and fear of the tribes finding a refuge in Mooltan, were the two great fountains of his generosity.

But it was with him a fixed principle never to hesitate or appear to hesitate, much less go back, with barbarians, whether in the field or in negotiations; hence he repeated his declaration that he would, *God willing*, march the 16th to Dooz Kooshta, yet in consideration of Beja's domestic affliction would wait there until the 19th. In the night of the 15th however, so much rain fell the camels could not carry the tents, and he was not displeased to be thus forced to give a longer day; yet true to his policy, he made the ambassadors remark this natural impediment as a divine restriction, and not any wavering on his part. *God was not willing*. Their eastern imaginations would have otherwise found many impertinent causes to encourage them in further resistance, such as want of food, orders from the governor-general, or a fear of Ali Moorad's power. This last notion the vain-glorious ameer was diligently inculcating amongst his followers, and through them amongst the hillmen, assuming an appearance of superiority upon every favourable occasion; he even declared that he would march on Dooz Kooshta though ordered to move to Heeran on the border of the desert. His first delay had enabled the enemy to escape at Gondooee when the war might have been terminated; now he was pretending great personal anger at receiving orders, and was assuming an independence of command which might produce disaster; but he was quickly taught another lesson. A peremptory order not to go near Dooz Kooshta was transmitted, with this message; that if he were found in possession of that watering-place a cannon-shot should go through his pavilion as a signal to decamp.

At Sebree, on the evening of the 16th, notwithstanding the rain of the evening before, the wells were dried up, and the troops all gasping for water, when suddenly from the rocky hills in front came down a torrent sixty yards wide and two feet deep, pouring through the middle of the camp. Most of the soldiers, astonished and rejoicing at this unexpected relief, looked on it as a special providence, and the general, who had from his knowledge

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of hilly districts foreseen this event, thus noticed it in his journal. "How many phenomena there are in these countries which admit of being turned with a little forecast and ingenuity into seeming miracles! This torrent was one which I could have foretold and employed to advantage. And on the march from Shahpoor, when manna was found in the desert, the soldier who first brought it to me said, 'Sir, this is a miracle—it is on the bushes—it is food—it comes from God, it comes down from heaven—it is a miracle!' He was right it was a miracle—What is not?"

None of the hillmen opposed him in the defiles of the rocky wall which, from Lullee, extended as before observed to this point, where it was beginning to mix with the Mazaree hills; Dooz Kooshta was therefore attained after many hours' marching without opposition on the 17th of February. Ali Moorad had not dared to come there, and when the camp was pitched the general, who had been in the saddle for ten hours, entered his tent and thus recorded the strong feelings which the date of the day had called up.

"This is the second anniversary of the battle of Meeanee, and I am again in the field! Am I doomed to constant war and bloodshedding? Well! This is a righteous war, and so was that against the infamous ameers. But this day two years! What heaps of dead were around me—what numbers of friends were dying—what shrieks from the hospital-tent of men undergoing amputation! Peace be with them, they behaved nobly, those who died and those who survived that terrible conflict. And I am here now waiting for the surrender of the robber chiefs at Dooz Kooshta, which, translated, means *The Thief's Death*. Singular coincidence!"

## CHAPTER X.

AT Dooz Kooshta the camp remained until the 19th, in pursuance of the promise to Beja Khan; but it was apparent that Ali Moorad had been deceived by the chiefs and their secret allies amongst the ameer's councillors, and that the negotiations were only to gain time. The robbers had spies and emissaries in all places and were perfectly well informed, when no tidings of their positions or designs could be obtained by the British leader. Even his personal attendant, a Hindoo, who had been with him for years, transmitted all that his master uttered in his presence to some employer, who was not detected: yet passages in the Bombay libels indicated a connection with this treachery.

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On the 19th the campaign recommenced, but ere the events are related, the positions and their military bearings must be laid down, for a new front of battle had been adopted, and the line instead of facing northwards looked eastward.

Simpson being now at Deyrah, near which he had captured a string of camels, formed the extreme left; behind him, to the westward, was a cavalry post at the Tomb; a good watering-place, from whence the patrols could communicate with the Murrees by the defile of Sartoo, and scour the Sungseela ravine.

South of the Tomb, and connected with it by patrols, Fitzgerald's camel corps was at the Jummuck pass; and both those posts were in communication with Jacob at Poolagee: thus the ravines of Tonge, of the Illiassee, and the Teyaga were commanded, and that of Sungseela watched.

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Shahpoor, always strongly garrisoned, contained the magazines.

Head-quarters were in centre of the first line; Ali Moorad formed the right wing at Heeran, touching on the frontier of the Mazaree country; and between these principal posts the cavalry and police maintained the communications by patrols.

This disposition of the army restricted the hillmen to half their original occupation of those desolate regions, cooping them up in the north-eastern corner; and though their fastnesses there were the most rugged, and they could from thence descend finally into the Mooltan territory if the Dewan was faithless, the English leader had employed moral means to prevent that, and the following skilful combinations debarred them of any successful counter attack.

Jacob, holding the forts of Poolagee, Oolagee, and Lheree, on the west, could not be easily hurt; and his cavalry and guns entirely awed the Khelat tribes in the Bolan hills, who being secretly inimical would otherwise on the first opportunity have extended the war along the Hala mountains down to Sehwan.

Simpson having the Deyrah fort, impregnable to any attack from the Beloochees, formed a pivot on which the main body could securely turn for offensive operations; he also commanded the principal valley and was connected by the cavalry post at Tomb with the camel corps at Jum-muck, and with Jacob at Poolagee.

Ali Moorad watched from Heeran the Mazarees, and was within call from head-quarters if wanted for a battle; meanwhile, excised from the operations and exposed in an open country to the action of the British cavalry, he was debarred opportunity for treachery. The principal force under the general was thus free to act offensively in any quarter.

In this state of affairs the troops lived hardly from hand to mouth, and as the captured herds furnished much of the subsistence, the campaign was one of great privation as well as fatigue. However the hillmen fared worse. Their

stores of grain had all been taken at Poolagee, Shahpoor and Ooch, which forced them to feed on flesh, an unusual diet producing disease, and numbers died. Some supplies indeed they got from the Mazarees of Rojan on the Indus, but they paid exorbitantly for them; and here it may be explained that there were two Mazaree tribes—a river tribe subjects to the Seikhs, and a hill tribe. From both of them the robbers expected aid, but Sir C. Napier's letters to the dewan of Mooltan had not been fruitless. The river tribe, the Dewan said, had been strictly forbidden to receive any of the robbers, and had been directed to send supplies to the British; but for the hill Mazarees, they were enemies to the Seikhs and he hoped for their destruction—they were not only robbers like Beja, but half of the depredations attributed to that chief were perpetrated by them.

These hill Mazarees were however those the general most desired for friends, because their country was known, and to enter it would dangerously extend his line of operations. Fortune again befriended him. The Bhoogtees, just before the commencement of the campaign, had plundered some hill Mazarees, and that offence coupled with the general's personal menaces, induced the latter to send several chiefs with three hundred followers as voluntary hostages. But they went first to Ali Moorad, and he from a desire to appear great induced them to remain in his camp. This insolence, the English leader, having other means of evincing his paramount authority, took no notice of at the time, justly observing, that the greater Ali pretended to be, the more powerful would his superior appear in the eyes of the hillmen when his dependence became known; and the Mazarees indeed, soon finding who was master, hastened to do homage to real power.

On the 18th Captain Salter brought advice from Deyrah, that the hillmen's camp was at Goojroo, or Shore, twenty-four and twenty-one miles in front of Dooz Kooshta; that they were about eight thousand strong, and lying close on the hill Mazarees' frontier, which they were now forbidden to pass; but whether they designed to fight the British or

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to surrender was not known. This intelligence involved new considerations. Would the robbers, if pressed in their actual position, go into the Seikh territory? Would it be right to follow them? The conclusion was in the affirmative for the last. They could only go there with secret permission, or in violation of the neutrality avowed by the dewan of Mooltan: moreover, the frontier being rocky could not be well defined, and pursuit of a flying enemy would not admit of nice distinctions. Ali Moorad's credulity and falsehoods had already caused the loss of six days, at the most important crisis, and the whole object of the war was not to be further endangered by delicate respect for national rights which were totally disregarded by the enemy. The Seikhs said they had not admitted, and would not admit the tribes; the latter might then be pursued; because, either the assurance was false or they would not be within the Seikh boundary.

These reflections made, and the term of delay promised to Beja having terminated, on the 19th the troops were secretly put in motion to surprise the enemy. The camel corps had been previously called up, and orders were sent to Ali Moorad to bring forward his forces, because a great and decisive stroke was contemplated. The road to Shore, running through the defiles of Lotee, was long, rugged and difficult—in the night-time peculiarly so—but the march was so well combined that the confederates would have been surprised in their camp, but for one of those minor insubordinations which no commander can guard against, which so often mar the finest combinations, and render war the property of fortune. The movement was to have been in darkness and silence, the orders to that effect were peremptory; but some camp-followers lighted a fire, Beja's videttes saw it, and that chief instantly fled from his position. Hence, after being twenty-two hours on horseback without taking food, Sir C. Napier pitched his camp in the afternoon of the 20th at Shore, a baffled general for the moment; but a quantity of grain and a hundred and fifty camel-loads of baggage were captured at Shore, and the last was given as a prize to the soldiers. Hindoo merchants

had come from the Mazarees of Rojan with this grain, on speculation, but they lost life and goods together, for they and their followers fought bravely and were killed. These captures showed that the tribes were moving as a people, not as warriors, and that finally the English operations would inevitably circumvent and destroy them.

On the 21st Ali Moorad arrived with his wild warriors, stout and brave men; and the same day a hill chief, Ali Shere Khosa, came in and made salaam. He was quite a youth and disliked the robber life; but his lands being surrounded by those of the other chiefs, he had no free action until that moment. Sir C. Napier gave him a government employment, observing, that to punish the robbers was only half his object, to reclaim them was his aim; and despite of the universal impression to the contrary he judged that he could do so, and was resolved to try, founding his hopes upon his extensive experience of mankind. He had dealt, in peace and war, with many nations, British, Irish, Americans, Italians, French, Germans, Greeks, Turks, red Indians, Hindoos and Beloochees; and he thought military persons, having principally to do with the soldiers and peasantry of each country, had the natural characters of men in those countries, most openly exposed to their observation. By the peasantry because they are unsophisticated and have no motive for concealment with soldiers who are not enemies; and there is a curious similarity of military law and usage in all nations, indicating a distinctive general character, exclusive of what is imposed by customs and religion, and very perceptible to an observant officer. The military life forces observation of character upon the mind. All soldiers, men and officers, must study the temper and character of those above as well as of those below them; they are more or less in the position of courtiers with Eastern despots, and none are more shrewd in detecting character, though none are more skilful in hiding it, than Asiatic court-men—the one quality generating the other.

It is pretended, said Sir C. Napier, by men who assume to themselves all knowledge and competency for



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governing in India, that something occult exists in the Indian character ; but the distinctive general character of man is as pronounced with them as with others, when clothed in uniform. There are indeed modifications to be remarked, yet easily to be traced to conventional causes, the general character remaining the same. The sepoy for example, is sober, and cleanly as far as ablutions go, the European not so—that can be traced to religion and climate, the last being father to the first. But as a recruit, the sepoy is vaunting and eager to fight, so is the European ; as a veteran he is cool and daring like the European ; and like him he is fond of being smart in dress, of having a military bearing, and is proud of being a soldier. If undisciplined he is easily panic-stricken, so are Europeans, but when well drilled both are fierce and intrepid. The Indian, having been a slave for ages, is a liar—so is the European slave—but, like the European, the Indian as he grows in civilization and freedom adopts truth as the better policy. This is proved by the existing character. The old and respected soldier is more truthful than the recruit, and a native officer of low rank in the British service can be believed when an officer of Ali Moorad's cannot, however high his rank.

Finding fear, pride, vanity, courage, honourable ambition, ostentation and self-respect, common to both races, Sir C. Napier judged that in their avarice and generosity, and in their susceptibility to the impressions of skilful leaders, the eastern men in no way differed from their western brethren ; wherefore with hope and resolution he looked forward not only to subdue but to reclaim and civilize the wild tribes now opposing him in arms—feeling assured that a life of murdering and robbing, with continual danger, could not be really one of choice.

As the march against Shore and Goojroo had been made in the expectation of fighting a great battle or receiving the tribes in surrender, General Simpson had also been called in, and he arrived in camp on the evening of the 20th, having left a garrison in the fort of Deyrah. Thus nearly the whole army was concentrated, and the





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first thought was to push on in pursuit; but the extreme fatigue of the troops prevented this; those of the main column had been twenty-two hours under arms, and Simpson's column nineteen hours, seven of which were employed to descend one ghaut. It was absolutely necessary therefore to rest; but next day a strong detachment being led out to examine the pass of Goojroo in front, the enemy was both seen and felt at no great distance, and some of his men were killed. Fame had not exaggerated the extraordinary ruggedness of the country. With infinite difficulty the precipitous rocks on each side the entrance of the Goojroo pass were scaled, but all beyond was desolate, and impracticable from the transverse chasms. The defile itself being penetrated for about a mile was found absolutely stupendous; there was no mode of passing it save by the cavalry galloping through; a desperate expedient; for the guides said it was in length four leagues and without change, being only fifty feet wide, strewn with large loose stones and having perpendicular sides several hundred feet high: it was also without a drop of water after the entrance was passed. The flanking parties therefore came down again, not without danger and difficulty. While above, they had discerned the smoke of the confederates' camp twelve miles off, and the hillmen were evidently waiting until the British should enter the terrible defile; they would then have barred all egress, and using their knowledge of the bye-ways have closed round and destroyed the entrapped soldiers.

This state of affairs demanded new combinations uniting the utmost caution and vigour. The enemy had been at last found, and though his position was unattackable it could be turned; his back was to the Seikh territory and he could not retreat further if neutrality was observed; nor could he for want of provisions remain long where he was. But the question as to where he would go had to be revolved with more care than ever, for on the next movement the success of the war was likely to depend. It was probable indeed that Beja would push suddenly upon Deyrah and from thence throw himself into Trukkee;

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yet, though the name and strength of that celebrated fastness were familiar in the British camp, no man, guide or spy, could or would tell exactly where it was situated. In this doubt the English leader formed new combinations with a sagacity marking his mastery in war.

The Bundlecund Legion was ordered to remain at Shore, under the command of Major Beatson, a stern determined soldier; Ali Moorad was sent back to the Lotee pass; Hunter went to the Jummuck defiles again, and the general marched with Simpson's troops to Deyrah. These dispositions brought him nearer to the magazines without seeming to retreat; but they could not have been made if the Mazaree merchants' wheat had not been captured, and it was no small part of the difficulty of this campaign, that the army had to win its food from the enemy and dig for water day by day; it was no slight proof of genius either, thus continually to change the whole scheme of operations in such a country, and on such accidental circumstances.

Plans 1 & 2.

There were two courses in the enemy's choice especially necessary to guard against. First he could turn the British left by a defile which led down towards Lotee, and then moving by Deyrah break through the Jummuck defile and regain Tonge. Second he might avoid the Jummuck, after passing Deyrah, and moving by Marwar to the ravine of the Tomb, break through Jacob's posts, and make for the Kujjuck and Bolan country. Both of these movements would indeed be desperate efforts, but the hillmen were in a desperate situation, and any wild and furious effort might be expected from them.

If they did not adopt one of these courses, four operations remained for them, namely, to fight in the narrow plain, which being behind their actual camp could be reached by the British from Deyrah—to descend into the Seikh territory—to surrender when their food, of which they could not have much, was expended—to throw themselves into Trukkee. Any of these operations would be their ruin; but it was possible there might be minor defiles about Goojroo unexplored, and at this time unex-

plorable, through which they could pour upon Beatson at Shore. In fine the war had now reached a crisis and the problem to be solved was become very complicated.

1°. The British line of communication with Shahpoor was more than a hundred miles long, and passed through many dangerous defiles.

2°. To the supplies of food, it might be, that supplies of water were to be added; for the habit of poisoning wells and pools was an understood practice amongst the hillmen.

3°. Strong escorts were required to guard the convoys, because roving isolated bands of well-mounted robbers were still lying in most of the nullahs and smaller ravines behind the army, watching for spoil.

4°. Provisions were already scarce, and the government camels had again failed from overwork; the troops were on half-rations, and at Shore only two days' supply was in the field magazine. Hence the principal reason for sending Hunter back to Jummuck, was to protect and shorten the line of communication with Shahpoor, by turning the convoys through that pass instead of continuing their movements by Sebree and Dooz Kooshta.

Grass and water for the exhausted camels could be obtained at Deyrah, and from thence new offensive operations could be undertaken, but as it was essential to parry counter blows during the movements the following combinations were arranged.

If the enemy, who knew very exactly from his emissaries everything that was passing, should, when the main column marched upon Deyrah, find means to overpower Beatson, that officer was to fall back on Ali Moorad at Lotee, and Hunter's column, though in march, was to turn in support.


If the hillmen were deterred from pursuing Beatson by this accumulation of forces at Lotee, and should from Shore follow the head-quarters to Deyrah, Beatson and Ali Moorad had orders to close in on their rear, and place them between two fires; Hunter was then to change his direction and move on Dusht-Goran by which the enemy would be entirely enclosed.

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
Having arranged these combinations, the general marched from Goojroo towards Deyrah on the 22nd. He had little fear for Beatson, and was anxious that Hunter should arrive at Jummuck on the 25th, not only to secure the shorter line of communication with Shahpoor and have the convoys turned, but that he might be in a position to support the cavalry at the Tomb—an object of importance, as the enemy could from the Murrow plain descend on Deyrah, or by the Sungseela ravine pour down on the Tomb. In the former case the general's column could, moving by Tussoo, reach Deyrah first, as it would march faster than a heterogeneous mass of warriors, women, children and herds. The rugged defile leading from the Murrow plain on Deyrah would thus be barred; or, if the hillmen were first, they would in the plain of Deyrah fall an easy prey to a compact army assailing them while still confused and issuing from the defiles. But in the second case Hunter's aid would be required at the Tomb. That officer, however, halted a day at Dooz Kooshta, and so far the nicety of the combination was marred; yet with no ill effects, because the enemy did not adopt the operation to be guarded against.

Head-quarters reached Deyrah the 23rd, having marched through a country of astonishing asperity, where the troops were dangerously embarrassed by the multitude of camp-followers and quantity of baggage. Deyrah itself was however in a fertile, though at this time uncultivated plain, having a fine stream of water flowing through it. Here rest was obtained, and after a time, vakeels from the Murrees arrived to make salaam, induced thereto by a previous menacing communication—their recent conduct having become suspicious.

On the 26th Hunter reached Jummuck and the whole army was thus re-established under the new combinations. Beatson, if driven from Shore, could, as shown, retire on Ali Moorad at Lotee, where their united forces could hold the robbers in check until the main body from Deyrah, having only a march of fifteen miles, fell on their flank—and from Jummuck Hunter could also move to the support







G. Wells, lith.

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PASS BETWEEN DEVRA & THE MURROW PLAIN.

of Lotee, in case of disaster. But if Beja attempted to enter the plain of Deyrah instead of assailing Lotee, after driving back Beatson, he would be met in front by the general's column, while the passes in his rear would be closed by Beatson and Ali Moorad. Nor could he gain any advantage by moving across the Murrow plain, northwards, and so pouring down the Sungseela ravine, because the cavalry post would oppose him at Tomb, being sure of support from Jummuck which was only twelve miles distant, and from Deyrah which was not much more.

The great difficulty remained: Sir C. Napier had twice let Beja and his tribe pass before his army without attacking him, because the women and children of the tribe being present he feared for their lives. This feeling still governed his operations, and with more power, because of a painfully interesting experience he had on entering Deyrah, where some poor deserted children were found starving. They were taken care of, but for a long time, demanded each day when they were to be killed, having no other expectation: thus indicating too plainly the ferocious habits of their tribes. Hence with more than his usual resolution the English leader sought to avoid battles, and keep the masses shut up in the rocks, where want of food and water might compel them to yield without fighting. Still he could not forego final success, and had now to decide on what would most conduce towards it.

The confederates had, during the recent marches, retired from the Goojroo defiles to Partur, north of the Murrow plain and touching on the Keytrian frontier; but this was judged a wile to draw the army from Trukkee, of which, though then close at hand, no information had yet been obtained, save that it was not very far off and was amongst rocks through which a narrow fissure led northwards from Deyrah to the Murrow plain. It appeared certain however that the chiefs had been refused an asylum in the Keytrian and Seikh territories, and were thus delivered over to the British operations; hence, changing as it were the fixed point of his compasses, the general now resolved to make Beatson's position on the right his pivot, and

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Plan 2.

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sweeping round with his left and centre, as he had before swept with his right, to hem in the robbers and finally attack them if warranted by circumstances. To effect this he only waited for his convoys, which were now being brought up, though slowly, because the loss of the hired camels had been as yet but partially restored, and the troops had been for many days on half-rations.

On the 28th, while preparing for the new movement, Sir C. Napier secretly heard that Trukkee was really close to him, on the north-west and not amongst the rocks before indicated. Wherefore, hoping that sooner or later he should find the tribes in that fastness, he forbade all straggling or explorations towards the mysterious quarter, lest the hillmen should be thus deterred from going there; for he was well assured that, once in Trukkee, he could by famine, drought, or force of arms, or all three combined, reduce the robbers to submission. While ruminating on these things a trooper galloped into camp, saying that a convoy, which after depositing a supply was on its return, had been attacked only three miles off and was defending itself. Instantly the general made for the scene of action with his Mogul escort, leaving orders for a regiment of irregular cavalry to follow; for that such a daring attack, so close to his camp, would not have happened unless a refuge was at hand he felt assured, and that refuge could only be Trukkee.

In this conviction, when he reached the ground, he wished to keep the enemy in play, but his staff seeing only fifty mounted robbers in the field galloped against them and caused a retreat. This unmilitary procedure was very displeasing, but his judgment was quickly confirmed; the retiring horsemen suddenly rode into a chasm amongst the rocks, and a guide at his side involuntarily exclaimed as they disappeared, *Trukkee!* having only the evening before declared it was two marches distant! This exclamation, coupled with the confident retreat of the robbers, gave warrant that the long-hidden fortress was found, and the confederates brought to bay; wherefore the irregular cavalry were instantly posted opposite the chasm



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TERRACE WALLS, SEEN THROUGH THE PASS OF THE OUTWARD SCREEN



through which the horsemen had disappeared, and the English leader went back to camp exultant. It was then dark and the troops were merely warned to support the cavalry, if any alarm was given, but at daylight both infantry and guns marched, and the discovered southern entrance to Trukkee was blocked up.

In his tent the general had found a spy, come to report, that all the confederate chiefs, with four thousand fighting men, had gone into Trukkee by the northern entrance two days before, having quitted their camp at Partur for that purpose, and there were no other entrances save those now watched by the cavalry. This advice, agreeing with what had just occurred, was confirmed by the ambassadors from the Murrees, and Sir C. Napier, seeing he had the game at last in his hands, instantly detached the camel corps and the volunteers of the 13th regiment, also mounted on camels, to reinforce Beatson at Shore; carrying orders for that officer and Ali Moorad to move—Beatson by the Goojroo defiles, Ali by a route leading westward of that pass on to the Murrow plain, whence they were to track the hillmen, and seize the northern entrance to Trukkee.

This reinforcement was sent to enable Beatson to act alone, for Ali was habitually neglectful of orders, and his camp was full of traitors; but he was not perfidious, and his services were thus described. "He was faithful and useful, but too vainglorious, and his people were so many spies for the enemy. I had some trouble to keep them clear of us and carry on the operations independently, yet apparently in unison." Ali did not now obey promptly, but finally he and Beatson blocked the northern entrance on the morning of the 5th, and thus the renowned fortress of Trukkee, hitherto hidden as it were by enchantment from the search of the British leader, was suddenly found, and as suddenly sealed up; and all the robber tribes, a few roving bands infesting the communications of the army excepted, were imprisoned like the Afreets of their eastern tales under the signet of Soliman. It was a masterly stroke of generalship, an astonishing physical effort and a

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Plan 2.

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fitting climax to the cautious and calculated though vigorous operations which had preceded and enforced such a termination. The chiefs were amazed. They had imagined that Trukkee itself, involved and blended with the other rocks of that desolate and savage region, would remain a mystery, baffling the search of their antagonist; and that from its wild intricacies they could emerge from time to time on their murderous excursions, until the invading army, dwindling under starvation and a partisan warfare, could no longer keep the field. With these hopes, like hawks as they called themselves, they had gathered on their rocks, ruffling their wings and peering for their quarry, but the fowler's net was thrown, and like hawks they were taken to be reclaimed.

App. XIX.

Thus shut up, the robbers were without the means of lengthened existence. Their herds were reduced in numbers, their stores of grain, no longer to be replenished, were scanty, and famine awaited them, to vindicate Sir C. Napier's prescient scheme of operations against the loud idiot cry raised in derision of the expedition. Nor was the execution unworthy of the conception. The marches had been efforts of no ordinary kind. Beatson and Ali Moorad had threaded terrible defiles, had moved along tracks covered with huge rocks and loose sharp stones, for nearly sixty miles almost without a halt, and on half-rations; the men therefore arrived nearly naked and barefooted, and the animals unshod: a horse-shoe was sold for thirty shillings, and their progress was truly described by the general as climbing not marching! This also had been the character of all the movements, without a murmur being heard.

While awaiting news of the arrival of Beatson and the ameer, the infantry had encamped opposite the southern entrance, and the cavalry were moved further to the west for the watching of another entrance which was now heard of. Then the general after examining with great labour and fatigue all the approaches, scaled a high rock from whence he looked into the interior of Trukkee and formed a plan of attack—to be executed however only in the last extremity,





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
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PASSES TURNED BY COL. BEATSON.









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HEAD OF ENCAMPMENT NEAR U'RU'RU K. K. E. E.

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for the place was indeed worthy of its reputation. Resembling an extinct crater, it was twelve miles long, by five or six broad, and nature had most curiously contrived it alike for secrecy and strength. For strength, because externally it presented a belt of rocks many hundred feet high and nearly impracticable of ascent on the south side; and though it was less austere on the north, the inside there was precipitous while on the southern side it was comparatively easy of descent. Thus the whole circuit was equally impervious to assault; and the interior was a vast collection of rocky hillocks with chasms of different depths, yet all precipitous.

For secrecy, because on the south was a second wall, or screen of perpendicular rocks some hundred feet high, forming with the actual belt of Trukkee a restricted valley, or rather lane, which was to be entered by narrow fissures before the passes into the crater could be approached; and all the country for miles around, beyond that screen, and adjoining the true wall, was a chaos of huge loose stones which it was hardly possible to cross. The entrances to this hidden fastness, which seemed like some ruined colossal amphitheatre, were mere cracks in a wall of rock, so suddenly opened that the upper parts seemed still to touch and refused to let in the light. There was abundance of water inside; and just outside the fissure by which the robbers retired after their attack on the convoy, there was a copious hot spring, wholesome to drink yet forbidden to the troops by matchlock-men, perched on landing-places in the side of the precipitous crags.

It was impossible to discover exactly what stores of grain and cattle the tribes had introduced, or had previously laid up; and as there might be more entrances and many of their warriors must still be abroad, the length of their resistance to a blockade could not be calculated. Wherefore at first the cavalry were merely spread to the west until they were connected with the horsemen at Tomb, and the latter, patrolling round the western point of Trukkee, communicated with Beatson and the ameer; but when all the entrances were thus ascertained and

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secured, and the investment completed, the general proceeded to arrange a plan for forcing a way in and fighting the human hornets in the midst of their stony cells; a terrible prospect of slaughter on both sides and uncertain of success, for the interior was as formidable as the exterior. This had been ascertained at the northern entrance, where the exterior belt of rocks being more accessible than the southern, was scaled and some progress made in the defile itself; but the interior precipices were then found impracticable, and from the heights thus attained, the hillmen were seen moving from one place to another, with such labour and difficulty as plainly showed what the ground was; for they had to draw up and let down their camels and cattle by ropes, and in places even to swing them across gloomy chasms, offering defensive positions at every hundred yards, and of infinite intricacy, spreading like a network over sixty square miles!

The scheme of attack, though not finally executed, was planned with such subtilty and caution, and was yet so daring, that being afterwards laid before the duke of Wellington it drew from him strong expressions of approbation. It was as follows. The lane between the southern screen and exterior belt of Trukkee was only three hundred yards wide, but nearly forty miles in length, extending from beyond the Tomb on the west to the eastward of Deyrah. Being widest opposite the main entrance to Trukkee, it was proposed to establish there all the field-batteries and mortars, to fire directly at short range upon the entrance, and to throw shells on to the ledges, where the enemy's men were perched with levers to cast down rocks when the assailants should enter the fissure. These projectiles, it was hoped, would not only dislodge the levermen, but also bring away masses of the rock; which in conjunction with those shells that rolled off the ledges and exploded below, would help to clear the defile of its defenders. The infantry meanwhile, formed on the left of the batteries, were to open a brisk sustained musketry against the matchlock-men lining the crest of the rocks

on the robbers' right of the entrance; but no person was to go or be seen on the enemy's left of the defile.

A detachment, ostentatiously moving westward, was to offer a false attack, the commander having a discretion to turn it into a real one if he could find any practicable ascent. But during these demonstrations, a selected body of men under the command of Fitzgerald, were to lie in ambush near the rocky heights on the enemy's left of the defile, with orders to scramble up in a direction previously examined, and—correctly as it afterwards proved—judged accessible to active and resolute men. For this dangerous service the whole of the Company's 2nd European regiment volunteered, and three hundred had been accepted; but to them were added a hundred volunteers from the 64th native regiment, to whom the general wished to give an opportunity of regaining their colours, having found them on trial very gallant soldiers. These volunteers were sworn to silence even under wounds, and with the strong and daring Fitzgerald at their head, would have encountered anything. The ascent would have taken about two hours, and very subtle arrangements were made to prevent the enemy from either seeing the troops or hearing the noise of the loose rocks rolled down by them as they scrambled upwards.

Previous to the time being fixed for this attack, Sir C. Napier and General Simpson, and their staff-officers had anxiously watched the hill for several nights in succession. At first they saw a large fire burning through the night, and many hillmen about it; but the third night it was allowed to go out about ten o'clock; indicating that the undisciplined warriors had become tired of sending up pickets to such a height, where the cold was at this time very severe for eastern constitutions. At last the fire was not seen at all, it was evident the hill was no longer guarded in force, and then the attack was fixed to take place with the following accessories. All the great guns and musketry were to open at once, in the expectation of filling the narrow valley with smoke, and causing such an uproar by the reverberation of sound from the perpen-

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dicular rocks, that the robbers' attention would be entirely drawn to the entrance-fissure being thus menaced, and they would also be prevented from seeing Fitzgerald's storming party or hearing the noise of stones rolled down in its ascent. His attack would be too far off to be disclosed by the transient flashes from the guns, but, if discovered, his men were to rush on and endeavour to obtain a footing above—if undiscovered, they were, on reaching the summit, to light a fire as a signal and then attack whatever was before them.

The entrance-fissure was meanwhile to be stormed or not, as circumstances dictated, that is, if Fitzgerald made his footing good above, the whole of the infantry were to file up after him; but if he was beaten, the entrance was to be stormed before the disaster could become known along the enemy's line. This desperate sanguinary operation it was desirable to avoid if possible; yet the men were so confident and eager, that the general, always mindful of moral force, designed to give no positive order for the storm, but merely keeping a reserve in hand, to push the troops by degrees towards the entrance; trusting to their natural fierceness and bravery, excited by the astounding noise and smoke, for plunging them voluntarily into the defile with such vehemence that nothing could stand before them. And what his troops were capable of attempting had been already evinced at the northern entrance, where Beatson and the ameer were to second the main attack by a simultaneous assault.

Those commanders had, as before related, entered a short way into the defile, but from some error, a sergeant and sixteen privates of the 13th volunteers got on the wrong side of what appeared a small chasm and went against a height crowned by the enemy, where the chasm suddenly deepened so as to be impassable. The company from which the sergeant had separated was on the other side, and his officer, seeing how strong the hillmen were on the rock, made signs to retire, which the sergeant mistook for gestures to attack, and with inexpressible intrepidity scaled the precipitous height. The robbers waited concealed behind

a breastwork on a landing-place until eleven of the party came up, and then, being seventy in number, closed on them. All the eleven had medals, some had three, and in that dire moment proved that their courage at Jellalabad had not been exaggerated by fame. Six of them fell stark, and the others being wounded, were shoved back over the edge and rolled down the almost perpendicular side of the hill; but this did not happen until seventeen of the robbers and their commander were laid dead above.

There is a custom with the hillmen, that when a great champion dies in battle, his comrades, after stripping his body, tie a red or green thread round his right or left wrist according to the greatness of his exploit—the red being most honourable. Here those brave warriors stripped the British dead, and cast the bodies over; but with this testimony of their own chivalric sense of honour and the greatness of the fallen soldiers' courage—each body had a red thread on both wrists! They had done the same before to the heroic Clark whose personal prowess and intrepidity had been remarkable. Thus fell Sale's veterans, and he, as if ashamed of having yielded them precedence on the road to death, soon took his glorious place beside them in the grave. Honoured be his and their names!

Although Sir C. Napier was resolute to storm Trukkee in the manner described, if no other resource remained, he loved his soldiers too well to risk such slaughter until every minor influence had been tried on their brave but ferocious enemies; and much he trusted that want of food, and the despondency which the failure of all Beja's well-devised operations and negotiations must have produced, would bring them to terms. Yet beyond a certain time he could not persevere in the blockade; he had to bring up water as well as provisions to those barren regions; and the troops, thirsty and hungry, were almost naked and quite barefooted; for long marches over sharp loose stones and through low bushes, had torn their clothes and entirely destroyed their shoes: short of those terrible visita-

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Appendix XI.



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tions which have swept away whole armies from existence at once, they were suffering as much as soldiers ever did. Yet not a murmur was heard, their general's skill was apparent, and they were content to die by fatigue, by starvation, or by steel as he commanded. "When I see that old man incessantly on his horse, how can I who am young and strong be idle? By God I would go to a cannon's mouth if he ordered me," was the high-souled expression of a youthful officer in this campaign.

Gallant officers, generous hardy soldiers, they were, and now their day of power was come, with this consolation for past national mishaps, that from their tent doors they could see the very places where former expeditions had failed, and could even mark the wild crags where the skeletons of Clark and his brave comrades seemed to wait in grim expectation of this avenging hour. And sternly they would have been avenged had the hillmen awaited the assault, for the murder of the camp-followers in the previous operations had rendered the soldiers gloomily resolved to give no quarter; yet such is the influence of a great leader, that while they swore to be as merciless to men as the robbers had been to them, they were avowedly fixed to save women and children, even from the knives of their own remorseless kindred.

Happily all slaughter was avoided. It was on the 28th of February that Trukkee had been discovered, and on the 4th of March Beja Khan Doomkee—Islam Khan Bhoogtee—Deyrah Khan Jackranee—Houssein Khan Mundooanee, and two smaller chiefs of dependent tribes, having with them Beja's brother Mundoo, who appeared the master-spirit although till then unknown, entered the English general's tent under truce, but with the Khoran on their heads and submissive accents on their lips, at the very moment he was giving orders to storm their rocky hold. Tall and strong men they were, and of warlike aspects and proportions, bigger men could scarcely be found, with exception of Deyrah, who was of moderate size and gentle look, and much beloved by his tribe for his honour and mildness. Yet this chief, not undeservedly respected,





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G. Wells, lith.

\*

according to their notions, was prone to murder and spoliation, being only more ready when passion subsided to make reparation. Beja, aged, but of Herculean dimensions, had a pre-eminently imposing appearance, answerable to his reputation as the most powerful and daring robber of the hills: but his spirit, though fierce, was scarcely answerable to his appearance and reputation.

They demanded terms. Submission, emigration, and a quiet settlement on the plains, far from your wild crags. We wish for time to consult our tribes. Take it.

Next day came Mundoo to demand modifications. The general was inflexible. Then Deyrah Jackranee—Toork Ali—Denana Mundooee—Suleyman Randanee and Jumal Khan Doomkee, brother of Beja, came with most of their followers and laid down their swords in submission—the first and second induced thereto, as they said, by the honourable treatment of their women at Ooch. These men were protected from plunder, and retaining all their property moved with the army as a caravan. The others held aloof. Beja they said, had been so perfidiously treated by Captain Postans the political agent that they could not trust English honour; and when told by General Simpson—who was sent into Trukkee as a hostage for Beja—that Sir C. Napier's faith was undoubted, they pointed to their ancles and wrists and cried out, Postans! Postans! Thus forced to renewed action the general ordered a column of three hundred infantry to open the communication with Ali Moorad and Beatson, by the western end of Trukkee; and at the same time, as the submission of so many chiefs had put him in possession of the southern entrances, he sent a number of smaller columns through them with orders to scour all the interior of the fastness and pursue with fire and sword whatever they came across, always sparing women and children. This was on the 7th, and soon two more of Beja's brothers and their families were captured without opposition, and consequently without bloodshed; but Beja himself was nowhere to be found, whereupon the scouring columns, the camel corps, and the cavalry and even the

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head-quarters escort of Moguls, were launched in pursuit, with orders to bring him in dead or alive.

Thus hunted, the recalcitrant chief, his brother Muddoo, a nephew, his son Wuzeer and a minor Bhoogtee chief, with all the followers still adhering to them, surrendered on the 9th. As a punishment the soldiers were allowed to plunder their goods, and they did plunder the men; but true to their honourable compact, molested no woman or child either in person or property; where a woman's dress was seen, or a child's voice heard, all was safe. Islam Khan escaped with his Bhoogtees, but his father-in-law, the Keytrian, whose tribe was one of cultivators not robbers, would not receive his followers. Driven to desperation by hunger he then plundered the Mazarees, but they retook the booty and killed a hundred and twenty of his men. With the remainder he fell on the Murrees who killed a hundred more, and the poor remnant became miserable wanderers—for with those tribes there was no charity. Thus the war ended after fifty-four days of incessant exertions.

“I have had great anxiety during this difficult campaign was the observation of the successful leader. I know not if I shall get credit for it; but I think I have done well. However the play is over.”

No credit did he get from any person save Sir H. Hardinge, who behaved as a brother soldier and a public man should behave; but no thanks came from power in England, and strenuous efforts were made and successfully to prevent this great campaign becoming known in all its worth to his countrymen. The skill of the general, the devotion, the hardihood of the officers and men, the heroic deaths of the veterans on the rock were all withheld from public approbation: and the persons who sought to stifle the fame of such actions were those who should have been foremost to proclaim and reward them. History however cannot be stifled, though from natural baseness its posthumous vengeance may be disregarded. None of his staff received any promotion. Lord Ripon long withheld his despatch from the public, and when asked why he did so?

answered He had forgotten it! A day, an hour of the dangers and fatigues of that campaign would have rendered his memory less treacherous, his luxurious existence more noble; it would have furnished at least one passage in his public life unmarked by public derision or public indignation.

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During the operations to reduce Beja, the Murrec vakeels had remained in camp, and in fear, because the conduct of the tribe had been so suspicious that the English general, as before noticed, had menaced them. And he could now easily reach them, because the surrender of Beja left him free action, and there was a cannon-road within his power, which, turning the defiles of Sartoof and Nufoosk, led upon their town of Kahun. It was that danger which had brought the vakeels to camp, and meanwhile the tribes removed their families and herds forty miles northwards. The general however, finding them so submissive, renewed the alliance, and offered them the Bhoogtee fort of Deyrah, with the fertile plain around it; but they refused, influenced by the fear of after-feuds if the British should give up Scinde.—An event which the Bombay faction continually assured them was inevitable.

Short as this campaign had been, the greatness of the enterprise considered, it would have been terminated much sooner, if the fear of a collision with the Seikhs had not precluded the execution of the first design, namely, passing through the Rhojan Mazaree's country and invading the hills from the east and west at the same time: the confederates would thus have been early debarred retreat to the defiles of Goojroo, and have been thrown at once into Trukkee. Nor could they have so long baffled the actual operations, if Ali Moorad had been true to time when Beja abandoned the Lullee and Jummuck passes to make for Gondooee; for wily and clever as the hillmen were in their warfare, the superiority of the Englishman's generalship over barbarian art was pre-eminent—illustrating a passage in Plutarch's life of Philopœmen, where he says that great man "*adopting the Cretan customs and*

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*using their artifices and sleights, their stratagems and ambushes against themselves, soon showed that their devices were like the short-sighted schemes of children when compared with the long reach of an experienced general."*

With less than five thousand men Sir C. Napier had crossed a desert of more than eighty miles, had surprised the enemy's first line of forts and watering-places, had seized their strongest passes without a stroke, had baffled all their counter schemes, and in fifty-four days subdued tribes having four times his number of fighting men, without giving them even an opportunity of delivering battle in an advantageous post. He had starved them where they thought to starve him ; and by fine combinations and unexampled rapidity overreached them in their own peculiar warfare, in a country more than a hundred and forty miles long, from eighty to one hundred and twenty broad, and of such desolate strength and intricacy as can scarcely be equalled in the world—chasing them amidst crags and defiles, where a single error would have caused the total destruction of his army merely by the casting of stones down on the columns. All other invaders had ever met with destruction amongst those wild rocks and terrible passes, whose impregnable nature had become proverbial throughout Central Asia ; and hence, the sudden conquest of warriors, honoured as unconquerable by all surrounding nations, spread wonder and awe. The conqueror was by his own Bengal sepoy called a Deota or spirit ; and tribes hitherto dreading and obeying the Cutchee hillmen as demons, now earnestly desired to be accepted as subjects of Scinde ; while the wildest Scindian tribes became more contentedly submissive to a government thus proved to be equally powerful and protective.

These results were not easily obtained. " War in these deserts, said the successful leader, is very embarrassing. To get up supplies is difficult ; to move is difficult ; to find a road is difficult ; in fine it is a chain of difficulties such as I believe no other country presents—rocks, mountains, wastes !—all barren, wild, and full of frightful defiles, every step through which was over sharp stones, that lamed half

our animals—horses bullocks asses camels—all were crippled, and the soldiers went barefoot. It was very severe work for man and beast. Napoleon said that war in deserts was of all wars the most difficult, and my experience leads me to the same conclusion.”

Nor was the courage of the hillmen unsuited to their rugged country. In the hand-to-hand fight, where the volunteers of the 13th fell so heroically, one of the robbers being pierced with a bayonet, tore the musket from the soldier's hands, drew the bayonet from his own body, repaid the stroke with a desperate wound and fell dead! In another action twenty-five robbers, meeting with twenty of the Moguls in the desert at dusk, instantly attacked; the horsemen had the advantage and offered quarter after a sharp fight, but the gallant barbarians refused it, and died side by side, fighting to the last!

To have warred down such men in their own desolate hills, without a single reverse, by the mere force of genius and hardihood was a noble exploit; and factiously to hide its lustre from public admiration was essentially base and un-English! For if the surmounting extraordinary difficulties by a union of extreme caution with extreme daring and firmness be looked to, rather than the number of troops employed, as the test of generalship, there are few recorded exploits in war more remarkable than this campaign. And perhaps nothing in it was more remarkable than the resolution with which it was undertaken, and persevered in despite of the universal cry of derision raised by a faction but responded to with an incredulous feeling as to success in the army employed—despite also of the terrible loss of the 78th regiment, the arrogant imbecility of Lord Ripon, and the certainty of personal ruin if it failed of success.

Regarding the execution it is unnecessary to point out the subtilty with which the robbers, the khan of Khelat, and even the friendly Chandian chief were misled as to the opening of the campaign; or how Ali Moorad and his ill-disposed Beloochees, were at once debarred of opportunity for mischief and forced to push a war against their



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own race; but when was ever a surprise effected under greater difficulties, with greater physical exertion, or more prompt and able combinations than that by which Ooch, Shahpoor and Poolagee fell, and the robbers were cut off from the western mountains ere they knew even that the war was begun? Can the skill be denied, with which the terrible passes of Lullee and Jummuck were rendered nullities for the confederates, by the vigorous march of Simpson's column, combined with that of the headquarters? Was it ordinary resolution under adverse circumstances that maintained the camp between those passes, until the surprising expedition of the camel corps, relieving the distress for provisions, facilitated the third great movement of the campaign, namely the taking of new positions at Sebree and Doosh Kooshta, and from thence attempting a second surprise at Shore, which only failed from an accident that no human foresight could have prevented. And was he a common general who with one stroke then changed the plan of operations, extricated his army from the embarrassment caused by that failure, and at the same time placed his enemy in difficulties from which he could never escape?

Let the intricacy and military accuracy of the combinations there made, be examined. The confederates had been by the previous operations forced into a corner of their hills; but they had escaped the surprise designed, and had taken refuge behind a defile through which it was impossible to penetrate; it was equally impossible to remain in observation because the troops were nearly starving and the magazines distant. Meanwhile the confederates could break out by defiles in their own rear, to regain the country they had been before driven from and renew the war; thus rendering all the previous able operations null. To have turned such difficulties to the entire disadvantage of the enemy, to resign the offensive for a moment, and by seemingly retrograde marches, illustrating the saying, "draw back to make the better leap," force the confederates to receive battle in a bad position, or abandon their impregnable one altogether and take the offensive on a bad

line which could only lead to their ruin, was surely the mark of a great general.

Ali Moorad, Hunter, and the commander-in-chief seemed to be retreating when marching on Lotee, Jummuck and Deyrah; but no part of the country previously gained was thereby relinquished. Beatson still blocked the southern end of the Goojroo defile, living on the grain captured from the enemy, while the rest of the army got nearer to the magazines. Thus the supplies were assured, and the head-quarter column, without losing its connection with Hunter's detachment for more than two days, was placed where it could by a new road turn the terrible Goojroo defile, and assail the confederate chiefs at its northern end, while Beatson and Ali Moorad still blocked the southern end. If the hillmen had waited for that attack, the war would have been brought to the decision of a battle on ground favourable to the British; and there was no escape from defeat by the confederates, because the neutral territory of Mooltan was behind them and on their left flank; and if they had come down the defile it has been shown they would have got between two fires. It was then they felt all their opponent's generalship and took refuge in Trukkee, where he shut them up with potential skill. Surprisingly rapid also were his movements, for though his fighting men were few, his was an Indian army and the whole mass was heavy. Not less than twenty thousand persons and their innumerable animals were to be provided for, and handled amidst those barren rocks.

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Plan 2.

## CHAPTER XI.

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Appendix VI.

Appendix XII.

DURING the campaign Sir C. Napier had not neglected the Scindian administration. "This negotiation with the chiefs in Trukkee," he writes in his journal, "has only kept me from the business of civil government for a few days, and already the pile of trials is two feet high on my table; I dare say not less than thirty are there, several from fifty to ninety sheets of foolscap—and life or death depend on some!" Yet with all this unceasing mental labour he had found time and thought early in the operations, to give an elaborate opinion for the government upon the reformation of the Indian Articles of War; and while propounding terms of capitulation to the robber chiefs, he was treating with the jam of Beila for the purchase of some choice fruit-trees to plant in the public garden at Kurrachee. Attentive also to the claims of science he had placed carriage at the disposal of Captain Vickery—a qualified person of the Company's service—for the collection of geological and mineralogical specimens, which were transmitted with a memoir to the London Society and acknowledged as valuable contributions. He would have extended these researches if the army had remained in the hills; but to avoid that public expense, the moment Beja was captured, the fort of Deyrah was destroyed, Oolagee and Poolagee were restored to their former owners the Keyharees, Lheree was given to Belooch Khan, and the army was put in motion for Scinde. The general then repaired with an escort to Shahpoor to meet the khan of Khelat, whose leave he designed to obtain for putting a garrison in that place to watch those outlying robbers who

had not entered, or had escaped from Trukkee; and well content he was to have finished the war so soon, for already the heat of the desert had become nearly unendurable by Europeans.

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At Shahpoor the khan was found, for like all the surrounding powers he was so awed by this sudden reduction of the hitherto invincible hill tribes, as earnestly to seek that conference which he had before carefully evaded. The campaign had however been entirely to his profit; his rebellious subjects were effaced as tribes, his unruly sirdars humbled and alarmed, and his desolated but fertile plains of Cutch Gundava could now be repeopled and cultivated in safety. He still complained of the hostility of the Candahar chiefs, and on that ground asked for a subsidy; but the general, though anxious to give him political weight to press down the loose materials for commotion which abounded around, thought a subsidy would only tend to enrich his scheming sirdars, and substituted for it an austere warning to the Candahar men not to molest an ally of the British. He also proposed to the governor-general that a Khelat force should be raised, officered and paid by England for a time, as a means of awing the Affghans and discontented nobles, and strengthening the alliance. This suggestion was not attended to, but the Candahar chiefs gave an earnest assurance—for they were in great fear—that they had no hostile designs, and the khan readily assented to the occupation of Shahpoor.

The Englishman now adopted a singular expedient for protecting the frontier of Scinde against the outstanding robbers. Planting the captive Jackranees and a minor tribe of Doomkees on fertile government land, near the southern edge of the Kusmore desert, he made Deyrah Khan their chief, allowing him to reject the violent spirits whose quietude he could not warrant; but those were immediately taken into pay as policemen, and removed to the south where they served well and willingly. The people under Deyrah were compelled to build houses and cultivate lands, being fed by the government until their first harvest was reaped; then house and land were be-

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stowed on the military tenure of opposing the incursions of their kindred robbers still in arms—yet with this stern admonition, that if they themselves robbed any one, or failed to oppose the incursions of others, their lands would be taken away, the chiefs hanged, and the followers set to labour in chains. Deyrah Khan was selected for this settlement because he had always been averse to the robber life, and amongst the first to surrender; under him therefore it was hoped, if the experiment failed to reclaim the fathers, that the children would have better customs. It failed with neither, only Houssein Bhoogtee and his brother, fierce violent men, who had betrayed the heroic Clark and his comrades to death, refused work, and they were instantly put to labour on the public roads in irons, without a murmur from the rest. Civilization triumphed!

It was designed to hang Beja Khan for the murder of McKenzie's grass-cutters, but Ali Moorad prayed for his pardon, and Beja's barbarian nature and customs, joined to the fact that he had been admitted to negotiation during a campaign which had annihilated his power for mischief, gave weight to the ameer's intercession. The old chieftain and his immediate followers, were therefore placed under Ali Moorad's guard as settlers eastward of the Indus, on the conditions given to the Jackranees. Sir C. Napier was also moved to clemency by hearing that when the confederates expected their last fight at Trukkee, and had left servants to kill their wives and children, they thus modified the bloody injunction. "Unless you see the English chief in person, for as he saved the honour of the ameer's women so will he do with ours—yield to him!" Neither was Beja's complaint of perfidy without weight; for though Captain Postans afterwards made a long defence, said to have satisfied the governor-general, he certainly had not satisfied the men who accused him, as their conduct at Trukkee proved.

These matters being arranged, the general reached Kurrachee after five months of incessant marching and fighting, added to laborious administrative duties, the pressure of which he thus laconically described. "Climate

and work have weakened me, but one cannot live for ever." He returned however to encounter anew the enmity of the thankless oligarchs he was so efficiently serving. His astonishing campaign, derided at first as impracticable, had been during the operations assailed with a ridiculous fury; the death of every camp-follower had been announced as the forerunner of a direful terminating calamity, which the organs of the Bombay faction strove hard to produce. Their cry had always been that "Sir C. Napier knew nothing of government—that the people abhorred him—that they were only kept down by an overwhelming army." Yet here he had carried away his main force, attended by auxiliary Beloochee tribes, one hundred and fifty miles beyond the frontiers of Scinde, and six hundred miles from Kurrachee the seat of government, to war down a kindred population. Public opinion and even the feelings of his own army had been against the enterprise, yet he pursued it for two months, and during that time no movement of insurrection had taken place in Scinde, no conspiracy was formed, no discontent was shown, no murmur was heard!

This successful campaign cut away the foul hopes of disaster cherished by the Bombay calumniators; but then, with inexpressible effrontery, they declared that nothing had been done and that a large force had been employed at enormous cost without the slightest gain: they even described Beja Khan as still ravaging the frontier at the head of his victorious tribes, when he was actually in prison trembling for his life. Such were the factious ravings in the *Bombay Times*.

History appears degraded while recording the practices of these hirelings; but it is because they were hirelings, the organs of power, that they must be noticed. Buist boasted of the support of official men; and persons of his stamp cannot be neglected in history when peace and war have been influenced by their publications. He announced at this time that Sir C. Napier was urging the governor-general to a war in the Punjaub, and had publicly detailed the plan of operations! And Major Carmichael Smith,

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in his work upon the reigning family at Lahore, expressly asserts that a speech—a *forged one*—published in the *Delhi Gazette* as spoken by Sir C. Napier, was the principal cause of the Punjaub war. For the general being there made to say his army would immediately invade the Seikhs they resolved to be first in the field, and crossed the Sutlej! This statement has been corroborated by another writer, Captain Cunningham, and verbally by the French Colonel Mouton, who was a general in the Sikh service—wherefore the baffling of the governor-general's peaceful policy, and the terrible battles on the Sutlej, with their train of consequences involving a second war, may be traced directly to the flagitious forgeries of two contemptible editors. The following extracts from a letter to the governor-general, written two months before the breaking out of the first Punjaub war will show with what indifference even to probability these forgeries were promulgated.

“It is very hard upon professional men, that it is always put down as a settled thing that they want to make war, though history proves that is not the case. They make it indeed better and govern better than the civil servants of the public; but nothing in history proves that they are more, or even so desirous of war as civil servants are. Nothing can make me believe that any man who has ever been in one battle can wish to be in a second from personal feelings, if he has those of a man or a Christian. If a battle must be fought we like to be side by side with our companions—reptiles only try to get away—but no man loves danger, except as producing honour. Woe to the ruffian who fights a battle that can be avoided, he is a wholesale murderer for his own private selfishness. Two of the most miserable days I ever spent, were those after Meeanee and Hyderabad—not from the slightest doubt of my own conduct being right, but because of the loss of my companions. I venture to say that no man ever more rigidly questioned himself as to the need of risking those battles than I did, or more entirely felt convinced; and subsequent events bore me

out, as I believed they would. No man of common sense, or knowledge of mankind, can suppose that another would fight with an enemy so immensely superior in numbers, except from necessity.

“These reflections come up on reading your letter, saying you had to prove to your employers, that a military man can honestly resist professional temptation, the indulgence of which without an absolute necessity would be criminal, in which I cordially agree with you. But the proper military *precautions* are deemed to spring from a resolution for *war*, though originating in a resolution for *peace*! And what is more, the only way of maintaining it. Lord Ellenborough was forced by an insensate, I should rather say an unprincipled clamour got up by the Whigs, to leave Gwalior independent, the result will be another war probably. Peaceful Hume! One would think peace was sold by the yard and Hume had a monopoly of the article.”

“My brother thinks the Indus ought to be our frontier in its whole course *now*. I do not think we are ripe for that. I agree with you that the Sutlej is our wisest boundary just now. I would go on to the Indus when we have gotten rid of our foolish system of keeping native princes on their thrones, *within* our territory; until then it is impossible to trust to internal safety. But while I am decidedly of opinion that the Sutlej is our proper boundary-line now, I am equally certain that to keep within it is *impossible*. The revenue will not allow of such a line of defence in existing circumstances, and *you will be the conqueror of the Punjaub before 1847 if you are alive and governor-general*. Solomon was a wise man and a peaceful prince, but he had a very full treasury, and such credit with the merchants of Egypt and Tyre that to make war on him would have been dangerous—his frontier was safe. Had he been governor-general with a Seikh army prowling like a wild beast along his frontier, and requiring thirty thousand men to watch it, he must speedily have made war, or postponed the building of his temple!”



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Such were the sentiments of the man represented as thirsting for war; but he, unshaken in his course of right, was only seeking the prosperity of Scinde, and expressing his contempt for the factious folly, and the folly exclusive of faction, which tainted the minds of men in power, who could not, or would not, form any just or even sane idea of the resources of the country, or of the measures required to work them beneficially. Because the land had not sprung up into a garden by magic—because the Indus was not at once covered with merchant-boats jostling for want of room in the pursuit of enormous profits—because all the wild Beloochees, and all the degraded Scindees, had not suddenly changed their nakedness and ignorance of everything but robbery and oppression, for a scientific knowledge of the earth's products and a persevering enlightened industry in the manufacture of them, Scinde was called a desert and thought to be irreclaimable! "How!" he exclaimed "can rational beings, if such persons can be called rational, expect miracles? Because we have succeeded in keeping the heterogeneous population in peace and tranquillity, these men expect a high state of civilization to spring up on the instant!" With a master mind however he laboured to realize their first dreamy expectations.

Prominent amongst the moral obstacles were the wild ferocity of the Beloochees, the Mahometan religion, and the want of a language to communicate with the multitude, for there were many dialects, but neither Persian nor Hindostanee was known. He meddled not with man's faith or religious rites, save where the Hindoo would burn women, and hence the Mahometans had no fear of conversion; but they dreaded contamination, and would not mix with unbelievers; he could not therefore conciliate them by the gentleness and honours of society as he wished to do. Yet one faith he proclaimed, one social comfort he administered, one language, by him accentuated with peculiar force and clearness, he used, and the multitude understood him. They required no priest to expound his general beneficence, his protection

of life and property, his prompt unadulterated justice. The rich needed no interpreter to explain the generosity which assured to them their possessions and dignities. The poor were content, that without speaking their dialects he should break down the ameeers' cruel system of government farming, in all its branches, whether of taxes or rent.

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At this time he gave to every person, natives or immigrants, who would cultivate land, leases for fourteen or twenty-one years with exemption from rent or taxes for the two first, the holders being responsible only to the government collectors without the intervention of zemindars or kardars. This was his appropriation of the land retained when the jagheers were regranted, and of the greater part of the ameeers' accursed shikargahs: and to give the stimulus to industry more effect he made small government loans to the poorest to enable them to start in the course of cultivation. Infinite pains also he bestowed on the general irrigation, observing that health, revenue, food and civilization depended upon controlling the waters.

His minor measures for improving the public condition and awakening men to advantages before unknown, or unheeded, were many and judicious. He formed a breeding establishment at Larkaana with the female camels taken from the hill tribes; he endeavoured to set up windmills at Kurrachee, and with the profits of the government garden, which now supplied several thousand persons with vegetables, he stimulated industry in various branches; the mills indeed failed; for being made at Bombay under the superintendence of Dr. Buist who as secretary of the agricultural society there was charged with their construction, they were very costly, and so defective they could never be set up.

Through the collector of customs Mr. McLeod, and Major Blenkyns, a sheep and grass farm was established for which merinos were obtained, and it soon produced Guinea grass and lucerne in such abundance, as to give promise of entirely providing forage, which had hitherto

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been obtained for the army from Cutch at enormous cost. Through Mr. Curling, who had been long in Egypt, tutor to one of the pacha's sons, he also sent for fine West India sugar-cane plants, and they arrived in a thriving condition at Bombay; but official people detained them there until they died, for any improvement of Scinde was to them as wormwood. However, cereal agriculture was in Sir C. Napier's judgment the only sure foundation on which to rest Scindian prosperity, and there was no real knowledge of it possessed by the people, even the most industrious; yet the Beloochee and Scindee were alike so eager to acquire knowledge of any kind, that he saw their civilization would be certain if means of teaching were provided, the regimental schools were besieged by them praying to have their children instructed. To satisfy this craving for knowledge he proposed to Lord Ripon the institution of agricultural schools on a plan first established by Captain John Pitt Kennedy, at Loch-Ash in Ireland. It had been entirely successful there, and was afterwards pressed by that gentleman upon the Irish government. And it is no hyperbole to say, that had his plan been supported against the intrigues of pretended patriots, the famine and misery which has desolated that unhappy country would have been very much abated if not entirely averted. That great and useful project was stifled to satisfy corrupt influence in Ireland, and in like manner this proposition for Scinde was set aside: it did not conduce to factious interests!

While the regeneration of the poorer classes was thus urged forward, the just claims of the high-born people of the land were not overlooked. Though a conquered race, Sir C. Napier regarded them only as English subjects, and resolved to open for all places of trust and dignity without objection to colour or religion, demanding only qualification. Mohamed Tora, one of the greatest sirdars who fought at Meeanee, was made a magistrate, at his own request, the appointment being thus justified. "The nobles of Scinde must have the road of ambition opened to them, or they will not have their rights in the honourable

sense of my proclamation—that is, if they qualify themselves for the offices demanded. But in questions of general interest like this, even qualification should not be required before enjoyment—we must give first, we can turn out afterwards for incapacity. The class-right will be thus acknowledged while the man is removed; and if one Beloochee gentleman becomes a magistrate many will qualify themselves. I want to go beyond this, if the *Indian system* will allow me; but that system, a rotten fabric of expedients for the supporting of robbery, is equally destitute of humanity and knowledge of human nature, and will I suppose certainly debar the Scindian gentlemen of the rights possessed by Englishmen. I will however give them all I can. The Beloochee gentleman may likely enough abuse his power for ten years to come; but we who have conquered the country can surely keep half a dozen of such persons in order; and the great men of the land must have a door open for their ambition, their virtues and their industry, or they will become rebellious or vile: I know not which is worst, but the government which produces either is a detestable tyranny.”

In virtue of powers granted by Lord Ellenborough, Sir C. Napier now negotiated with Ali Moorad a treaty, which that prince ardently desired, though he objected to one article, which gave a right to all persons to settle in either state, and provided that none who fled from one to the other should be given up, save for treason or murder, when the proof of guilt was to be satisfactory to the protecting state. Against these provisions the ameer clamoured—“They would ruin him, his people would all depart, his country be rendered desolate!”—“Truly have you spoken ameer if your design is to be a tyrant.” This silenced Moorad, yet his fears were not unfounded. Not only his subjects, but the cultivators of Khelat and those of Candahar, and traders from all the surrounding nations, even from the north-west provinces of British India, were crowding to Scinde as to an asylum against oppression. Kurrachee had swelled too big for its walls, and new streets were rapidly springing up beyond the gates. Many people

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of Cutch Gundava had come across the frontier, more were coming; and two independent tribes of the Gedrosian desert, the Hedgees and Punjeurees, who could bring eight thousand swordsmen to the field, entreated to be accepted as subjects, and were strangely disconcerted when denied.

Meanwhile the rejoicing for the fall of the robber tribes spread for hundreds of miles beyond the immediate neighbourhood of their stony fastnesses, indicating the extent of Beja's depredations and of his ferocity. Nor were the robbers themselves the last to proclaim their conqueror's prowess. "The Emperor Ackbar, the great Ahmet Shah, and other kings, had, they said, failed at the head of armies to penetrate beyond Tonge—and though at times British detachments had got through the first passes, they were invariably cut off in the end; and no large force had ever before been able even to approach Trukkee: they had now been subdued, but by a man no one could resist." The fame of the exploit was thus spread even to Toorkistan, where the traveller Wolfe found the wild warriors of Central Asia expectant of Sir C. Napier's coming and hoping for the spoil of kingdoms under his leading, being all willing to join him in arms. And strange to say the town of Bunpore, on the confines of Persia, being besieged, actually surrendered on receipt of a forged letter of command, having his name affixed! But so vivid is the Eastern imagination, especially in warlike matters, that had he been master of his own actions he could at this time have overrun all Asia as a conqueror, and arrived on the Mediterranean with half a million of wild horsemen. Little did those fierce plundering Asiatics think, that the chief whose military prowess had thus excited their admiration, was then bringing into activity a new, a simple and a beautiful principle of contention totally opposed to their notions—the contention of rulers, competing for power and riches and grandeur indeed, yet not by war, not by negotiation, nor by commerce—but by a benign sway, attracting the oppressed of all nations to come under his government.

Amongst the essential means to attain that noble object, was the reduction of imposts, that comfort might soothe the poor man's industry. Yet a strange difficulty attended this amelioration. The Beloochees would often prefer an onerous tax, if it was one of custom, to a lighter one which disturbed their habits; and being men of violent impulses there was always danger of their resenting changes however beneficial. Cautiously therefore were financial reforms introduced, for the general desired more to make the people understand his desire to benefit them than to obtain the fame of a rapid regenerator; holding the first to be the vital principle of permanent legislation; the last an ephemeral distinction suitable only to a reforming tyrant—a Mehemet Ali of Egypt. But while seeking in all ways to amend the moral condition of the people, and to forward their national prosperity, he considered the repression of Belooch ferocity to be a holy work, and pursued it with stern resolution though he writhed under the means necessary to effect it; for having to combine the lawgiver with the judge, and the executive office with both, there was no salve for a wounded conscience if error were committed.

“I put men to death,” he said, “for murder only, and generally it is for the murder of helpless women or children: and having deeply considered the justice and necessity of doing so my conscience is clear as an administrator, since no labour or pains, no care or reflection, have been spared by me to arrive at a just conclusion in each case. I do not flinch from this painful duty, but I do not like to be a judge. I would rather be a private person. Yet being here in authority I must do what should be done, and the cruelty of those ferocious men can only be stopped by force. Even Deyrah Khan whose countenance bespeaks his natural goodness—he who for years expressed his abhorrence of the robbers' habits and at once closed with my offers—even he is capable of fraud and murder. Bred in a bad school, the tendency of all the Beloochees is to starve from idleness and rob and murder from habit—but that habit I will break.”

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A few months after this was written, Deyrah beat one of his followers to death, and though he was from some accidental cause only sentenced for manslaughter by the military commission, the trial gave infinite disgust to the Beloochees.—“Who ever before heard of a chief being blamed for killing a follower? Well! God is great and will in time remedy what cannot be now accounted for!” Such was the language of this fierce race of blood-spillers. Nevertheless their propensity to murder sensibly abated, and the good-will of the labouring classes towards the government as sensibly advanced.

With the general prosperity the revenue also improved so rapidly, that after defraying the whole expense of the civil government, a surplus of one hundred thousand pounds sterling was paid into the treasury of India: subject only to the cost of constructing the new barracks which did not much exceed one-third of that sum, was not a permanent charge, and was sure to repay tenfold in the saving of soldiers' lives. Meanwhile so assured was the tranquillity of Scinde, that Sir C. Napier proposed to hold it with five thousand men; a proposal not adopted by the supreme government, because the Seikh troubles were so menacing. Scinde did not require an army, the general interest of India did; but so far was Sir C. Napier from desiring war at this time in the Punjaub, or anywhere, that he expressed his dread of it, saying, age had incapacitated him for the labour—that in the hills, he had been indeed several times more than twenty hours on horseback, and once twenty-six hours with only the support of a crust of bread and some tea carried in a soda-water bottle—such was his simplicity of living—yet old men do not recover rapidly from fatigue, and to do well in war a general should be always in the saddle—that his will was strong, but his worn-out body dragged it down, like a stone tied to the tail of a kite. That with the duke of Wellington body and mind seemed to have made a compact; with him they were as cat and dog.

These expressions as to his bodily powers were but indications of momentary lassitude after extreme exertions in

a debilitating climate, for his continued labours evinced his iron hardihood. However at this time he was compelled by the great augmentation of juridical business to alter his system of revision, and permit the judge-advocate-general to decide finally on the trials for certain specified offences, still allowing the accused an appeal to himself. It was full time, for between January and June he had studied, written notes upon, and passed sentence in four hundred criminal trials, some of ninety folio sheets! in addition to the military trials!

This relief enabled him to devote more time to other branches of administration, especially the system of taxation; and he had ample proofs that his recent campaign had been effectual and beneficial. Before the hill expedition the protection of the frontier had required three regiments of cavalry, and they could scarcely hold their ground. "We can do nothing against the robbers, they come and go and our men are exhausted." Such was the substance of all previous reports. Now a single regiment of cavalry and some horsemen of the Bundelcund legion more than sufficed for the duty. The presence of any cavalry was even declared unnecessary, and the officers complained of having nothing to do. There were no incursions to drive the Scindian cultivators from their lands, and those of the Cutch Gundava plains had again rendered that fertile district a sheet of grain—an unusual but truly glorious result of war, and the more glorious that those very people, driven to desperation before the campaign, had at one time actually resolved to join the robbers in a mass as the only mode of avoiding utter destruction. The khan of Khelat's revenue was thus augmented by two lacs and a half, which gave him a personal interest in the preservation of tranquillity.

While this peaceful scene was exhibited beyond the frontier of Scinde, the captured tribes within it had joyfully taken to agricultural labour, and even Beja only complained that Ali Moorad watched him too closely; but the ameer sarcastically replied—alluding to his own expenses in the recent campaign—that it had cost him



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two lacs to capture so great a chief, and it might cost him more to let him loose. In truth the general's policy had been rather to put Ali Moorad to charges than to have his aid, thinking it a good means to keep him from entertaining Patan adventurers who always desired war and disturbance. Beja was however now allowed more liberty which he did not abuse, and afterwards paid a visit in friendship to his conqueror at Kurrachee.

In the course of the summer the Murrees announced that they had again defeated the wandering Bhoogtees under Islam Khan, and had killed so many of them and taken so many arms, and so much cattle, that the tribe was nearly extinguished. This seemed to be confirmed by the arrival of a number of isolated Bhoogtees seeking a home amongst the settled tribes in Scinde, and by an offer of submission from Islam himself; but when the former terms were again proposed he rejected them with great insolence, and continued to haunt the hills with a considerable force: yet only as a bandit, his power of raising commotions was gone. The Murrees complained that the Kyharees had from Poolagee aided the Bhoogtees, and the general menaced the Kyharees so sternly that they were heedful not to provoke his wrath; for being a tribe odious to all around them, the simple withdrawal of British protection would have been their destruction. These minor troubles were not unexpected. While any robbers remained in the Cutchee hills, want would compel them to make incursions, and it was to bridle them that Shah-poor had been occupied; but no pains were spared to bring them to a peaceable disposition, and it was hoped the flourishing condition of the tribes, under Deyrah Khan, would finally prevail over the predatory habits and pride of those who still roved for spoil—for very clearly did the contentment of those settled tribes prove, that the robber life was not one of choice.

That he had saved the subdued and reclaimed ones from slaughter, was a constant source of satisfaction to Sir C. Napier, and could he have had his own way, he would at once and for always have ended the robber system, by

planting sepoy regiments at Deyrah as a military colony. The Bhoogtee fort there was ready for occupation, and the air remarkably pure, the water good and copious, the land fertile, the hills around full of mineral riches. Trukkee was a vast quarry of fine white marble, the transmission of which to the Indus for exportation would have been easy. This was a noble scheme, but necessarily relinquished, because no disposition existed with the high authorities to adopt useful projects, and Sir Charles Napier had to struggle for every public amelioration, against the folly and enmity of the oligarchs in whose ungrateful service he was wasting strength and life. From Sir H. Hardinge indeed, when applied to personally, he received a just support against his secret enemies—and he needed it; their hostility being as unceasing as it was unscrupulous—but from the councils and superior boards of India he experienced opposition, official delays, thwartings, and denials, little according with the requirements of a new government, which had to create the means of regenerating as well as to administer to a conquered nation.

From the robbers nothing serious was now to be dreaded, and even the Lion asked leave to reside with Ali Moorad, but the reply was "Surrender." This he was too high-spirited to do, and went to the Punjaub; but his tried friend, Ahmed Khan, the Lhugaree chief, seeing all hope gone, yielded, pleading truly that he had only obeyed the prince's orders in his previous career: the plea was admitted by the general, who obtained pardon, and restored his possessions. This terminated all Scindian enmity; but in June the frontier touching the Mazaree district was molested by a Seikh band, which under pretence of pursuing robbers had crossed the boundary. Sir C. Napier, to avoid embarrassing the governor-general's policy towards the Lahore Durbar, refrained from punishing this invasion, but he sent four hundred men and two guns under Major Corsellis in steamers from Hyderabad to Khusmore, with orders to fall upon any armed foreign body within the frontier-line if they did not instantly

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retire, yet to abstain from any violation of the Seikh territory even in pursuit. At the same time the Mazaree chiefs were admonished with reproachful sternness to beware of further offence. This promptitude, and the prudent conduct of Corsellis, put an end to a dangerous affair, which might otherwise have precipitated the Punjaub war.

Meanwhile the public works of Scinde were pushed as fast as adverse circumstances would admit, and amongst the most adverse was the dearth of good engineers. However the dike designed to keep out the inundation between Sukkur and Shikarpoore, was now finished by Captain Scott; it had given way to the violence of the flood at one time, and there was some doubt as to the final success; but it was restored on a new plan of execution supplied by the general, and thus completed in despite of these serious obstacles: then the yearly epidemic which had before ravaged those places ceased.

To obtain this result Sir C. Napier willingly endured a temporary loss of revenue; for with him the people's welfare always had precedence of state opulence; but many rich proprietors were discontented, for being fatalists they laughed at the notion of sickness averted by human efforts; and they would not take the trouble to sink wells, though a very few, in addition to the sluice-gates practised in the work for partial irrigation, would have compensated the loss of water from the checked inundation. They even menaced to cut the dike, but a distribution of cavalry met that threat, and meanwhile the labouring population obtained full employment, and high wages from government without pestilence or oppression—the high wages being perhaps the chief cause of the rich men's discontent. This sanitary state of Sukkur became permanent, and as to the annual pestilence, this year, it was not very prevalent in any part; but in July and August cholera appeared at Shikarpoore, Sukkur and Larkaana, and then descended to Hyderabad. To meet this visitation hakims—native physicians—and in their default, intelligent men were appointed with salaries in

every district, and they were furnished with medicines, and instructions for the relief of the poor: they had power also to enforce sanitary precautions.

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Thus ceaselessly Sir C. Napier watched and laboured in all directions, yet the course of his administration was rendered slow from the impediments continually created by official men and boards; and so artfully were those managed that he could make no specific complaint, save of delay, though the public service languished under the effects. He had now been for nearly two years soliciting a sanction for bringing the Mullyeer river to Kurrachee and was still without even an answer; though the want of pure water was so grievously felt in that place, and the cost of conducting the river, only twelve thousand pounds, would have been quickly repaid by a small water-tax. Still more vexatious was the delay in sanctioning the formation of a camel baggage-corps, to the organization of which he had early attached the greatest importance; and he was especially earnest to have it ready for service before a Punjaub war should break out. It was a great military creation, which had been suggested by observing that in India armies were appendages to their baggage, instead of the reverse. He resolved therefore to reduce the latter to its proper rank as an accessory, to render it capable of regular and timely movements, to correct its tumultuous character by a military organization, and no longer permit it to be a confused host of men and animals—rolling about in misery, wasting the country through which it passed, and by its disorder helplessness and weight breaking down the finest combinations, and menacing ruin at every movement to the troops it was designed to sustain.

Appendix III.

Appendix VIII.

During his first campaign in Scinde the multitude of men and animals gathered under the name of baggage, weighed as a millstone on his movements. In the Cutchee hills the safety of the army was more than once endangered by it; for the camels being all hired, their drivers naturally sought to avoid danger, not in the military meaning but according to their personal interpretation of the term; and when their rude generalship was at fault, they con-

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cluded all must go wrong and deserted. No order was or could be maintained in the hills, where the narrow ways crowded with baggage forbade the corrective action of cavalry; and no rigour of punishment could restrain the camp-followers and camel-men from straying beyond the lines for forage or plunder, generally the last. At Jummuck the loss of life from this cause was considerable, and on the march from Goojroo, the troops having gone forward to secure the head of the defile of Toosoo, the baggage choked up the road for ten consecutive hours, liable the whole time to attack; and yet beyond aid, because for three miles the pass was so wedged with men and loaded animals that the general could scarcely pass himself or send orders to the troops, and he was finally compelled to move his artillery and cavalry, which were in the rear under General Simpson, by another way and with great fatigue.

To make the baggage of his army fulfil the conditions of its existence — a help instead of a burthen — was now Sir C. Napier's object, when after two years' constant solicitation he obtained a tardy sanction to form a baggage-corps. The pervading principle was, that the carriage of baggage should be a government matter, and organized with as much care and order as a regiment. On this basis, he formed divisions, giving to each six hundred government camels, and uniforms to the drivers. Each division had a directing animal, which was to carry a flag by day and a lantern by night—the flag, the light, the trappings of the camels, and the uniforms of the drivers corresponding in all points. Remembering the Israelites' march in the wilderness, he also placed an elephant at the head of all, carrying a larger flag by day and a larger lantern by night, a star to lead, and a sign of command which none were to disregard.

The camel-drivers were enlisted, disciplined armed and paid as soldiers, and commanded by regular officers; and the general knew human nature too well not to invest them with every title to respect and honour which the bravest soldiers could claim. Their animals, classed as

strong and weak, bore round their necks tablets, engraved with the maximum load of their class, as a protection from oppression in overloading, an injustice to which the poor beasts are very sensitive. One man was appointed to each camel instead of three camels to one man, as the practice was, a change saving baggage guards; for one man still led three animals while two flanked the march as soldiers, and were yet at all times skilled and ready to help in loading and unloading.

To aid the passage of baggage and guns in difficult places, five spare elephants were attached to the corps, and the whole mass was placed under the command of a superior officer, who had power to enforce all regulations, and move his cumbrous masses as a second army in conformity with the operations of the fighting men. If the enemy's horsemen, sweeping, as was their wont, like a whirlwind round the flank, should fall on the baggage corps, the latter instead of fettering the action of the troops, or flying confusedly towards them for aid, was practised to cast itself by command into orbs or squares, the camels kneeling down with their heads inwards and pinned together, while from behind that living rampart the drivers defended themselves with the carbines they carried.

Minor regulations completed the system, and the result was superiority of movement, saving of animals and expense, with increased comfort for the troops and consequent diminution of sickness; and withal so great a relief to the field operations as to make the creation of the corps a signal epoch in military organization. It was in truth an enlarged and perfecting application of that principle of order which first dictated the substitution of disciplined forces for feudal levies and armed mobs. Its creator well observed at the time. "That it was the way to obtain rapidity in war, which did not result from bugling, double quick marching, and galloping of horse-artillery, but from incessant care, the raising and supporting the moral feeling and physical strength of the soldier, the rendering the baggage conducive to his wants, and as little of an impediment as possible."

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When this corps was organized Sir C. Napier may be said to have given wings to his army; for he had before so horsed his batteries that they were capable of any exertion—had created the fighting camel corps with its surprising power for sudden and distant expeditions—and had in a manner also created the Scinde horsemen, the *Moguelaees*, whose matchless ability for irregular warfare did not keep them from being foremost in the field charge when solid hosts were to be broken. They had indeed existed nominally previous to his arrival, yet, neglected and undisciplined were falling to pieces and an order for disbanding them had been issued, but he interfered; reforming their organization he increased their numbers and placed them under Captain Jacob, an artillery officer, but selected with a sure judgment for this service. The army of Scinde was therefore emphatically an army of movement; swift to assail, terrible to strike; and if the formation of the Belooch battalions, now well organized and fit for service, be added to the institutions mentioned above, the military creations will be found to have kept pace with those of the civil administration in Scinde.

By the Bombay faction the baggage corps was necessarily decried—"It was an expensive folly—a complete failure—so had the conquest of Scinde been—so had the administration been—so had the hill campaign been." Colonel Burlton, a Bengal commissary-general, also published a work against the baggage corps, striving to prove that waste, disorder, extravagance and oppression of the native population, are as profitable to armies in the field, as they are by some supposed to be for persons in his situation. But every advantage gained by Sir C. Napier in war, every stroke of successful policy, every undeniable proof of enlightened government, naturally produced a storm of passionate calumny from men whose incessant predictions of failure were as incessantly belied by results. India was well described by Chief Justice Roper at this period, as a press-ridden community; and yet with a few exceptions, such as the *Gentleman's Gazette*, which did justice to its title, there was not, and there is

not, a free press for the many. There is only a licentious press for certain factious persons having wickedness enough to protect the editors from legal consequences: a few instances of this immunity for libel enjoyed at Bombay will suffice for illustration.

Dr. Buist published, as a regular official document, a reprimand to a naval officer, which had indeed been written by Sir C. Napier, but for reasons affecting the public interest had been cancelled and locked up in his desk, from whence it could only have been obtained by infamous means! He also published a forged letter from Sir C. Napier to the governor-general, in which the former was made to return Sir Henry Hardinge's personal kindness with foul abuse; and though the Bombay government was officially called upon to prosecute for these two offences, Buist committed both with impunity, and boasted of having information and support from men in power, in such a way as to indicate very plainly that members of the government council itself were intimately connected with his libels. Lieutenant-Colonel Outram likewise, published in the newspapers such slanders against Sir C. Napier that the governor-general desired the latter to leave the correction of them in his hands, but with an overstrained delicacy he referred them to the home authorities. His motive was that as the slanders were also directed against Lord Ellenborough, Sir Henry Hardinge in dealing with them might be embarrassed by his family connection with that nobleman. It was an error of which he was soon made sensible. The secret committee in England passed indeed a severe censure privately on Outram, but with a miserable cunning, falsely assuming that Sir C. Napier had entered into a public controversy with that person, instead of having, as the fact was, sent in a formal demand for justice to the government, condemned such controversies generally and refused to notice the official appeal. But Outram, thus privately reprimanded, was immediately appointed to a lucrative civil office, in the view no doubt of giving weight and currency to his vituperation. That error was however in time corrected by the public voice, which forced

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the Court of Directors to bend with abject submission to the general whose reputation it had thus basely sought to lower.

There was yet another authority—Lord Ripon—who declared that Outram's proceeding was right, that it was what men in power must expect, and should excite Sir C. Napier to greater zeal!! In fine he plainly disclosed his own connection with the assailants of the man he was bound to protect. There is however a moral as well as an official standard of right, and Lord Ripon's authority is not of force to establish the one or to efface the other. It was not right that a violation of the Articles of War, and all just authority, should be, not only left unpunished but encouraged; that truth should be outraged and public decency outraged, by loathsome calumnies—that soldiers in the field should be told their general was entirely ignorant of his duty, and the murderer of their comrades—and it could not be right that a minister of the crown should countenance such insults to real greatness, at the dishonest behests of a body he was appointed to control!

Dr. Buist in support of his libels boasted that his informants were men high in office, a boast never contradicted, and of weight when coupled with these facts that secretary Willoughby was, as men say, one of the proprietors of his journal; and when reeking from the acknowledged slander about the ameers' women having been dishonoured by the officers of the army, Buist was received as a guest in houses whence he should have been especially spurned for that foul falsehood. Those official informants therefore told him "That nothing had been effected in the hill campaign, and that the robber tribes were more formidable than ever, though the greater portion were then settled as quiet cultivators in Scinde—that Beja, when actually in prison, was a victorious chief and ravaging the frontier at the head of his Doomkees—that Sir H. Hardinge, though he had given his express consent to the expedition, and warmly applauded the successful execution in public orders, entirely disapproved of it—that Scinde was a wasting drain upon

the resources of India, when it was paying a large surplus to the general treasury—that Sir C. Napier had refused to hold the country with less than sixteen thousand troops, when he had actually only twelve thousand—that he had applied for a reinforcement of a thousand men to meet the sickly season, when he had in fact sent away three regiments to enable those ‘sovereign authorities’ to quell a rebellion caused by oppression in the Bombay presidency; and instead of demanding reinforcements had proposed to spare seven thousand of the twelve thousand under his command, and hold Scinde with five thousand!”

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Such was the hostility evinced towards a man who was wasting life in exertions to serve the government that thus encouraged and protected his assailants; and that nothing of baseness or absurdity might be wanting, the Bombay faction endeavoured to confer the character of a martyr on the savage filthy criminal Ameer Shadad, fawning on and licking his hands, red with the blood of the murdered officer Ennis. They concocted also a petition to the Queen from the Ameer Nusseer, which Sir Henry Pottinger undertook to present. Every line of it contained some notorious falsehood forged by the faction. The attempt was however too gross to succeed in England though Nusseer’s cause was adopted by Lord Ashley, whose profound and deplorable ignorance of everything relating to Scinde affairs did not prevent him from meddling and countenancing to the utmost of his power, the efforts of these conspirators against the interests of England and the fame of Sir C. Napier.

But while Buist’s high official authorities were so ready to give this kind of information to injure the governor of Scinde, they were totally insensible to the just pride and welfare of the gallant troops who conquered that country; and so also were the authorities in England; each seeming to strive for pre-eminence in heartless scorn of the soldiers’ claims, rights and honour.

Lord Ripon took more than two years for striking off the Meeanee medals, and it was believed they would never

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have been struck but for the strenuous interference of Lord Ellenborough; thus numbers of gallant men died without the consolation of having those honourable marks of merit attached to the manly breasts they had so bravely presented to the sharp swords of the enemy. When struck the medals were sent to Bombay without ribands, and the government there, with a like scorn of honourable feeling, transmitted them, as bales of common goods amongst commissariat stores to Scinde, with such contemptuous irregularity that the commander-in-chief received his from the hands of a lieutenant-colonel, whose subaltern officers had obtained theirs long before!

When the 25th native regiment, whose courage had been so conspicuous in the battles, was recalled to Bombay — against the general's wish, and apparently because against his wish—it was, after five years of foreign service treated on landing with insulting neglect; as if it had come back stained with dishonour instead of beaming with the lustre of heroism.

Sir C. Napier's representations to the Bombay authorities that the widows and children of the Scinde horsemen who fell at Meeanee in 1843, were still in 1845 without any provision, were treated with indifference, though he stated that those poor claimants were living on the charity of their fallen protectors' comrades! Even the sacred duty of forwarding the *living* sepoy's remittances to their families was so shamefully neglected, that he was compelled to represent the matter to the governor-general.

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Sensitive enough however they were upon other points; for a memorial was framed by some civil servants, avowedly under an official stimulus, praying the interposition of the directors to make the governor of Scinde declare why he called some of their body jackals! And this singular folly was clamorously pressed until he, admitting wrong to the jackals, intimated an intention to call for a statement of work and salaries, and institute a comparison between those of the memorialists and his soldier civilians. The cry then ceased. But in truth he had not assailed the civil servants as a body at all, he had only said in a

private letter, with the publication of which he had no concern "The general opinion was that '*certain civil servants*' were corrupt." And it is not a little singular that this "*general opinion*," thus quoted, had come to him from some of those very persons at Bombay, when speaking of their brethren at Calcutta, who were now rendering themselves subjects for derision by a simulated indignation.

But by a singular coincidence, always some proof of the superior government of Scinde was publicly furnished when its maligners were most boisterous in condemnation.

Thus it was predicted that a ten years' partisan warfare would be established on the right of the Indus, and immediately after more than a hundred chiefs on that side of the river voluntarily proffered their salaams.

When it was clamorously asserted that the whole Belooch race abhorred their conqueror, all their chiefs and sirdars eagerly came to the great Durbar at Hyderabad in sign of submission and good will.

It was proclaimed that Scinde was tranquil only because it was kept down by a large force; and a portion of that force was immediately sent to aid in quelling an insurrection in the Bombay presidency, leaving Scinde tranquil.

When it was announced that the population of Scinde only awaited a favourable occasion to restore the dethroned ameers, the general marched to war beyond the frontier of Scinde; and this favourable occasion could not induce a man to stir in aid of the Lion, or of the forty-eight Talpoor princes who were still at large and actually in Scinde, calling on their former subjects.

Striking as these facts were, none were more so than a partisan warfare undertaken in the autumn of this year by Deyrah Khan, against Islam and his roving Bhoogtees. The general had foreseen, when he planted his captives near the frontier, that the outlying rovers would soon be forced to make forays for food, and he judged their first attempt would be on the settled Jackranees; because from them less resistance was to be expected; and they could be thus

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sounded as to resuming the robber life. So it happened. The Jackranees were plundered. But instead of hankering for their former vocation, fiercely they rose and demanded leave to retaliate. Nothing could be more in accord with the general's policy, and he directed some cavalry to support them while crossing the desert, yet to leave them to their feud when within the rocks.

He had no doubt of their return to the plains, for being now industrious cultivators, he had the double hold on them, of their interests as proprietors, and their vengeful passions as warriors; nor was he without hostages, having previously taken the most energetic and influential of the tribe into government pay. Deyrah Khan's warfare was therefore the consummation of a profound scheme of policy, which had in nine months subdued and reclaimed the spirit of men previously regarded by the world as more akin in ferocity to wild beasts than human beings—a policy which had so changed their habits, that being peaceful agriculturists when not injured, they were now marching against their former confederates in the interest of civilization; and invading those very fastnesses from which they had been so recently torn themselves by force as robbers!

This was a result the greatest of men might be proud of; but it was carefully hidden from the English public, and he who had achieved it was more foully and vociferously vilified and calumniated than before. Indeed the secret practices of his official enemies had become so dangerously unscrupulous, that he was now compelled in self-defence, to avoid all financial responsibility, and decline all public works until superior sanction could be obtained—and that was always delayed by official forms—for he well knew that men and boards were on the watch to effect his ruin. The Bombay council had already privately sent letters to the governor-general insinuating charges against him, and though they were returned with great indignation, and an intimation that such accusations should be made publicly and sustained, or not made at all; the council continued its hostility in secret, and in a

mode so flagitious, that the wronged man's own words must be used in exposition. The necessity of frequent references to libellous publications will then be comprehended, and Buist's boast, that he had *eminent and unquestionable authority close to the sovereign power in Bombay* will be understood. Sir Charles Napier speaks.

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"The *Bombay Times* has asserted, and *entered into details*, that I was driving the people of Scinde mad with excessive taxation, and that I had even dared to re-establish the impost called the *transit-duty*. These assertions were accompanied with abusive epithets such as the *sordid and shameless leader of Scinde*—*The autocrat of Scinde*—*The Scinde czar*—*The unscrupulous murderer of the soldiers*—*The liar at the head of the Scinde government* and so forth. India was kept ringing for several months with accounts of my *infamous attempts to make up a sham revenue*.

"As I never put on a tax and never laid the value of a mite upon any article in the way of impost; and as I have taken off a number of taxes, I laughed at what I knew must in time he found an invention as pure as that of the people said to have been seen by Sir John Herschel in the moon. But how could I laugh, when, after India had resounded with these charges, I found, by the mistake of a clerk at Calcutta who sent *to me* what was designed to be kept *from me*, that the Bombay government had *sent a secret note of council to be registered at Calcutta*—containing accusations against me *of making up a false revenue*, not only by levying excessive taxes, which they only hinted at, but by a monopoly of grain; the price of which the minute said I had raised by my command of the produce and sold dear to the troops, and made the loss fall on the Bombay government! In fine that my conduct had been so infamous, that, one iota of it being true, hanging would be too good for me!

"Had the clerk not made this mistake—if mistake it was and not a generous disgust at such villany—there would have been in the Bombay and Calcutta archives heinous crimes *secretly* but *officially* registered against me

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by my bitter enemies. And when I was no more they would have been given to the world as irrefragable proofs of my flagitious government of Scinde! And these accusations were so ingeniously concocted by two members of the Bombay council, *Reid* and *Crawford*, who are old practical accountants, that it cost me a week's hard work to prove the villany of the men; and that so far from increasing the expense of feeding the troops, if there was one point more than another to which I had devoted myself during the three years of my ruling in Scinde, it had been that of *reducing* the price of grain to all, by destroying monopolies and lessening the pressure on public revenue.

“ But this was not all, the secret minute was recorded, and the authors of it chuckled at having thus shot their assassins' bolt, but not content, they manufactured their minute anew for an article in Doctor Buist's publication—the words only slightly changed to suit a newspaper. Not knowing its source I only laughed at it as one of his usual attempts to make me out a scoundrel; but when I received the minute from the Calcutta clerk I answered it, and gave my opinion to the council freely; disproving by document after document every lie they had advanced. Was that all? No! Enough in conscience, but not all. I got a letter from Lord Ripon, saying, ‘ he had *heard* of the accusation but *hoped* it was not true!’ And then he gave me all sorts of reasons to prove that I ought not to reimpose the *transit-duty*—thus showing that he *believed I had done so*, notwithstanding his *hope*! To do Lord Ripon justice, he gave me but little trouble to answer him, for he discovered such entire ignorance of the subject, that I saw he did not know what a *transit-duty* was. Yet again a day was lost to me in answering him, and my *real work* thrown into arrear—and what work! Long trials to read and to decide upon, putting five men to death. Horrid work! requiring calm thought, great and concentrated thought and resolution not to err. At such a time, with my mind stretched on the rack to attain right in the sight of God, I was to force myself to examine, to

write, and to dwell upon villany past all belief, and beyond my power to chastise! Fortunate that I have escaped from the snares of those who, while profiting from my ebbing life, are seeking my destruction!

“No sooner had I answered Lord Ripon, thinking I had been sufficiently tormented, than there came from Calcutta a letter written by the secret committee, Lord Ripon’s colleagues, to demand why I had restored the *transit-duty*? which from ‘*various sources*’ they heard I had done. I have asked why they did not name their ‘*various sources*’ or any one of them, that I might expose their *secret informer*. This they won’t do, but were we of Venice in the days of the Ten, these men would soon put me out of the way: and things of this nature happen weekly.”

To expatiate upon this almost incredible proceeding, not indeed of a council, for the governor Sir G. Arthur opposed it and was outvoted by the others, that is to say by Reid, Crawford, and the secretary Willoughby—a man who upon every occasion stimulated the hostility shown to Sir C. Napier—to expatiate upon such a proceeding would be an insult to the honour and sense of the English people to whom this work is dedicated. Nevertheless it is fitting to observe that when this secret minute was being concocted, the price of grain was in Scinde absolutely more dependent on demand and supply than in England, all taxes on its importation being abolished in Scinde and not in England, and Sir C. Napier’s real views on the subject may be judged by the following instructions to his collectors.

“There is but one sound way to make grain cheap, viz. encouraging cultivation and not taxing importation. I took off the importation-tax last year, and I have been liberal to cultivators; these are the only radical cures for want of grain—expedients there may be besides, but these are the foundations for having cheap food. As to the effect produced by monopolists, the correction is to make grain so plentiful they cannot forestall; if they attempt it they will be ruined, or at least lose greatly where they



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seek to gain greatly. I at first thought it might, in this case, be good to fix a maximum, but reflection renders me sure that government had better not interfere, except by providing plenty of grain. I dread direct interference of government with men's private affairs, and it seems to me government must be to blame, directly or indirectly, where a whole people suffer want of food. Slavery indeed justifies the summary interference of government; for if a man deals in human flesh, human flesh has a right to deal with him; but cheap food, good wages and plenty of labour; these are the three essentials of good government and they produce each other if the taxes are light; without that the machine will not ply freely.

“As to the occupiers of ground, government ought to take a fair share of the produce of land and *no more*. If we legislate for bad land, taxing good land to make grain rise to a remunerating price for that bad land, we pull down the good land to the level of bad land; that is to say, we raise the cost of food to the poor, to enable zemindars to cultivate bad land. That was done by the ameers, and look at the result! Half Scinde lies waste, and good land too; for why should any one seek for good land so heavily taxed that it could only make the profit of bad land. My reduction of imposts on land is an equal benefit to all, and is proportionate to produce; hence if bad land could pay when the impost was high it can do so now when lower, and the sale of its produce is secure while Scinde *imports* grain—when it *exports*, the demand will raise the value of bad land, if it is worth cultivating at all. Nor must it be forgotten that the great difficulty of cultivation in this country is to get water, and the wider cultivation is spread the more readily will water be obtained.”

Grain was however high-priced in 1845, and the causes were amongst the extraordinary difficulties through which Sir C. Napier dragged Scinde to prosperity.

1°. The war of conquest had continued in different parts until August 1843, which was nearly too late a period to commence cultivation for that year, and plundering of

grain just previous to and during the military operations was general; for the people seeing a strange army descend on the land knew not what might happen, but fearing the worst stole and concealed all they could, neglecting agriculture.

2°. The sudden conquest cast the whole administration of an unknown country and people at once into the hands of the British authorities; and before light could be thrown on the system of imposts and collection, government was easily defrauded; law also was so little regarded that most men were occupied with pillage instead of agriculture.

3°. The canals were that year left uncleared, the ameers being only intent on war; and when the canals are choked neither health nor harvests are to be expected in Scinde.

4°. A dreadful epidemic raged from August 1843 to January 1844 destroying thousands and leaving the survivors, for nearly everybody had been attacked, too debilitated to labour. Thus agriculture was nearly abandoned in 1844; men had not strength to work; and though the troops were less fatally affected than the people, only two thousand feeble tottering convalescents were at one time capable of bearing arms. And as this terrible calamity was rendered more oppressive by a wide-spread visitation of locusts, scarcely any produce remained in Scinde.

5°. The Indus fell suddenly that year in an unusual manner and did not again flood, thus the poor remnants of vegetation which had escaped the locusts perished for want of water.

It was under these frightful visitations, these terrible calamities Sir C. Napier's energy and ability lifted and shielded Scinde from famine and commotion, and placed her on a solid social basis in the end of 1845. And it was with a knowledge of these dreadful miseries that the Bombay councillors complained of grain being high-priced—that they secretly accused the governor of causing that high price by infamous arts, and at the same time themselves

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endeavoured to make it higher by imposing an export duty on all grain leaving the port of Bombay—thus putting the finishing touch to their intolerable baseness by doing themselves what they were falsely accusing him of doing! Scinde was however in the latter part of 1845 unmistakably prosperous even to eyes offuscated by these vile arts. The population had been increased by immigrant cultivators, besides the forcibly-settled tribes; and a very large accession of inhabitants had swelled Kurrachee and Shikarpoore to cities, thus augmenting trade both ways, by the sea-board and by the river. Wealthy merchants were now also seeking to open new commercial channels in a country considered by them as that one of all the East where justice was most surely and cheaply to be had.

Meanwhile the revenue had so increased that in December another ten lacs were paid into the general treasury, making a gross surplus of two hundred thousand pounds; and it was the opinion of the collectors that the same system would in ten years produce one million sterling without pressure on the people, or very sensible increase of administrative expenses. But the most remarkable proof of good government and personal reputation was, that the whole people of Cutch Gundava in the north, and the tribes of the Gedrosian desert on the west, now asked to be received as subjects; while on the east the nawab of Bhawalpoor, who did not disguise his dislike of the political agents with whom he had hitherto dealt in his political relations, demanded to be placed entirely under the control of the Scindian conqueror, whose government had been so suddenly thrown by the shock of war into the midst of these wide-spread populations. Like a rock cast from a volcano into a lake, it had come, and like the waters they had receded tumultuously, like them to return and tranquilly subside.

But none of his great administrative services, nor all of them combined with his surprising exploits in war, were of any avail to cool the malignant heat of enmity in the Court of Directors, nor warm Lord Ripon to a momentary

sense of what was due to a great man from a minister of the Crown. Vexatiously he had delayed the soldiers' medals, had insulted the general, and endeavoured to stifle the despatches announcing success in the hill campaign — had applauded Outram's slanders — had adopted the secret accusations of the Bombay councillors, without daring to name them as accusers, and had refused, or at least neglected, to expose the false official statements foisted on the public as to the expenses; thus without inquiry—to which he was invited—countenancing the industriously inculcated notion that it was a worse than useless conquest. Scinde is nevertheless a great and beneficial acquisition which has opened a high-way for commerce with Central Asia; and if governed on Sir C. Napier's principles will become an opulent province and a powerful bulwark on the south-west for India. If governed on the usual system of the Company it will become one of those lasting shames for the directors, which made Lord Wellesley call them the "Ignominious Tyrants of the East."

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WHILE Scinde was thus happily ruled, the state of Indian affairs beyond her frontier was perplexing and menacing. An embarrassing and costly insurrection had long tormented the Bombay presidency, and in the north-west a war with the Seikhs was hourly impending; yet the prevalent opinion in India was adverse to the occurrence of this last event; and joined to that incredulity was the arrogant assumption, that if it did happen, an easy triumph awaited the British arms. Judging very differently on both those points, Sir C. Napier reflected carefully upon every possible phase of such a contest, the danger and difficulty of which he foresaw and foretold from a distance, with a surer military and political comprehension than others who were closer. He had, under the governor-general's orders, equipped, and in September sent to the upper Sutlej, pontoons for bridges, and he was vigilant to keep his own military administration so organized that no sudden call, however onerous, could cause confusion though its extent might embarrass his resources. He had therefore unceasingly pressed the progress of the camel baggage-corps, as the most powerful spring to insure regular and rapid movement in that great and complicated machine, an army in the field. Constantly also he meditated on the force to be employed, and the operations to be adopted when required—as he foresaw he would be—to act as an auxiliary to the main army on the upper Sutlej.

His speculations, transmitted to the governor-general, were found to coincide in a remarkable manner with the

transmitted opinions of the duke of Wellington on the same subject, and thus mentally fortified, he awaited the course of events. It was not long before his sagacity was vindicated. The governor-general, trusting too confidently to his own strenuous efforts to preserve peace, had certainly adopted—it might be caused—the public opinion as to an amicable termination of the Punjaub difficulty, and the Seikhs commenced the contest before the British forces were prepared; so unexpectedly they did so, that only a fortnight before the battle of Moodkee was fought Sir H. Hardinge assured Sir C. Napier he would give him six weeks' notice of hostilities. The war was therefore an unlooked-for event which made India tremble; the veil of falsehood, woven at Bombay to cover Scinde from public estimation, was thereby rent asunder; and the great importance of that acquisition was comprehended when the announcement of the battle of Moodkee was accompanied by an order to assemble at Roree, with all possible speed, an army of fifteen thousand men equipped for the field, and with a siege-train. To do this was impossible from the resources of Scinde; but reinforcements were to come from Bombay, and soon ten thousand men of all arms, with guns, waggons, horses, camp-equipage and camp-followers were marched from the interior of that presidency to the coast, and embarked at all the sea-ports of Western India. From Mandavie, Surat, Bombay and Vingorla, on every description of floating craft, from the steam-frigate to the open country boat, men and materials were poured into Scinde with a promptitude showing, that Sir George Arthur, and Sir Robert Oliver the commander of the Indian navy, had no sympathy with the factious sentiments of the Willoughbys, Reids and Crawfords.

Had the policy of the supreme government permitted Sir C. Napier to obey the dictates of his perception that the war was inevitable, a Scindian army could and would have been equipped for the field three months before, and cautiously quartered from Hyderabad upwards, ready at a moment's notice to concentrate at Roree and move into

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the Mooltan country. This could have been effected without attracting the attention of the Seikhs; but it had been forbidden to move a soldier, to purchase a camel, or in any manner to prepare for a contest; and when the order for war came, only the eighteen hundred camels, of his newly-organized baggage-corps, that is to say, carriage for a column of three thousand persons was available, when carriage for nearly fifty thousand was required; and when the general spread agents abroad to purchase, the jam of the Jokeas endeavoured to thwart them. Sir C. Napier's vigour of command to meet the campaign thus violently thrust upon him was not to be so impeded. He arrested the jam in the midst of his tribe, awed all insidious enemies, redoubled his own efforts, and soon obtained twelve thousand camels; meanwhile he equipped and pushed men and guns up the Indus with incredible rapidity; for his battering-train was advanced a hundred miles two days after he had received the governor-general's orders!

Then he met the influx of the multitude from Bombay with a power of order and resources never surpassed. Every department worked day and night and on the right road, without jostling or confusion. The artillery in addition to their numerous field-batteries formed a siege-train complete of thirty-two pieces, with a thousand rounds a gun; the engineers under Captain Peat, an officer of unbounded talent, organized a park, said to have been a model—so complete was it in arrangement and all things essential for war—although collected under great difficulties, and where genius was taxed to supply the absence of regular arsenals and the resources of civilization. The commissariat carried up two months' provisions; the medical department was amply furnished; and though the Bombay reinforcements had to be marched to the coast and embarked with their equipage and followers, in all not less than thirty thousand persons; though their voyages were of five hundred and eight hundred miles, and the troops when disembarked again had to march nearly four hundred miles, the whole army was concen-

trated at Roree on the forty-second day after receiving the order!

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On the 6th of February more than fifty thousand men, if the camp-followers be included, were assembled at Roree with every department well ordered, well combined and completed. Eighty pieces of artillery were gathered with all materials and ammunition for a campaign in abundance. A powerful armed flotilla was on the Indus freighted with stores and three months' provisions, and having on board three hundred yards of flying bridge. A zealous body of officers worked like men anticipating and resolved to merit success, and an almost frantic enthusiasm pervaded the soldiers—they fought with the air and could hardly be restrained from shouting to the charge as they marched—yet a careful discipline was everywhere apparent.

This rapidity, unexampled if the scanty resources of Scinde, the suddenness of the order and the completeness of the equipment be considered, could not have been attained if the camel baggage-corps had not been previously organized; nor could this powerful, war-breathing army, when assembled, have dared to move in advance but for the previous campaign in the hills—that campaign which Lord Ripon with official imbecility stigmatized as an insignificant affair of outposts. Had it been neglected the army would now have had as many enemies on its flank and rear as it had in front, and could not have moved a step in advance—fortunate if it had not a separate warfare to sustain for the defence of Scinde!

About five thousand men remained for the protection of that country.

Three thousand with six field-pieces and fifteen heavy guns were appropriated to Kurrachee as the principal place of arms, and key of the whole system.

At Hyderabad the fortress and intrenched camp, the latter armed with six twelve-pounders, were furnished with three months' provisions and garrisoned by a sepoy regiment and eight hundred police.

The steamer arsenal at Khotree on the Indus, had its



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own fort with two guns and a hundred marines, aided by the armed workmen and some policemen for garrison; this was however a small force to secure so extensive a district, wherefore troops were brought from Cutch to Wangar Bazaar, on the borders of the Delta. Detachments from Deesa were also directed to garrison Omercote in the desert, but Meerpoor and Aliar-ka-Tanda were guarded by policemen only. Larkaana and Sehwan were likewise left entirely to the native police, and the five thousand regular troops presented but two formidable masses.

Shahpoor, Kanghur, Sukkur, Shikarpoore and Bukkur, were guarded by a regiment of regular cavalry and one of infantry, with six field-pieces; Sukkur had also its armament of heavy guns, and all these places were to be aided by the northern policemen who were now as formidable as the sepoy, and so resolute that Ayliff Khan, the swordsman, had recently with only six men defeated a predatory band of Seikhs, and ignorant of the general's order not to pass the frontier, had crossed and pursued his enemies for twenty miles.

To resign the whole country, during war, to the keeping of so few troops was in itself an answer to all malevolent libels on his government, but Sir C. Napier had other and surer warrant for tranquillity. Belooch Khan, the independent hill-chief near Lheree, whose suspicious dealings during the campaign against the confederates have been mentioned, now offered to join the army with a hundred horsemen. Khan Mohamed made a like offer, and to serve at his own expense, adding, that for a small pay he would bring five thousand of his "*tenantry*" to the field! Now Mohamed was the most powerful sirdar in Scinde, and a Talpoor, being nephew to the Lion, at whose side he had fought bravely up to the latter's defeat by Jacob; yet was he earnest to march with the man who had dethroned his kindred; and he had so entirely adopted the new order of things as to talk of his warriors as his *tenantry*! To him Sir Charles spoke frankly, saying how willingly he would have given to the world this proof of the contentment and good faith of the

Scindians ; but as the Beloochees and Bhawalpoores were enemies of old, the nawab would have just cause of complaint if the British brought foes into his territory. He would think some sinister design to deprive him of his possessions was entertained, and would become a suspicious ally, perhaps a secret enemy. Mohamed acknowledged the force of the argument, and so the matter ended. Secretly the general's policy was to quell, not to stimulate the warlike habits of the Beloochee race ; but this offer from a man so resolute and powerful, and of such lineage, coupled with the sentiment of fear which the strongly-organized army now assembled was calculated to produce, left him without fear of commotion in Scinde. He had therefore only to consider his plan of military operations, and the disposition of the neighbouring powers in Khelat and Affghanistan, both of which he treated with cautious sagacity.

The Khelat sirdars, thinking to make a stroke of policy demanded money in the khan's name, to resist the Affghans, who were, they said, prepared to invade Khelat and even Scinde when the general entered the Punjaub—adding, that the money would enable them not only to hold the Candaharees in check, but even to win them over as auxiliaries in the war. Thus artfully they sounded his fears as to that contest, but the reply was sternly explicit. “I will not give a rupee. I want no aid against the Seikhs, and if the Affghans give offence an English army can go again to Cabool, and perhaps remain there ; if the khan is molested the troops at Hyderabad and Shahpoor shall march to his assistance.” This sufficed for the sirdars ; and the Candahar chiefs, instead of menacing Khelat offered to join the British army—an offer received with thanks, but declined as being likely to embarrass the operations with wild plundering warriors, who troublesome in success would become enemies if a reverse occurred ; indeed at this period Sir C. Napier could, if so inclined, have led half Beloochistan and Affghanistan into the Punjaub.

Now also Ali Moorad tendered his services thinking to

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get back some territory formerly taken from him by Runjeet Sing; and his offer was accepted, on the condition that he moved up the right bank of the Indus, and supplied a garrison for Mittenkote when it should fall, an arrangement which promised the following advantages.

1°. The ameer would sweep away the bands of matchlock-men that were sure to infest the right bank of the river, and interrupt the communications.

2°. There would be an appearance of two armies, one on each side of the Indus, the fame of which would be exaggerated by the Asiatic imagination, and spread even to Constantinople!

3°. Mittenkote would be held by an ally, whose aid in the field of battle was not required, whereby the British line of operations would be shortened by the distance from that place to Roree.

4°. If the ameer proved treacherous, which was scarcely to be expected, he could do no serious mischief, because the left bank of the Indus and the river itself would still be commanded by the British army and flotilla; and Mittenkote would be under the control of Captain Malet and Mr. Curling, whose influence with Ali Moorad's hired Patans was sufficient, with an offer of higher pay, to draw those adventurers altogether away from that prince's service.

The general's plan of operations was framed with singular care and foresight. Mittenkote was the first place of importance capable of resistance, the Seikhs were busily strengthening the works, and its situation within the confluence of the Punjaub rivers, adapted it for a place of arms to sustain an invasion from Scinde, and to facilitate the sieges of Sojuabad and Mooltan, the fortresses next in succession. The design was therefore to make a rapid movement on Mittenkote in two columns, throw a flying bridge over the river, and crush it at once by the concentrated fire of eighty pieces of ordnance. This the general observed was like "killing a gnat with a sledge-hammer," but, besides the value of time he knew how dangerous irregular warriors like the Seikhs were behind stone walls,

and his policy was to terrify Soojabad and Mooltan by this sudden overwhelming of Mittenkote. The movement against Mittenkote was to be up both banks of the river with the flotilla between, because, after passing Kusmore, the right bank belonged to the Mazarees—enemies—and as some of the troops were already on that side and the whole would have to be there at Mittenkote, two passages and time would be saved by the double movement which would also awe the Seikh Mazarees.

Ali Moorad was then to be launched with all of his men, not required to garrison Mittenkote, against Deyrah Ishmael, a rich town to the westward. For with a nice appreciation of character the general judged that the ameer's desire for plunder would lead him to advance several marches, that his fears would then make him halt, and thus, without misfortune to the town of Deyrah, a powerful diversion would be effected, which would draw off troops from the right bank of the Sutlej. Meanwhile the army, moving up the left bank upon Ooch, was to form a field depôt there, fortify the place, and prepare to force the passage of that river; an operation judged of easy accomplishment, if Ali Moorad's diversion was effectual; but always mindful of that great principle of war, that as an enemy is never to be despised all available strength should be applied to every effort, the English leader resolved not only to place the whole of his siege-guns and field-artillery in battery on the bank, but to transfer the guns from the steamers to small boats to insure a preponderance of fire. When the passage was effected, he designed to construct a double bridge-head, armed with steamer guns, and by intrusting it to the Bhawulpoor auxiliaries, keep his own force and battering-train entire to move against Soojabad or Mooltan.

He had fifty-four field-guns admirably horsed, and on these he chiefly depended for defeating the Seikhs, expecting by rapid movements to put their heavier artillery sooner or later into a difficulty, and then with his active army to break their cavalry and infantry without being crippled, for his intention was to go far, yet not wildly.

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He knew his ground. He had prepared means to raise all the population along the Indus as far as Deyrah Ishmael Gazee against the Seikhs ; and had he been permitted to assemble his army as he desired, at an early period of the cool season, he would have shown the world a great game in war, and burst upon Lahore at the head of fifty thousand fighting men long before the battle of Sobraon was fought. The siege of Mooltan in the second Punjaub war, perhaps that war itself, would thus have been spared. It was otherwise ordained.

While the Scindian British army was being assembled, the battle of Ferozashur was fought on the upper Sutlej, with so little advantage that the contending forces remained in observation on the English side of the river, and a powerful corps was necessarily detached under Sir Harry Smith to protect the communications, then menaced near Loodiana by an auxiliary Seikh force. In this state of affairs the governor-general suddenly ordered Sir C. Napier to direct his army on Bhawalpoor, and repair himself to the great camp on the upper Sutlej ; a journey not to be safely made without an escort for several days, which would have been slow for the occasion ; but the fighting camel corps was here again made available and the speed was as a courier's. He reached the camp at Lahore on the 3rd of March, yet only to find that the battle of Sobraon had been gained, that a treaty was in progress, that his well-devised campaign was nullified, and his life endangered by the combined action of mental and bodily fatigue, for no object ! Anticipated fame, health and independent command had been snatched away at once ; and, worse than all to his spirit, he found that when the Punjaub was actually lying bound at the feet of England if he had been allowed to conduct the operations as he had projected, the war was not to be continued by the main army—peace with the certain contingent of another war was to be substituted for complete conquest. He was received by the governor-general with honour and very great kindness ; by the soldiers with enthusiasm ; and in Durbar he was treated by Goolab Sing, then going to be raised to the

sovereignty of Cashmere, with such a marked respectfulness of demeanour, as to indicate that he had adopted the general opinion as to the "*nusseeb*" or fortune of the Scindian conqueror, which the Beloochees rudely expressed by saying it was "*a cubit longer than that of any other man.*" But his mission was naught, and after a few days' stay he had to return to Kurrachee, where he arrived in April, suffering in health from this useless continuous journey of eighteen hundred miles under an Indian sun.

While at Lahore, he saw and reflected on the difficulties arising from the advanced season, and the absolutely denuded state of the British army, and as his own projected auxiliary invasion of the Punjaub, which would have insured entire conquest without imposing further operations on the main army was set aside, he judged negotiation advisable; but his opinion was adverse to the general policy pursued. He had before hostilities commenced, declared his belief that the British empire in India was not ripe for a frontier on the upper Indus; yet as circumstances had forced on this war and the Punjaub was virtually subdued, he thought the conquest should and might have been consolidated without further bloodshed; whereas—"if a puppet king like Duleep Sing, and a real monarch like Goolab were established, the battle would have to be fought again, rivers of blood would flow, and the result might be doubtful." He said so, and in two years Mooltan, Ramnuggur, Chillianwallah and Goojerat, bore red-handed testimony to the truth of the prediction.

It has been said, with sufficient authority to assume the fact as historical, that his projected campaign was thus stifled, to have his aid on the upper Sutlej, where, previous to the victory of Sobraon, the war bore a dark aspect. This was a flattering recognition of merit, but having been productive only of mortification and evil to the object of it, gives the right of examination as to the possible public benefit.

Sir C. Napier with fifteen thousand men, so well organized, disciplined and provided, and wrought to such frenzied eagerness for battle, was, his great reputation

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with the nations around considered, worth another man with thirty thousand; and his line of operation was, politically and militarily the true one for an auxiliary force. He had a sure base and retreat on well-furnished fortresses, his power would have been magnified extravagantly when he had crushed Mittenkote and invested Mooltan, and as nearly the whole of the warlike population on the left bank of the Indus were in secret communication with him and ready to join him in arms, he would have decisively influenced the operations on the upper Sutlej. Indeed the mere appearance of his army at Roree had so terrified the southern Seikhs, that the Dewan had secretly treated for the surrender of Mooltan; and an influential native in another quarter being ready to obey his secret orders, he was very justly confident, of reaching Lahore without a check, and with the Dewan and Mooltan Seikhs as auxiliaries. In fine the campaign was in his hands, that is, using his own words, "*as far as man could know of war, for if fortune take offence she can make a straw ruin an army.*"

Was it wise to cast away such moral and material advantages, to call such a general from a country and a people so perfectly known to him, and, no slight consideration, knowing and fearing him as though he were a demon in battle—to call him at a critical moment to a country and people of whom he knew nothing. And for what? To have one man more in a council, where perhaps there was already one too many; and where unless some very unusual arrangement was contemplated, he must naturally be regarded with jealousy. Ignorant of the resources on either side, he could only have advised hesitatingly, and could not act at all. Meanwhile his own army was thrown entirely out of the scheme of operations by being moved to Bhawalpoor, where it was palsied and without sure communications; for the river was thus rendered useless as a communication, and an invasion of Scinde was invited, which would have thrown all the incumbrances of the force upon the grand army. This is not conjectural. It was subsequently ascertained that a

Seikh force was actually prepared for such a counter invasion, and was only stopped by the negotiations after the battle of Sobraon.

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To overrule all these considerations, simply to have a third general in council, would seem to argue a state of much greater peril and nakedness on the Sutlej than has yet been made known to the public; and without presuming to censure or even to analyze the plan of campaign followed, it may be permitted to indicate another scheme of operations, which might possibly have been as effectual with less bloodshed; and would certainly have obviated the necessity—if there was a necessity—for blotting Sir C. Napier and his army out of the campaign.

For two years the state of the Punjaub had indicated a coming war; and though the governor-general might hope by policy to avoid that extremity, there was always sufficient danger to warrant preparation up to the verge of action. To say such preparation would have provoked that event, is a conclusion to be reasonably denied; and it is certain a contrary system did not avert the catastrophe, though it did deprive the army of the resources required to give human confidence in the result. Taking then as a basis, that hostilities should from the first have been deemed inevitable, it follows, that the most powerful military means to sustain a war should have been combined with judicious policy to prevent one; and the time required for warlike preparation, could certainly have been most easily gained by negotiations to stave off a conflict altogether. A war and peace policy would thus have marched together for a certain time, and the following dispositions would have placed the army in a better condition as to its communications, than it was previous to the victory of Sobraon; they would also have enabled it to decide the war by one great action, instead of fighting five times ere its own safety was insured.

Lahore was the Seikhs' base of operations, and they had several lines of invasion open.

*First.* To pass the Sutlej near Ferozepoore, or at Hureekke, as really happened.




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*Second.* To pass the Beas, and the upper Sutlej near Loodiana, as the force defeated at Aliwal did do.

*Third.* To pass the Sutlej below Ferozepoore, and, crossing the desert by Seersa, menace Delhi.

In the first and second cases, the Seikhs might have marched forward in mass, or, intrenching themselves, have detached their numerous cavalry to ravage the country up to Delhi. The problem to be solved was therefore how to dispose the British army, that, while remaining on the defensive, it could yet baffle those three courses of invasion without losing command of the initiatory impulse if circumstances gave it the right to strike first. To effect this solution, Ferozepoore should have been considered, not as the key and pivot of the operations upon which the army was to gather, but as an isolated point to be thrown on its own resources. It should have been furnished with stores as a place of arms, and with the means of bridging the Sutlej; it should have been strengthened with an intrenched camp to be occupied with a moveable corps of all arms, ten thousand strong at the lowest, and so have been left to itself.

This arrangement would have obviated the necessity of the flank march from Loodiana down the left bank of the Sutlej to succour it, such as occurred. Certainly an un-military march, for that river did not cover the British army, being fordable in many places, and it was actually passed by the enemy during the movement; in fine it was a line of march which could not have been adopted before a skilful enemy. The Seikh general showed no ability, and yet that flank march enabled him to fight the dangerous and indecisive battles of Moodkee and Ferozashur, and involved an after-necessity on the British side for Smith's operations to clear the communications. But if Ferozepoore had been originally shaken off as a detached point, the main army could have been assembled in masses at and about Loodiana and Sirhind; using those towns and Umballah as secondary places of arms and communicating with Delhi. In this position, having the cavalry thrown out on the wings to protect the country on each





flank against any sudden action of the Seikh irregular horsemen, the army, provided with means for throwing a permanent bridge over the Sutlej and having a flying bridge for further operations, might have calmly awaited the development of the Punjaub troubles after giving notice to the Lahore Durbar, that any Seikh movement towards the Sutlej, or even the furnishing of their troops with means to take the field, would be considered a declaration of war.

Thus prepared with a declared policy and a powerful army, the British chief, when the Seikhs, as really happened, issued pay and ammunition to their troops and consulted astrologers as to the fortunate hour for action, could have called in his cavalry, laid his permanent bridge over the Sutlej, avoided the left bank altogether, and taking post on the Beas, have thrown his pontoon bridge and fortified a head on the further side of that river. This movement would have inevitably stopped the Seikh army, and yet have permitted further negotiations, not unlikely to succeed when thus vigorously supported.

If those negotiations failed, the command of all the movements offensive or defensive would have remained with the British army. For if the Seikhs attempted to pass the Sutlej below the confluence of the Beas, they could be opposed in front by the corps at Ferozepoore, while the main army, crossing the Beas, fell on their flank and cut them off from Lahore. If they attempted to force the Beas itself, the main army could receive the attack with every advantage; while the corps from Ferozepoore, by means of their bridge and the fords, either passed the Sutlej at Hureekee to menace the enemy's flank, or at Erareese to support the defence of the Beas.

But the Seikhs would never have attempted such difficult operations, and must have remained passive in defence while Sir C. Napier's army was operating from the side of Mooltan on their flank and rear; and if, as is most probable, the Seikh general intrenched a position to cover Lahore and Umritzer, the British army on the Beas and the auxiliary force at Ferozepoore, passing the Sutlej and the Beas simultaneously by means of their respective

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bridges and at the fords, could have united to deliver a decisive battle which would have given them the capital, possibly the whole country, and would certainly have brought them to the Chenaub, or the Jelum, where Sir C. Napier's force could, if necessary, have joined.

If the battle was adverse to the British, their retreat over the Beas and Sutlej was secure; and if driven from those lines, Ferozepoore offered a refuge for its own corps while the main body took a new line behind the upper Sutlej as at the opening of the campaign: meanwhile Sir C. Napier's operations would prevent the Seikhs from vigorously following up their victory. Now quitting this hypothetical campaign to resume the story of the administration of Scinde, it shall be shown that the field of battle is not the only place where heroic conduct can be displayed by an officer.

At Kurrachee Sir C. Napier, although suffering from illness, resumed his unceasing cares for the people committed to his charge. He could not indeed help seeing that he was a man looked to in danger and difficulty, but overlooked in the distribution of honours and treated with contumely when fear did not enforce respect; but with a noble scorn he pushed base usage aside in his pursuit of the real greatness belonging to a discharge of his duty to a whole people. "I do not pretend" he said "that I am not chagrined at being a man marked by the government. This has been made evident in many ways. Nothing has been done for my staff in the hill campaign; which would not have been the case I imagine under any other general, and I receive no redress or even answers to my complaints of injuries. As to rewards I can only act as I have always professed—namely that those who are to receive them are not the men to dictate. Hardinge and Gough are both my seniors, Smith however is only a colonel, and is made a baronet—that is very marked, why I know not nor do I care—I have worked and do work from motives of honour and right feeling, and because I love work, and if the ministers have not the same right feeling I cannot help it."

It was his fortune that while thus personally maltreated,

nearly every possible natural ill should be accumulated to bar the progress of Scinde under his government, as if to prove the unyielding energy of spirit which could sustain both burthens and still work through to good. It has been shown how war, pestilence, locusts, anomalous overflowing of the Indus, scarcity, predatory invasions, and the previous tyranny of the ameers, were combined with the hostility of the Court of Directors and the foul practices of the factious Bombay authorities to produce disasters, thus tormenting his administration during the first three years—and how the fourth year was opened by the mortification of being called away from that gallant army, which with such unexampled pains and surprising rapidity he and his officers had organized for the field, at the moment when with a natural ambition he looked for increase of reputation.

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There was still a crowning ill in store. In June the cholera came to Kurrachee with more than its usual terrors and havoc. It had appeared amongst the natives in May, not severely, but gradually acquiring intensity until the night of the 14th of June, when it struck all people, soldiers, Europeans and sepoy, with such a sudden fearful mortality, that to feel it was to drop, and to drop was death. Fear seized every breast, the cooks, butchers and bakers died or fled with the panic-stricken mass of the population to the open country, where without food, water, help, or cover from the sun, then in its raging season, nearly all perished and the land was covered with carcasses.

The soldiers rushing, some to the hospitals others from them, were very much excited, and in one place some commissariat carts laden with spirits, which were imagined to be an antidote, were on the point of being seized when the town and cantonments would have been overwhelmed with madness as well as death. Soon the general appeared with his staff, issuing the necessary directions for re-establishing order and system, and recalling men to their senses and duties; for seeing that some panic prevailed in a quarter where the utmost devotion was necessary, and some drunkenness amongst the hospital attendants, he

CHAP. XII. infused new vigour by aiding the sufferers himself, helping  
1846. to carry the dying to the wards, rubbing their convulsed limbs, and encouraging all to bear up as they would on a battle-field.

This terrible visitation continued to scourge the place from the 14th to the 18th unceasingly, and if it had not then abated the whole station would have been destroyed; for in its mitigated form, the deaths on the 30th of June were one hundred and twenty of the people besides soldiers! Every twenty-four hours the general and his staff, twice visited every ward and every man in the hospitals, besides taking measures for reassuring the population—a fearful duty, because of the horrible agonies of the sufferers. The labour was also great. The different hospitals were far asunder, the nearest more than a mile from his house, and in that dreadful heat and on that dreadful duty, they must have passed over twenty to twenty-five miles each day besides the exertions of personally aiding the patients. The dying men with look and voice expressed satisfaction at having their general near them in their pains, and he, seeing that moral influences would be at least as efficacious as medicines, though he was debilitated by previous sickness, nerved body and soul for the task without any shrinking of either, even when the plague smote his own home—heavily smote it.

The child of his nephew, John Napier, first died and was buried, its mother being then on the eve of giving birth to another; and the next evening the young father, whose affliction had not lessened his efforts to help others, was laid in the same grave! His years were few, and he had no opportunity of gaining that distinction in arms which with a chafed spirit he constantly sought, for he was a lion's cub! He found instead a death of agony, and obscure for such an ardent soldier; yet it was on the straight path of honourable duty, which he followed without faltering when danger was more rife and intrepidity more needful than on the field of battle.

It was computed that seven thousand persons, more than a third of the population of the town and canton-

ments, died in the few days the horrible pestilence lasted ; and the deaths in the country around being added not less than sixty thousand persons perished. The Angel of Death had passed over the land with sounding pinions and all were dismayed.

“This mysterious disease,” said Sir C. Napier, writing at the time, “principally attacks the finest and the strongest men. I separated the regiments as quickly as my deficiency of carriage enabled me, but nothing would stop the vehement progress of the sickness for the first three days. Afterwards, that is to say from the night of the 17th, its virulence seemed mitigated, and on the 18th it became infinitely milder. This day, the 19th not more than fifteen soldiers have died, and the medical men expect that to-morrow it will pass away. It is a strange and mysterious sickness and defies reflection to account for it. In some it appeared with violent convulsions, dreadful to behold ; in others all was calmness, they came into hospital placid and silent. Not one of these quiet ones lived many hours, but the cries of the others were prolonged and very painful to hear.

“I believe many medical men hold that water is bad in cholera ; this seems a great error ; some of the most violent cases appeared to give way to repeated draughts of cold water. At first it was thrown up, but after two or three rejections remained on the stomach, and the patient recovered. All were continually calling for water, and especially for soda-water, which happily was manufactured at Kurrachee, and thousands and thousands of bottles have been drunk. I greatly encouraged the surgeons to give water, because, seeing death was inevitable, I thought it cruel to add the pains of intense thirst ; and I happened by a strange accident to have seen in the newspaper, the morning of the day cholera broke out, an advertisement by a medical man, asserting the beneficial effects of cold water in cholera ; his description tallied exactly with what I observed in the hospitals, and I am persuaded it is correct to give water. I endure great anxiety from this sickness, and from fear of the station being destroyed by



CHAP. XII. famine, and the sun is hot beyond anything we have yet  
1846. experienced in Scinde; however, generally speaking, until this blow fell we had been remarkably healthy."

Notwithstanding the great diminution of the population by death and by flight, food became very scarce, because distant people, dreading infection, would not come in with supplies, and every horror menaced the station. Shocking also was the reflection that the disease had been exacerbated—and would have been more so but for the accidental presence of the soda-water manufactory—because sanction for bringing the Mullyeer river to Kurrachee had been neglected. The Kurrachee water, holding many deleterious substances in solution, predisposed the viscera to accept the disease, and aggravated its development. Sir C. Napier, as already shown, had been for two years prepared to supply good water, but never could he get even an answer to his solicitations on the subject—"and for the king's offence the people died!"

This official procrastination clogged or retarded almost every measure of importance. The formation of the baggage corps had been delayed for two years, and the names of the officers of the irregular corps which had been formed were long withheld from the *Gazette*, so they could only draw their pay on account, to their discontent and public inconvenience. Above seventy thousand pounds also had been disbursed under the supreme government's orders for various objects, yet the regular official sanctions were retarded, and thus the public accounts were thrown into confusion, the accountants into difficulties.

It was so likewise with respect to Ali Moorad's treaty, which he was impatient to have concluded; and it was very essential that it should be arranged, because the rumour of restoring the ameers, sounding like his death-knell, urged him to look for alliances and support independent of the British. Yet no effort could extract any decision or any intimation on the subject, the treaty was neither confirmed nor abrogated, a profound silence was maintained on the subject.

Sir C. Napier attributed this state of things to a

malicious feeling in official persons, civil and military, who having thwarted Lord Ellenborough for reasons before mentioned, now transferred their hostility to him as one of that nobleman's successful generals. Sir Henry Hardinge, new to Indian affairs, and having a great war and negotiation on his hands, naturally referred such matters to the subordinate authorities, secretaries and boards, with whom to embarrass the governor of Scinde was a maxim of state. "*Oh let Scinde wait*" was the official password, and hence all measures of a beneficial tendency depending on such persons, were held in abeyance or entirely abated, and the action of the Scinde administrative policy had no adequate scope.

"It is thus," he observed, "that I am lamed in my course, for if I make fight, both I and Sir Henry Hardinge will be overwhelmed with an enormous correspondence from every department to prove that they are quite right; and after two or three years of this work it will be settled that I am a very zealous but entirely wrong-judging person, and ill informed of what is required in government. The game is not worth the candle, when that candle is my life, which must sink under such additional vexatious work. Wherefore, when justice to individuals or to bodies is involved I am stiff, but where the evil only affects the government I let things go their own gait; the public suffers indeed, but I cannot help that when every remedial effort only makes matters worse. I will not sacrifice the primary consideration of forwarding the civilization and prosperity of Scinde, to waste my time and my bodily strength in useless contests with factious official people; I am content, if they so please, to do nothing, but I will not do mischief!"

Though cribbed and constrained by such arts, all that depended on his own authority made rapid progress, for it was well said of him at the time of the cholera, "That neither age, nor exhausting toil, nor gathering dangers, nor broken health, nor the greatness of the public calamity, nor the stings of private sorrow could make his heart falter, or shake his spirit in the performance of his duty." The advancement of agriculture, of commerce, of popu-

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Remarks on  
Lieut.-Colonel  
Outram's work,  
by Richard  
Napier, Esq.,  
published by  
Ridgway.

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lation and of revenue was astonishing. The most experienced men had judged it hopeless for many years to make the country pay even its own civil expenses, and in 1843-4 the revenue had been only nine lacs; yet such was the power of his formula of government, that in 1844-5 it was twenty-seven lacs—in 1845-6 the financial year ending in April, it was forty lacs, of which thirty-one, or three hundred and ten thousand pounds sterling were surplus paid into the general treasury, after defraying the whole cost of civil administration including more than two thousand policemen horse and foot, all excellent soldiers! Yet the ameeers' taxes had been reduced one-half, and no new ones imposed, while the cost of the civil government by vigilance and economy was kept stationary.

This steady augmentation of surplus revenue was sure to increase under the powerful administrative machinery developed, which was attaining every day more regularity and precision and was attended by an increasing commerce and agriculture. Each half-year also cancelled some current expenses, which had been required for the first establishment of government, but which were not to be permanent, such as the construction of barracks and fortifications. A thorough clearing out of the canals was another enforced outlay of a temporary nature, because that duty had hitherto of necessity been trusted to the kardars to whom it belonged under the ameeers; and who had taken advantage of the times to redouble their usual frauds; but now the organization of a canal department under Major Scott being completed, a general survey made, and the water-levels all over Scinde ascertained with great cost and labour, a scientific system was laid down, and the whole of the canal and water system was taken out of the kardars' hands.

On the new system a far greater extent of country would have been irrigated, and at a diminished cost, augmenting the revenue both ways; but the principal improvement would have been the establishing of sluice-gates, so combined that the waters of the Indus were entirely controlled, whether in flood or in recession, whereas previously

they had rioted capriciously both for production and destruction. Thus in June and July the country was always an expanse of water in which grain shot up marvellously ; but often the water would recede anomalously, leaving the plants to the raging sun, which they could, from the moisture left, sustain for a time, and if a second inundation came quickly the harvest was sure to be rich and heavy ; but if the refreshing flood did not return, as often happened, or was not high enough to fill the canals, the crops perished, and in conjunction with the lower levels which were always swampy, produced promiscuous crops of grain, weeds and fever ! These evil changes and results would have been corrected by the sluice-gates, and yet at first, the ignorant people thought this controlling of the waters was designed to withhold it and starve them ! The Bombay faction greedily recorded those foolish apprehensions as proofs of general disaffection ; but soon the cloud passed away, and the conquered would have rejoiced in this new benefit from the conquest.

The conqueror did rejoice at having established a system which in a few years would have been thoroughly understood, and which by controlling the action of sun and moisture on an alluvial soil, was sure to render Scinde one vast farm for cotton, indigo, sugar, wheat and all minor grains. He had now also the satisfaction to find that the merchant cafilas, which had previously gone from Khelat by Beila to the Gedrosian port of Soonomeeanee, the rival of Kurrachee, had, from the security of Scinde under his government, changed their route, descending by Sehwan to Kurrachee ; which thus by the mere force of justice, with an inferior harbour, had usurped the whole trade. Soonomeeanee was then deprived of its mercantile value, and Sir C. Napier dropped the negotiations for its purchase. He had however already raised the revenue of Bombay very largely by stopping the smuggling of opium from Scinde ; and had good reason to say the conquest was a most profitable one for the Company and for England. For the Company so enormously profitable, that in the suppression of opium

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Plan 1.

See Captain Rathborne's and Mr. Edwards's letters, App. XVI.

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smuggling only, it must be reckoned by millions, and would be almost incredible if the proofs were not so clear and irrefragable. The facts are indeed still perverted in parliament, or withheld from the public, but from this source alone the Company have by the conquest of Scinde derived millions of pounds sterling!

Notwithstanding all these facts, false statements of the expense, and equally false returns of the number of troops employed, were palmed on the parliament with the object of discrediting Sir C. Napier's labours—but while loud cries were raised against the number of troops quartered in Scinde there was really a strong aversion on the part of the Bombay faction and its unworthy abettors in England to have them reduced, because that would have publicly demolished all their libels as to the feelings of the people towards their conqueror. Those feelings were not as was said, hatred and discontent; they were of reverence of attachment and of admiration, which grew stronger and were more unequivocally shown as the result of his protecting and encouraging legislation became more developed; and those results, however great, would have been much greater but for the two interrupting wars which had occurred—that against the hillmen in the beginning of 1845 and that of the Punjaub in the beginning of 1846—which engrossed all the mental and bodily energies of the general and his officers, day and night, leaving no margin for thought or intervention as to civil improvements. Many months' action of the energy which had marked every day by some measure of peaceful utility, were thus forcibly abstracted from the three years which the civil administration of Scinde had now lasted; and it has been before shown how vexed and tormented those years were by natural visitations, by the foulness of factions, and the negligence and enmity of power.

## CHAPTER XIII.

WEARIED of exile, or believing the Talpoor dynasties would be finally restored, the Lion sent vakeels in the summer of 1846 to treat for his return to Scinde, but being referred to the governor-general, broke off the negotiation and remained in the Punjaub. This notion of restoring the ameers had been, as already shown, industriously promulgated by the Bombay faction. In England also Lord Ashley had moved parliament in their behalf; and without any accurate knowledge of affairs to warrant interference, he so stirred himself, as to merit being classed with the persons described by Napoleon as "*Brave blunders who with all possible good intentions, do all possible mischief.*" The ameers therefore, thinking him a sure support, had through their Bombay confederates announced, that a paper given by Lord Ashley to their vakeels in London, contained an assurance to themselves, that they were to live as private gentlemen close to the frontiers of Scinde. That paper indeed said, they would *not* be allowed to do so, but it suited the faction to leave out the negative, and hence the story ran, that they were to be conveniently planted for raising commotions in their lost dominions.

This prospect produced consternation all over Scinde, and the sirdars of the Talpoor family were most alarmed. The ameers, they said, could not live quietly, they must conspire. Belooch honour would compel the Talpooree nobles to join them, and thus ruin would fall on all, for their power would be naught against Sir C. Napier, and their treason would give him the right to destroy them.

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CHAP. XIII. They earnestly deprecated the return of the ameers and  
1846. wished for no change. The Scindee population was less concerned. Believing equally in the power of the British general, and feeling only hatred for their former tyrants, they were able and willing to defend their newly-acquired independence; but the Hindoos were so frightened that some of the richest merchants instantly transferred their money to other countries, and prepared to follow it with their families. Thus commerce was seriously checked, and doubt and dread pervaded the whole community, as the concocters of the falsehood designed: nor was the distrust entirely removed by a proclamation which was immediately issued by the general to contradict the report.

Over these shameless artifices Sir C. Napier grieved, as they were injurious to the public and hurtful to private persons; but as they affected himself he treated them with contempt. "I wish," he said, "plenary success to them. I wish they may restore the ameers, and withdraw all our troops—in one year anarchy would be at its height. The poor indeed, of all countries bear much before they resist; but the poor of Scinde have now justice, work and high wages; and the rich have all they had before and more, for now they can keep their riches. The merchants have security, all classes have the benefit of a vast reduction of taxation, and twenty thousand soldiers with their followers spend money. Let the ameers be restored and the poor will get plenty of work, but no wages, justice will disappear, the rich will be plundered to form a new treasury, and will hold their jagheers at the caprice of despots, instead of fixed law; the merchants will again be squeezed, the old pernicious taxation will be renewed, and the cutting of throats will be resumed as a virtue."

Whether there was any intention of restoring the ameers, is not publicly known, but a change of government at home happened at this time, and Lord Ripon, on quitting the Board of Control, wrote to assure Sir C. Napier that he approved of all he had done, acknowledged the difficulties overcome, and thanked him for his exertions in the public service! This unendurable provocation from the

man who had encouraged and supported his enemies, and condemned what he now acknowledged to be meritorious, proved the abject submission with which that man had obeyed the Court of Directors. He was thus answered.

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“I have the honour to thank you for your letter of the 7th of July, which however places me in a position distressing to any man of proper feelings. I mean that of obligation for expressions of private kindness, while as president of the Board of Control you have refused me *justice*. Your lordship refers to the difficulties which I have had to encounter in Scinde. The greatest, and the only painful one, has arisen from your lordship’s conduct relative to Major Outram. While I have strictly obeyed, though with mental uneasiness, the orders to be silent, issued by the governor-general to myself and to Major Outram, that officer has been not only allowed, but by your lordship’s silence, encouraged to assail me in the public prints and in a book! I now find also, from Lord Hardinge, that your lordship had long ago resolved that I should not receive support from government.

“My lord, you must excuse me for saying, that if my conduct in Scinde deserved the approbation which it received from her Majesty, from Parliament, from the Court of Directors, and from yourself, it also deserved a better return than the injustice I have received from your lordship.”

Having given this merited rebuke to Lord Ripon Sir C. Napier, hearing that Scinde was to be placed under civil authorities from Bombay, and knowing how much error was afloat in England as to his government, thought it proper to instruct Lord Ripon’s successor, Sir John Hobhouse, as to the true state of affairs and the probable results of such an arrangement. In that view, he sent him the following memoir which, though composed in a few hours amidst pressing public business, displays the true aspect of the government and evinces the writer’s power of generalization.

*State of the People.*—The people of Scinde are wild, uneducated, warlike, and a noble nation, if the word



CHAP. XIII. nation can be applied to men who have no national  
1846. feelings, no union whatever. They are divided into tribes,  
some stationary, some nomadic. All are addicted to robbery and murder if we can call their acts by those names; but that would not be strictly just, because no law existed under the ameers against such crimes, in which those princes largely participated. A few general rules did exist, but they were so open to every species of corrupt influence that it is an abuse of terms to call them *laws*. They only applied, if applied at all, to the first of the three races inhabiting Scinde, namely Beloochees, Scindees, and Hindoos. The Beloochees are Mahomedans and, until the conquest, were the masters;—the other two were their slaves. The Scindees were serfs, over whom every petty Belooch chief held the power of life and death, and used that power freely. In reality there was no law, and each tribe protected itself in the following curious way.

Tribe A being in want robbed tribe B, which remained passive for a longer or shorter period according to circumstances. When the proper time came, B, having perhaps a quarrel with tribe C, proposes pardon to A if it will help B to rob C; which aid and a small compensation for the original robbery made up the quarrel between A and B. This rotatory system of plunder was general, and thus pressing necessity was relieved by what may be called forced loans; and between these attacks on each other, the plunder of travellers, and the levying of "black mail" on caravans, intervened. The black mail and a limited but existing commerce, enabled the tribes to live in a country where neither lodging, nor clothing nor firing are needed; and where the greatest chief lives under a mat stretched on poles cut from the jungle. It is true that the richer Hindoos had houses in towns; but built of mud, and purposely made wretched in appearance, or the ameers would have squeezed from their owners large sums of money. This system to us is robbery; for them a conventional arrangement, understood, and producing no very bitter feelings amongst the tribes. At the same time it prevented in a great measure (except amongst chiefs)

intermarriages ; for evident reasons each tribe kept itself pure and distinct.

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With regard to murder, it is still a sort of rude natural law, understood and rigidly maintained. If a man of tribe A seduces a woman of tribe B, her friends kill both, a blood-feud arises, and the two tribes become deadly enemies unless they have joined to slay both culprits. But if a man of A seduces a woman of B, and her relations kill her, while the man escapes, there will be a blood-feud, because a man of A has caused the death of a woman of B, and the first man of A that can be caught is slain ; but then the feud would cease.

I have said the first man of A caught, is slain, but the man so sacrificed is unconnected with the criminal, and his family make no remonstrances ; they admit the justice of the act yet secretly vow a private feud against the man of B who actually slew their relation, and they will watch for years and finally slay him or some of his family in revenge—thus the public balance of murder is again uneven and both tribes take arms. These private feuds are not blamed, it would be dishonouring to neglect them. I have traced this running account of blood through several generations, on several occasions, and one recently between the “ *Bull-foot Noomrees* ” and the “ *Choola Noomrees* ”—the first our subjects, the last our neighbours. They knew I would not let them fight, and so made me umpire. Originally of one family they split about a hundred years ago, and their feud comes down to this day. They embraced in my presence with a peculiar ceremony, the Choola making the first advance to the Bull-foot chief as the head of all the Noomree tribes. Their expression, when I recommended reconciliation, was, “ That my sword was stronger than their swords, and what I ordered must be obeyed.” When reconciliation takes place it is not unusual for the murderer to give a sister or daughter in marriage to the next of kin of the slain ; and I have known the daughter of the murdered man given to the murderer. Educated to expect this, it is not such a hardship on the girl as it would be with us.

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From the time a blood-feud begins, an exact account is kept, and until an equal number are slain on each side no peace can be—sometimes not even then. So accurately is this account kept, that wounds which do not prove fatal are set down. All this we call murder, with them it is only fatal duelling, and not so bad as our duelling, for we have law protection if we choose to seek it. But in the ameers' time, these men had no law, and no other protection; wherefore *robber* and *murderer* does not justly apply to them.

As to petty thieving it is scarcely known—a little in the large towns; and in our cantonments which are infested with the lowest blackguards from Bombay.

These divisions amongst the tribes prevented their having any national feeling or any attachment whatever to their late rulers the ex-ameers. I saw this when I first arrived, and when the conquest happened I turned it to account by giving each chief all he possessed before the battle of Meeanee, and with it a secure title which he had not before; for under the ameers no man who was not very strong was sure of his jagheer. The nobles were thus attached to an order of things which confers advantages they never before possessed; and I acquire knowledge of their feelings as to government from the collectors—especially Captain Rathborne the collector of Hyderabad, who lives on intimate terms with the most powerful, and is an officer of great ability.

*System of Government.*—I shall now state my mode of governing such rude tribes. Having secured the confidence of the chiefs as to their possessions, my next object was gradually to subvert their power over their Scindee and Hindoo slaves—not called so, but so in fact. The abolition of slavery by order of the supreme government gave the first blow to this, as far as their purchased African slaves were concerned. The second step was to hear all complaints made by the poor of ill-treatment perpetrated by Englishmen or Beloochees. This produced a feeling that justice and protection to all would be found under the British rule. The third step was to deprive the chiefs

of the power of inflicting death, torture, or any other punishment; and force them to refer to our magistrates for justice against offenders. This in some measure lowered the chiefs in the estimation of their retainers; but it raised the latter in their own estimation. The fourth step was to abolish the abominable *old Indian* system of regulating labour by a tariff. I threw open the market for labour, and wages rose, to 3*d.* and 4*d.* a day, having been before forced, unpaid labour, or nearly so. This met with opposition from Englishmen, and, strange to say, I have hardly been able entirely to enforce the rule yet! I have heard that a tariff on labour prevails very much in India at this moment. I do not know this from personal experience, and can hardly believe in the existence of such foul injustice and tyranny towards the labouring class. However by this measure I have so improved the condition and feelings of the poor, that I doubt, if government were so unwise as to restore the ameers, that the latter could hold their position for six months: all would be confusion and bloodshed.

I deprived all persons of the right of bearing arms in public except the chiefs; for them it would have been an indignity; and I doubt if they would have borne it so patiently as they have other rules more fatal to their supremacy as feudal chiefs. Had I suppressed their arms discontent would have united them in a common cause and healed their feuds, whereas by leaving them their swords and shields I added to their consequence and flattered their vanity. Their followers would care little for the deprivation unless worked up to anger by their chiefs; but if so worked, they would have been fierce and ready to use their arms instead of relinquishing them. All was received with good feeling. Meanwhile the Scindees and Hindoos, who were never allowed to wear arms, acquired importance, and were pleased to find themselves on a level with their former tyrants—the latter being pulled down while they were raised—and were no longer awed by the Belooch scimitar which had before been drawn and fatally applied upon the slightest provocation.

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It is now man to man, and the Scindee is as good as the Beloochee, allowing for the habitual fear of the slave. Emancipation cannot at once remove that, and I see it still to prevail, especially when the reports are spread by some of the infamous Indian newspapers that the ameers are to be restored.

A letter arrived last Christmas from the ameers, stating, that Lord Ashley had written to say, they were to live on the frontier as private gentlemen! I am unable to say what truth there was in this, but the Hindoo merchants believed it, and in consequence sent their money to Muscat and Bombay and prepared to abandon Scinde. The first notice we had of it was from a great chief, the nephew of the ameers, who stood by them to the last against us. He possesses a principality which I restored to him to honour his faith towards his family; for he fought at Meeanee at Hyderabad and in the desert; but when Shere Mohamed (the Lion) fled from Scinde this man laid his sword at my feet. He is very clever and has heartily entered into the English habits, improving his land, and adopting civilization. He said "I am ruined, and so are numbers of others if this news be true; for we *must* join the ameers in a conspiracy to overthrow the English government, and shall be overthrown. For God's sake tell your government to let us alone, we are happy and getting rich; but all of Talpoor blood must join our chiefs if you let them come near us, and as to their living quiet as private gentlemen that is nonsense."

And if the ameers do come assuredly blood will be spilled; not by the people, but the great chiefs who will be influenced by family honour, and as this chief said, *ruined*. His words were emphatic. "The first time I was received by the general as a brave and faithful soldier, and I have received from him all and more than all I had before; but if I fight him again I shall be a traitor and can have no claim on his mercy." Speaking thus to Captain Rathborne, this prince became very animated, and taking a jug of water that stood near filled a glass, saying, "You English are a very odd people, you have conquered Scinde,

you have done us good, all is full like this glass, but instead of drinking you throw all away thus"—and he poured the water on the floor, alluding to the return of the ameers.

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The prohibition to appear armed has tended more than most things to keep the people orderly and prevent murders and feuds arising from the sudden wrath peculiar to men of hot climates.

*Collection of Revenue.*—I divided Scinde into three great collectorates, placing at the head of each a collector with deputies under him, English officers. They are all magistrates, but with restricted powers as to punishment. To them I gave the whole establishment employed by the ameers for collecting money and inflicting vengeance; as to punishing moral crimes those princes never interfered; the only crime in their eyes was disobedience of their orders, and those orders had but two objects—amassing money and administering to their debaucheries. The last was only painful to certain individuals. The first opened a door to great and general calamities—injustice, torture, and ruin to the country at large. Their machines for extortion were the *kardars*, the head men in each village who collected the taxes; the *umbardars* who took charge of the grain when collected for the ameers. Both *kardars* and *umbardars* had their *familiars* to execute their orders; and what those orders were depended generally on what the *kardar* himself was, but not always, as the following facts show. If grain was high the ameers ordered the *kardars* to sell it at a certain price beyond the highest in the market, and to send the amount received at once to the treasury. The *kardar* assembled the richest people of his district, compelling each to take a portion of the grain and pay instantly the ameers' price, perhaps more for their own profit. If any refused he was hanged by the thumbs to a beam and a hot ramrod was placed between his thighs. The money being thus collected—God help the *kardar* if it was not—each *zemindar*, or farmer, took his forced purchase away and divided it in like manner, and with *like persuasion*, amongst his *ryots* or labourers, who, being

CHAP. XIII. poorer, had a larger allowance of hot ramrods and other  
 1846. tortures. The kardar in such cases could not help himself if he would ; but it generally gave him opportunity to extort money for his own profit.

All these kardars and umbardars I made over to the new magistrates to work with, and thus enlisted a large body of influential men in favour of the conquest. They of course robbed us at first as the English officers were ignorant of what ought to be paid ; but now the collectors know their work well, and from their systematic military habits and experience of men they quickly got the whole machinery into high order, working hard, and the revenue rapidly improved and will yet improve. The collectors and their deputies keep diaries, which are sent to me weekly and I thus learn what goes on in each district. They are read to me by the secretary to the government, Captain Brown, an officer from whom I have received such able assistance that I ought in justice to call him my colleague rather than secretary.

*Police.*—To secure the peace of the country and avoid disseminating the troops, which would render them too familiar with the people and possibly diminish the wholesome fear of our power, I established a police of two thousand four hundred men, well armed, drilled, and divided into three classes—one for the towns, two for the country. The first all infantry, the two last infantry and cavalry, called the rural police. They assist the collectors, but form a distinct body under their own officers. The police never agree with the kardars, and while the police inform us of the cheating of the kardars, umbardars and zemindars, these people complain of the usual faults of policemen—namely overbearing insolence. In this manner they keep each other in check, and both take the part of the poor, not out of humanity but spite : the motive signifies little, the government profits by the results, for the poor now look on both as protectors. Thus if a policeman ill-treats a ryot the latter applies to the kardar for protection ; and if a kardar robs the ryot, the latter goes to the policeman. All this gives much trouble at times to the collec-

tors and myself, for some sub-collectors have been weak enough to enter into the disputes of their followers; but that is ephemeral, and we have a sufficient number of men of sense and temper. The whole works well and the police not only seize thieves but are good troops: they had on their first establishment sundry battles with robber bands whom they generally defeated, and now no such bands exist.

*Control of the Administration of Justice.*—An officer has been made judge-advocate-general, who from experience and study has acquired much knowledge of his work and of military law; he was sent by Lord Ellenborough, and his calm dispassionate good sense and amiable disposition and his great industry and uprightness singularly qualify Captain Keith Young for the post he so worthily fills. To this officer I have given two deputies who officiate at Hyderabad and Shikarpoore. To this judge-advocate-general all the magistrates send reports of trials which they are competent to enter upon. Crimes of a deeper hue, such as murder, robbery with violence, are first examined into on the spot by the magistrates, and the preliminary depositions on oath are sent to the judge-advocate; he submits them to the governor, who orders thereon, if he thinks fit, a trial by a military commission consisting of a field officer and two captains; or in case of a paucity of officers a subaltern of not less than seven years' service: a deputy judge-advocate conducts the proceedings, but has no voice in the finding or sentence. The minutes are sent by the president to the judge-advocate-general, who makes a short report upon the sentence and submits the whole to the governor. If the court, the judge-advocate-general and the governor all concur, the latter confirms the sentence and orders execution: if the court and judge-advocate-general differ the governor's opinion decides. By this mode justice is rendered as quickly as I can insure it, though not so quick as I could wish, and the prisoner has in fact the advantage of three courts.

I read all the trials on which I have to decide, with the greatest attention, frequently twice or thrice over, especially



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when the punishment is capital—never ordering an execution until I have given at least two and often several days to the full consideration of the sentence. In smaller matters the deputy-collectors at once try the cases and submit the proceedings to the collector, who either confirms the award or objects, but in either case forwards the proceedings to the judge-advocate-general, who has a casting voice in some cases; in others appeals to the governor. In addition to the above, there are for civil cases, what are termed *Punchayets*. I have made a slight change in these; they were formerly assembled without remuneration and I give them a small daily pay to cover their loss of time. They are something like our juries, or rather courts of arbitration, and hitherto their functions have been restricted by me to civil cases; for I keep all criminal cases in the hands of Europeans; but I wish much to increase the powers of these tribunals, which I found under another name existing in Greece. They exist I believe in all eastern countries and the English jury is but one form of them. In Greece they call it the court of *Veechiarde*, or Ancients, in India *Punchayet*, and their powers vary at different periods and in different countries according to circumstances. In India and in Scinde they are limited; in the Punjaub lately the *Punchayet* assumed supreme power! I am sure this subject demands much consideration, as a cautious mode of gradually introducing the people to take part in the government of their own country: but it is possible the directors do not think *that* so advisable and wise as it appears to me.

Such is the simple process by which justice is administered in Scinde, and the frequent disagreement in opinion between magistrates, military commissions, judge-advocate-general and governor, proves in my opinion the independence of the judges, and that the system works well and is merciful rather than harsh; especially as the judge-advocate-general and myself endeavour, as far as we can with justice, to modify the sentences so as to go with the feelings of the people and avoid giving disgust. But this is a large field, so I will conclude by saying that I

have long applied for leave to transport culprits to Aden, CI but have not yet had any reply. If this were permitted much of the capital punishments would be avoided, and the government would gain cheap labour for the fortifications there; the culprits would come back at the end of their sentence and the great evil, so justly reprobated by the archbishop of Dublin, of forming a condemned population would be avoided.

*Revenue.*—The revenue of the ameers averaged from thirty-five to forty lacs. The revenue under my government has gradually increased from nine to thirty-one lacs; but there seems no reason to doubt that it will reach thirty-five lacs next April, ending the financial year of 1846-7. The general opinion of the collectors is that it will in 1848 amount to forty lacs and gradually increase, because commerce is increasing, and cultivation has this last year been greatly extended. However this letter is to state facts not conjectures. I am given to understand that the conquest of Scinde has added very much to the Bombay revenue by preventing smuggling through the Portuguese colony at Demaun. I have also to call to your notice, that in the ameers' revenue one of the most productive of their taxes was the *transit-duty* or *rahdari*. This has been abolished by us, and yet there is every probability that our revenue will exceed theirs. I have also abolished many other taxes—hence the amount of all these abolished taxes should be added to my revenue, and it will appear that less taxation has raised greater revenue.

*Commerce.*—Our imports of European goods have increased since 1843, from four and a half to nine lacs in 1845; and to ten lacs in the first six months of 1846! The merchants of Kurrachee cry out for steamers to convey their goods up to the sources of the Indus and the Sutlej! I have received memorials from them to this effect, and have begged of the governor-general to make over four of the war-steamers on the Indus to the Scinde government for mercantile purposes. Thus the steamers will repay their keep, be equally available for war, and give facility for general commerce by their rapid and safe transmission

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CHAP. XIII. of goods. For now the calculation is, that of every seven  
 1846. vessels coming down the Indus at certain periods of the  
 year, six are lost altogether or their goods destroyed,  
 owing to the badness of the country boats and the igno-  
 rance of the boatmen. This amounts to a prohibition of  
 commerce. No steamer has ever been lost on the Indus,  
 and if four are given up to the Scinde government they  
 will be continually and fully laden, and I understand from  
 merchants here that trading companies to the interior  
 would be instantly formed.

Merchants are not altogether to be trusted in this  
 country on such points, as the desire of lucre deceives  
 them. But the demand for steamers has without doubt  
 arisen, and I think it ought to be complied with, and  
 the more readily as we have just discovered an inland  
 passage for steamers from Kurrachee to the mouths of  
 the Indus. I have had it surveyed, and a steamer has  
 passed through. It runs parallel to and very near the  
 shore, which shelters it from the furious monsoon sea,  
 one impassable for five months in the year. The only  
 doubt is whether this passage will be affected by the inun-  
 dations. This will be decided when the waters have subsided,  
 and a steamer is then to make the passage. The officers  
 of the flotilla are confident of success, and if so, Kurrachee  
 becomes the real fixed mouth of the Indus, not varying  
 like the other mouths with every inundation, so as to be  
 useless for commerce. If this passage fails us, the  
 merchants will still equally require steamers to convey  
 their goods from Tattah to the sources of the Five Waters.

It did not fail.

*Agriculture.*—Cultivation and revenue are on the  
 increase, because taxation has been lowered; and during  
 the short time we have ruled, considerable immigrations  
 have taken place. I am now endeavouring to ameliorate  
 still more the condition of the ryots. You must know, Sir,  
 that the system of farming the revenue has generally pre-  
 vailed in Scinde, the ameers farmed every branch of their  
 revenue. I have abolished this detestable practice; but  
 still the zemindar, the farmer, exists; he hires large tracts  
 of land from government or from jagheerdars, and while

he cheats his landlord he starves the ryot—as far as men can be starved who live in a country full of game and wild fruits—who can rear fowls without cost, and who have abundance of firing for the trouble of collecting fuel: men who go naked, who require no houses and who make no difficulty of stealing a sheep when pressed. A man here first steals a camel, which he rides a hundred miles to steal a sheep, returns next night with his mutton and turns the camel loose into the jungle from whence he took him. No one is the wiser, unless he who loses the sheep misses his animal in time—that is to say, while the camel's foot-prints are fresh; but then he hires a *puggee* or tracker who *pugs* the camel's steps and the thief is caught. These *puggees* are unerring. They follow a track for eight or ten days and nights, unless a storm of wind overlays the foot-prints, human or quadrupeds, with sand; or a fall of rain washes them away. No ingenuity seems able to elude a good *puggee*.

The zemindar oppresses the ryot, driving him to idleness and robbery. And I am granting small farms to ryots to take them out of the zemindars' hands, giving them only so much land as they can cultivate by their own labour without sub-letting. They pay their rent to the collectors direct without the intervention of kardar or zemindar. I hope thus not only to raise the character of the poorer ryot, but greatly to increase our reputation in surrounding countries, and so add to the population of Scinde, its happiness and its revenue. I have also adopted a measure which I know succeeds in England, viz. making small loans to the industrious poor when they are distressed by unforeseen accidents. These loans are made with caution by the district collectors and sub-collectors: the repayment is by instalments and rigidly enforced, yet under certain rules which cannot be detailed in a letter.

I consider that taxation may be still more diminished and yet the revenue be increased. In time I will prove this, and I expect next April will show more clearly what my system will finally produce. Last year realized thirty-one lacs—and I shall be disappointed if this year does not

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produce thirty-five lacs. Our crops this year are good, but in great danger from locusts, which have destroyed the grain in the adjacent countries. Scinde has not had time to settle since the conquest. People fancy that trade and agriculture spring up at once like Aladdin's palace. But it will, I reckon, require ten years to recover from the effects of the ameers' tyranny and such a great revolution as Scinde has undergone; and it appears to me no ordinary matter, that already she is perfectly tranquil and rapidly improving. At the time of the battle of Hyderabad I thought that if we kept Scinde it would take ten years to put it in the state it is now in. Lieutenant-Colonel Outram publicly asserted, that I would have a guerilla war for ten years! So much for his knowledge of the people of Scinde!

This is our present financial position :—

Total revenue from 24th March, 1843, the date of the battle of Hyderabad, to 30th April, 1846 . . . . .	£659,393
Total expense of civil government for three years including police force . . . . .	£336,526
Balance in favour of general government, April 30th, 1846 . . . . .	£322,869

I shall make a full statement on this head in another paper, because the papers laid before Parliament and ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 30th of April 1846, I do not think correct. Meanwhile I have to say the large force in Scinde has not been *for Scinde* but *for the Punjaub*. I have for two years constantly said, that 5,000 men are sufficient, and more than sufficient, for the defence and for the maintenance of tranquillity in Scinde. This has been contradicted by an ignorant and factious party at Bombay; but I can prove this force is more than sufficient. Have I not quitted Scinde with nearly my whole force, even when the Seikhs were up and might have been looked to for help against us—as they always were by the ameers? And has there ever been the least doubt of the tranquillity of Scinde? Never! And there

never will be while I am here, because that tranquillity has been based, not on the force of arms after the battles, but the justice and kindness of government towards all ranks. Not an Englishman has been murdered since the ameers quitted the country—not an Englishman has been even insulted! These are facts of no small weight, and not usual in these eastern countries, nor in any country recently conquered.

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The extraordinary military expenses are of two kinds; the one relating to supplies, the other to the building of barracks. The first will diminish as the force diminishes, and three-fourths of it must be charged to the Punjaub account; the other fourth to the *occupation* of Scinde—not one penny to the *conquest* of Scinde, except the expense of barracks at Hyderabad, which has been already much more than covered by the surplus revenue stated above. *The conquest of Scinde has not cost a single shilling to the East-India Company*, on the contrary it has saved money; for I defy any politician, or soldier to say that, had the ameers still ruled in Scinde we could have occupied Kurrachee and Sukkur with a smaller force than was kept here during the events of the last two years at Gwalior and on the Sutlej. I will say more—and I can prove it—that had the ameers remained, bloody scenes would have been enacted here when Gwalior was in arms, and when the Seikhs crossed the Sutlej.

Had the governor-general been so rash as to reduce the garrison of Scinde to 5,000 men in 1842-3, the ameers remaining in power and our small force divided between Kurrachee and Sukkur, he would have lost the army. The delusion of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, who could not perceive the hostility of the ameers till he was attacked in the residency, would, had he been left in the position I succeeded to, have lost the whole army in 1844 or in 1845; for all would have been apparently tranquil in the first year until Gwalior was ready; and in the second till the Seikh army crossed the Sutlej, which would have been accompanied by a simultaneous and equally unexpected attack by the ameers on Kurrachee and Sukkur.

CHAP. XIII. No succour could have been sent to our weak divided and every way unprovided force. Lord Keane's army was scarcely able to hold the ameers in check even before the disasters in Affghanistan. The result would have been a cost of blood and treasure, far exceeding what the conquest required: I therefore assume *that* conquest must be accounted, except in the opinion of an obstinate faction, a great saving of blood and treasure, without reference to the honour of our arms, which has certainly not been stained in Scinde since the end of 1842.

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\* Mine may be called an impartial opinion as regards the *policy* of the conquest; for I cannot recollect ever having presumed to offer a single suggestion to Lord Ellenborough on the subject; so far from it, I did, until I was appointed governor, expect that the ameers would be subsidized. I admired Lord Ellenborough's policy, but I must have equally executed my orders had I disapproved. *I believe I am a singular instance of a successful general having been run down by his own government, for having obeyed the superior authority set over him by that government—and receiving no support in his command from home when all he did was approved of by successive governors-general. Yet this is what Lord Ripon and the Court of Directors have done by me.* However I am prepared to prove that the conquest of Scinde has been less expensive in blood and money than an occupation would have been, according to what is generally understood as being originally intended after the destruction of our army at Cabool. If to occupy Scinde with a diminished force was not the original intention, it is evident that the only result of the conquest is the addition of its revenue to the public treasury, without additional outlay. This will be seen when passion, prejudice, and a very insidious, very virulent, but not very honourable war, made upon me, by individuals shall subside—a moment that I wait for with patience because I feel confident in the result.

*Climate.*—That the climate of Scinde is very hot is unquestionable, but that it is more unhealthy than any other part of India I know to be untrue. Many soldiers

have died, so they have in every new conquest made by the Company, and for these simple reasons. *Want of good barracks—want of comfort—want of local experience.* All three were felt by the army in Scinde—a country so entirely ruined, so miserable and deprived of everything by tyrannical government, that we are really more like a colony planted in a desert than an army occupying an inhabited country. We have lost but few officers, even including those who died of cholera and other diseases unconnected with the locality, because they have been better lodged and have had more comforts. Now we are gradually getting good barracks erected, and Scinde will not be unhealthy beyond what all parts of India must ever be to European constitutions. Twice since the conquest has an epidemic fallen on the troops, and the European private soldiers have also suffered, because they drink ardent spirits, *bad* ardent spirits, and because their constitution is not congenial to a hot climate. We have also twice had cholera. All this frightens weak timid people and they unjustly condemn the climate.

*Natural Riches of the Country.*—Scinde is capable of producing an immense revenue; the soil is rich beyond description. I am endeavouring to control the waters of the Indus; this will I hope ere long be effected, and then the produce will be very great. The present want is that of sufficient population to cultivate the great quantity of waste land. The mines are supposed to be rich, and the fields of salt inexhaustible.

*Surrounding States.*—The newspapers talk of our being constantly embroiled with neighbouring tribes. This shows great ignorance. Not a single tribe has the least desire to quarrel with us—on the contrary they are gradually coming to settle in Scinde! All who love peace and desire to cultivate and enjoy the fruits of their labour wish to settle here, and numbers do so.

Such is the general state of Scinde since I have governed it, and I do not think I have misstated anything. I could not enter into details without having more time than I can command, and to have done so would have



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made this memoir a book; still I feel how very slight and general is the view I have given. But under this system the revenue has increased and is increasing; the people are contented and happy, and there have been no conspiracies or insurrections, though the hill campaign and Seikh campaign both offered tempting opportunities. Here also I will give an opinion, I think a correct one—not formed by *an old Indian* (which frequently means a man who has been living twenty years in India eating, drinking, and in profound ignorance dogmatizing; as if he possessed a thorough acquaintance with the people), but by one who has for five years studied the character of the Scindian people and successfully governed them for four years. It is then my opinion that if a civil government is formed in Scinde, the revenue will be swamped by large salaries to civil servants, immense establishments and little work: for as civil servants of experience and real knowledge will not quit their good positions in India to come here, the province will be overrun with young and ignorant men who have been initiated into all that is luxurious and idle without experience or perhaps ability to have acquired the good. They may be very good fellows; they smoke, hunt hogs, race, drink beer and issue their orders in bad Hindostanee, to a subservient set of native clerks, who consequently soon get the real power into their hands, and turn it to account by all sorts of venality and oppression. The result of this will be, or rather may be, bloodshed and expense. The people here have no respect for civil servants. Soldiers themselves, they look to being governed by soldiers, a feeling that would make them ready to draw the sword if affronted by civilians.

In proportion as the civil establishment is increased, expense will increase, and the military will decrease, and the control will become weaker; so that if a civil government produced insurrection it would not be well able to put it down. I am aware of the inconvenience which arises to the army by the extensive employment of military men in civil branches of government, and I have

introduced four or five uncovenanted civil servants into the Scinde government, with good effect; they, with one exception, have conducted themselves with diligence and modesty. But three *covenanted* servants, sent by Lord Ellenborough in the first moment of conquest, were quite useless. I had no prejudice against them, but the contrary; for one was the relative of an old comrade of mine, who fell in Spain, and for any one belonging to him I would have done anything in my power; but their ideas were so grand as to establishments, and they were themselves reported to me as being so idle, that I could only send Lord Ellenborough the statement made by the collector Captain Pope, under whom I had placed them, and with it their own explanation. He ordered them back to India. They were, I have no doubt, clever and gentleman-like young men, but a dozen of them would have paralyzed my government, and thrown it into the hands of clerks and natives. I indeed should have no objection to these clerks who are very clever men generally, and so are natives; but then let them have the pay and responsibility and get rid of the gentlemen with their high salaries, their clerks, their pigs, and their beer-barrels. Let the men who do the work have the offices! If men have any other pleasure than their business they are good for nothing in that business.

I will now conclude by saying that though the officers with me, and myself might have done more and better, no one will deny that we have had many and great difficulties to struggle with—war, and pestilence in its utmost virulence, the destruction of a whole harvest by locusts, and the greatest part of another by a sudden and unprecedented fall of the inundation before the grain was mature have been amongst the evils afflicting Scinde since 1843. In the midst of an extensive military command I have had to construct the entire machinery of a civil government, assisted by young officers who had at first starting little or no experience, but whose zeal and abilities have enabled them to serve me well; and by diligence they have overcome the great obstacle of total want of local experience,

CHAP. XIII. which was at first almost insuperable in the collection of  
1846. revenue. How we have succeeded we must leave the world to decide. But we have done our best; and if, as I see stated in the public papers, it is intended to change the system of rule here to one more analogous to that of India, I am ready, if called upon, to give a full account of my mode of conducting the government since it was confided to me by Lord Ellenborough in 1843, and to deliver it over to my successor, who I hope may feel the same interest in it that I do. But if the home government approve of what I have done and wish me to remain in my present position, I am prepared to continue my exertions as long as my health will permit me to do with justice to the public service.

Since writing the above I have received orders from the governor-general to send away a large portion of the force in Scinde. This is to take place next January, and greatly pleases me, as it will be another proof of the tranquillity of this country and relieve the province from the absurd charge made against it of being ruinous to the finances of India.

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It was understood that this able memoir arrested the transfer of Scinde at the time, but it in no manner abated the falsehoods promulgated, or softened the hostility of the Court of Directors. Nor did it procure justice or protection from the cabinet—Lord Howick's despicable enmity prevailed there too strongly. Meanwhile Sir C. Napier in pursuance of his convictions renewed his proposition for reducing the number of troops, offering to send away eleven regiments and all the European artillery! The governor-general actuated no doubt, by an inward sense that the Punjab conquest was unsettled, would only call off four regiments, and the Scindian governor thus remained under the accusation of retaining troops when he was anxious to get rid of them; and the Scindian people were called disaffected, when the most touching proofs of their profound attachment were being given, and when foreigners were eagerly demanding to be allowed to become

their fellow-subjects! For in the autumn of this year, an independent chief formerly driven from Scinde by the tyranny of the amceers, offered, and his offer was accepted, to abandon his mountain refuge and settle with eighteen hundred families for cultivation if lands were assigned to them. At the same time the collector of customs, having business to transact at Beila, was on his return surrounded by a multitude of miserable slaves entreating him to take them to Scinde, "*where all men were free.*" Their masters came up, and, being afraid to coerce them lest the "great English sahib should be angry," besought the collector to put them back officially. He refused, saying, he hoped they would break their bonds, but he could not interfere either way. Then the masters forced them back, two excepted, who were armed with axes and keeping close to the collector's horse forced a way across the frontier.

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There was still much distrust abroad as to the probable restoration of the ameers. Ali Moorad, foreseeing ruin to himself if that should happen, became so uneasy at the non-confirmation of his treaty, that it was to be feared he would seek other alliances if fresh troubles arose in the Punjaub; and meanwhile the reasons assigned by the government for having so many troops in Scinde contrary to the general's wish was, that fear of him alone kept the people submissive! This assumption he proudly and peremptorily rejected. "They were at first submissive from such fear, and he had taken advantage of it to establish his administration vigorously, but that influence had long passed away and been replaced by self-love—they were quiet because they were getting rich and enjoying the fruits of their industry. Their quietude was not the result of force, but of justice and its attendant happiness: they were quiet because they knew their own interests."

But Sir C. Napier had now acquired the certainty that official men in England were, equally with the Bombay council, the instigators and protectors of the libellers who so constantly assailed him, and whose virulence was hourly augmenting. He had honestly strived to serve, and had most efficiently served governments which were

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bent on his ruin while they profited from his devotion to their interests; he had been successful in war and peace, had won battles, subdued kingdoms, tranquillized and governed nations, legislating happily, administering justly; and he had made English power an object of love and reverence where before it had been abhorred and at times despised. He had been repaid with foul enmity, malignant and scurrilous abuse, and his virtues had been denied. He had been denounced as a man stained with cruelty and rapacity, and the slanderers who thus assailed him were rewarded by those who owed kingdoms, aye and safety to his genius, his courage, energy and incorruptible character. He alone of those officers who had been distinguished in Indian warfare had been neglected in the distribution of honours. Even the thanks of Parliament had been withheld for a year—an unexampled slight to a victorious commander—and they were not finally voted without the accompaniment of personal insult from a knot of calumniators, the chief of whom was now a cabinet minister. Attempts had been made to stifle his despatches that his exploits might be lessened to the public; and sinister measures were taken, vainly indeed, but taken, to render him unpopular with his troops. His name had been studiously withheld at public banquets when Indian victories were toasted, as if he were an outlaw from glory; though to nearly unexampled success in the field he had added unusual sagacity and unusual economy in civil government—the last perhaps an inexpiable offence, for he was so vigilant that corruption could not thrive in his neighbourhood.

These things made him reflect seriously on the inutility of wasting his life to serve men who had marked him for every injustice and insult; and with this sense of ill-usage he resolved to retire into private life. Yet remembering what he owed to the people he had subdued and undertaken to civilize, he determined not to resign until he had completed what was necessary to consolidate his work, and for that another year of power was required.

His principal objects were,

1°. A reduction of the troops to the number formerly

fixed by Lord Auckland for the garrisons of Sukkur and Roree, namely, five thousand; at that time certainly insufficient against the ameers, but now more than enough to hold all Scinde; and even this number was adopted in deference to the views of the supreme government, and with reference to the appointment of a civilian, or some obscure military man, to the government, more than to the necessity of the case.

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2°. The complete development of the ameliorated system of taxation, whereby all vexatious town-duties were abolished, and all export duties collected at fixed posts on the frontier. This was a matter involving the future interests of commerce and the immediate comfort of the towns, and a vigilant superintendence of the early working of this system was all-important.

3°. To obtain Mittenkote from the supreme government as an appurtenance of Scinde; and to have Deyrah in the Cutchee hills occupied either as an outpost, or as a military colony; an arrangement which would give the Cutchee hills as a frontier from the Indus to Dadur near the mouth of the Bolan pass, and debar their being again filled with robber tribes, who he knew by experience could not be again put down without much bloodshed.

In the hope of attaining these objects he remained in Scinde. But his recent trying journey to Lahore and back while suffering under a painful wearing bodily ailment, his great mortification of spirit, his extraordinary exertions during the cholera, and his grief for domestic losses, nearly deprived him of life. It was not until the end of autumn that his strength returned. Fortunately his administration now worked easily and happily, and with exception of a not very fatal visitation of cholera at Sukkur, the country was remarkably free from disease. Crime was very much diminished, and the comparatively fewer murders of women, and of homicides in feuds, proved that the social habits were being improved. The public works were also well advanced. The great mole at Kurra-  
chee had got into such deep water that steamers took in cargoes alongside it; and these cargoes were for Sukkur,

CHAP. XIII. an important step in the river commerce, enhanced by the  
1846. discovery of the chain of salt creeks mentioned in the memoir addressed to Sir J. Hobhouse. They run parallel with the coast to the nearest great mouth of the Indus, offering a natural canal, intricate indeed, but always full and unaffected by the inundations, or the monsoons.

As this gave direct water communication with the Indus and made Kurrachee the permanent port of that great artery of commerce, the general immediately appropriated the only two river steamers at his disposal for the transport of merchandize by this communication to the Indus; thus opening a new commercial road to Central Asia, the effect of which must, sooner or later, render Scinde a great and prosperous country. Some slight difficulties attending the first effort, were thus described.

“The Kurrachee merchants are a little timid, or rather I believe cunning, and mean to frighten me into low fares; but they will not succeed. I have made my calculations as low as we can afford, and if they don't like my charges, they may buy steamers for themselves—there is no force for pigs that won't eat grains. Or they may continue to send their goods by camels, which cannot reach Shikarpoore under five weeks, while my steamers get there in sixteen days. Each camel must be guarded, and may be robbed notwithstanding. A steamer is safe, and one man guards the whole cargo, whereas each camel requires two men—one to lead another to guard—making twenty or thirty men for every cafila, some of which take three months for the journey. Yes! the merchants will come to my terms: their shyness is subtilty, but Cocker's arithmetic beats barbarian arts.

“The merchants of Shikarpoore take larger views. They see that the freight charge must cover the cost of fuel, and they are all ready. I have refused passages to my officers, at which they are discontented, but, ‘know thyself,’ said the oracle; and next to that it is good to know your countrymen. I will give passages to officers in the war steamers, but not in these merchant steamers; they would lord it too much over the merchant and the super-

cargo. When my experiment can go alone, it shall cease to be a government venture, and I will turn it over to the merchants; who will not then be able, if willing, to return to the cafilas, for business will have become too brisk, the demand will cover the cost, and yield a profit to draw private steamers into the trade—meanwhile the child must be nursed.”

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This happy state of affairs was supported by a vast increase of production. 1846 was the only year since the conquest in which agriculture had not been distressed by wars, locusts, pestilence, and anomalous inundations, hence the price of grain fell one half; and for the first time since the accession of the Talpoor dynasty Scinde became a wheat-exporting country instead of an importing one. Scindian wheat was actually exported in 1846 and 1847, through Bombay to England, with good profit; for being much harder, drier, and heavier than Canadian wheat it fetched twenty shillings a ton more in the market. Sir C. Napier offered eleven thousand tons, received as revenue, for the use of famishing Ireland, at one-third of the market price of wheat in England, and Lord Ellenborough pointed out to the ministers a cheap mode of conveying it—the bargain would have been most advantageous, alleviating the misery of the Irish and improving the Scindian revenue; but a measure reasonably beneficial to Ireland, and useful to Scinde, was a cup of double bitterness and instantly rejected.

This excess of production exceedingly lowered the revenue, which was chiefly paid in kind, yet left it sufficient to defray all civil expenses; and it would have paid all the military expenses likewise, if the proposition to reduce the troops had been acceded to. Revenue was however with Sir C. Napier always secondary to the welfare of the people; he rejoiced in the abundance and would not increase the imposts; for to raise more money by taxation than the absolute expenses of administration and protection required he thought a crime in government; and vigilantly to economize these expenses a sacred duty; not however in a pitiful spirit, for he judged it no



CHAP. XIII. economy to starve useful institutions. A great vexation  
1846. to the Bombay libellers however was this abundance, and they displayed it with an effrontery of falsehood scarcely credible; for while the Scindian population was thus, as it were gorged with food, they asserted that it was scourged with famine, the result of Sir C. Napier's ignorance! And this astounding falsehood was republished in England and believed!

Unheeding their fury he continued his administrative labours. His canal system was in full progress; and the chief engineer, Captain Peat, an officer too soon lost to his country, conducted all the works of his department with such singular ability, that the general felt he could, so assisted, open the road to prosperity in a marvellous manner if supported by the supreme government. With this feeling he formed great schemes, and made arrangements to send an exploring steamer to Attock, hoping thus to establish trading communications along the great river and all its confluents. But official procrastination baffled all plans, all hopes; he could not even obtain an answer to any proposition; and while fretting under this injurious restraint he had to break up and disperse the model army he had organized for the Punjaub war. It was a good occasion, and he took it, to make an exposition of the real condition and value of Scinde in the following general order issued January 1847.

“The army of Scinde is ordered to be broken up, and the number of troops reduced so as, in future, to form the ordinary garrison of a frontier province. This, as regards the interior tranquillity of Scinde might have been done two years ago. But the character of the Lahore government and of its troops made it necessary for the government of India to keep an army in Scinde.

The danger apprehended from the Punjaub subsided after the victories gained on the Sutlej, and the concentration of a large force on the Indus ceased to be necessary.

To the army of Scinde is due the tranquillity of this noble province. To the discipline and orderly conduct of all, and the support which the officers of this army have

given to me by their just and conciliating conduct towards the people, England is indebted for the tranquil possession of a country which the valour of the troops had conquered.

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To the abilities of those officers who have from the first conducted the civil branches of this government, and to their unremitting exertions in the administration of justice, is, more especially to be attributed the successful administration of the province, that attachment to the British rule, and that confidence which has been so strongly evinced by the inhabitants of Scinde on two signal occasions, the campaign in the Bhoogtee hills, and the march of the Scinde force to Bhawulpoor.

But to the glory of freeing an enslaved country by a necessary conquest, and the consequent tranquillity of an apparently satisfied people, this army has added an increase of revenue to the Company.

The last financial year showed, that the united ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the civil government of Scinde (including the expense of a police of two thousand four hundred horse and foot) amounted to only fifteen lacs one thousand seven hundred and fifty-four rupees. That the revenue, for that year, was forty-one lacs forty-two thousand nine hundred and twelve rupees, and consequently, that *twenty-five lacs* were paid last year towards defraying the military expense incurred, not by the conquest of Scinde in 1843, but by the previous occupation of Scinde, and by the disturbed state of the Punjaub.

*Previous* to the conquest, the army of Scinde was an unmitigated expense to the East-India Company.

*Since* the conquest, that expense has been reduced by the aggregate sum of forty-two lacs thirty-seven thousand four hundred and thirty-five rupees, which has been collected *in excess* of the expenses of civil government and police force, calculating both from the battle of Hyderabad to the present day.

Thus, whatever the previous occupation may have produced, the conquest of Scinde has not cost the East-India

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Company a single rupee: for had the ameers continued to rule the land not a soldier could have been withdrawn from the force which occupied Scinde in 1842—on the contrary, strong reinforcements must have been added to it, divided, as it would have been, between Kurrachee and Sukkur, with the aggregated forces of the courts of Hyderabad and Khyrpoor assembled, in a central position, between the weak wings of the army of occupation—wings separated by four hundred miles of difficult country, and incapable of assisting each other, or of receiving any reinforcements during five months of every year! Such a position must have been untenable, or tenable only in consequence of egregious folly on the part of an enemy who commanded one hundred thousand men in a central position.

An army divided as I have stated, would probably have been cut to pieces, for apparently there could not have been any retreat!

The prompt military operations ordered by Lord Ellenborough in 1843, not only saved the army of Scinde from the fate which befel that of Cabool, but secured the north-west frontier of the Indian empire, speaking of Scinde in a military point of view—while in a commercial one, as commanding the navigation of the Indus, it is the key to the Punjaub.

*Not a man has been added to the army of occupation in consequence of the conquest.* Scinde was conquered by the troops which previously occupied Sukkur.

This is a fact which cannot be too often repeated. But this is not all. The advanced frontier has a right to the troops that occupied the former retired frontier, extending from Bhooj to Balmeer. The latter no longer require garrisons, and consequently the conquest of Scinde has not entailed the necessity for having additional troops, or throwing greater duties on the Bombay army—whereas, but for the conquest, not a soldier could now be withdrawn, or the Indus would be closed to commerce even though the Punjaub were opened!

No troops, beyond the police, are now required to pre-

serve the interior tranquillity of Scinde. The increasing revenues are thrown into the Indian treasury, and the military charges belong to India generally, not to Scinde more than to any other province of the empire.

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An immense increase of revenue has taken place in Bombay in consequence of the conquest of Scinde, which prevents the smuggling trade in opium, formerly carried on. What may be the amount of this increase I have no means of knowing; but it is said to be very great. Commerce is already actively commencing between Kurrachee and Sukkur, ready to branch forth into the Punjaub when the results following the victories on the Sutlej shall open up *the Five Rivers* to the enterprising spirit of British merchants. Sukkur, ordered by Lord Ellenborough to be called *Victoria on the Indus*, has become the depôt for goods passing into Central Asia.

See Appendix  
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Such, soldiers of the Scinde army, have been the services of those regiments which conquered, and of those which have occupied Scinde since the conquest. During this period of four years, there has not been a single political crime, conspiracy, or act of hostility of any kind, public or private, committed by the people of Scinde against the government, or against the troops, or against any individual. Nor am I aware that any body of officers, any officer, or any private soldier, has given cause of complaint to the inhabitants. There has been perfect harmony between the conquerors and the conquered, if the term, conquered, can be applied to a people who have been freed from a degrading and ruinous tyranny, which sixty years ago was established by traitors over the country of their murdered sovereign!

This adds more glory to our arms and to the British name than even the victories which you won on the fields of *Meeanee* and of *Hyderabad*. Courage may win a battle, but it is something more than courageous when a victorious army turns a conquered people into friends and peaceable subjects!

Such, soldiers! have been the results of your labours, and your dangers; and those regiments which return to

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their respective presidencies, return with the becoming pride of men who have well performed their duty, and gained the approbation of their sovereign and their governments—the greatest reward that well-disciplined soldiers can receive !

For myself, I remain at my proper post as governor of Scinde, and the commander of that division of the Bombay army stationed on the new line of frontier. But it becomes your general, who best knows what you have done and what you have suffered, to make known on the breaking up of the army the things it has achieved for India—his admiration of its merits and his gratitude for its assistance. The military spirit which animated the force that marched last year to Bhawalpoor, was probably never surpassed : no army was ever more worthy of India, nor more possessed the confidence of its commander.”

This forcible exposition increased the obscene violence of his enemies, because it displayed the truth they were so anxious to obscure ; and their mortification was augmented at the time by two public testimonies to his merit from the duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough. For the first moved the sovereign to confer on him the rank of lieutenant-general in India—an advancement hitherto confined to commanders-in-chief. The second offered the following concise but comprehensive eulogium.

“It is unnecessary for me to declare in words my entire approbation of Sir C. Napier’s conduct. I showed what I thought of it by my acts while I was governor-general, and I think the services he has performed since I left India have been even greater than those I endeavoured, but was unable, adequately to reward. His campaign in the hills was a military operation even superior to that which was for ever illustrated by the victories of Meeanee and Hyderabad ; and he has proved himself to be the ablest, at least the most successful of all administrators, if the success of an administration may be tested by the contentment and confidence it gives the people. His

services during the late campaign on the Sutlej, when, having had no previous instructions to keep his forces prepared, he moved in a few weeks with fifteen thousand men and a hundred guns against Mooltan, leaving Scinde tranquil in his rear, was of itself sufficient to show to all minds capable of comprehending great measures of war and policy, not only the perfection of his arrangements and the popular character of his just and excellent government, but the immense value in a military point of view of the position which his former victories had given to Scinde. These matters are however so very little understood in this country, even by the few who attend to them at all, that I fear it may be long before his merits are justly appreciated; and people here may discover only when it is too late, that Sir C. Napier has possessed that rare combination of military and civil talent, both excellent in their kind, which is the peculiar attribute of a great mind."

Scinde was now internally very prosperous, but it was still subject to frontier disturbances, and towards the close of 1846, the miserable Bhoogtees, defeated by the Murrees, rejected by the Keytrians, repulsed by the Mazarees, and warred against by their former comrades the Jackranees under Deyrah Khan, had finally cultivated the valley of Deyrah for subsistence, desiring rest: but their harvest failed and they once more made a foray on Scinde. The British cavalry posts immediately took the field. Twenty-five troopers under Lieutenant Moore, accompanied by some Jackranees, first fell in with them, and the latter slew several in a jungle, amongst them a noted chief. The Bhoogtees then came out of the bush, and Moore, finding their numbers considerable, retired, urged thereto by the Jackranees, who declared themselves unequal to a conflict, yet offered if so commanded, to kill their horses and die sword in hand. There was no need for such devotion, and all fell back on Meerpoore, a small place, where a supporting force was assembled under Colonel Stack. To that point also came Lieutenant Greaves, who had likewise fallen in with the Bhoogtees, and sent notice of their foray to Shikarpoore. Stack had a respectable

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cavalry force, and some riflemen, sent to him from Shikarpoore on Greaves's report. That officer had however forgotten to send a like notice to Shahpoor, the garrison of which could, with timely warning, have moved on Ooch and so cut off the robbers' retreat; this rendered prompt action essential, but Colonel Stack remained four hours at Meerpoore, and finally, made a night march in the desert with his cavalry only, and without carrying water or food for man or beast.

At dawn he found the enemy drawn up on a sandy waste, covering the retreat of the herds they had captured. There were only eight hundred footmen and not all provided with matchlocks, but rattling their swords against their shields with loud shouts they offered battle. Stack had two hundred and fifty troopers, furnished with carbines and pistols of great range; yet he declined action and returned to Meerpoore, his men and horse fainting from the double march and want of water. This was excused on the plea that the enemy had a strong rising ground with a nullah in front. An after-examination showed that there was no nullah, and the rise of ground very slight; it was then said the mirage common in that desert had quite deceived the English commander. Islam Khan subsequently declared that he had resigned all hope of life at the moment the cavalry retired. He now regained his rocks in safety and held a funeral feast, where vengeance against the Jackranees was solemnly sworn for the death of the champion killed in the jungle. The failure on this occasion was certainly in the execution. The efficiency of the general arrangements was proved by the robbers being found by so many parties; and soon afterwards Lieutenant Younghusband of the police showed what the result of a fight would have been. For hearing of a minor foray, he with only thirty-four mounted police pursued a superior force, overtook it after a march of thirty-five miles in the desert, and in a sharp encounter, where Aliff Khan the swordsman distinguished himself, killed ten and carried off seven prisoners, with a chief named Dora.

Stack's error was disquieting, because the slightest success elated those barbarians inordinately, and the Bolan tribes might join the Bhoogtees; the Scinde Moguls and the camel corps were therefore sent to the frontier; but meanwhile the Bhoogtees, always in trouble, had fought with the Murrees again, and losing the battle were quieter for a time. At Bombay the whole affair was, as a matter of course, proclaimed to be one of Sir C. Napier's crimes; for at this period he could not move, or utter a word in public without furnishing a topic for torrents of scurrility; and always there were abundance of correspondents to furnish the newspapers with a thousand easy and infallible correctives for the civil and military errors and disorganization which those persons perceived and deplored. Supremely contemptible all this would have been, if experience had not demonstrated that some members of the council of Bombay were the secret instigators and concocters of these calumnies, and that the Court of Directors was ready to reward the calumniators. With this stimulus to slander, India was deafened with statements of his crimes and follies; and one especial topic was his inhumanity to the ameers' wives.—“He had torn away their personal ornaments to swell his prize-money, and still remorselessly persecuted those helpless females, having recently treated the aged mother of the excellent Shadad with peculiar barbarity, intercepting her correspondence with her virtuous son and opening her letters to add mental anguish to bodily sufferings.—She was actually pining from hunger under his government while her jewelled ornaments were being offered for sale in Bombay to swell his brutal profits!” with much more of a like nature.

This starving lady, had however, in conjunction with her sisterhood, and notably the widow of Kurreem Ali, taken advantage of the conqueror's extreme delicacy towards them, after the battle of Meeanee, to abstract nearly two millions sterling from the ameer's public treasury! And they were at this time, while complaining of destitution, for the starving story originated with them,



CHAP. XIII. expending ten thousand pounds upon a tomb for one of  
 1846. the princes! She and Kurreem's widow, in concert with the latter's confidant, Mirza Kosroo, a Persian slave and a clever violent man, were engaged in secret machinations with the young ameers residing in Ali Moorad's court, and it was in pursuance of some of their schemes that leave had been asked and obtained to send letters to Shadad. Secret information led to the arrest of the messenger on the frontier, when, as foretold, a large sum in coin and ingots of gold was found artfully concealed in his baggage. Whether this treasure was designed directly to aid Shadad's escape, or to pay Buist and his employers for their advocacy did not appear, because the general, while barring this improper intercourse with a state prisoner, returned the gold, and the letters, unopened, to the lady.

App. XVI.

In this manner passed the year 1846, but in 1847 Sir C. Napier, while treating with disdain the calumnies of his enemies, felt that he must give a permanent character to his interior policy before he quitted Scinde, foreseeing that once placed under the civil government of Bombay the object would be to overturn and destroy all that he had effected, were it only to prove that he had effected nothing. Minor mischief he could not prevent; but he resolved that the people at large should not be thrown back into barbarism, and therefore hastened the action of his regenerating policy as to the tenure of land. By that policy he aimed to make the great men landlords, their retainers tenants, and their serfs independent labourers, instead of remaining as heretofore military barons, vassals and slaves. He had long meditated on the principle, had gradually prepared the people for the change, and was now determined silently and quietly to complete it—trusting, and, as it proved, judiciously trusting that the extreme ignorance of the Court of Directors on all that really affected the interests of the nations under their rapacious rule would enable him to effect his object without official interference. Once done, by no evil intermeddling of power could it be undone. "And I shall then," he said, "stand upon a rock and defy them."

It has been shown before that all the land of Scinde was by law and custom vested in the government, which was entitled to resume any jagheer or crown grant at pleasure ; but at the great Durbar, held in 1844, jagheers had been given on life tenancy, subject to a rent, a portion of the land being retained, in the nature of a fine, to be let to poor ryots on government account. This system had been gradually expanded, to accustom the people and the jagheerdars to changes preparatory to the great one now to be effected.

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Jagheers were of all sizes, from three hundred thousand acres down to small estates ; but not above a fourth part of any had been or could be cultivated by the holders, and the remainders were wastes, only valuable as they gave importance by their royalties, and an excuse for a greater warlike following, to be subsisted by oppression and plunder ; but the suppression of military tenures having taken away that advantage the extent of jagheer no longer conferred such dangerous greatness. The system of life tenancy had worked well, and was spreading ; for always the jagheerdars were free to choose under which tenure they would hold ; and the principle was now to be extended in the hope of giving the population, rich and poor, new views of social organization, by making the great men territorial nobles and gentlemen instead of turbulent rapacious waiters on despotism.

With that view they were offered an absolute hereditary right of property in all the land they had, or could cultivate ; but the remainder was to be resumed by government as a fine, or purchase of the fee-simple ; and the resumed lands, nearly three-fourths of the whole, were to be let to ryots and immigrant settlers, at very low rents and with the advantages of being free from both rent and taxes for two years. The cultivators and the immigrants of both races would thus be attached irrevocably to the new order of things ; and the noble Beloochees would be satisfied with a secure title and enjoyment of all that was really valuable in their jagheers. Their importance in the state would be increased by this enjoyment of independence, but

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their clannish power abolished, and their hitherto oppressed serfs would enjoy freedom and gain good subsistence while they contributed largely to the revenue by bringing the waste lands into cultivation. The sirdars came slowly into the scheme at first, because they could not easily divest themselves of their suspicions, that no government could be of good faith, and hence that Sir C. Napier's departure would destroy their security of title; but it has since spread, as such a wise, great and benevolent measure should spread.

The complete mastery the general had obtained over all the people of Scinde was thus evinced; for the new principle was established without constraint, without commotion, without remonstrance or discontent; but from his first assumption of power, his measures were always advanced to consummation, with the cautious sagacity of sound legislation. "My motives for this step," he said, "are that a host of poor ryots, hitherto slaves, not only to the ameers but to the jagheerdars, will be enfranchised and enabled to live in comfort if industrious; and I know that the nobles can never be good or contented subjects unless we give them public employment and honour them. When civilization advances they will, under this system, find themselves rich, and they will embark in mercantile pursuits and agricultural improvements, because they will find their property safe and need not as heretofore make themselves formidable as military chiefs to retain it. But had I left them in possession of their enormous jagheers, and their military tenures, and their royalties, they would have always been dangerous subjects. We have now put them down as military chieftains, and we can keep them down because of their semi-barbarism; but hereafter we should find it very difficult to deal with their more civilized sons, if they continued to hold such immense tracts of land, which advancing civilization will change from wastes to fruitful possessions. Even under my system they will become very powerful; but I have established a counter-check by opening a way to raise a race of independent farmers attached to the govern-

ment. This is all I can now do for Scinde and its fine people.”

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That he could do no more good was daily becoming more evident, and his resolution to free himself from the stupid spiteful enmity of ungrateful masters was fixed; yet, ere he took that step, he thought it politic to show himself to the people after the number of troops had been reduced, and while the false impression that the ameers would be restored was prevalent. Wherefore as the body of Nusseer Khan, the chief of the captive Hyderabad ameers, who died about this time, had been brought to Scinde for interment, he resolved to carry the corpse with him up the river. The Bombay faction had looked for disturbance on this occasion, thinking there would be a great public ceremony, but the prudence of the general baffled that expectation. “I would,” he said, “give the deceased ameer a pompous funeral, but reason forbids it, and I balk my own desires and reject the prayers of my son-in-law, McMurdo, who invoked me, exclaiming, ‘*But, general, a dead enemy!*’ I did not want the hint, and I like him the better for having given it; but to accede would raise a notion, that the supreme government had ordered the ceremony as a prelude to the restoration of the ameers and if bloodshed followed blame would justly attach to me. Much therefore as I might wish to honour a fallen enemy, who however had no honour according to our ideas, I refuse myself the credit of such a display, because I have no right from personal vanity, and after all it is but that, to risk the shedding of blood. Lord Ashley has, unintentionally, by urging this restoration retarded the tranquillity of Scinde and caused great loss to private Hindoo families; but as to restoring the ameers, as far as I am concerned, he could do nothing more contributive to my reputation in these countries. The poor know I devote myself to their interests, and they know the cruel treatment they would receive from the Talpoor race if they again became masters. Experience has taught them a lesson, and I defy anything but English bayonets to replace the ameers!

CHAP. XIII. Lord Ashley and myself will appear before a tribunal  
1847. where truth alone can be heard, and he will then learn—  
I will not say to his cost for I am told he is a good man—  
but he will learn that I have acted with honour and  
humanity to the ameers and to the people of Scinde; that  
I have seen my way with more knowledge of the country  
than he has; that I have never done an act of injustice,  
but have raised the character of the English for truth and  
honour where the political agents had sunk it; and that  
he has been from first to last in error about Scinde.

“ Well! time will tell on these matters and I abide  
mine, though I do not think any justice will be done to  
me while I am alive, and when I am dying I will not say  
with that great man Sir John Moore ‘ *I hope my country  
will do me justice,*’ for I am so hardened by undeserved  
abuse and misrepresentation, that I care not whether  
justice is done to me or not. Yet it is discouraging, how-  
ever firm the heart may be, to see persons like Lord Ashley,  
ignorantly assenting to the running down the character of  
a man who has lost two of his family in this trying climate,  
and who is risking the lives of the rest, and his own life,  
from a determination not to abandon his post while he  
can be of use. I am however hardened—not in feeling,  
but by principle and reason—against abuse. I have done  
nothing but what was right and honourable. I have in no  
instance violated religion or honour to obtain success; on  
the contrary, I have attained it by a rigid adherence to  
both, and I hold those who so foully abuse me in just  
contempt.”

With these sentiments he continued to work conscien-  
tiously, and by the light of his own genius amidst the dark  
cloud of falsehood raised to shroud his actions from the  
knowledge of his countrymen; but in July, 1847, a severe  
illness, which nearly sent his wife to the grave, hastened  
by a few months his resignation of power, and in October  
he embarked for England with all the honour that his  
troops could offer to show their veneration, and every  
good wish that a people grateful for happiness and security  
bestowed, could express. Nor was this a transient feeling

with the Beloochee and Scindee races; for this after-proof of its depth and sincerity has been given; one as irrefragable as that furnished by the grateful peasants of Cephalonia, when they cultivated his farm in his absence. In 1850, when returning from the supreme military command of India through Scinde—when it was known that he was at variance with the governor-general and was abandoning India for ever—the grateful Belooch chiefs asked leave at Kurrachee to present him with a sword of great value, not, as they said, because he was their conqueror, but that he had, after conquest, secured to them their rights, their dignities and possessions, and made that conquest a benefit to them and their race.

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This is a noble contrast to the feelings which have actuated Lord Dalhousie and the Bombay government; for with that littleness which forgets the public welfare in the indulgence of personal malice, they have, since Sir C. Napier's departure from Scinde destroyed as far as their power went every great work and institution projected by him for the benefit of that country.

The camel baggage corps if not entirely put down, has been so withered by intentional neglect as to be useless.

The completion of the barracks at Hyderabad, perhaps the most excellently contrived for the soldiers' health and comfort of any in the British dominions, has been peremptorily stopped when one wing was finished, the other advanced; and all the materials gathered are left to rot alongside the walls which are perishing from exposure!

The continuation of the great mole at Kurrachee has been abandoned under positive orders, issued in disregard of the loud cries of the shipping and mercantile community for its completion. Those cries have indeed been so loud and imperative, that the present able and vigorous commissioner for Scinde, Mr. Frere, confident in the just feelings of Lord Falkland to support him, has, it is said, resolved to resume the work. The petty jealous folly which stopped it remains however the same, it is Mr. Frere not Lord Dalhousie who has displayed sense.

The construction of the aqueduct for conveying the

CHAP. XIII. Mulleear water to the town and vessels has never been permitted.  
1847.

The great canal system for scientifically irrigating Scinde has been abolished, and the control of the waters, so absolutely essential to the agriculture and revenue of the country, has been thrown again into the hands of the ignorant and fraudulent kardars.

To these retrograde acts must be added the breaking up of the annual mart for horses and other commodities at Sukkur, and the refusal to sanction the building of a safe magazine at Bukkur. Commerce with Central Asia was forwarded and the army supplied with fine animals at a cheap rate by the first establishment, and the want of the second exposes Bukkur, Sukkur and Roree hourly to a terrible explosion. These and many other minor injurious interferences present a lamentable picture of destructive folly and ignoble jealousy.

While Sir C. Napier was yet in the land, the last decisive blow was given to that robber system which he had sworn to extirpate—a blow terrible in its details of blood, but a crowning measure of mercy for the tranquillity of Scinde.

Notwithstanding their skirmish with Lieutenant Young-husband, and their subsequent disastrous fight with the Murrees, Islam Khan's Bhoogtees, always pressed by hunger, made another foray on the Scindian frontier. Moving down the Teyaga ravine, they first assaulted one of the Kyharee forts, were repulsed, and their further march tracked by a young officer named Merewether, who from Shahpoor followed them with a detachment of the Moguls and some auxiliary Kyharees. He found them, about seven hundred in number, thirty-five only being mounted, arrayed in a deep line near the foot of the hills, but preparing to cross the desert. They first sought by a flank movement to gain a jungle on their left, but Merewether galloping across their front cut them off; yet their position was still strong, amidst rocks and bushes, if they had staid quiet. They however, thinking the gallop of the Moguls was to avoid an action rushed forward firing

matchlocks, clashing sword against shield, shouting and howling in a frightful manner, whereupon the horsemen wheeled and charged through them. The shock was rude, but the undaunted Bhoogtees closed again and keeping shoulder to shoulder still made for the hills, followed by the Moguls who plied their carbines with a terrible execution. Having crossed a rivulet the robbers turned and stood to receive another charge and carbine-fire, and then without breaking renewed their efforts to retreat, yet were once more cut off from the hills and finally brought to bay. Merewether offered quarter, but they bore his fire until only one hundred and twenty remained, who sullenly threw down their arms. Two of their mounted men escaped, all the rest were killed or taken, and eight chiefs died sword in hand.

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Islam and Ahmed Khan, the two principal men, were not present in this fight, and so avoided the general ruin, but their stout-hearted tribe was destroyed; for though only one hundred and twenty Moguls were engaged the earth was cumbered with six hundred Bhoogtee carcasses! There was here no cruelty to cause this dismal butchery—all the ferocity was on the side of the sufferers. Long had Sir C. Napier striven to abate that ferocity and induce them to settle alongside the Jackranees in Scinde; he had personally endeavoured to soften the temper of the captive chief Dora, had given him land and sent him with renewed offers of protection and possessions for his tribe; and in the fight Merewether had adjured them to accept of quarter. Hence, while admiration for their constant intrepid temper is mingled with pity for their destruction, justice proclaims that their blood was on their own heads!

So ended Sir C. Napier's administration of Scinde!

He had found that land domineered over by a race of fierce warriors, who hated the English from political and religious motives, and who were preparing for war, with a well-grounded distrust of British public faith and honour, and a contempt for British military prowess—a contempt which the disaster at Cabool and several recent minor defeats in Khelat seemed to warrant.



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1847.

He had found it under the oppressive sway of an oligarchy of despots, cruel, and horribly vicious in debauchery ; setting such examples of loathsome depravity, as must finally have corrupted society to its core and made regeneration impossible.

He had found the rural subject population crushed with imposts, shuddering under a ferocious domination, wasting in number from unnatural mortality and forced emigration—the towns shrinking in size and devoid of handicraftsmen. The half-tilled fields were sullenly cultivated by miserable serfs, whose labours only brought additional misery to themselves ; and more than a fourth of the fertile land was turned into lairs for wild beasts by tyrants, who thus defaced and rendered pernicious what God had created for the subsistence and comfort of man.

He had found society without the protection of law, or that of natural human feelings ; for slavery was widely spread, murder, especially of women, rife, blood-feuds universal, and systematic robbery so established by the force of circumstances as to leave no other mode of existence free, and rendering that crime the mark and sign of heroism. Might was right, and the whole social framework was dissolving in a horrible confusion where the bloody hand only could thrive.

He had found the Beloochees with sword and shield, defying and capable of overthrowing armies.—He left them with spade and mattock submissive to a constable's staff. He found them turbulent and bloody, masters in a realm where confusion and injustice prevailed—he left them mild and obedient subjects in a country where justice was substituted for their military domination.

He had found Scinde groaning under tyranny, he left it a contented though subdued province of India, respected by surrounding nations and tribes, which he had taught to confide in English honour, and to tremble at English military prowess as the emanation of a deity. He found it poor and in slavery, he left it without a slave, relieved from wholesale robbery and wholesale murder, with an increasing population, an extended and extending agri-

culture, and abundance of food produced by the willing industry of independent labourers. He left it also with an enlarged commerce, a reviving internal traffic, expanding towns, restored handicraftsmen, mitigated taxation, a great revenue, an economical administration, and a reformed social system—with an enlarged and improving public spirit, and a great road opened for future prosperity. He had in fine, found a divided population, misery and servitude on the one hand, and on the other a barbarous domination—crime and cruelty, tears and distress, everywhere prevailing. He left a united regenerated people rejoicing in a rising civilization the work of his beneficent genius.

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## SUPPLEMENT.

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IN the foregoing chapters, the administration of Scinde has been sketched rather than described ; a full exposition must be sought for in Sir C. Napier's correspondence ; and should that proof of his qualities for command be ever laid before the world, it will show how entirely he loved justice, and how conformable to the spirit of Christianity was his whole government. It will then be seen that he deserved well of his country, and of the directors who treated him so basely : but neither worth nor success could abate their ungrateful hostility, which continued to pursue him in England.

It had been the constant usage when conquests were made in the East, for the Court of Directors to move the Crown to order a distribution of "booty" prize-money being so officially termed ; but this was by the Court of Directors refused to the victorious army of Meeanee, which was thus forced to appeal directly to the sovereign. This appeal was successful, but for some reason not explained, though not difficult to divine, the Court of Directors was made trustee for a fair distribution, and immediately proceeded to make a foul one ; namely, that Sir C. Napier, *"not being a commander-in-chief, should, according to the prevalent usage in India, share only as a major-general, and have but a sixteenth instead of an*

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*eighth.*" This was notified to the Lords of the Treasury as the Court of Directors' decision!

There was however more to be done. A decision it was, and as mean and base a one as ever disgraced a public body, but it was not a final decision. The royal warrant provided an appeal to the Lords of the Treasury; and though the Court of Directors withheld all official notice of its decision from Sir C. Napier, who was then in Scinde, thus indirectly seeking to debar him of his right of appeal by lapse of time, his friends in England, apprized of what was going on through other channels, were permitted by the Lords of the Treasury to put in a plea for the absent general. Then was poured into the public ear, all possible anonymous scurrility, and resistance to oppression was represented as a sordid seeking for dishonest gain at the expense of the soldiers who had fought the battles! Moreover at the very time the decision, shameless as it was shown to be, was made by the directors, one of their body, Sir J. Weir Hogg, prompted a member of the House of Commons, Mr. Baillie—the prompting being readily accepted in all its foulness—to assert, in opposition to a suggestion that the general had not been duly honoured, that “he *had received* seventy thousand pounds as prize-money!”—a sum exceeding the amount of the eighth which Sir J. W. Hogg was then endeavouring to reduce one-half, and also knew well, that far from being *received*, neither the greater nor the lesser sum could be paid for several years! Neither prompter nor speaker on this occasion could understand, that to a generous mind money was not an equivalent for honours withheld when glorious actions had been performed: that was a mystery they could not penetrate.

The directors' decision was, on appeal, reversed by the Lords of the Treasury, and Sir C. Napier's advocate, Mr. John George Phillimore, dissecting it with a firm and skilful hand, exposed all its malignant weakness. He showed, that the denial of rank as commander-in-chief was advanced in direct contradiction of the governor-general's

minute conferring that appointment, and in opposition to the whole stream of his official correspondence—that the directors had studiously suppressed all facts bearing on the real question, and had as studiously brought forward irrelevant matter to obscure the truth—that all former decisions, all usage, all analogy precedent and rule laid down, whether by former courts or by royal authority, contradicted the Directors' assertions, and marked their decision, indelibly, as a pitiful display of personal hostility, offensive alike to custom, to law, and to honour! Yet here, justice again imperatively calls for the admission, that amongst the directors were men who did not join and were incapable of joining in this proceeding, though powerless to prevent the corporate act.

As a corporation the Court of Directors acted in a base manner. From the moment Sir C. Napier appeared as a victorious general under the auspices of Lord Ellenborough, he was marked by that court, and through its influence by the crown ministers, for slights and ill usage, because his exploits gave lustre to a policy which it had been factiously decided to decry. In that spirit the park guns had been silenced, and the thanks of parliament for his battles withheld for a year, though the noise of both was readily furnished for intermediate actions scarcely to be called victories.

Every scurrilous writer, from the pompous libellers of the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews*, to the penny-paid slanderers of the daily journals, were set to assail his character and depreciate his actions; and while he was denied all legal and customary official protection, subordinate officers were inordinately rewarded for assailing him in publications violating at once discipline, decency, and the orders of the court itself—orders issued with Machiavelian policy, to give an appearance of condemning what it was secretly encouraging and openly rewarding. Miserable expedients also were resorted to for abating his reputation. Lord Ripon *forgot* to publish his despatches—ministerial orators omitted his name at public banquets

when lauding the generals who had gained Indian victories : and those contemptible arts were continued when he returned to England. He only of the officers who came back from the East with any pretensions to celebrity was uninvited to city feasts, was ungreeted by the offers of city honours. When tributes of respect, springing from real public feeling, were paid to him, the London journals, a few excepted, left them unnoticed ; and that this was the result of an extraordinary sinister influence was proved by its constancy, and by the following fact. The town-council of Portsmouth, in presence of an enthusiastic assemblage of inhabitants, presented an address to Sir C. Napier on his landing ; and he was escorted to the town-hall by all the regular officers of the garrison, and those of the royal marines. No account of this complimentary proceeding appeared ; and when the mayor of Portsmouth sent an authentic report to one of the leading journals for publication it was refused, though he offered to pay for it as an advertisement !

The contrivers of those artifices in their eagerness to obscure a great man's fame, forgot that history and posterity would remain, even though the English public had been so indifferent as to accept such pitiful impositions on its judgment. But it did not do so. Unexpected and imminent danger to India caused the real national feeling to burst forth with a violence overwhelming all despicable arts ; and those ministers who had lent themselves to the Court of Directors' passions and enmity, were compelled by the nation to present to their sovereign the slandered, neglected, victorious general, as the man whom England called for in the hour of danger—and then the directors, licking the dust with fevered tongues, besought him to accept honours and confer safety !

Scornfully forgetful of past injuries, Sir C. Napier put ministers and directors from his thoughts, and looking only to the sovereign and the people, returned to India, there to meet, as he foretold, the same ungrateful male-

volence when danger should pass away. Forced by insult to resign his high command a second time, he is again a butt for injustice, and supercilious neglect; but for posterity, for history, he will always be the daring victor of Meeanee and Hyderabad, the intrepid subduer of the hillmen, the successful regenerator of Scinde, the firm military reformer of India—the man on whom the universal English nation called in the hour of danger to uphold a distant tottering empire.

THE END.

## A P P E N D I X .

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### I.

THE nature of the ameers' government to which the Bombay faction gave the character of "patriarchal" is here shown.

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*Extract from a Report of the Kurrachee Collector, to the Judge-Advocate-General on the mode of examining witnesses in criminal trials under the Ameers.*

November, 1844.

The ameers had no regular rules for examination of witnesses or for administering justice. The most common practice was to ask the witness, without administering an oath, what he knew, and in the event of his professing ignorance, should the judge entertain suspicion of his truth, he was forthwith put to the torture to make him tell what the judge considered he ought to know. This torture was either the hanging him up by the thumbs, and applying a red-hot ramrod to different parts of his body; or by pricking him with a dagger; or by applying a naked blade to his throat, with an intimation that his throat would be severed unless he at once told the truth. These atrocious modes have been practised, to my knowledge, by different hakims or governors of Kurrachee since I have been in Scinde, and on two occasions with success!

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*Extract from a Report of the Hyderabad Collector and Magistrate.*

November, 1844.

Oaths were generally in the ameers' time administered to parties in civil suits, but there were then no such things



as regular criminal trials in Scinde. The usual way was, if the case was one of murder to leave the respective tribes to settle the matter by retaliation or otherwise. In case of robbery or other ordinary crimes, the kardar ascertained as he could by verbal information, by tracking, and other modes, who the delinquent was, and when he had seized him, put him in the stocks and thrashed and tortured him until he confessed. Any man whom there was good reason to think able to throw a light on the case, but who refused or tried to evade giving evidence, was treated in like manner, till his reluctance was overcome. There was also the ordeal by fire and that by water, wherein, if the accused was burned, or unable to remain below water the regulated time without being drowned, or if he refused the ordeal altogether, he was without more ado found guilty.

In the above cases I suppose always the accused to be a Hindoo or Scindee, or a Beloochee of some tribe whose chief was powerless; for otherwise he would not have concealed anything, but have kept the property in defiance of complainant and kardar, and cut down the first man sent to apprehend him.

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## II.

*Compressed Extracts from a Report by C. W. Richardson, Esq.  
Deputy Collector in Scinde.*

July, 1845.

Sugar has been planted and grown in considerable quantities throughout upper and lower Scinde on the banks of the Indus for many years, and I am led to believe the culture of it may be increased to any extent. The culture was in the ameers' time much diminished, from the exorbitant taxes on the ground; but the soil on both banks is admirably adapted for the sugar-cane. The richness of the soil from the annual alluvial deposits obviates the necessity of manure, which in every other part of India is absolutely requisite and entails besides

much labour and expense for carriage and collection. In Scinde the principal labour is ploughing and clearing the land of jungle-bush and weeds. In many parts of India it has been found difficult and even impossible to raise sugar-canes, from the great quantity of water required independent of the labour of drawing it from deep wells; but near the Indus they can be supplied in abundance and certainty. Notwithstanding the advantages of rich soil and abundant water, the inhabitants during the ameeers' sway have taken no interest in the cultivation of sugar; and even now with ameliorated taxation they do not take care or trouble; hence the cane which ought to be of a superior kind is generally stunted and small, and the juice is of an inferior flavour.

A great deal of the cane is sold as an esculent in large towns and the villages in the vicinity of the cane-farms; some portion is however compressed in a rude manner for *goor*, but the people are ignorant of any good process. By the introduction of superior canes from the Mauritius and other places, and a better cultivation of the indigenous cane with superior manufacture, the actual produce of goor might be doubled; meanwhile sugars of every description are imported, chiefly from Muscat. In many parts of Bengal sugar-manufactories have been established with success; yet nowhere have the facilities been so great as in Scinde, where soil, climate, abundance of water, easy irrigation and transport are all combined; it needs but the hand of government to make sugar-cultivation flourish. The expense of a large sugar-manufactory would not be very great, and a handsome return would soon be realized, and induce private speculators to commence enterprises which would largely increase the revenue. The sugar-mills should be established in the vicinity of the cane, as the latter dries and ferments rapidly after being cut; and it would be well to encourage the ryots to raise the cane, make the goor and bring it under conditions for sale at the government sugar-manufactory. The cost of an iron mill sent from England would be about three hundred pounds, and the govern-

ment outlay of the establishment be about three hundred and sixty pounds; but if the government had the ryots instructed how to produce the best raw material and then purchased it, the cost of an iron mill would be spared..

Joined with the institutions for making sugar might be one for indigo, for which valuable product the soil, from Sukkur to Kotree, is generally very favourable; but below the latter place the dews are so heavy as to be injurious to the plant. Any quantity of indigo may be grown in Scinde; and the alluvial soil on each side of the Indus, saturated by inundations, should produce indigo of a quality fully equal to, if not better than that of Bengal; and I doubt not would do so; for in fact Scinde is just Bengal over again, without its rains, and the rains are the great enemy of the Bengal planter. In the districts of Kanote and Mahajanda, ninety or a hundred maunds of indigo are yearly made, and the quality of the drug is good, but a rough mode of manufacture greatly depreciates its value.

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### III.

*Extract from one of many Letters addressed by Sir C. Napier to the supreme Government about the Mullaree river, which were unanswered.*

August, 1845. -

As we have now passed over the season for rain and have not had any at Kurrachee, the tanks are all dry and the wells very low. The consequence of this is bad water, and bowel-complaints are attacking the soldiers. I assure you it would be very desirable for the health of this cantonment if we were to have the Mullaree river brought into camp, the expense, which I forwarded in August 1844, would be only twelve thousand pounds: a small sum compared to the great advantages of health and convenience which would result from this work.

The water here is drawn from wells, and is strongly

impregnated with soda and other matters. Sometimes you dig and come to fresh water at ten, twenty, or thirty feet; then go a foot deeper and it is perfectly salt. There are wells in the cantonments within two hundred feet of each other, and in some cases a great deal nearer—one is *salt* the other *fresh*. The earth is full of saltpetre and soda they say. However the water is deleterious whatever it be composed of, and you would do a great favour to Kurrachee if you will order us to begin this work at once.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

To Sir HENRY HARDINGE, &c.

*Note.*—A medical board was afterwards directed by government to report on the water at Kurrachee and declared it to be “*pure and good water.*” Nevertheless it contained the foreign substances mentioned in the above letter with the addition of alum: and invariably produced bowel complaints when first used by new comers. It was by all unlearned men considered unwholesome. Moreover this board examined it at a time when rain had just fallen, and as all the wells were then full the proportion of deleterious matter was greatly reduced.—W. N.

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#### IV.

*Extracts from a Letter to Lord Ellenborough written when preparing to commence the Campaign against the Hill-men.*

Sukkur, 19th December, 1844.

I have this day arrived here, the anniversary of the day on which I left it two years ago! It reminds me of all your lordship's kindness to me, and of the danger to which this empire has been exposed by your recall; and in the words of one of our greatest men, Sir John Moore, I will say I hope all the mischief that may happen will not happen. I left Kurrachee the 11th of November, and have found the country a dead level with, if I may use the expression, rows of mountains running through it in

Paragraph A.

a direction, more or less, north and south. These hills do not gradually rise so as to form undulating sections; they are all strongly defined like walls and full of fossils. One day we marched through quantities of petrified wood; this we found at Mulleree camp—so marked on Walker's map. When we passed Pokune the country changed to hill and valley, and between those two watering-places the highest part of the country appears to be. Thence it becomes rocky and the alluvial soil disappears, but we again come upon it on reaching Chorla. Up to that all is barren.

Between Pokune and Chorla the country is wild in the extreme; rocks rolled together apparently by some grand convulsion of nature. I heard from one guide that there is a quantity of alum here—he said he had got it and sold it. I would have halted there a week were it not that I am so ignorant of geology and mineralogy that I should have lost time, and Scinde would have gained nothing, nor science either. There are hot springs among these hills, and we observed a low range of hillocks ten to twenty feet high, running parallel to the great range of the Hala, and formed of stones like cinders. One wise man of our party pronounced them a "concrete of vegetable matter," so I suppose they are. However they have a curious appearance and are quite different from their neighbours. I carried away some pieces which I keep against the time I meet a learned man, the breed of which I am afraid is rather scarce in Scinde, and I have begged a *little philosopher* from Sir H. Hardinge, if he has one to spare, for travelling in Scinde to tell us what treasures we possess.

From Chorla I passed through Peer Aree where Colonel Roberts surprised Shah Mohamed. It was well done, and I am sorry the colonel did not get the C. B.; that march and capture of the Lion's brother were of great use in settling the country, and a march at that time of year was no ordinary movement.

At Sehwan I examined the ruins of what is called Alexander's Tower. I have seen a great deal of Grecian ruins, and this is decidedly not Grecian. It probably is

the site of the colony left by Alexander, because the rocky bank makes it probable the Indus has always run here and occasionally Greek coins are found, but the ruins are those of a fortress destroyed by Aurengzebe. From thence to Sukkur the land has much cultivation though not a hundredth part *is* cultivated. Still it is rich and so may all between Kurrachee and Pokune be—immense plains of rich soil untouched by man! The formation makes it difficult to find water, but to me it is beyond a doubt that water may be found everywhere by sinking wells, and to that I will give my best attention as soon as I can. My idea is to increase and improve the wells where they have been already made by poor people; then, as the advantages are there felt and agriculture increases round them, and the people grow richer from growing markets and decreasing robbery, they will themselves sink new wells distant from those existing. This seems to me the most rational mode of proceeding—a slow one, but that is inevitable—one needs patience in these things, yet the more anxious I am to be of use, the more difficult I find it to be patient.

I found a set of robbers of the Rin tribe—not Beloochee, but Scindee Rins—they had remained faithful to the Kalloras and the ameers persecuted them. They were driven by the ameers from the Delta to the mountains some years ago, and have from that time lived by plunder; but being intruders the Belooch robbers were hostile to them and were supported by the ameers, the poor Rins lived a hard life. They petitioned me for land and protection, and I gave them waste land in the vicinity of Jurruck. This has been one good done by my tour. Another is that I found, in despite of my exertions, slavery existing to a great and cruel extent. This was made known by the slaves coming to me when they found I mixed with the poor people and had an interpreter, for they crowded round my tent everywhere. I instantly seized ten or twelve slave-masters, men of rank and influence, and for three weeks I have marched them as prisoners through the country. \* \* \* I am

extremely displeased at this slavery still existing, and I believe it to be only in Captain Preedy's collectorate, and in the close neighbourhood of the mountains, where obedience to the law only establishes itself step by step and cannot be enforced at once as in the flat lands—it is a great point for robbers to have their retreat secure in their war against the law. However my harsh treatment of the slaveholders has struck a terror that I hope will really destroy slavery.

Wullee Chandia has behaved with perfect fidelity. He captured Nowbut Khan, a robber chief who has defied me for a year, plundering and murdering without remorse. On his plundering a caravan of seventy-five camels and killing the camel-men I offered 1,000 rupees for his capture, and he is now in Fort Bukkur, and with him another great robber, Sobah Guddee, who also defied me. Fitzgerald marched seventy-five miles with the camel corps and surprised this chief in his mountain hold; 400 of his men were out, he and forty were at home. He fought. His son and two nephews died gallantly in arms with their backs to a tree. Lieutenant James, deputy-collector, begged of them to surrender but they refused, saying, they were Sobah Guddee's son and nephews and would not lay down their swords and shields. I am sorry they could not be saved. Their father had less courage; his character is that of a cruel unsparing robber, and the whole country rejoices at his fate; Lieutenant James says, people turned out in crowds to see him pass and expressed their satisfaction. He shall be tried by a military commission. I think the capture of these men will stop robbery in bands for the future, and I now hope I may say the right bank of the Indus is orderly and tolerably secure. There are however one or two gentlemen with whom I had conversation as I passed their villages, who are very fit subjects for capital punishment. One was very active in pursuing Nowbut when he plundered the caravan: he recovered sixty-three of the camels and very generously gave eighteen to the owners. As I passed they complained

and I sent a policeman to him. He is old, and if ever villany was depicted in man's face it is so in this chief's countenance.

I find in many cases here taxation taking one half the produce, I will reduce it everywhere, and under all circumstances to one-third. It is objected that the revenue will suffer. It will at first, but there will be a reaction; more people will then come and settle in the plains and there will be more jungle cleared, and increased cultivation will more than cover the loss to the revenue for two or three years. The government has plains of good land, some twenty miles long by eight and twelve in breadth, untouched, and by giving great advantages to the ryots so many will settle as to repay the temporary loss of revenue, and the additional comfort will diminish the disposition to robbery. But these wild men must get comfort on easy terms at first, or they will not change their swords for ploughshares. I have turned all this much in my mind as I rode through the country thinking how I could best serve it. The result is to reduce taxation and rent—they are really one—to one-third of the produce of land at all hazards. If I do harm I must be punished by my own regret, and the Company must place here a better man. I have the collectors against me, and I do wrong therefore, if wrong it be, of my own will, no one else can be blamed, except your lordship for putting me here; but I am too thoroughly convinced that my principle is right to have fear. However I will go slowly and gradually to work.

I am resolved also upon another step—that of making advances to the poor ryots of a little money, say, as far as thirty rupees to purchase a pair of bullocks; and to give them land rent free for two years on condition of clearing jungle. I am told they will run away with the money. This may happen in one or two cases but I wholly disbelieve it will be general. These Scindees I think an exceedingly honest people. As to the hill chiefs it is another thing; robbery is a profession made necessary with them by bad government, which has left men of a certain rank no other mode of existence. No officer is



robbed, every kind of property is safer in Scinde than in Bombay. I am therefore sure that by these little advances to poor families I shall clear the jungle rapidly and raise up that class for which England was once so celebrated—yeomen. I am also gradually breaking down the system of jagheers. Whenever a jagheerdar dies, I either resume the jagheer and divide it amongst zemindars and ryots, or let it to the son of the jagheerdar for a regular rent, depriving the jagheer of its royalties—they try hard to preserve their privileges of life, death, and taxation.

The black mail is a terrible affair; I cannot see how to deal with it for several years. Our police works admirably. They fight stanchly, and their inclination to bully has been taken out of them on one or two occasions rather severely; so they no longer give offence to the people as they did at first.

The system of trying great culprits by military commissions answers well as far as I can judge, and the magistrates deal out substantial justice in minor cases. I read every process and sign every sentence myself, and I find my labour increases: the people like our system and the number of trials is very great. I fear if they increase I shall hardly be able to go through them for want of time. I have now given your lordship a general idea of how we go on. Perhaps I may add, that with allowance for Eastern manners, the flocking of the people round my tent everywhere to make salaam, and the shouting loud prayers for me as I rode through their villages, were signs that they are rather content than otherwise, with my government. Another good sign is my riding with only the Scinde irregular horse through these wild tribes. Insult might have been offered, and maintained also, by these mountain chiefs; for I could not have entered their mountain defiles with a slender escort of cavalry far from any support. I felt however confident in the disposition of the people or I should not have done so.

I have just heard the *Delhi Gazette* states that Scinde is positively to be given back to the ameers. Unless government puts a stop to these reports they must do

harm ; they keep the Hindoo population in great alarm, and they will not spend money in any speculation while these doubts exist. Some of them tell me frankly, " We have money, but if we show this, (which we would do if we were certain of the English remaining) and you restore the ameers we shall be lost men : they would not leave us a shilling, and we might be tortured to make us confess to more."

They are going to take Cutch from Scinde ; they are wrong and I have said so in answer to a very weak paper sent by the directors to Sir Henry, who sent it to me. I hope they will do so as far as I am concerned, for Cutch adds to my labour and I feel no interest about it ; but Colonel Roberts, who has been all his life a personal friend of the Raō, has I think done much good. The Bombay government is very sore, Cutch having been taken from it. However all these external matters have little interest for me ; I am wholly engrossed by Scinde, and always fear I do not do half what ought to be done—indeed I know I do not, yet I strive hard, for the interest I feel for the country is past description, and daily increases. I hope I shall never be offered the commander-in-chiefship of Bombay, especially now, when they seem going on badly I fear, though they have the advantage of "*single-handed James Outram*" "*with full powers*" as the papers inform us. I am ignorant of the nature of this social warfare, but it seems to train on, and will open men's eyes to the advantage of your lordship's vigour at Mahara-japooore ! I suspect they will find that they removed your lordship when you had "scotched not killed the snake ;" but for that blow at Gwalior, the insurrection in the southern Mahratta country would probably have worked well with the northern, and that long line of country been in arms. Nor are the Mahrattas a despicable enemy—the spirit of Sevagee is still amongst them.

I have given Sir G. Arthur the 6th N.I., and the 13th light infantry, not numerous but stanch old soldiers, worth double the number of young ones. I cannot give

him more; I know not what effect his disturbance may have on Scinde, and I have lost the 78th. That beautiful regiment arrived here in high health, and every other part of Scinde was healthy; but the first week in November they began to grow sickly, and here they are bodily in hospital, about 200 dead, men women and children. I am sending them away as fast as I can to Hyderabad. As to any movement against the hill tribes at this moment I have no men! This place is just a depôt of fever—not a man has escaped, it is as bad as last year.

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V.

*Extracts from Letters to Lord Ellenborough and Sir H. Hardinge touching the mutiny of the Sepoys and the sickness of the troops.*

Mutiny—I am afraid the mutiny is not over. I met Hunter to-day for the first time, and he knows the sepoy well—he has no confidence in the present calm:

\* \* \* \* \*

I cannot delay telling you that General Simpson and Hunter are both of opinion that *all is not right among the Bengal troops here*. The soldiers of the 4th have of late been putting very unpleasant questions to their officers about pensions to their families in case of their (the sepoy's) death. The 64th expect to get those pensions; the other regiments want to know why they who have not mutinied should not have the pensions also. In short there is reason to believe that great discontent prevails. Some of the 4th have said that if the 64th go back to India they mean to follow them. \* \* \* \* \*

It is with great pleasure I correct a mistake that both I and my adjutant-general made as to the opinion of General Hunter regarding the sepoy. He *is* satisfied that all is now right. General Simpson is not; nor is it the general opinion of the officers as far as I can discover

*quietly*, for it is not a thing to be talked about—one must *find* out without asking.

*Sickness*.—I have this day sent the first division of the 78th to Hyderabad—not a man in the whole regiment can stand under arms! and not above 120 of the 64th N.I. and about 80 of the 4th N.I. Some of the guards have not been relieved for five weeks; but fewer native soldiers have died than of the 78th regiment. I have also sent the European battery or rather the men to Larkaana: the guns and horses were left behind; there were no men able to take them. This is a crippled force to do anything with—only 200 men and they have been ill! I brought the Scinde horse through the hills with me as a guard; they and the camel corps are the only men I have able to use their arms, except 300 volunteers from the 13th whom I have left at Larkaana. I was afraid to bring them to this den of fever. Five or six of the 78th died this day; and I fear many more will go. In this state, hostility on the frontier, and crippled by this terrible fever you will I am sure approve of my acting as circumstances may demand, I may be obliged to keep the volunteers. \* \* \* \* \*

As to the 78th, that a severe fever raged through the cantonment is certain; the natives suffered as much as the Europeans. But my own opinion is, and I am backed up in it by Dr. Robertson of the 13th, a high authority, that the *mortality* in the 78th was as much owing to drink as to fever! no medical man can say that malaria fever or remittent fever does not fix upon the *brain* and the *liver*—they all say this—they all say that ardent spirits do the same, and the received opinion of mankind is so, even to vulgar songs, “*Gin it burns my liver.*” Now let us take the soldier. I do not mean the 78th in particular—it is, say in beautiful order and no drunkenness—but the Highlander takes his allowance to the full as well as any other man. Observe then that the government allows him two drams a day—that is to say, three glasses or nearly one-third of a quart bottle. One he takes before breakfast, and one after. And will any one tell me, who

have lived my whole life amongst these men that they do not, aye! *the soberest of them who drinks at all, add at least one if not three more?* I laugh when I hear their officers, men of little experience, and who do not pay the attention I have done all my life to the habits of soldiers—I laugh when I hear these young men say their men don't drink!! by which they mean get *drunk*. I have said the truth. These sober and well-behaved men pitch in at least half a bottle of spirits daily. But I want no exaggeration. I will take the government allowance of nearly one-third of a bottle of raw spirit, swallowed daily, and I ask common sense if that is not enough to keep the liver and brain in a constant state of inflammation, more or less. And I ask of any medical man to say, if a remittent fever supervenes, whether the chances of recovery are not against the patient?

For those who are more guided by authority than reason, I heard Sir John Moore say, he thought the third of a bottle of wine too much for a young man to drink regularly every day *in England*. Yet *here* we give a boy one-third of a bottle of raw spirits! My second authority was Doctor Bailey, the great Bailey, who said to \* \* \* “If you want to recover your stomach and have health never touch wine or beer”—“Oh! but I am used to wine I cannot leave it off so suddenly”—“That is egregious nonsense, an argument used only by men who don't like to give up their wine.” So much for authorities; but common sense must tell every one that the government allowance is enough to ruin the health of the young men who come to this hot climate. I again appeal to medical men. The strength of a young soldier carries him through the remittent fever and his ration of raw spirits; he is weak indeed and at death's door, but nature triumphs. He leaves the hospital, his body disposed to dysentery; the hospitals are full, the attendance, from the sickness, scarce, surgeons worked to death. When weak and low the convalescent gets his dram and his spirits at once rally. Young and uneducated, he attributes this to the dram doing him good; after a while

the exhilaration goes off, and then languid and feeble he tries another—he won't get drunk, he knows that is bad ; but he goes close to it, and in a few days the internal irritation turns to dysentery, or that is upon him from the first perhaps, and he takes the drams to cure it—in either case he is gone. Now here is a good youth without vice, merely using what government allows him, which he naturally thinks good for him, and his comrades tell him so ; it kills him, and when he dies the result is laid on climate. Now climate is strong, yet medicine and regimen can wrestle with and overthrow it ; but medicine cannot overthrow climate and the third of a quart bottle of raw spirits, taken daily preparatory to fever before going into hospital, and as a restorative after coming out ! I have taken a sober soldier who drinks only his ration ; and how few there are who confine themselves to that ! I am told that some “tee-totallers” have died. I do not doubt it ; there may be hundreds of exceptions—sobriety does not make a man immortal—but I will still say that the mortality is divided between drink and climate, and also want of sufficient care and attendance which in these heavy attacks cannot be provided—surgeons and attendants get sick and die like other people.

I have entered largely into this question because I know its importance. Dr. Robertson of the 13th (Queen's) told me that in his long Indian service, wherever it happened to be impossible to get spirits the hospitals were invariably empty ! He had not a sick man in Jellalabad until they were relieved and spirits arrived. When that regiment had leave to volunteer here he said, “Now you will see, the moment the bounty is paid my hospital will be filled with cases of fever and dysentery”—and so it was. Yet in the face of these facts and of medical opinions, and of common sense, we give rations of spirits to soldiers !—and men of sense will assert that it does no harm ! It may be so, and the government seems to be of the same opinion. However the natives who do not drink spirits recover in far greater numbers than the Europeans do.

[*Extract of a Letter to Doctor Kirk.*]

My own opinion is immoveable, that among the many concurring causes of death in cases of malaria, of which I have seen much in all countries, especially in the Mediterranean, drink is one of the most vigorous. I do not mean drunkenness. I mean swallowing a certain portion of spirits every day—especially with young soldiers whose habits before entering the army were those of sobriety. The young soldier winks his eyes as he swallows his first dram, and is obliged to make, as they say, “two bites of a cherry.” He then comes to tossing it off with ease—then he likes it, and then he buys another in addition to the ration drams which are given him twice a day—to train him I suppose! Now, do not run away with the idea that I am such an ass as to attribute malaria fever to drink as a *cause*. I am persuaded that on certain occasions, and in certain circumstances it is a *preventive* of malaria fever; but I am confident a man who never gets drunk, but regularly imbibes a certain quantity of alcohol daily, prepares his brain and liver for fever, and an attack will run him hard—especially if this alcohol is poured into an empty stomach. What can be worse than the silly Indian habit of drinking a glass of wine before dinner to enable the stomach to take more than it has strength to manage!

## VI.

*Sir C. Napier's Observations on the 6th section of the new Articles of War for the Indian Army, re-introducing corporal punishment.*

December 29, 1844.

With regard to the note to Sec. 6 “Criminal Offences,” which I received subsequently to writing my previous observations, I think the greatest care should be taken not to tie up the courts-martial by defined rules when it can be avoided.

1°. Because, where no criminal jurisdiction exists the

country must be one lately come under the power of the East-India Company.

2°. Such a country is probably in a state of barbarism, like Scinde.

3°. The most decisive, and at times the most severe measures are necessary to secure the peace and control the chiefs of such a country.

4°. Such measures cannot be supported by the good sense of a court-martial (if it be tied down by accurately-defined crimes and punishments, and by rules formed for objects which are quite different) by military judge-advocates, who believe they understand law, and yet are ignorant of law. They thus destroy the real vigour, the efficiency and spirit of military courts without gaining the advantage of real legal principles. They produce a non-descript which is neither military nor legal. The result is that the military spirit of courts-martial is daily changing into the captious spirit of quibbling; and the use of such quibbles, the only part of law these gentlemen know, may do great harm when a lawyer pleads before a judge and jury. The latter hear the ingenuity of the lawyers on both sides, and then have the deep learning and experience of the judge to clear away the quibbles and place the case before them in a plain unprejudiced manner. With his charge impressed upon their minds they retire and decide on their verdict. Very different is the case with a court-martial. A military judge-advocate, who unhappily for the service fancies himself versed in law, and two or three of the members, who believe themselves equally enlightened, lay down all sorts of rules which they have decided to be law, and screw and twist every word and sentence in the charge, which is thus placed on the rack of their ignorance; and the most determined culprit often escapes by this quibbling spirit. There is no adverse counsel, no learned judge to clear the law and expound it. It has been laid down by extreme ignorance, to people who are equally ignorant and carries the force of law, without being law.

The courts are thus placed in a false position, for these



ignorant men are the judges as well as the jurors; there is no real judge to control or instruct them, no refuge from their self-sufficiency, and the military spirit of courts-martial is lost. I mean the consciousness amongst them that they are courts of honour and conscience assembled to arrive at the truth, without regard to the means, if they be such as honesty warrants and common sense dictates—the members, satisfied that the prisoner is guilty or innocent acquitting or condemning accordingly.

The judge-advocate being a soldier of some experience should regulate the forms of the court according to the *customs of war* and the *Articles of War*, and not according to writers on military law, who are no authority whatever. The judge-advocate, not having a vote, has no other responsibility and can give his whole time to correct the court if it acts against the *Articles of War*, or the rules of the service. He probably knows no more of them than the senior members; but as he is taken off other duty he is supposed to be more ready, and to have the details more at hand. But if he forgets that he is a *soldier* and fancies himself a *lawyer* all becomes illegal quibbling, produced by the legal castle the gentleman has built in the air, and for which he finds inhabitants amongst the weak-headed portion of the members.

Now if the new articles define too much the jurisdiction of courts-martial, where no criminal jurisdiction exists; it is my opinion that great confusion quibbling and illegal proceedings will take place. We have no learned judge to charge, and our courts are not juries in any point of view. But if the new *Articles of War* will merely say, that where no criminal judicature exists, courts-martial are to take cognizance of all criminal offences, we shall have courts which will judge as honest enlightened men of education always judge when untrammelled—that is to say they, together with the approving authorities, will do substantial justice, which is all that a newly-acquired territory can want till its habits demand, and its revenues can pay for a regular code of laws with proper officers. Then the military rule ceases. \* \* \* \* \*

The way in which the judge-advocates at head-quarters go on is in my humble opinion subversive of our code ; and is making courts-martial absolutely dangerous to a general officer. It is no longer a question whether a man is guilty or innocent ; but whether he can get out of a scrape by quibbles. At Newcastle-upon-Tyne I brought a soldier to trial on the occasion of the \*\* regiment attacking the new police. The case was a gross one. The captain of the man's company sat by the prisoner with a very clever attorney, who so bullied the court, that, if I recollect aright, the man was acquitted. Here every European soldier demands "a day for his defence" and produces a very fine written defence ; some of these are very clever, but very mischievous from their pert and saucy tone to the prosecutor, and their legal quibbles—these are well paid for of course. Now all this is exceedingly bad I think.

By our judge-advocates-general not being in their proper places they are ruining discipline. D'Aguilar's book was good as a help ; *it sticks to the Articles of War* ; but all the others, which bring their miserable modicum of law into play, and God knows it is bad law, do a world of harm. We soldiers are not lawyers, we never can be lawyers ; but we may be, and are—and we are daily getting worse—great quibblers, and in time we shall not be able to convict a criminal. The other day there was a doctor, a known drunkard, tried. Several officers proved he was drunk, one being his senior medical officer, whose evidence was, "The assistant-surgeon was drunk." — "Are not so and so the signs of blood to the head?" — "Yes." — "Might I not have blood to the head?" — "Yes ! but you were drunk." The court then asked the medical witness. "Did you apply any test!" — "No." An acquittal followed, and the drunkard is turned into an hospital in such a climate as this, and the unfortunate patients see him reeling from bed to bed, and must take what he prescribes !! It is horrible ! Yet not a man of that court had a doubt of his guilt.

Another doctor here, whom I also tried, got off with

being put a few steps down the list, though he actually fell down upon Colonel ——'s daughter who had the fever, while attempting to feel her pulse! She died, poor girl, and no wonder. Those men got off by the spirit of quibbling; the honour of the medical profession, and, what I care more for, the safety of the soldiers was sacrificed in one instance, not by this judge-advocate who is not troubled with the law rage, but by the quibbling members of the court.

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## VII.

### *Compressed Observations on the necessity of restoring Corporal Punishment in the Indian Army.*

I have long considered the flogging question as regards native troops, and my opinion is fixed. I entirely concur in the governor-general's remarks upon the orders of Lord Combermere, General Barnes, and Lord William Bentinck. The abolishing flogging was a great mistake and injurious to the Indian army. Discharge from the service is not the greatest punishment to a bad sepoy, though it is to a good one. And it is severe to give that highest punishment—made more terrible and disgraceful by hard labour in irons along with felons—to a well-drilled sepoy of previous good character, a man attached to our service, who has, perhaps only in a single instance, broken the rules of discipline; a man who, born under the fiery sun of India, is by nature subject to flashes of passion that cannot be passed over but do not debase him as a man. It is unjust and therefore injurious, and even disgraceful to the military code, which thus says, "I punish you in the highest degree, and stamp you with infamy for having a weakness, more or less common to all men." These transgressions, chiefly ebullitions of anger, are to my knowledge often provoked by young officers who frequently command regiments, and by others not in command. These gentlemen at times fancy, because they "passed in the languages," that they are masters of Hin-

dostanee, when they cannot speak a sentence correctly; and if they could, the chances are a Mahratta or Guzerat sepoy would not understand them. In some disputes both grow angry. If the officer commits himself by unjust abuse, it passes over, unless he brings the man to trial and thereby exposes himself. If the private is wrong he is dismissed and worked in chains like a felon. There is now no other punishment; and in the field scarcely this; so that the power of punishing ceases when it ought to be most vigorous, and order becomes almost a matter of personal civility from the sepoy to his commander. Really one is astonished how the army preserves any discipline! It proves that the sepoy loves the service, and how unjust it is for an outbreak of temper to give a punishment so terrible to him. Their own expression admirably depicts this injustice. "If we deserve punishment flog our *backs* but do not flog our *bellies*." Lord William Bentinck was a man I loved personally, as my old and respected friend and commander; but he did not see the severity, I will almost say cruelty to the sepoy of a measure, which he deemed to be the reverse.

Taking the sepoy's own prayer as the basis of our system, I would reward him and flog him, according to his deserts—his good conduct should benefit his belly, his bad conduct be laid on his back. An Indian army is always in the field and you have no other punishment but shooting. In the campaign against the ameers I availed myself of provost-m Marshals to flog. Some of the newspapers called upon the sepoys to mutiny. I stood the risk. Had I not done so, and showed the Scindians they were protected on the spot, instead of feeling safe and being safe they would have been plundered, and would have assassinated every man who passed our sentries, and instead of bringing supplies would have cut off our food: thus to save the backs of a few marauders hundreds of good soldiers would have been murdered. And if the campaign had not failed in consequence, such hatred would have been engendered that at this moment we should have only the ground we stand upon. Instead of my riding as I am doing with a

slender escort, I should be praying for reinforcements; instead of chiefs arresting robbers at my command, all would have been in arms against me. All this was avoided by having at once ordered every pillager to be flogged. And plenty these were—I dare say not less than sixty were flogged the first two days. Some religious people said “it was unholy” forgetting that our Saviour scourged the money-changers in the Temple. Some attorneys’ clerks in red coats said “it was illegal;” but I flogged on, and in less than a week the poor ryots instead of flying, or coming into camp to entreat protection (which I could only give by the lash) they met us at the entrances of the villages and furnished us with provisions. That some plunder goes on still I know; so there does in England; but the principle of protecting the people from the insults of armed men has been established; the people know it and are attached to a government which thus protects them. Without the use of the lash plunder would have raged—officers would have made personal efforts to stop atrocities, and what the great duke calls “the knocking-down system” would have prevailed, and shooting and hanging alone could have saved the army.

In the courts-martial here on native soldiers, insolence to officers is a strong feature; and the prisoners who in a moment of anger have been heedless of imprisonment and dismissal express deep regret when too late; but I think they would master their tempers had immediate corporal punishment awaited them. I observe that in nearly every case the officers and non-commissioned officers have fairly cautioned the offenders, but the suffering from dismissal being in some degree remote the angry sepoy braves it. Formerly he loved a service which punished him when he deserved it, yet still kept him—he does not in the same degree love one which discards him for one fault not in itself dishonourable. In the former state the army was his home, but that feeling has been weakened by the second.

I must take another view. The *state* has to be considered as well as the culprit. The good soldier does not

enter into the question at all, which is confined to culprits and the state. The state enlists, arms, drills, pays, and at an enormous cost places the culprit in presence of the enemy. The army exists by its discipline—all safety, all hope of victory depends on discipline. A wild violent malicious or drunken sepoy breaks through that discipline. You cannot confine him with hard labour—that is impossible. Dismiss him ! He will join the enemy and teach him to shoot your good soldiers. But say there are five hundred culprits, five hundred well-drilled soldiers to join the foe ! They will not do so. Worse and worse as far as humanity, justice and policy are concerned ; for they will die of starvation or be murdered by the enemy, and that, because they are still faithful to a service which rejected them !

I am convinced corporal punishment must be restored, whether the sepoys like the measure or not ; and at once, or the governor-general's observation will prove prophetic—“*Delay* tends to confirm the general order of 1835 by usage, and weakens the power as well as the right of returning to the former system of discipline.” If a right be not exercised, it grows so weak that to exercise it becomes impossible ; or a tyranny which divests it of propriety and makes justice revolting. I do not agree that if once a sepoy works in chains with felons, dismissal should be a necessary consequence. I doubt the necessity. It is not so with us. Infamy is a matter of volition. I would say to the sepoys, “The state has bought you from yourself ; the bargain was voluntary ; it paid a great price for you and you shall perform your contract—you shall go again in irons if you do not. The road of repentance and honour is again opened for you.” In some cases dismissal may be necessary, but it should be left to the commander-in-chief, when recommended by courts-martial.

With regard to *caste* it has attained an importance beyond its due. I would not outrage any man's religious prejudices ; if he chooses to redden a stone and worship it, let him do so : but if, seeing I respect his prejudices, he goes beyond that and says, “Now worship you likewise,”

I am surely a fool to do so; for he next will say, "I have drawn a circle round this stone, your house stands inside my circle and the god has ordered me to pull down your house, it is a respect due to my religion." And if I obey another demand will follow. But if instead of submitting to his absurd demand I at once punished his impertinence, he would have felt that I was just and not foolish. This appears to be our way with caste. We are meanly, unbecomingly and mischievously nourishing prejudices that we ought not to pay court to, for we have abundant examples of the natives being ready to break through them if properly treated—that is to say neither insulting them nor permitting them to insult us. The 35th lost caste by their intimacy with the 13th when defending Jellalabad. They are attacked I understand by their own people. What is the result? They glory in their friendship with the 13th. These natives have good sense. Insult them and they resist; act upon just principles and they will go hand in hand with you to the end of the chapter. I see great danger from giving undue importance to caste, as I understand is done in the Bengal army. They pay, apparently, little attention to caste in the Bombay army. If a high-caste man in private life touches a low-caste man he is defiled. If this happens in the ranks he is not defiled. This shows that good sense effects the object despite of prejudices, which ought not to be considered insurmountable though not to be interfered with lightly. The highest caste man, if he commits crimes can bear being flogged and will do so if administered justly, and that he sees we are resolved to punish him.

The great danger of our Indian system is this. We keep Indian princes on their thrones and allow them to tyrannize under our protection, while we teach the people not to bear their oppressions! The Kolapore irregular horse have just turned traitors; had this happened at the moment flogging was restored it would have been attributed to that cause; and that necessary punishment would have fallen into disrepute. This may seem a digression; but I wish to show that the whole Indian fabric is inti-

mately connected, and that we are in no danger from introducing *wise* measures; but we are so from *old* measures, wise and necessary perhaps in their day, but dangerous now from the growth of the empire, when our stations are so distant, so isolated, and consequently weaker against sudden outbreaks by native princes. If flogging be objected to by the Bombay army, it might be dangerous to restore it until the Kolapore insurrection is quelled; but from all I hear it will not be objected to by officers, native or European, nor by the sepoy. I had here an instance of how firmness acts on caste. A 64th mutineer, a Brahmin, refused to drink the water at Kurrachee which was carried to him by low-caste men: he said he would rather die. My answer was he might choose to die or live, but if he did not work I would flog him, and he gave no more trouble; his plain sense told him that he must submit; but had I yielded he would have made other demands. If the independent native princes are put down, their people justly ruled, and the sepoy punished as justly as they are paid, our hold of India will last for ages.

While I thus strongly advocate corporal punishment, I must be clearly understood to wish its adoption only under very stringent rules; such as I find in the new copy of the Articles of War which appear excellent; but I object to the same number of lashes being given to the sepoy as to our soldiers; he is a weaker man, more delicate of fibre, and has a softer skin—I think half the number would have equal effect. How the sepoy bears solitary confinement I know not, it is not used in the Bombay army; but I think a month too much for Englishmen even in the English climate. When commanding the northern district I inquired into this, and found magistrates, and medical men, civil and military, thought it too long. The sepoy is likely to bear it better—he eats opium and sleeps.

The additional responsibility given to regimental commanding officers by the new Articles of War makes it more necessary to have experienced officers in command. At



present lieutenants are frequently in command of regiments, and if this evil be not remedied no rules can prevent the deterioration of the Indian army; exclusive of the danger in active service. The native officers and sepoy have the greatest respect for experienced officers; but they cannot respect youngsters, without knowledge or experience, in the same degree as they do men who have been their instructors and protectors, men who first made them soldiers and have led them against the enemy. The young officers are anxious to learn, but like other trades they must serve their apprenticeships under master workmen. Now who is to teach them? A brother subaltern? Preposterous! As to lieutenant-colonels, they seem never to be left a moment with their regiments. This is a great injury to the service, and it is a matter intimately connected with the judicious infliction of corporal punishment. It becomes more than ever important to have field officers at the head of regiments and they should not be changed as the custom is. I do not mean that a lieutenant-colonel is never to have any other command, but that his removal should be a rare occurrence. The 64th regiment at the execution of the mutineers was under a lieutenant! a very young one! That fact seems ominous for the Indian empire! I speak with fifty years' experience of soldiers generally, and with two years' experience of an Indian army constantly in the field; a period sufficient for a general to learn something of the nature of his troops, if he is capable of learning anything—if not, a life spent among them would be unavailing.

There are people in India who think differently, who believe bile and a knowledge of the native character is acquired by the same process, and that men with the largest livers must necessarily be the greatest generals and diplomatists. Without admitting this doctrine entirely, I maintain that a certain degree of age and experience is necessary to command a regiment, or that reverence with which European officers are still held by the native soldiers will decline. A regiment is a school and if it has no experienced master the army must decline,

especially when the character of the people as well as the profession is to be taught—the Indian army's fidelity and efficiency depends more on its regimental officers than any army in the world. When a lieutenant commands, unless he has naturally an extraordinary character, he becomes a butt for his brother youngsters; he makes mistakes from inexperience which become subjects of mirth for the young men, and of course for the sepoy. All this is injurious to the respect for the "sahib" character which should be maintained and cherished with the sepoy. I would have more captains, or call the present captains divisional captains, placing them at the head of grand divisions, or two companies, each company having a brevet captain or captain-lieutenant, so that experienced men should be at the head. I would let the divisional captains on parade be posted in front of the centre of his two companies like a squadron leader in the cavalry. This would be better than five companies with captains, and five commanded by subalterns; because every sepoy would then have an experienced divisional captain to look up to; I would not allow captains to be on the staff, but form a staff as an exclusive corps. In this manner having experienced and respected officers in regiments, I would seek to make corporal punishment little needed, much feared, and effectual in this noble army; for better soldiers or braver men I never saw—superior in sobriety, equal in courage, and only inferior in muscular strength to our countrymen. This appears to me, as far as I am capable of judging, the true character of the Indian army in the three presidencies, and I have had men of each under my command. I may be in error; let abler men judge; but to me it is as clear as the sun in the heavens, that unless the East-India Company keep officers of high rank at the head of their regiments, and more captains with companies, it will ere many years pass have cause for regret—native officers will gain influence and finally *take* the command. If I am answered "It is too expensive," I reply "It is more expensive to lose India." Every part of this magnificent army is in the highest degree interesting. It is one grand

arch, the keystone of which is *pay*, and accordingly it is the best paid army in the world ; and the Company has a right to hold the soldier to his bargain. Nor does the sepoy shrink ; he glories in the service and nothing but unfortunate mistakes on our part will make him swerve from his fidelity.

Paragraph A.

The Bombay government has said that I was "*unnecessarily alarmed*," because I complained that the remittances from the sepoys in Scinde were not duly received by their families in the presidencies. I differ with the Bombay government. It was just one of those important details, which might, if it was not instantly attended to give a dangerous shake to the fidelity of the army, especially when mutiny had made its appearance in the Bengal and Madras troops. It signifies nothing, whether the error which caused the nonpayment arose in Scinde or Bombay ; with our difference of opinion on that point the public can have no interest ; the danger was that the sepoy should feel a want of reliance in the faith of government, and be uncertain as to the fate of his family. I therefore took good care that he should not feel this ; and that the moment that a mistake arose he should see that the supreme government—the Bombay government, and the Scinde government—were all at work to correct the evil. I made a great stir about the matter purposely, that the sepoy should feel safe ; and I would do the same thing again, so far from thinking I was unnecessarily alarmed. It is utterly impossible to be too cautious in such a case—the second I have had to complain of, since I came to India, and in both I have had thorough support from Sir George Arthur, the governor. The first took place before his arrival ; but when he came he at once took the matter in hand ; and I believe (for I left Poonah), satisfied the sepoys of the 24th N.I. whom I found in a state of extreme indignation and very justly so. Thus in the short space of three years I have *twice* seen the sepoys very much wronged in the most important of all points and this, not by the supreme government, for the Company is generous in the extreme to its troops, but from the neglect of individuals.

All this proves that officers of experience must be with regiments and companies, and I strongly recommend this reform when the re-adoption of corporal punishment is promulgated, as a matter of precaution; but I repeat that in the Bombay army the general opinion is that measure will be popular with all ranks.

On reading the account of the battle of Maharajahpoore I was struck, by finding that many of our sepoy's relations came from the enemy to see them the day before the action. Those men fought us the next day and were enemies because they were too short for our ranks, in which I presume they would otherwise have been! I could not help reverting to Napoleon's plan of *voltigeur* battalions for men of under-size.

I do not know whether I shall be thought to have written sense or nonsense; but I have done my best to understand the Indian army; and if my zeal has drawn from me a more extended opinion than I was called upon to give I hope to be forgiven for the honest motive.

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## VIII.

### *Memoranda on the Baggage of an Army. Addressed to Lord Ellenborough.*

Hyderabad, 18th May, 1843.

In acknowledging your lordship's letter of the 12th April, which letter reached me last night, I have to observe that your lordship refers to suggestions, relating to a camel corps, contained in some letter I have never received. With regard to the other observations with which I have been honoured, and also the report of Sir W. Nott which I have attentively read, I must agree with that officer as to the difficulty of making a report beyond the confined limits of one's immediate experience. I will therefore without further preamble lay before your lordship the results of my own experience during the campaign I have served in India; for in the Peninsula we used a superior animal to the camel, that is to say the mule.

*The Camel.*

This animal seems to be the favourite beast of burden in these provinces ; and one more unfitted for military purposes can scarcely be imagined. His faults are.

1°. He is extremely delicate in his constitution.

2°. He is liable to diseases the treatment of which appears to be but little understood ; for if the camel grows ill from fatigue or any other cause, the cessation of that cause seems to have no effect in producing a recovery. The horse or the mule when exhausted by fatigue is quickly recovered by rest. Not so the camel, he grows daily weaker and weaker, he expresses his sufferings by the most piteous groans and in a short time dies in spite of every care.

3°. He requires an immense time to feed, and in military movements it is frequently impossible to give him this time, and always difficult in an enemy's country ; for it is immediately after a march when everybody is fatigued that the camel requires his nourishment and the camel-driver feels least disposed to attend to his wants.

4°. The least wet completely impedes his march in clayey ground ; his soft foot slips in moisture ; his long unwieldy hind legs split widely asunder, and the weight on his back prevents his recovering his position, both his hip joints are dislocated in an instant, the great force of his muscles prevents the possibility of setting the dislocated joints and the animal is lost. The smallest ditch after a shower of rain is sufficient to stop the baggage of an army for many hours. The baggage arrives late, and daylight is nearly gone before the animal can be turned out to graze. If his grazing-ground be at a considerable distance, and an enemy in the neighbourhood, it is impossible to send him to it, and he goes four-and-twenty, perhaps six-and-thirty hours without food, except such as may be carried with the troops, which enormously increases the number of animals and the difficulty of making military movements.

5°. In mountainous and in rocky ground the camel appears to me unfit to carry burdens ; I have remarked, on

all occasions, when ascending a hill he is frequently obliged to stop for want of breath, and unless rest is thus given him he cannot pass mountains without being distressed in an extraordinary degree. I discovered this when watching the progress of the camel battery over steep sand-hills. They did not exhibit the same evidence of suffering that a horse does. There was no panting, no apparent want of breath, but the animals suddenly became powerless and apparently unable to move. After a few moments' rest they recovered, and again put forth their strength. Their soft feet are quite uncalculated for rocky ground and prevent their exertion.

6°. The length of the animal, and the slowness of his movements, when loaded, make the baggage cover an enormous space of ground, and demand, when in presence of an enemy, an immense force to guard it. Such appear to me to be the natural defects of the camel as a military beast of burden and they cannot be remedied.

*Ill-treatment of the Camel.*

Under ill-usage the camel quickly succumbs, and he always receives it in some one of the following ways, generally speaking in all conjoined.

1°. The proper load for a camel is in these countries from 200 to 300 pounds weight. It is impossible accurately to estimate the load of a camel, but the average may be taken at 250 lbs. Now this is invariably exceeded. I have frequently detected 800 and even 900 lbs. weight upon a camel. The sepoy has no mercy upon these animals, nor have the Europeans much, and the latter are even more violent in their treatment of the animal afterwards: they constantly beat them ferociously and tear out the cartilages of their noses. Naturally of a gentle disposition he pines and dies under this maltreatment.

2°. He is never sufficiently nourished.

3°. He rarely gets sufficient rest.

4°. His drivers are generally of the lowest and most brutal description of persons.

5°. Owing to ignorance or carelessness, his load is ill put on, and few things destroy the power of the camels sooner than an ill-balanced load, for the length of his leg becomes a powerful lever to distress him when the load is on one side.

Such are the evils, natural and artificial under which those unhappy animals labour, when pressed into the military service. Let us now inquire into their few perfections.

1°. He goes longer without water than the horse or the mule.

2°. In Scinde, and other countries where the tamarisk and other shrubs of which he is fond abound, he is easily fed and it is not necessary to carry forage, as is always necessary for the horse and frequently for the mule.

3°. In the sandy desert for which the conformation of his feet seems peculiarly fitted, he is perhaps more valuable than the horse or the mule; he does not suffer much from extreme heat, and if fairly loaded, not hurried, and well fed, he is capable of making long marches without suffering. For example, when I marched to Emaumghur the camels of the camel battery performed their work well. It was very severe, but I increased their rations, they were carefully attended to by Captain Whittie, and more camels were put to each gun than was allowed by the constitution of the battery. Had I adhered to the regulations with regard to food and number of camels to each gun, the battery would never have reached Emaumghur. If this battery had been drawn by horses we must have carried forage for them, the number of animals would have been immensely increased, we should not have had water sufficient for them, and the enterprise would have been rendered much more difficult, if not altogether impracticable. Here then the camel was in his element and did his work well.

Having now stated as far as I have been personally able to judge, the advantages and disadvantages of the camel as applicable to military carriage, the next point to be

considered is, what ordinances are necessary to render his good qualities as efficient as possible, and render his natural deficiencies less inconvenient. I am convinced, and long ago wrote a memoir on this subject, that the baggage of an army can never be rendered properly moveable even in Europe or America, still less in India, unless it is formed into a corps perfectly organized. It was with great satisfaction therefore that I found your lordship was disposed to such a project. It applies to every country, every army and every climate. It is a general principle by which most difficulties regarding baggage may be removed, and all of them reduced and made comparatively trifling. I am not aware of anything which would better exemplify the advantages which arise from the division of labour.

The baggage of an army is perfectly susceptible of being reduced to order; but for that purpose a base of rigid organization must be thoroughly established. How can such an organization be produced among a thousand camels, uncouth camel-drivers, sepoys, servants, all assembled on a dark morning at three or four o'clock, jostling, shouting, fighting for places, the baggage-master hoarse with useless roaring to people who do not mind the least what he says—and exposed perhaps to the attacks of insolent camp-followers. How can any order or system be introduced by him into such a mass of wild confusion, and introduced too within the space of half an hour allowed for the baggage to assemble and march? The thing is utterly impossible and the consequence is that the movements of the army are impeded, the duties of the baggage guard most fatiguing to the troops, and the baggage itself liable to be cut off, or which is worse driven in among the troops producing a great risk of general confusion and defeat. The fact is that a general officer's character when he commands an Indian army is greatly endangered by the baggage, the great mass of which, and the immense number of followers, if they are driven upon the fighting men, is quite sufficient to produce total defeat.



The organization required is to form a corps of camels, horses, mules, bullocks, and donkeys, the division of which is an arrangement of detail for after-consideration. But I shall here speak of camels only as being the chief beast of burden with an Indian army; and sufficient to exemplify the principle. The "corps of camels," then, should have its colonel, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns (for it especially requires standards), non-commissioned officers and privates, the latter being also the camel-drivers. All these should be armed, and I should say that the proportion would be as much as two to every camel, of whom, on the line of march, one should lead two camels, and one form their guard. These minor matters, however, are details for future arrangement, and must vary according to the state of the country, its formation and the description of roads.

The next point to be considered is the arrangement of the baggage itself. An order should be issued prohibiting the use of any other than a regulation form of box, of bed, of table, of chair, and of every article carried by officers or private soldiers in the field, or indeed at any time; for in peace, if an officer wishes to have an inordinate quantity of baggage let him send it by whatever means would be open to him were he a private gentleman, but it is not just that the public service should be hampered by their trumpery. The size, the weight, the form, the number of every article in the officer's or private soldier's possession would be at once ascertained by the practised eye of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the camel corps; they would immediately detect the slightest irregularity, and on the roadside burn the extraneous article, taking care to inform the owner at the end of the day's march that a portion of his baggage had been burned. The halter for the camel, the string by which he is led, and his saddle should all be minutely according to regulation, and the last should be made so as to admit of a man being carried together with the baggage; for preparation should be made beforehand that in case a temporary exertion should be demanded of the camel on an emergency to carry sick or tired men,

the increased weight may be placed without deranging the equilibrium of the baggage.

The advantages of such an organization seem to be as follows.

At the hour appointed the drilled officers and non-commissioned officers conduct their detachments of camels to the head-quarters of the regiments to which they are respectively attached; there the servants of the officers await them and are ready to guide the privates who conduct and guard the camels to their masters' tents, where the officers deliver their baggage and that of their companies to the drivers; the whole being according to regulation and made to fit in a particular form on the back of the animal; each article has its particular and well-known place and the whole is packed in an instant however dark the night may be. The soldier camel-drivers then return to the head-quarters of the regiment, where their officers await their coming and assemble them by some peculiar signal of trumpet or drum. From thence they march to the "rendezvous" where the superior officers arrange them in that formation which a habit of doing their work has taught them to be most suitable to the description of country through which they are marching. The whole is systematic and methodical, no time is lost; the camels are not unnecessarily harassed, the loads are all of an equal weight and that weight suited to the power of the weakest camel and balanced with precision; the march is liable to no interruptions, or difficulties greatly beyond that which would attend the march of the troops themselves; and the steady pace of the camel would generally enable the commander to ascertain with precision the moment of arrival. A small body of cavalry would then be sufficient guard, for if the baggage were attacked it could throw itself into squares, the animals kneeling down with their heads towards the centre; (a position in which I ordered them to be placed at Meeanee) and form a living redoubt of great strength; for from behind the baggage a fire would be kept up by the baggage-men, and no cavalry could reach them with their swords.

The certainty of the hour at which they would reach the encamping-ground would prevent the soldiers being detained in the sun and waiting for their tents; each company or section of camels would at once proceed to the several departments and regiments, and in an instant they would be unloaded by the camp-followers and at once marched to their grazing-grounds, instead of being detained (as they now are) for many hours after arriving at the encamping-ground. Thus they would have the whole day to feed, they would be attended to by their respective officers and drivers, instead of what happens under the present system, and which I have myself detected fifty times at least, viz. That the idle driver of a government camel, afraid of being flogged for losing the animal, goes into the jungle, ties him fast by the nose to a small bush (which the poor brute devours in five minutes) and goes to sleep, leaving the animal to fast till the guard of cavalry which is scattered all over the jungle drives them home at night. The commissary, supposing very naturally that the beast has been feeding all these hours and having other duties himself, is unable to attend to the camels and prevent such villanies. Here the "division of labour" would act with its wonted force to the advantage of the camel.

When order, method, responsibility, are fairly introduced into a body of men, a moral feeling also arises, and instead of the base, thieving, cowardly crew which now form the mob called the baggage of an army, the camel corps, systematic and orderly, would feel proud of their work and courageously defend it too in case of need; and the general of an army could with safety detach his baggage to a considerable distance without danger. He would be sure that it would accompany him in the most rapid movements, for its commander and his officers, perfectly acquainted with the relative strength of their animals, would on all occasions of emergency make a temporary distribution of the loads, relieving the feeble camel without distressing the strong one; the sick camel would be also attended to.

I believe that the loss of camels in the force which I have commanded in the present campaign is considered to be exceedingly small. I do not think in the whole five months that we could have lost 150 camels altogether; and when it is considered that they were chiefly composed of miserable animals, nearly worn out in Affghanistan, this number I am told may be considered as nothing. I attribute it in a great measure to my endeavour to approximate as much as possible to the system I have proposed, namely, attaching the baggage-master the provost-marshal and the commissary as much as possible to the baggage on the line of march, and ordering them to flog without mercy the camel-drivers and camp-followers who were disobedient. I also ordered the baggage-master to burn all baggage which was over the weight, yet in spite of this I more than six times found camels loaded with eight hundred-weight and even upwards! As matters now stand, *fire* is the only thing to deal with baggage in an Indian army, and the only way to preserve the camel from overloading—no activity and zeal can supply the want of regulation, and no regulation can be applied except by means of a camel corps.

There is another advantage in a camel corps which I have not yet mentioned. You are always secure of the efficiency of your carriage, whereas on the campaign in which I am now engaged this is by no means the case. The influence of the ameers nearly crippled my operations about ten days before the battle of Meeanee. The contractor's house and family fell into the hands of Nusseer Khan at Shikarpoore, and he had made his contract with us when Shikarpoore was occupied by a British force. The result was, that on the day when he was to have furnished 1,000 camels only 170 were forthcoming, and during the two nights previous to the battle of the 24th of March about 200 of the hired camel-drivers disappeared: such accidents as these are severe trials upon the moral courage of a commander. With regard to bullocks and other beasts of burden the same principles will apply,

namely: systematic arrangement to insure justice to the animals and orderly movement.

I will send a copy of this memoir to Captain Thomas in order that he may make any remarks which his ability and experience may prompt, though I am inclined to think he will agree with me in what I propose, for the subject has long been a matter of much reflection.

It does not appear to me that the system I propose is in any way influenced by locality, because it is entirely based upon the principle of doing justice to the animal, which saves their lives, and consequently diminishes the difficulty of supply and the expense produced by an increased demand, which of course raises the value of the animal.

The whole subject seems to me to be one of great simplicity, but whether or not I have succeeded in stating my ideas clearly I cannot say.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

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## IX.

### *Extracts from a Letter to Lord Ripon.*

Bhoogtee Hills, 7th February, 1845.

*Prize-money.* — I enclose to your lordship a direct application from myself, (to the lords of the Treasury) though I confess I feel a dislike to do so after having been deliberately, and I will say, *most atrociously* accused in the House of Commons by Lord Howick, of having sacrificed the lives of thousands of my fellow-creatures, and amongst the rest many of my brother officers and intimate friends, from the infamous desire of getting prize-money, which neither I nor any man in my army *could* have expected. Who could have expected such a victory as Meeanee in its results? Who expected the unconditional surrender of Hyderabad? However it is idle to occupy you with refutations of Lord Howick's accusation.

My interest is so united with that of the troops that we go together, and her Majesty will decide what is proper.

I must do what you think just for the sake of others, though it has the awkward addition of being personal and will of course be said so by the public. Having nothing but what I have saved from my salary, since I came to India, I am not so hypocritical, or so foolish, as to deny that I should be very glad to have prize-money; but I assure you, Lord Ripon, that I have thought very little about it, being quite satisfied that whatever share I had in the conquest of Scinde has been amply rewarded by the grand cross and the approbation of government.

Your lordship says, you conclude the batta issued must be considered part of the prize-money. I am no judge of these matters, but I know that the men who *fought* will not be at all satisfied to have the batta issued to regiments which *were not in Scinde* (78th, 86th and many native regiments) deducted from their prize-money. The whole force reckoned that the batta was given to *cover their loss of health from the unexpected and unparalleled epidemic*, in which hardly a man of 16,000 escaped suffering in health. If the batta be deducted it would I imagine be only so much of it as was paid to the troops of Meeanee and Hyderabad. Whether we have a right to prize-money I put aside as a distinct question, to be decided by her Majesty. But if we are to have it, the division should I think be made as it would have been on the field of battle. Extend the principle of deducting batta given to troops who neither made the capture, nor preserved it, nor were in Scinde at all until long after the treasure was in Bombay, and I do not see where a line is to be drawn. The batta of the whole Indian army might with equal justice be deducted! In a few words. *The Company takes the prize-money to cover its military expenditure.*

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## X.

*Hill Campaign.*—My last letter informed your lordship that I was preparing to attack the enemy. You will ere this reaches you have heard that we made a

most successful one, and as the details will reach you officially I will not enter on them here. I am now following up my attack with very great difficulty. The robbers will I fear retire within the Mooltan frontier which I dare not enter. Any military man will tell you that a warfare amongst arid sandy deserts and barren mountains, and against the inhabitants of those mountains, is one of the most difficult that can be made and requires the greatest caution. To enter the defiles of these mountains is not possible without making the means of *retreat secure*. To get intelligence of the enemy is all but impossible, and to catch him quite so, if the Mooltan people admit him.

Believe me, my Lord Ripon, that the *Punjaub must be conquered*. I am hostile to the extension of territory beyond the Sutlej on *principle*, but I am satisfied that we must go into the Punjaub. Lord Howick will say I want to go there for prize-money; but I do not; I can hardly bear the fatigues of war. I do not want to go to the Punjaub, yet I apply the words of Cato—the Punjaub is the Indian "*Carthago*," only it must be conquered not destroyed! Its present state will, amongst other and greater evils, force you to keep 10,000 men in Scinde *more* than the occupation of Scinde requires. I positively deny that I love war and want to see wars; I am most unjustly accused; but I do know that unless the Court of Directors are very careful they will some day find, that in endeavouring to *make a show of peace* they will be doing what unskilful surgeons often do—heal the skin and leave a sinus full of matter beneath. Look at the state of the Mahratta country at this moment. How is it possible to suppose that we can be safe, while native princes are left on their thrones *within* our territories. *Outside!* Yes! That is a distinct case. I hope to put many regiments at Sir Henry's disposal after I finish this war, which I hope to do within a fortnight; but who dare prophesy in such a war as this?

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## XI.

*Names of the Volunteers from the 13th Regiment who Scaled the Rocks of Trukkee 8th March, 1845.*

Sergeant John Power—Reached the top—Was slightly wounded.

Corporal Thomas Waters—Did not quite reach the top—Two medals.

Private John Kenny—Did not quite reach the top—Three medals.

Private John Acton—Reached the top—Slew three enemies—Killed—Two medals.

Private Robert Adair—Reached the top—Slew two enemies—Killed—Two medals.

Private Hugh Dunlap—Reached the top—Slew two enemies—Killed.

Private Patrick Fallon—Reached the top—Killed—Two medals.

Private Samuel Lowrie—Reached the top—Slew the enemy's commander and another—Killed—Two medals.

Private William Lovelace—Reached the top—Killed.

Private Anthony Burke—Reached the top—Slew three enemies—Two medals.

Private Bartholomew Rohan—Reached the top—Slew an enemy—Severely wounded—Two medals.

Private John Maloney \*—Reached the top—Slew two enemies—Saved Burke and Rohan—Severely wounded—Two medals.

Private George Campbell—Reached the top—Slew two enemies.

Private Philip Fay—Did not quite reach the top—Two medals.

Private Mark Davis—Did not quite reach the top—Two medals.

\* John Maloney was wounded with his own bayonet after he had driven it through a Beloochee, for the latter unfixing it, drew it out of his own body, stabbed Maloney and fell dead!



Private Charles Hawthorne—Did not quite reach the top—Two medals.

Sepoy Ramzan Ahier—Did not quite reach the top.

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## XII.

*Extract of a Letter from Sir Roderick Murchison, upon the Geological Specimens collected in the Cutchee Hills by Captain Vicary during Sir C. Napier's Campaign.*

I return the report of Captain Vicary on the geological features of the Beloochistan hills, the reading of which produced much interest and a good discussion at the Geological Society. It was curious to observe that among the camel-load of fossil shells sent here by Sir C. Napier several specimens are perfectly identical with fossils of the *uppermost beds of the chalk in the Pyrenees*; thus the age of the chief ranges of Beloochistan, and also I believe of Afghanistan, has been for the first time determined.

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## XIII.

*Letters to the Governor of Bombay touching Forged and Stolen Letters published by Dr. Buist.*

Kurrachee, 13th August, 1845.

TO THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

HONOURABLE SIR,—The *Bombay Times* of the 23rd July has published a letter to the governor-general of India in council, and to this has affixed my name. Sir, I never sent such a letter to the governor-general; nor any letter on the same subject to his excellency. I therefore enclose to your honour in council an affidavit to that effect, and request that the editor of the *Bombay Times* may be prosecuted for the forgery of a state paper, and for affixing my name to the same; or that such other steps may be taken as your honour in council may deem to be the proper course to punish the delinquent, and to insure the integrity of the public offices against the

corrupt influence of the *Bombay Times*. If the editor gives up the name of his informant, and that he is in Scinde, I will either try him by a general court-martial here, or send him a prisoner to Bombay, as the law officers judge most proper.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

The GOVERNOR of BOMBAY  
in Council.

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*Extract of a Letter to the Governor-General.*

16th November, 1845.

I do not understand what the verbose letter of the Bombay government means. *A state paper is stolen.* It is found in the *Bombay Times*. Surely the proprietors of that paper can be called upon to say where they got it? It is like any other description of property, inviolable! My reason for never sending you the letter in question was a good one. Captain Powell commanding the Indian flotilla told me he thought it would give offence to the navy, for they did not like orders issued to them through a military orderly-book. I therefore thought it better not to risk making the seamen discontented, as the great object is to work well together; but to my surprise I saw my letter in the *Bombay Times*, as having been sent to you! Whereas it is a draft and is in *my own possession now!*

It is very clear that now the *Bombay Times* can get, and will get, any paper he wants if it leaves my writing-box, or perhaps the editor can *reach it there*—I may leave my key out of my pocket accidentally.

By Mr. Lemessurier's doctrine any secret state paper may be published with impunity, provided that it really was *authentic* and had been written. The *mode by* which it was obtained and *who* obtained it appears to be a matter of no importance. I am pretty certain that I know the man who stole the paper, and so does Powell; but we have no proofs and the Bombay government will not make the *Bombay Times* tell. Its own *editor boasts of its connection with government*—see Mr. Buist's letter—but I believe he told no secret.

## XIV.

*Letter to the Governor-General relative to Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's published slanders.*

3rd August, 1845.

RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,—Captain Outram, a brevet lieutenant-colonel in the service of the Honourable Company, has published a libel reflecting on my character as governor of Scinde; and has added the monstrous accusation that I caused the destruction of her Majesty's 78th regiment.

I shall not trouble your excellency in council by the detail and easy refutation of the mis-statements deliberately published by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram; but I am ready to do so. I simply send a copy of that part of his production which has reached me.

I have not either by word or deed, privately or publicly given to this officer any cause for hostility.

His libel professes to be an answer to a work published by my brother Major-General Napier. Now, I in Asia am assuredly not answerable for what another man publishes in Europe! I may consider such a publication to be good or bad, eloquent and true; or vulgar and false; but I cannot be responsible for it.

Even if Lieutenant-Colonel Outram were to form the tribunal before which general officers are to be dragged like criminals to receive judgment, I could not in the present circumstances be amenable to his, or any jurisdiction; for not only was General Napier's book written at such a distance as to be beyond the reach of consultation, but it has only been read by me within forty-eight hours; and the work altogether contains a mass of matter on which I was previously but imperfectly informed.

My whole conduct as regards Lieutenant-Colonel Outram is explained in the two *Blue-books* on Scinde. It was direct—open—official—and public! In short I can only attribute this officer's hostility to me, and the untruths

which he states, to that malicious blind vindictiveness which we frequently see arise from disappointed self-sufficiency acting on feeble intellects. I had preserved an army, and the Blue-books contain the proof, that had I attended to the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, that army would have been annihilated.

Lieutenant-Colonel Outram is responsible for what he puts his name to. I am responsible for what I put my name to, and General Napier is responsible for what he puts his name to; but none of us are responsible for what another man writes.

I therefore formally demand through your excellency in council the protection of her Majesty's government, and that of the Honourable Court of Directors, against the libels of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram.

I have served with faith, zeal, and hitherto with unusual success, and always in strict obedience to the orders of the supreme government of India. I have devoted myself to the honour and glory of her Majesty's and the Company's troops; and more especially to that part forming a part of the Bombay army with which I am intimately connected, both as my companions in arms and by private friendship; yet a captain in that army, a man whose ignorance was nearly causing its destruction, has with unprovoked malice put forth these \* \* \* \* and scurrilities. If I had given this officer any cause of complaint, redress through the proper channel was open to him; as it is to every officer and soldier in the Queen's and Company's service.

I have up to the present moment received the marked approbation of her Majesty, the Parliament, the British Government, the Court of Directors and the supreme government in India. But it is impossible for any man to command a military force if a captain in the army, of which that force forms a portion, is thus openly and foully to traduce and hold up such general officer to the scorn and contempt of the troops under his orders.

I do not complain, Honourable Sir, of *the effect* of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's publication on the troops generally, because they know me too well for such \* \* \* \*

to do much harm, or produce any other result than that of contempt for the writer. Yet in particular cases, it may do mischief; for what are the poor Highlanders to think, when in their barracks at Poona they read the gross \* \* \* \* \* adduced as having been uttered by me to the disparagement of their noble regiment? And when Lieutenant-Colonel Outram tells them in print, that their general is more ignorant than any subaltern of five years' standing under his command, and that he recklessly destroyed their comrades.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

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## XV.

*Extract from a Letter addressed by Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General.*

7th November, 1845.

We have received our medals, *sent to us amongst the commissariat stores as a bale of goods, without ribands or any means of hanging them on our breasts!* As Lord Ripon has taken nearly three years to prepare them they might have been finished! Those I received from Bengal came in a more gentleman-like way from the commander-in-chief, and through the adjutant-general—the orthodox channel. Lieutenant-Colonel Penefather *sent me mine*, and some officers here received theirs through *private hands* long before! Indeed it was from them I first heard of the arrival of the medals. Those gentlemen were annoyed and brought their medals to me. However all this is *Bombay style*, and don't much signify, or rather does not signify at all.

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*Compressed Extracts from a Letter addressed by Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General, touching the secret schemes of the Ameers and their women.*

9th September, 1845.

I have traced a correspondence between Shere Mohamed (the Lion) and Shadad at Surat, and the channel is the

zenana of the ameers, which is entirely governed by a man named Mirza Koosroo, a very violent man. When going through the zenana in the fortress to give up the treasure there to the prize agents, Mirza made all sorts of difficulties—no blame to him—to give time for the abstraction of treasure by the departing ladies. He stopped every moment and began disputing with the agents, and when an attending havildar said “Come, come,” and took Koosroo by the arm but without violence, the latter seized Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson by the throat and tried to choke him. He was made a prisoner, and the *Bombay Times* said *I flogged him cruelly*. I did not flog him at all! I sent for him, and telling him such conduct would not do set him free again. This admonition was the only punishment he received; but a sepoy seeing McPherson so handled was going to put his bayonet into Mirza and McPherson saved him. He was left by the ameers in charge of their intrigues, together with Noor’s widow Kurreem. She gave *seven lacs* to Nusseer for the war, and took, it is said, and was said at the time, *six lacs from the fortress*. I however refused to let her baggage be overhauled.

From information, I have now arrested a slave named Mayboob. In this man’s secret box and a bag were found about 3,000 rupees in *gold mohurs*, with other articles—one a rich hilt of lapis lazuli belonging to the ameers. We also traced his intercourse with *Shadad*, and found in his box a letter from Shere Mohamed. Mayoob says the gold belonged to Mirza Koosroo, and *he* says it belongs to the ladies, who, we can prove, have before through the same channel sent to *Shadad* 8,000 rupees, or some such sum. I have given all the money to the ladies. We found a quantity of the richest Cashmere shawls and silks, which there is little doubt were abstracted from the treasury of the ameers “*the Toshkhana*.” These I also gave back, as the washermen, on whom they were detected said they were presents from the ameers, and that was *possible* though not probable as the amount is so large. One of these men had given his three daughters to

Nusseer Khan, and the other, a handsome man, is supposed to have been Shadad's. \* \* \* \* \*

I thought it right to return the articles as not becoming in government to doubt the generosity of their highnesses for *such favours*, or to go into an examination of such matters.

The correspondence of Shere Mohamed with the ex-ameer Shadad is another affair. By all I hear the latter lives quite familiarly with the officers and is under no restraint whatever. I have written to Sir G. Arthur about this, because we should have mischief if this villain is allowed to lay his train. I wish he was removed to Bengal, where he would be properly watched and out of reach; and as Mirza Koosroo was a Persian slave I think it would be wise to send him to the ameers. The ladies flatly refuse to leave Scinde and will continue to intrigue, and if I take the least step to prevent it no terms will be bad enough to describe me! Some other information, crossing upon that which led to what I have discovered, makes me fear Ali Moorad is not going on right. I do not think he is doing any actual mischief, but I suspect he is carrying on some correspondence with people to the west. He is watched and I shall give him advice, if I find cause, and plain speaking steadies him for a short time. But he has got some bad counsellors, who are not friends to the Feringhees on religious grounds.

I hope it will be practicable to put Shadad in some fortress in Bengal; it is not good to keep him in a presidency where all but the governor himself, think and tell him he is a *martyr*, and not a *felon*.

There does not appear the remotest symptom of any jagheerdars, much less of the people, having been mixed up with these things; indeed from first to last it has been clear they never liked the ameers nor cared whether they were dethroned or hanged. The Scindees and Hindoos hated them, and the Beloochees were indifferent. Every Beloochee looked to the immediate chief of his tribe, and those chiefs thinking our object was to despoil them fought: finding this erroneous they are quite satisfied!

This as far as we strangers can judge seems to be the real state of the case, and it is the opinion of all the Europeans in Scinde. If we are wrong the Beloochees must be the most expert conspirators to deceive both us and the Hindoos! The hill campaign was a strong test. The Punjaub war, if it takes place, will be another and a stronger one.

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## XVI.

### *Letters to the Widow of the Ameer Noor Mohamed.*

17th October, 1846.

LADY,—You asked me to let you send four men to the ex-ameer Shadad, and you said they were to bear letters and a few clothes which you specified. I had reason to believe you were also sending a large sum of money to the ameer. This very much surprised me on three accounts. First because you did not mention to me that you were sending money—secondly because you must be well aware that large sums of money are not allowed to be sent to state prisoners except through government—thirdly I was surprised, because, not long ago you and the other ladies stated to me that you were starving. Now lady, I had your men stopped, and the police found a large sum of money in bars of gold and coins of gold and silver in their possession, which you were sending and which I have ordered to be safely returned to you, and also your letters unopened. As your instructions about the money, if such instructions they contain, may require to be altered, your fresh letters, or those returned, shall be forwarded for you to the ameer, but no treasure shall be sent to him except through, and with the knowledge of, government.

C. NAPIER, Governor.

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28th October, 1846.

MADAM,—I understand and approve of your feelings for your son. I did not object to your sending him money, but to your sending money *clandestinely*, for it was concealed in a bag of rice; and to your telling me you were



starving, when in addition to the handsome allowance paid to you by the Honourable the East-India Company, you had means of sending large sums constantly to the ameer Shadad ; for you know and I know it is not the first time. This money shall be sent to your son if the governor-general pleases, and if you wish I will ask his leave, but I cannot allow money to be sent in large quantities without the permission of the governor-general. The ameer is not kept in poverty, and allow me to say you know this perfectly well ; and you also know, and *all Hyderabad* knows, how the English general was to have been treated by your son had the former been so unfortunate as to fall into your son's hands ! You know well Madam that I have always treated and shall always treat you and the other ladies with proper respect and honour, both because you are women and because your husbands and sons are prisoners. Your sons are fed and protected by government, and I regret to be obliged to differ with a lady when she asserts what I know to be inaccurate. I cannot allow the government I serve to be accused unjustly ; I do not know why your days are passed in distress, no one molests you, you have a handsome allowance from government, and you are not prisoners. You are free to go to your son if you choose. I am afraid that the people about you cheat you and tell you falsehoods—and therefore I will have this letter delivered into your own hands. I have the honour to be with great respect,

Madam,

Your most obedient humble servant,

C. NAPIER.

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## XVII.

*Major-General Hunter touching the progress of the Horse-mart at Sukkur, established under his superintendence by Sir C. Napier.*

I think I sent about 300 or 350 horses to Bengal—there was no doubt but 1,000 horses could have been got yearly,

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after the horse-venders were aware that a sale could be effected at Sukkur: the demand in common years for the army never could exceed that number, indeed 600 would I fancy be enough. For horse-artillery and European dragoons I paid 450 rupees each horse, and they were most excellent. For light field-batteries I never gave above 300 for each horse, and they were the best adapted for that work of any I ever saw; far superior to the under-sized stud-horses, which were much too light for gun-draught, and never could be put to use under the same sum that the full-sized horses cost.

The supply would yearly have increased both in number and quality, I am sure. The first year I got only sufficient to complete Foster's Bombay battery; the second I completely horsed Smith's battery and the Bundlecund Legion, and the 7th Bengal cavalry; and eighty horses I sent up with the return troops to Hindostan. I am so very fond of horses, and being well acquainted with the manners and customs of the northern horse-dealers, I doubt not that I could have formed a capital horse-market at Sukkur, and had Lord Ellenborough remained governor-general there would have been a great trade into Sukkur. He caused many letters to be written to me on the subject, but after he went nothing was done from Calcutta; and the assistance you gave me was in the third year quite upset by an order from Colonel Benson, by the authority of Lord Hardinge, desiring me to purchase no more horses for the Bengal army. You of course then directed only a sufficient number for the Bombay troops quartered in Scinde. To my certain knowledge many of the horses that went from Sukkur, by merchants, to Bombay, were purchased at five and six hundred rupees each and sent back to Sukkur for remounts, but that was before your time. No reason was ever assigned to me for giving up Sukkur as a mart, and I am quite at a loss to know what cause there could have been for so doing. Certainly we had sufficient proof that the light field-battery, nine-pounders of the Bundlecund Legion, were respectably horsed entirely by Sukkur-purchased horses. I think I made over

seventy to Alphorts when he arrived, to replace an equal number I was obliged to cast which he brought from Hindostan: these went off without training in any way to harness, and performed a campaign of fifty-two days through the Bhoogtee hills, and not one of them died or was lamed. ("Mowatt's troop it was that made the long march to the hills with me to Ooch."—Note by Sir Charles Napier.) On our return to Sukkur, Captain Mowatt (now colonel) also wrote to me that all the horses he got for his troop were excellent. You may recollect my writing often to you of the sad complaints the horse-dealers made at none of their horses being purchased the last year, when they in hopes of a sale brought some 1,200 noble nags. It was a great mistake stopping that market; no money was carried out of the country by those northern merchants, as what I paid them for horses they gave back for English or Indian cloth and other articles.

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### XVIII.

The following observations by Captain Rathborne chief collector of Scinde confirmed by the comment of Mr. Edwardes the civil magistrate at Simla, show one source of enormous profit to the Company by the conquest of Scinde; and the results thus set forth as clearly prove the incapable baseness which still strives to injure Sir C. Napier, by misrepresenting that conquest as a barren and expensive one.

*Observations by Captain Rathborne.*

Hyderabad, 30th July, 1850.

What Lord Ellenborough says is true about the forty-two lacs increase on opium-passes. But he omits to take into account the Company's profits on the opium grown by itself in Bengal. It must be obvious, that the same circumstance (viz. the closing up every route) that has enabled it to levy 275 rupees more per chest on opium in transit from foreign territories, must have procured it a proportionate enhancement of price on the opium grown

within its own. The price of Patna opium for export to China must necessarily be very much affected by the price of the Malwa, which eventually meets it in the same market—it would be absurd to suppose speculators would buy opium at monopoly price from the Company in Bengal, if they could get the Malwa opium at the mere cost of production and growers' profit through Scinde. The effect of Scinde being an open route was not felt in its full extent at the time, because for the last few years preceding the conquest the state of Scinde had been adverse to its being used very largely as a route for so valuable a drug as opium is. Nor were the ameers—cut off as they were by their institutions from all communication with the civilized world—aware of the advantage their country possessed in this respect. But with peace would have come security, and with increased intercourse with us, knowledge; and eventually, there can be no doubt, we should have had to compel them by force to close the route, or in other words recur to the old story of war, or *our opium revenue in India would have been annihilated.*

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*Continuation of Observations by the same.*

Hyderabad, 15th August, 1850.

With reference to opium I enclose a report of Sir John Hobhouse's speech on Mr. Bright's motion, which shows the increase in the number of chests sold by the Company *of its own opium* in the six years subsequent to the conquest of Scinde, and the actual amount sold. All this is wholly independent of the opium on which passes have been granted, and in respect of which Lord Ellenborough considers Scinde ought to be credited to the extent of forty-two lacs (£420,000) a year.

When, as in the case of opium, government raises a revenue in two ways—one by charging an export-duty of 1,000 rupees (£100) a chest on the opium of every one else; the other by selling its own opium at public auction with the privilege of exporting duty free—it must be quite clear that in each case the amount of tax will be

just the same, though in one it assumes the shape of pass-duty, and in the other that of monopoly profit to government. For were it otherwise, either the Calcutta or the Malwa trade would cease. No one would pay 400 rupees duty on Malwa opium in addition to the government charges if, duty and charges included, he could get it cheaper in Calcutta. And on the other hand, no one would pay a higher rate to the monopolists in Calcutta than—duty and charges included—he could get opium from Malwa, because the opium in each case, it must be borne in mind, is eventually to meet in the same market, that of China.

This being so, the same cause that has enabled the government to levy a higher duty by 275 rupees a chest on Malwa opium, has in reality given that increase per chest on its own, if there have been no other causes leading to depress the price of opium while this was raising it. This will be visible in a clear rise of the price of opium per chest to that amount at the Calcutta rates; but if there have been other depressing causes at work, and the actual sum paid per chest has fallen, the fall has not been in the monopoly profits but in the growers' charges; and the fall has still been less by that amount than it otherwise would have been.

Allowing these data to be correct—and be they tested as they may they will prove so—there is in addition to the forty-two lacs (£420,000) increase on passes, allowed per annum by Lord Ellenborough to be credited to Scinde, the sum of 41,347,150 rupees, being 275 rupees increase per chest on the 150,426 chests of the Company's own opium sold within that period. This in English money will be in round numbers, *four millions one hundred and thirty-four thousand pounds sterling!*

The proper person to comprehend the value of Scinde, taken in this light, would be a Spanish minister of finance, who has an instance before his eyes in Gibraltar, of the loss of revenue to a country from an outlet for smuggling being in adverse possession. In regard to a drug like opium, the only possible thing that could prevent the revenue

being utterly ruined by such a circumstance, would be the ignorance of the barbarian holder of power over our finances in this particular—an ignorance that in these days of enlightenment both with Blacks and Whites never could last long.

I mark another passage wherein Sir J. Hobhouse takes credit for the amount expended on canals in Scinde! I must say it does seem a good joke, this perpetually twitting us about the cost of the province, and then taking credit for the principal item as a proof of the liberality generally of the Company's government.

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*Comment on the above Statement by Mr. Edwardes, Civil Magistrate at Simla.*

September 5th, 1851.

I return you with best thanks Captain Rathborne's statement. I have studied it carefully and fully coincide in the correctness of his reasoning.

I have also submitted it for the judgment of our commissioner of customs, one of the soundest financiers in the country, and he fully agrees with Captain Rathborne, that the increase he mentions may fairly be attributed to our *holding possession of Scinde* and closing that formerly important outlet for contraband trade.

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## XIX.

*Notes by Major Beatson, on his Separate Operations, and March to blockade the Northern Entrance of Trukkee, 1845, written at the time.*

On the 20th of February 1845 I joined the camp of his excellency Sir Charles Napier, governor of Scinde, about two miles below Goojroo: I had with me a portion of the Bundlecund Legion, consisting of two nine-pounders, a squadron of cavalry and the first battalion of the infantry of the legion.

On the 21st Sir Charles directed me to take up a position at Goojroo which the enemy had left on the approach of his excellency's force: giving me two horse-artillery six-pounders, instead of my nines, which were considered too heavy for hill-work.

My position commanded both the pass from the westward, and the valley opening to the north of Goojroo.

On the morning of my arrival I accompanied Captain Malet and Ali Moorad to the place where the road to Deyrah goes off to the left; but we saw nothing of the enemy.

On the morning of the 23rd I went up the hills to the north-west of Goojroo, accompanied by Captains Winter, Barry, and Hayes, with an escort of fifty sepoy.

In a very difficult watercourse, near the top of the first range of hills, I found the remains of fires which must have been recently left, and also of one or two fires on the face of the hills; but did not see a man.

On the 24th we went to the top of the hills to the southwest of Goojroo; after my return to camp, in the forenoon, some of the Belooch horsemen made an attempt to carry off the camels at graze, but on being pursued, they made off by some of the numerous paths well known to them, but which we knew nothing of, and left the camels:—as yet I have not lost a single animal.

On the 25th I went up the valley to the north of Goojroo, over a very rugged pass, and descended into the sandy bed of a river, the only apparent entrance for which is through a chasm about thirty feet wide, formed by perpendicular rocks on each side, of about two hundred feet in height; so regular is this chasm, that it looked as if a column of infantry had opened from its centre by subdivisions, closing fifteen paces outwards.

One shot was fired from an inaccessible hill in the neighbourhood; but we saw no person.

Goojroo was an important post: the enemy had no choice but to force that or go into Trukkee, and he chose the latter alternative, which enabled the general to finish

the war. It was clearly the enemy's desire to avoid fighting from the first, or he never would have allowed Sir Charles's force to go without opposition through passes where he might by rolling down rocks have destroyed the force without losing a man.

I had at Goojroo a striking instance of the confidence which such a man as Sir Charles Napier inspires in all soldiers who serve under him:—the exigencies of the service, caused by the crippled state of our camels, rendered it necessary that my men should be put on half-rations of unground wheat, and with only enough of even that for a few days when we took up our position at Goojroo; but there was never a murmur from any man of the legion, and when we were sometimes reduced to our last day's half-rations the feeling of every soldier was "the general will not forget us!" And true enough, he did not forget us; for as sure as the sun was about to disappear behind the Belooch hills in the evening, a string of camels with supplies was seen ascending the pass, thus justifying the confidence of the soldiers that their general had not forgotten them—and recollect, these soldiers generally were the high-caste men of Hindostan—Rajpoots, Brahmins, and Mahomedans—the two former of whom would die rather than eat anything but grain. But the whole secret is, they had confidence in their general, and where soldiers have that they will do anything.

On the 2nd March I received orders from Sir Charles Napier to proceed with a field detachment from Goojroo to blockade the rear of Trukkee, while his excellency's force took up a position in front of that place. My instructions were to march if possible north-west from Goojroo to Lutt; but I found the country impracticable for guns. I therefore descended the pass into the Deyrah plain, and skirted the hills till I came to "Deolet Gorai" and then went due north through a very difficult pass into the Murrow plain, where I found Ali Moorad with his force encamped, and where I was joined by the volunteers of her Majesty's 13th under Lieutenant John Barry, and the camel corps under Lieutenant Bruce:—the former

See Plan 2.



brought me a despatch from Sir Charles Napier directing me to act independent of Ali Moorad in blockading the north of Trukkee. On my arrival I informed the ameer that I should march immediately my rear-guard came through the pass; on hearing which he immediately struck his tents, and moved off in the direction of Trukkee, which he did not appear to intend to do till he found that I was determined to move on whether he did or not. The delay in getting the rear of my force through the pass gave Ali Moorad a few hours' start, and enabled him to keep some miles in front of me all day—the difficulties of the country frequently obliging me to dismount the Europeans from the camels to drag the guns up passes, which the horses were found quite unequal to.

An instance of the tact and cunning of the Beloochees occurred on this march: I was riding at the head of the column, about dusk in the evening, when three horsemen with red turbans were passed up from the rear of the column under an escort of the Bundlecund cavalry, they having represented themselves as Ali Moorad's horsemen, come from Sir Charles Napier with orders for me to halt, as Beejar Khan had given himself up and the war was at an end. I asked them if they had brought me a letter from Sir Charles: this did not disconcert them in the least, and they at once replied that they had been sent on ahead, to give me the intelligence, and that others were following with the letter. Their story was so plausibly told, that I must confess I thought there was truth in it; but at the same time I was too old a soldier to halt without written instructions to do so, after I had received Sir Charles's positive orders to blockade the rear of Trukkee as soon as possible: I therefore told the three horsemen to go on to Ali Moorad, and I would continue my march till the letter came from Sir Charles. On joining Ali Moorad next day I mentioned the circumstance to him, when he immediately declared they must have been a party of the enemy who had tried to deceive me, as none of his men had come up with any message to him from the rear.

I must here mention that the only distinguishing mark between Ali Moorad's men and those of the enemy was that the former wore red turbans, and the latter white, or green:—the Beloochees were too knowing not to take advantage of this; so the three who professed to bring me the orders to halt, had donned red turbans for the occasion, thus the disguise was complete as to dress; and I must confess the ruse was well planned and skilfully carried out. Talleyrand could not have kept his countenance better, or told his story more plausibly than the Beloochees did. The instructions I got from Sir Charles Napier were, on getting to the north of Trukkee, to blockade the pass but not to attack the enemy without orders, and to report to his excellency every day. I did write and send off my reports every day; but I am inclined to believe that Ali Moorad played me false and did not forward my reports to Sir Charles, and I was obliged to trust to Ali Moorad to do so, as my men were totally unacquainted with the country. After I had been several days in rear of Trukkee I sent a European officer with an escort, and a letter to Sir Charles, and I have reason to believe that was the first he received since I left Goojroo. I was subsequently confirmed in the belief that Ali Moorad had not forwarded my letters.

After we had been some days in rear of Trukkee, I got impatient at seeing or hearing nothing of the enemy, and also at receiving no intelligence of what was going on with Sir Charles's force in front of Trukkee—I therefore determined to go some distance into Trukkee to reconnoitre. I told Ali Moorad of my intention, and moved off to the right into Trukkee at daybreak, leaving the ameer with his force at the mouth of the pass: to my astonishment on my return I found that Ali Moorad had moved off with his whole force to the left, out of sight, and left the principal pass into Trukkee, quite open: this was not only a strange kind of co-operation, but it also crippled my subsequent movements by obliging me to leave a part of my force to guard that pass which Ali Moorad's force had occupied. When I went into Trukkee the 8th

March to look out for some men I had seen on the hills to the right (supposed to be part of the enemy, which they turned out to be, and I believe Beejar Khan was with them) on a triangular table-land, it appeared from where we were, to us who were unacquainted with that difficult country, to be inaccessible; and so it was everywhere, excepting by foot-paths, by which only one man could ascend at a time—so that a few men at the top to roll down stones could have kept our army in check.

In an endeavour to turn this position to the right, in hopes of finding a way to get up on the other side, one of my flanking parties consisting of a few of those daring soldiers, the volunteers of her Majesty's 13th, ascended the apex of the triangle by a goat-path overhanging a tremendous precipice. The Beloochees had a breastwork on the table-land about twenty paces retired from the top of this path, behind which were concealed about seventy men, who overwhelmed the small party of Europeans as soon as they got to the top; first giving them a volley with their matchlocks, and then attacking them sword in hand, killing several and driving the others down the rock: the volunteers did all that men could do, and fought most gallantly; but seventy against ten! the former having all the advantage of position, while the latter were blown by the steep ascent and unexpected attack, were too great odds. One European drove his bayonet through the breast of a Belooch, but while so entangled, about a dozen swords flashed about his head, and he was of course cut to pieces:—the parties of volunteers under Lieutenant Barry and Lieutenant Darby, seeing their comrades engaged, immediately rushed to their assistance, but a deep chasm prevented their getting even to the bottom of the ascent; all they could do was to open a fire from the opposite side; but the distance was too great, the balls all falling short—their marks were afterwards seen on the rocks below the enemy's position.

The bravest of the brave could not have done more than these few men of her Majesty's volunteers—but they were

overwhelmed in a position where their comrades could give them no assistance—and even after I collected all my detached parties we could find no practicable way of getting at the enemy's position on the triangular table-land. We afterwards found there was a path on the opposite side, but our men being unacquainted with the country we did not discover the path till too late.

Early next morning I got a note from Captain Curling informing me that Beejar Khan had surrendered. I therefore suspended operations. I also got a letter from Colonel Frushard, mentioning that the enemy had agreed to surrender and that the war was at an end.

On rejoining Sir Charles Napier at Shahpoor, his excellency did me the honour to appoint me to the command of Shikarpoore and of the line of frontier outposts, as far as the Larkaana river to the south, and Shahpoor to the northward.

I was subsequently also appointed by Sir Charles Napier to be president of the military commission for the trial of all serious criminal cases at Shikarpoore, and on the frontier. The *Calcutta Review*, for September 1850, says, Major Jacob was left in command of the frontier. This is a mistake—Major Jacob did not succeed to the command of the frontier till 1846 after the Bundelcund Legion left it.

*Note.*—The position on which the Beloochees killed the men of the volunteers was such as the other men, who had been through the campaigns of Afghanistan, declared they had never seen anything at all to compare to in that country—"My eye what a place!" was their exclamation. It was an almost perpendicular rock to be ascended by a footpath, on which only one man could go up at a time—and supposing the enemy to let them get up unmolested to the top, there was not room for more than ten men to form in front of a breastwork capable of containing a hundred men, with the rear open and reinforcement constantly coming up from the base of the triangular table-land—besides which from the width of the ravine no musketry

fire was of any use in covering the advance of an attacking party, which would thus have had to ascend by single men as before described in the face of a strongly-posted enemy. This the Beloochees were no doubt well aware of, and seeing that the few men of the volunteers were separated from the rest of their party by one of those chasms so common in that country, they allowed them to ascend the precipice unopposed till they had got them on the top in front of their breastwork, where they expected them to be an easy prey, which they were not—for the Europeans fought like devils, and slew more than their own number of the Beloochees before they were overpowered.

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The gentlemen of the pipeclay school will probably ask why was this flanking party so far separated from the main column, and where were the connecting files! My answer is, You were never in Trukkee or you would not ask:—it is there quite impossible to keep either distances or communication. I have seen an officer, whom I knew to be a gallant fellow under the enemy's fire, lose his head on the ledge of a rock overhanging a precipice, so that several soldiers were obliged to help him across. I have seen others caught by the feet between two rocks, and several men required to extricate them, with the loss of their shoes:—if this will not explain to the martinet why distances and communication were not kept, I have nothing left for it but to recommend him to "try Trukkee."

In 1846 came the first Punjaub war; and there never would have been a second had Sir Charles Napier's plan of operations been carried out:—that it would have been carried out successfully, it is only necessary to mention that Sir Charles himself would have taken command of the force to march to Deyrah Ghazee Khan and thence to Mooltan. Such a move would have as effectually settled the Punjaub in 1846 as Scinde was settled by the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad.

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## XX.

The following letters properly belong to the History of the Conquest of Scinde, but having been obtained since the publication of that work, are inserted here.

The question as to whether Roostum's cession was, or was not voluntary, has been decided by the annexed letter from that ameer, written to his son at the time, but only produced in 1850 in consequence of an official inquiry instituted as to Ali Moorad's conduct: it disposes completely and peremptorily of all the falsehoods published on the subject by the ameers and by their English coadjutors and bewailers.

*Meer Roostum Khan to his Son Meer Mahomed Hussain.*

Dated 17th Zekaght, 1258,—20th Dec., A.D. 1842.

[After compliments.] According to the written directions of the general (Sir C. Napier) I came with Meer Ali Morad to Dejee Kagote. The meer above mentioned said to me, "Give me the Puggree and your lands, and I will arrange matters with the British." *By the persuasion of this Ali Morad Khan, I ceded my lands to him, but your lands, or your brother's, or those of the sons of Meer Mobarick Khan, I have not ceded to him: nor have I ceded the districts north of Roree.* An agreement to the effect that he will not interfere with those lands, I got in the handwriting of Peer Ally Gohur and sealed by Meer Ali Morad, a copy of which I send with this letter for you to read.

Remain in contentment on your lands, for your districts, those of your brothers, or of the heirs of Meer Mobarick Khan (according to the agreement I formerly wrote for you) will remain as was written then, and Meer Ali Morad cannot interfere in this matter.

Dey Kingree and Badshapore I have given to Peer Ally Gohur in perpetuity; it is for you also to agree to it. My

expenses and those of my household are to be defrayed by Meer Ali Morad.

(True translation.)

(Signed) JN. YOUNGHUSBAND,  
Lieutenant of Scinde Police.

*Sukkur, 4th May, 1850.*

The letter of which the above is a translation was given to me by Meer Mahomed Hussain.\* It bears the seal of Meer Roostum.

(Signed) JN. YOUNGHUSBAND.

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*Letter from Sir C. Napier to Sir Jasper Nicholls, Commander-in-Chief, in reply to the latter's Censures on the Conduct of the Operations in Scinde.*

25th June, 1843.

I have just had the honour to receive your excellency's note of the 9th of March, in which you observe, "*But I see you made that an arduous struggle, which might have been an easy success had you detained the 41st regiment and some part of Colonel Wallace's detachment.*"

This is a serious charge against me. Whether you will think it justly grounded, or not, when you hear my defence, I cannot say; but you will I am sure excuse my desire to stand higher in your opinion as an officer than I appear to do.

To begin with the 41st. Versed as your excellency is in Indian warfare, I need not tell you that a European regiment cannot march, especially in hot weather, without "*carriage.*" The 41st had *none.* They were on the Indus in boats. I *had* not and could not obtain sufficient "*carriage*" for the force I had with me; much less could I assist the 41st. The want of carriage obliged me to leave the 8th native infantry at Roree. The 41st must have joined me, if they could have joined me at all, without carriage for sick; for ammunition; for water; for tents; for provisions. How could they have joined me? Impossible!

\* The son of Meer Roostum.

But this was not all, though sufficient. Up to the 15th the amcers of Hyderabad had loudly declared their perfect submission to the will of the British government—they disclaimed all union with the amcers of Kyrepore. The latter had not an army that my force was not fully equal to cope with; and the governor-general and the government of Bombay had *reiterated* their positive orders to me to have the 41st ready to embark at Kurrachee on the 20th of February. I knew the cause of their anxiety, and that it was very important the 41st should embark the 20th. Was it for me in January, when all the amcers had declared their acceptance of the new treaty, to write to Sukkur in the face of superior authority and order the 41st to halt? Not to join my force, for that was impossible, but to halt! I suspect the governor-general and the government of Bombay would not have been much satisfied with my conduct had I done so. The 41st therefore arrived at Sukkur on the 4th of February and found orders instantly to proceed on its voyage, and it passed Hyderabad the 10th February, five days before the amcers declared war, and when Major Outram, an accredited agent of mine, was by their own invitation living in their capital, and assuring me of their earnest desire for peace—he being the person *supposed* to know more of Scinde than other Englishmen, and more of the amcers individually and personally.

On the day of the action the 41st were at Kurrachee. I being inland and my letters constantly intercepted could not know where the 41st was, except that it was somewhere on the Indus, that is *somewhere or other on a range of three hundred miles!* I did not hear of its arrival at Sukkur till it was past my reach had I supposed it was required, which I did not, how could I suppose so? By reference to my journal I find that on the 13th February, being then at Syndabad, I received no less than two expresses from Major Outram to say and impress upon me that there were "*no armed men at Hyderabad!!!*" At that moment however the town was *full*, and 25,862 men were in position at Meeanee, six miles off! short



miles, for the battle was seen from the walls. I think after the above statement your excellency will acquit me of having had the power to reinforce my army with the 41st regiment; but this and more shall become public if any inquiry be necessary.

Now for the second part of your excellency's charge, viz. that I might have *had an easy success, had some part of Colonel Wallace's detachment been with me.*

In the first place the whole brigade under Colonel Wallace, as far as I recollect, and my memory is tolerably strong, could not turn out fifteen hundred rank-and-file: it must therefore have been a *large* portion to have made the battle of Meeanee an *easy success*. However, say I had five hundred; assuredly that number would not have changed the character of the engagement. It would have brought a larger force of the enemy into action very possibly, and consequently both their loss and ours would have been greater in that proportion; but the action would not have been an "easy success." No! nor an *easier* success. But what excuse had I to weaken Wallace, who was apparently, at the time we divided, in more danger than I was? He was about to seize an extensive district, and if any resistance were to be made assuredly *there* it might have been expected.

Supposing me to have made the military error of sending a feeble force to execute what was expected to be a perilous operation, and that I had brought a thousand men down with me to the south, what would have been the result? Water was everywhere scarce, and oftentimes I had scarcely sufficient for the small force with me. Had I had the Bengal column *also*, or a large portion of it, I must have marched in two columns, with the interval of a day between them to let the wells fill after being emptied by the first column. The result would have been, that I should have been unable to have given battle till the 19th of February, before which 10,000 Chandians under Wullee Chandia—7,000 under Meer Mohamed Hussain and 10,000 under Shere Mohamed would have joined the troops at Meeanee! When the

victory was decided all these were within six or eight hours of the field of battle—an additional 1,000 on my side, an additional 27,000 on that of the enemy would not have rendered my success more “*easy*.”

Your excellency will say that these things were not known to me at Roree when I first marched south. *All* were not, but *enough* were ; 1°. I knew there was a great want of water. 2°. I knew I could carry spare provisions with me if the country refused supplies, but I should not have had carriage for this if the Bengal column was with me. The *additional* baggage would have been nearly as large as our own baggage, and all the wells would have been drunk dry. The Bengals had carriage for their baggage, but not for additional water and spare provisions independent of wells and of their bazaar.

Suppose I could have conveniently brought down the Bengal troops, and left the north unguarded. Still men are not prophets. The ameers of *Hyderabad were at peace with us*—I was marching against those of *Kyrepore*. The latter had not 10,000 men, I wanted no increase of numbers to encounter them ; nor did any man believe they intended to fight : nor the ameers of Hyderabad neither. Even on the 12th of February, Major Outram, then in Hyderabad, wrote me two letters assuring me the ameers of Kyrepore and Hyderabad had *not a single soldier*. So little did he then even apprehend hostilities.

The Belooch army suddenly assembled, as if by magic ! I saw nothing but disgrace and destruction in an attempt to retreat, and I at once resolved to attack, confident in the courage of the soldiers. My confidence was not misplaced ; neither will it now I hope, when I trust this letter will satisfy you that I brought every man into action that was at my disposal.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Lieutenant-General Sir JASPER NICHOLLS,  
Commander-in-Chief.

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Migrants







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H.C. 20-7-50





